Lord Howard of Rising
Main Page: Lord Howard of Rising (Conservative - Life peer)My Lords, in moving Amendment 8, I shall speak also to Amendments 19 and 20. Before so doing, I declare interests both as a farmer and a supplier to supermarkets. I still cannot get my mind around why there should have been a change from the original drafting of the Bill, which limited complaints to those directly concerned in a transaction. My amendment seeks to do so, so that only those concerned with the business could complain. I can only think that the people who changed this have absolutely no connection with reality or commerce because there is bound to be some form of malicious or frivolous complaint. Anybody who doubts that has only to look at the world around us, where they cannot even fix LIBOR without doing it how it should not be done.
With something that is so open to abuse, it is only right that there has to be some form of corrective mechanism. Indeed, in the Bill there is the ability for the arbitrator to ask for costs from those who put in malicious complaints. Amendment 19 obliges the arbitrator to seek costs. He does not have to seek all of his costs, it is discretionary. Nevertheless, it would act as a deterrent to those who wish to behave badly if it was a certainty that they would have to pay for it. Amendment 20 emphasises that deterrent by asking the adjudicator to include actions that he takes so that it can be seen that he is dealing with those who make irresponsible complaints. This is a very important and necessary amendment to the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, the problem with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, is that when we drill down, the real reason why the previous regime did not work is because a lot of farmers are very nervous and want to preserve their anonymity. That is why the regime, which I know the noble Lords, Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Borrie, and the noble Viscount, rather wish had been maintained, did not actually work in practice. Farmers were afraid that were they to complain and lose their anonymity, they would be victimised by the 10 major supermarkets. That is the reason we want to have this Bill. The amendment would go to the heart of the Bill and that is why it should be rejected.
My Lords, the question of who should be able to complain to the adjudicator has been discussed extensively: in consultation, at pre-legislative scrutiny, at Second Reading and in Committee. Along with most noble Lords who have spoken on this issue, the Government consider that the adjudicator should be able to consider evidence from any relevant source when deciding whether to commence an investigation.
The ability of the adjudicator to consider evidence from any source has been described by supplier groups as essential to the adjudicator’s operation. Furthermore, it simply makes sense. If the adjudicator has reasonable grounds to suspect a breach of the code, he or she should be able to initiate an investigation, no matter where the information came from.
My noble friend Lord Howard of Rising has explained that his concerns are motivated in part by the possibility of vexatious or malicious complaints and that is the issue behind Amendments 19 and 20. The Government certainly have some sympathy with this concern. No one wants to see the adjudicator’s time wasted or businesses put under a burden due to vexatious complaints. However, it is important that in the wording used we take into account what is customary as well as the need not to scare off legitimate complainants. As I said in Committee, this is intended to be a strong test directed at irresponsible complaints rather than simply erroneous or weak ones. I note also that the discretionary power to recover costs currently applies to the recovery of costs from both retailers and complainants. There seem to be few grounds for strengthening the requirement on one side without similarly strengthening it on the other. In either case the Government consider that the discretion provided by the word “may” allows the adjudicator to treat each case on its merits. The Government therefore consider that the Bill as it stands provides a necessary deterrent against vexatious complaints. The adjudicator can consider imposing costs on a complainant whose complaint is vexatious or wholly without merit but we do not think it should be mandatory or near-mandatory.
Regarding the amendment to produce an additional annual report, that would be an unnecessarily burdensome piece of bureaucracy. In paragraph 15 of Schedule 1 the adjudicator is already required to keep proper accounts and prepare a statement of accounts each year. These accounts would need to include any costs recovered from retailers or complainants. The application of the power to recover costs could be included in the annual report prepared under Clause 14. I therefore ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.
