(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when I spoke on this matter on Report, having tabled an amendment which dealt with the issue in slightly different terms from those proposed by Amendments 1 and 2 on the Marshalled List, I said that I would come back to the issue at Third Reading. But, on consideration of the various rules and practices, I decided not to renew my amendment in recognition of the fact that it would not be proper to bring it forward in those terms.
I am grateful to the Minister for the statement he has made, which goes a little way to addressing the problem. But I feel very strongly that this is an example of a missed opportunity, which could have been taken to clarify exactly what the Sewel convention is, to remove some of the problems to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred, and to deal with the complications raised by the use of the word “normally”.
As I stressed on Report, my concern was to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament, which the Minister mentioned in his brief address. The problem with the method he has chosen is that it opens up the possibility of a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament, which is the greatest danger of all, because it puts at risk the enforceability of legislation where the spectre, if I should put it this way, of the Sewel convention may be hanging over it. I understand that the Minister has gone as far as he believes he can—but, like others, I regret that he was not able to go further.
My Lords, it seems that the Government had an important decision to make on this issue. Did they want the Sewel convention, or the legislative consent convention as it has now become known, at least in the Scottish Parliament, to continue as a convention or did they want to convert it into statute? In truth, the answer is that they are making a mess of that decision. In a sense they are trying to do both, and in doing so they are creating bad legislation. They are continuing the convention—we have been told that and I certainly hope that that is the case. I hope that all legs and all elements of the convention will continue to be operated between the Scottish Parliament and the UK Parliament, the Scottish Government and the UK Government. But the Government have decided to take one rather limited and narrow—although, I accept, important—part of the convention into statute, and to do so in as limited and as loosely worded a way as possible, with words such as “normally” and with new expressions such as “devolved matters” that have not previously been used or defined in statute.
I now believe that the use of these words and the introduction of this vagueness has been quite deliberate on the part of the Government, to make it as ill-defined and declaratory as they possibly can. Why are they doing that? They are doing it to technically comply with the Smith commission’s recommendations, but this is not in the spirit of the Smith commission and it is not being done in a clear, sensible or coherent way. In summary, it is not a good way to legislate. If the Government’s excuse is that this is what the Smith commission told them to do, frankly, that is not a good enough excuse, because they can depart from the Smith commission—they have done so on the issue of abortion, for example—and the Smith commission was not perfect in every respect. On this issue it referred to only part of the Sewel convention—a mistake that I think the commission would readily admit to.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI agree that there is an issue there. I wonder whether the discussions that will take place in coming weeks, and perhaps even months, behind closed doors between the Scottish Government and the UK Government would be greatly assisted if there was a clear statement on the record from the Scottish Parliament that it supported this legislation. While I believe that both Houses will eventually indicate their support for this legislation, it would be helpful to have that clear support on the record now.
A lot has been said today about the monolithic, unassailable sovereignty of the UK Parliament but I ask the Committee to consider this point: the UK Government have introduced a concept called English votes for English laws. Perhaps the Minister would care to comment on this: the Government are pursuing a course whereby legislation passed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons can be vetoed by a subset of the House of Commons, so this Government have already conceded the point of a limitation on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. If it is sauce for the English goose for elected English MPs to veto legislation for England on devolved matters, it must be sauce for the Scottish gander for properly and democratically elected Members of the Scottish Parliament to be able to veto Westminster legislation affecting Scotland on devolved matters.
My Lords, perhaps it would be helpful for me to speak to my Amendment 12, which in effect restates in combination the points just made in support of Amendments 11, 15 and 16. I will also refer to Amendment 20, which deals with a related issue.
I think I saw that the noble Lord, Lord Lang, was about to rise to his feet and the background to my Amendment 12 is paragraph 38 of the Constitution Committee’s report, which draws attention to problems with the Sewel convention as his committee saw them. One problem was the use of “normally”, which gives rise to doubt as to what exactly that means. There was also the need to clarify the reach of the convention, which was the point just made in support of Amendment 11 and its related amendments. My Amendment 12 puts together in a package the same point that was referred to on those other amendments.
Amendment 20, however, deals with an issue which is closely related to existing practice. It refers to a:
“Duty to consult the Scottish Government on Bills applying to Scotland”.
It says, shortly, that:
“A Minister of the Crown must not introduce a Bill into the Parliament of the United Kingdom … that would make provision applying to Scotland unless a Minister of the Crown has consulted the Scottish Ministers”.
It is intended to reflect what I understand to be the existing practice and to follow on the points made in relation to restating Clause 2 in appropriate statutory language.