I thank the Minister for her remarks and all other noble Lords who have spoken. I just want to point out that it is normal that there is an imbalance between the person paying and the person receiving the money. Why there should be protection in this case I do not know, even though it would be to my own personal benefit. Amendments 19 and 20 come into effect only if the system of complaints is being abused. I cannot see that charging those who have committed the abuse for the cost they have incurred can in any way be unfair. Indeed, it is unfair the other way because it is the people about whom they are complaining who have to pay all the costs. That said, I will not pursue the matter further and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 11, which is grouped with Amendment 10, the sensible amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Browne. This amendment would seek the inclusion of comments made by the retailer to the adjudicator, and it seems to me only reasonable that both sides of the argument are included where a report is issued. The industry is particularly sensitive to public reputation and it would be unfair if it was not allowed to make its case at the same time as being criticised.
My Lords, I do not wish to repeat the arguments made in Committee but I support these two amendments.
The person is not necessarily unidentified; that depends on the supplier. I know that those arguments were made in Committee and I accept that it would not be for the adjudicator to impose compensation or the level of it themselves. However, it ought to be open to the adjudicator to be able to say, “It looks as if a supplier or a number of suppliers have been disadvantaged by this practice and the issue should be referred, effectively, to the courts”. That could be part of the recommendatory powers. That is not the central issue on this group of amendments, though; they are really to remove the constraints on the Secretary of State and allow the adjudicator to have a whole range of potential financial sanctions.
My Lords, contrary to what has been said by some this afternoon, naming and shaming is a genuine deterrent. In a cut-throat, highly competitive business such as this—reading the results of supermarket chains shows how very quickly they can go downhill from having made substantial profits—naming and shaming is a real deterrent. I also hope that the Minister will remember that the only person who actually pays those fines in the end is the consumer.
Both this amendment and Amendment 14 deal with appeals. The Minister was gracious enough in Committee to say that she would look at this and she produced a forceful argument in a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, pointing out the benefits of appealing to the High Court rather than to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. If one accepts her arguments, that still leaves open the question of the ability to appeal. If there is a financial penalty, it is all right to appeal. If there is a recommendation, there is no need to appeal. That leaves publishing information where the only remedy is a judicial review, which seems cumbersome, expensive and would involve delay, which, from debates in Committee, I know that the Minister thinks is unacceptable and undesirable. It would be only fair to have the right of appeal against naming and shaming, which, after all, can be more expensive to a supermarket than a financial penalty. That is to say, the damage to reputation can be considerably greater than a fine. If one is allowed to appeal on a financial penalty, there should surely be a right to appeal on something which could be an even greater punishment and more expensive. I beg to move.
My Lords, I can assure you that my noble friend Lord Howard really is a noble friend, although in this respect we disagree on the way forward. His amendment suggests that enforcement measures taken by an adjudicator, including naming and shaming, will be subject to the right to appeal to an appeals tribunal. This would surely lead to sclerosis of the adjudicator’s operations and the appeal could become bogged down in an attempt to enforce the groceries code. As we have already heard in the debate so far, there are avenues for retailers if they believe a decision is unfair, such as judicial review. This is the case with the Food Standards Agency. It could refuse to take remedial action, and a Competition Appeal Tribunal is available for making those decisions, such as with the OFT or the commission. I said earlier and I repeat: the adjudicator will not make competition decisions. The job is to investigate whether the groceries code is coupled with fair play in the marketplace. I therefore do not support this amendment.
My Lords, the question of appeals is important and I can fully understand the desire of my noble friends Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Eccles to return to it at this stage of the Bill. However, although we have considered the matter carefully, the Government’s position remains unchanged.
Financial penalties clearly deserve a full merits right of appeal and the Bill provides for this. However, the other sanctions, including the requirement to publish information, have no direct legal consequence against a retailer. A recommendation is just that and is not binding, and a requirement to publish is essentially simply about distributing and sharing information which will, in all likelihood, be in the adjudicator’s investigation report. For this reason, therefore, judicial review is sufficient.
Although a judicial review will not normally involve a reconsideration of all the factual evidence, it could consider whether the adjudicator had reached a decision which was not supported by the facts, or had taken into account irrelevant facts or had failed to take account of relevant facts. I draw a comparison with the Financial Services Authority. Under the terms of the Financial Services Bill currently proceeding through this House, the FSA—or, in future, the Financial Conduct Authority—may issue public warning notices about a specific firm. Before making such a notice, it must give the firm the opportunity to comment, but there is no right of appeal before publication. Issuing a public warning notice in this way is, given the potential impact on reputation of the financial services firm in question, similar in consequence to our requirement to publish information which also has the benefit of warning those who deal with a retailer that they have been found in breach of the code. The requirement to give the firm the opportunity to comment is similar to that provided in Clause 5(4) of this Bill. This is similar to what the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, has also said on this point.
Furthermore, as I said in Committee, a full right of appeal, requiring the repetition of a detailed fact-finding exercise, could seriously delay the requirement to publish and so substantially diminish its impact. In particular, we expect a full merits appeal of this kind normally to take significantly more time than a judicial review because it involves a reconsideration of all the facts. Taking these matters into account, the Government consider that a full right of appeal is needed only against financial penalties, and that otherwise the possibility of judicial review by the court would be sufficient.
On whether appeals should be in the CAT or the High Court, this is a finely balanced question and I have written to Peers on this matter already. We do not think it would be wrong for either the CAT or the High Court to hear such appeals, nor do we think there is likely to be a significant difference in speed. However, on consideration, we do not think using the CAT would make the best use of its expertise, which is, of course, in competition matters. This is because, although introduced on competition grounds, the context of the adjudicator’s functions concerns contractual and commercial relationships between retailers and suppliers. The expertise needed to address these practices can be found in the High Court, or the Court of Session in Scotland. We do not think that the particular specialist expertise of the CAT is needed in order to consider the adjudicator’s decisions.
A further practical issue is whether, if the CAT were to hear appeals against financial penalties, appeals against costs or judicial reviews of all decisions of the adjudicator were also to be referred to the CAT. To the extent any appeals or reviews remained in the High Court, one could see two separate appeals or reviews on related subjects being taken forward in different fora at the same time. On the other hand, if they all took place in the CAT, this could lead to the CAT making rulings on matters even further from its core competition remit. That is a difficulty which is avoided by the Bill as we have it now. Therefore, in conclusion, we consider that appeals should most appropriately be to the High Court. I therefore ask the noble Lords to consider withdrawing their amendments.
I thank the Minister for her remarks. I accept that the High Court would be as good a place as the Competition Appeal Tribunal. However, if an appeal is acceptable for a financial penalty, surely an appeal should also be acceptable for naming and shaming. It seems to me that fair play is the objective of this Bill, so surely there should be fair play in the application of the code by the adjudicator. Fair play surely would mean the right of appeal if someone thinks that the adjudicator has got it wrong.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for his support and I endorse his comment that, if there is to be no right of appeal, there should be an opportunity for the retailers’ arguments to be included with any report produced by the adjudicator. Having made those points, to which I hope that the Minister will listen, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this group of amendments is aimed at making it compulsory for the adjudicator to give advice to those seeking it from him. At the moment, there is no obligation. There is a strong argument that he should give advice. The opposing argument has been that he might get involved in frivolous requests if it is compulsory, and that that would mean unnecessary expense. A solution to that would be to make it compulsory to give advice to the large retailers which have to live by this code. They pay his expenses, so they are unlikely to incur unnecessary expense. Perhaps the Minister will consider this point and come back to us at Third Reading. I beg to move.
My Lords, I intervened briefly in Grand Committee to support my noble friend on part of the amendments in this group. I think that he has already implied the following point in what he said. Clause 12(3) states:
“The Adjudicator may publish guidance about … steps that large retailers need to take in order to comply with the Groceries Code”.
I believe that the adjudicator must give such guidance; otherwise the position would be nonsensical. In Committee I gave the possible example of my local authority publishing a parking order but not putting up signs to say during which hours the parking scheme would operate and with people having to apply to find out that information.