I should make it clear, as I did earlier on this afternoon, that the amendments to which I am speaking are in words that were in effect provided for me by the Scottish Government because they were tabled in June this year, in advance of Committee in the House of Commons. But I restate that I do not speak to these amendments on behalf of anybody other than myself; I simply see them as sensible amendments which have merit on their own wording. It is with that in mind that I speak to these two amendments.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThis is one of a group of amendments running through to Amendment 40. Although Amendments 31 and 32 are not in my name, they duplicate ones that are.
This is another group of amendments that I have taken from the group proposed or suggested by the Scottish Ministers in June this year. The interesting feature of these amendments is that they were tabled on 15 June but were either not called or withdrawn. So they were never considered by the other House, and I thought it right to bring them back so that at least they could be considered in this place and not be lost sight of entirely. Their aim is simply to improve the working of Clause 11, which deals with the supermajority system in the event of certain measures coming before the Scottish Parliament. Reading between the lines, I think what has happened is that draftsmen in Edinburgh have worked through the clause, with their knowledge of how the Scottish Parliament works and in the light of provisions in the relevant parts of the Scotland Act 1998, and made suggestions as to how the clauses could be improved.
Because of the lateness of the hour, I do not want to go through the amendments in any detail. However, the first amendment alters the timing of the decision of the Presiding Officer from the decision that the Bill be passed to putting the Motion. There may be some merit in that alteration of timing. In Clause 11(5), two matters are inserted which are reproduced by Amendments 31 and 32, and which are sufficiently important to be included in the list of protected subject matters. I suggest that there is some merit in those. Clause 11(6) inserts passing without a Division as an event which should have the same status as the passing of a Bill by a two-thirds majority. It is conceivable that that could happen, and it is as well to provide for it. If passed without a Division, there would be a consensus that would meet the broad requirements for a supermajority, ensuring that the Presiding Officer would not have to go through the drill of making a statement in that situation as to whether the provision relates to a protected subject matter.
In Clause 11(10) two situations are inserted which, given what appears above, should not trigger a reference. Importantly, a provision is inserted that would enable the Parliament to take the matter back for further consideration, in which event consideration of the issue by the Supreme Court would not be necessary. That type of treatment is already to be found in Section 36 of the Scotland Act, which deals with stages of Bills. Section 36(4) provides that standing orders shall provide for an opportunity for the reconsideration of a Bill after its passing if the judicial committee decides that a provision would not be within legislative competence. The same mechanism is thought to be appropriate for the supermajority solution. All these amendments are very technical. I do not think there is any political angle to them. There is simply a desire to improve the working of the Bill and to make sure that this rather complicated provision, which I imagine will very rarely, if ever, be triggered, makes proper sense.
I shall make one brief final comment in relation to the position of the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Kelvin, in relation to this Bill. The noble and learned Lord said, if I understood him correctly, that he was of the view that the terms of the Bill meet the requirements of the Smith commission report. I happened to meet the noble Lord on Sunday, and he said that if that is the impression that Ministers have, he has been misunderstood. His attitude is the attitude of a lay man, and he says that, as far as he is concerned, he has not looked at the Bill from the point of view of a lawyer. If there are matters in which it could be improved, given study by lawyers and legislative draftsmen, he is all in favour of it because his aim is to have a Bill that is as good as possible. He authorised me to say that if Ministers doubt my word, they should speak to him directly. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Smith, if he were here, would object to these amendments, whatever he may say about the others.
I rise to speak to Amendments 31 and 34, which are in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness. This is back to the future, back to the debate we had just a few minutes ago about the extension of the length of the term of the Scottish Parliament. The issue is still grouped with these amendments, and our proposed approach is to include the extension of the term of the Parliament in the list of special majority or supermajority issues, except for what will be the second extension of the term of the Scottish Parliament, which the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, mentioned earlier. That is happening right here, right now because the proposal is for the term which ran from 2011 to 2016, a five-year term, to be followed by another five-year term from 2016 to 2021.
The Bill in the Scottish Parliament to achieve that extension was introduced on 17 November. It is called the Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill. We believe that to make it clear and to avoid any uncertainty or confusion, that Bill should be excluded from the requirement to have a special majority. Otherwise, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that this is an important issue. I think there could well be some sort of cap on the number of years for which you can extend. For example, extending by one year is perhaps the maximum that any of us would envisage, but if we have an extension of the term of the Parliament, it seems entirely appropriate that, alongside the other issues listed here, it should be by special majority of the Scottish Parliament.