With respect to my noble friend, I think that his amendments are probably rather widely drafted. Looking at the phrase, “may publish guidance about any other matter relating to the groceries code”, I can understand why my noble friend on the Front Bench might want to resist it. However, it might be a fruitful course, between now and Third Reading, if the Government thought about the more confined area to which my noble friend referred. It would seem to offend against natural justice not to tell people the steps they must take to comply with a code which could lead to their being fined, named and shamed or whatever. I hope the Minister will consider that specific point which arises from my noble friend’s Amendment 22 in this group.
My Lords, I have sympathy for the spirit of all three amendments. On Amendments 21 and 22, we certainly consider that an important role of the adjudicator will be to provide advice and guidance. That is why we have included these clauses. It is clearly better if the adjudicator can encourage compliance with the code through light-touch means, such as advice, rather than by enforcing it after a breach has been committed through sanctions. However, as I think my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising would concede, we cannot make these provisions mandatory. The adjudicator must be able to prioritise his or her workload and cannot be required to give advice in all circumstances to any of the 10 retailers or thousands of suppliers who might have a question. Even limiting the “must” to the retailers, could be open to abuse by one retailer at the expense of others.
I ask noble Lords to keep in mind here that the adjudicator will be a public authority and will be required to act reasonably in responding to requests for advice. In that context, some discretion for the adjudicator is appropriate. Equally, while guidance is crucial, I would emphasise that the adjudicator is already required under Clause 12(1), to publish guidance about how he or she will carry out his or her core operations. It would not be meaningful to have a mandatory requirement for the adjudicator to publish guidance on “any other matter relating to the groceries code”. Again, there has to be some flexibility for the adjudicator.
On the other hand, the Government certainly consider that the adjudicator would normally answer reasonable requests, and should normally provide advice where this would aid in the core objective of encouraging compliance with the code. Similarly, sufficient guidance should be provided to ensure that retailers and suppliers have the clarity they need to interact effectively with the adjudicator. This is similar to the expectation that we would have of a local authority. If the adjudicator was not acting appropriately in giving advice and guidance, I am sure that the Secretary of State would take steps to remedy this by issuing guidance to the adjudicator under Clause 15(8). The adjudicator has a statutory obligation to take account of such guidance in carrying out his or her functions, which I hope offers some reassurance to my noble friend Lord Howard.
On Amendment 24, although again I can sympathise with the principle behind the amendment, I do not consider it necessary. This is because the Bill, in Clause 12(4), already requires the adjudicator to consult any persons whom he or she thinks appropriate before publishing guidance. In the vast majority of circumstances this would include the retailers. In the unlikely event that the adjudicator did not consult the retailers before publishing guidance, in a case where it was clear that he or she should have done so, there would be the possibility of judicial review. The adjudicator will be very aware of this, meaning that Amendment 24 is not necessary. I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her remarks, disappointing as they are. Of course, the point is that it is always the adjudicator who chooses what advice to give whereas there may be some area that is in doubt which the large retailers would like to know about. Perhaps they will be comforted by the Minister’s remarks, and by the fact that any future Secretary of State will be able to read in Hansard what is expected and call the adjudicator to order. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I have taken the unusual step of tabling an amendment to transpose two clauses—the effect of which I will come to shortly—to draw the attention of the House to a point that I was not able to raise at Second Reading because I was on local authority business. It was discussed briefly in Grand Committee, but proceedings were curtailed. I do not intend to detain the House long on the matter, but it gives rise to important issues.
I refer to the manner of writing sub-headings in italics, “How does the Adjudicator arbitrate disputes? … How does the Adjudicator carry out investigations?”,
and so on. This is a new way of writing Bills which is reminiscent of the “frequently asked questions” pages on government websites. I tried to use one such page on the HMRC site the other day and was very glad after 10 minutes of struggling to get through to a nice lady who was able to help me.
I was told, first, that there was no discussion with the House about the new way of writing Bill sub-headings. When I asked the House authorities, they said that it had not been discussed and, since the drafting of the Bill was the responsibility of the noble Lord in charge—in this case, a Minister of the Crown—it would not fall within the terms of reference of the Procedure Committee of your Lordships’ House. The Public Bill Office confirmed that it was not possible to amend such sub-headings. My noble friend circulated a very helpful note to noble Lords demonstrating that the Government can contrive to amend the sub-headings in response to issues that are raised in Parliament. That is by grace and favour of the Executive, not by the will or desire of Parliament.
I am suspicious of these sub-headings for several reasons. The first argument put to us is that they are in plain English. I do not think that many of them are. On page 2, line 3, the heading is, “How does the Adjudicator carry out investigations and enforce their findings?”. That is 11 words, whereas “Investigation and enforcement”—which was the old way of doing things and is what is meant—is three words. On line 11 of page 4, the heading is, “What advice, guidance and recommendations does the Adjudicator give?”. That is nine words. Once the sub-heading would have been, “Advice and guidance”. That would be plain English. There are many other examples in the Bill, but I will not take the House through them.
Once we start changing the way in which legislation is written, whatever our good intentions there is the risk, in an area where Parliament has little direct control, that we will tend towards more descriptive writing. Noble Lords will remember that in the late 1990s we had rather more exciting titles to legislation, with “stakeholders” starting to appear in the gracious Speech. There is a risk that value judgments could interpose.
If the sub-headings are intended to be plain English traffic lights or signals to help the public find key matters in Bills, Parliament ought to have some responsibility for them. In Committee, I gave the example of the sub-heading, “How is the Adjudicator supervised?”, which covers the issue of abolition that noble Lords have just discussed. If you are slipping through these sub-headings, you would not find it. Who decides to highlight these things? There are clear difficulties.
Before Clause 14 there is the sub-heading, “What are the Adjudicator’s reporting requirements?”. Again, if a member of the public were accessing the Bill by means of these signposts, they would go to the sub-heading, but the text covers only Clause 14, which concerns the annual report that the adjudicator must publish. However, there are many other reporting requirements on the adjudicator in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, won a victory in respect of one of the reports that the adjudicator has to present. The sub-heading goes much wider than the subject of the annual report covered in Clause 14. A real plain English heading for Clause 14 would be the good old, “Annual report”. Why not choose that? Why have this new and potentially misleading wording? I realise that these matters may be beyond my noble friend the Minister, who has been incredibly helpful in responding to them, so I hope that the powers-that-be will think again about the misleading effect that some of these sub-headings might have, or the incomplete information that might be given.
I will not repeat the arguments I gave in Committee about logical inconsistency. I understand that my noble friend has responded positively in relation to the sub-heading on line 1 of page 9: “Will this law mean other changes to the law?”. This is logical nonsense. When the Act comes into effect, the amendments to other legislation will already be law, so the sub-heading is totally illogical. I understand from my noble friend that it is proposed to rethink that. In Committee we discussed the sub-heading on line 3 of page 8: “How is the Adjudicator funded?”. However, the clauses covered, Clause 19 and 20, both speak in terms of how the adjudicator “may” be funded; for example:
“The Adjudicator may require … a levy”,
or:
“The Secretary of State may make grants”.
The new-style sub-heading is illogical because it uses “is” and gets into “may”/“must” arguments.
I agree with the Government that we should keep the law as plain as possible, using short, simple English. The more words you use, the more risk there is of inconsistency. The confusion that can be caused by the placing of headings is illustrated by my amendment, which proposes that Clause 17 should be moved to below Clause 18 because both clauses relate to the handling of information by the adjudicator and the sub-heading is: “How does the Adjudicator handle information?”. I understand that my noble friend has an answer to that.
I will bring my remarks to a conclusion, but we seem to be straying into unnecessary territory. If the Government—the masters of plain English—wish to give the public new signposts to find their way around legislation, let us not complicate the face of legislation; why not have a separate, short document, which may be available electronically? If people wanted to find out what the adjudicator’s reporting requirements were, you could have brief references to Clause 5, Clause 14 and so on, and people could be signposted around the Bill. The way it is done now just leads you to one clause, which gives an incomplete answer.
If this well meaning approach is intended to go forward, for it to be really accessible it should be done separately, not on the face of legislation. If Parliament is not going to be able to amend these sub-headings—and it never has been able to—we should leave the Bill absolutely simple, which would not risk any question of executive value judgments or misleading placement of sub-headings. The pursuit of plain English guidance could be done in a short companion to the legislation, if that is required. The more we go to electronic access to legislation, the more these kinds of sub-headings will become important.
I hope that my noble friend is going to give a favourable response on the sub-headings that will justify the points that I have made. Obviously I do not intend to press this matter to a Division but it affects both Houses of Parliament, and it is reasonable to bring it to the attention of Parliament, given that this is the first Bill in which this new manner of writing legislation has arisen. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support my noble friend. While he was speaking, I looked through these new italicised sub-headings and was rather entertained. The first one is “How does the Adjudicator arbitrate disputes?”, and the next word down is “Arbitration”. The second sub-heading is “How does the Adjudicator carry out investigations and enforce their findings?”, and the next word down is “Investigations”. The third sub-heading is “What advice, guidance and recommendations does the Adjudicator give?”, and the next word down is “Advice”. Surely if anything is superfluous, these things are.
My Lords, the amendment would allow large retailers to be consulted when the levy is set. It seems only reasonable, if they are paying the bill, for them to have some voice. The amendment would not oblige the adjudicator to listen to them, but they may make some points which are worth while and even suggest that he take more money than he is asking—who knows?
I also have Amendment 41 in this group. While I accepted the points that the Minister made in Committee about not wanting to create bureaucracy and making sure things were easily handled, I suggested before I withdrew the amendment that any surplus funds at the end of one year should be used in the next year. I think that this might be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government and would be grateful if the Minister could confirm it.
My Lords, the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Howard of Rising and Lord Eccles are ones that we have discussed before. As I said in Committee, the Government’s intention to fund the adjudicator via a levy is clearly set out in the Bill and in previous policy statements, so I see no need to require an order to be made first.
Regarding the suggestion of consultation on any increase of the levy, my worry is that this would add unnecessary bureaucracy and inflexibility. The adjudicator’s workload will vary depending on the number of complaints received. In some years, it may have very few, in which case the levy needed would be small. In other years, it may carry out major investigations requiring considerable resources, and I remain convinced that the safeguard of requiring the Secretary of State’s approval is the best way to balance flexibility and accountability.
On the subject of flexibility, my noble friends have also tabled an amendment regarding the returning of any unused funds to the retailers. While I believe that “may” adds helpful flexibility, I can assure them that any unused funds would certainly be taken into account when calculating the size of the next levy, so that no more was raised from the retailers than was absolutely necessary. I would therefore ask the noble Lords to withdraw those amendments.
With regards to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Razzall and Lord Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, in Committee, I indicated that the Government were sympathetic to an amendment along these lines. The Government have always stated that the intention should be that as soon as he or she has sufficient experience, the adjudicator should move to a differential levy. After consideration, it therefore seemed unnecessarily bureaucratic to require an order to be passed before this could be done and I am grateful to the noble Lords for bringing forward this amendment.
The fact that individual levies would still need to be approved by the Secretary of State will provide an adequate safeguard against abuse. Furthermore, the ways in which the levy can be raised are clearly specified. The levy must be the same for each retailer or else based on criteria broadly intended to reflect the expense and time the adjudicator expects to spend in dealing with matters relating to each retailer. It could not, for example, be proportional to turnover as that would not fit these specifications.
Noble Lords have said that they wish to see a system in which those who behave badly pay more. The Government concur with this sentiment and I am therefore happy to accept this amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend for indicating that the surplus in one year would be set off against the next year. I am completely gobsmacked at getting some support from the noble Lord, Lord Knight. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.