National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed. Before speaking to them, I make a general observation which is applicable to nearly all the amendments we have put down for debate today.

Broadly, Part 1 of the Bill is aimed at updating and clarifying the law against espionage, sabotage and subversive behaviour which threatens the safety, security or defence of the United Kingdom. We and the whole House support that aim, which is clearly described in the Long Title: to

“Make provision about threats to national security from espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers.”


However, as I said at Second Reading, we on these Benches wish to ensure that the Bill sticks to that remit and is not so wide as to damage individual liberties which our security and defence services are there to protect.

The amendments in this group would ensure that guilt of the relevant offences could be established only on the basis of actual knowledge of essential facts, and not merely what is often called imputed knowledge. The Bill talks of what a person ought reasonably to know rather than what they might be deemed to know. However, we object to the addition of

“or ought reasonably to know”

after “know”.

I shall remind your Lordships briefly of the offences covered by these amendments and the sentences proposed for them. The offences in Clause 1, “Obtaining or disclosing protected information”, and Clause 12, “Sabotage”, both attract a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. All four offences in Clause 2, “Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets”, Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, Clause 4, “Entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, and Clause 15, “Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service”, attract a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. The offence in Clause 5, “Unauthorised entry etc to a prohibited place”, is in a different category because it is a summary offence, but, apart from that Clause 5 offence, all these offences are treated very seriously indeed.

Yet in order to be guilty of the offences, the defendant does not actually have to know essential facts. It is enough if they “ought” to know them. In Clause 1, the offence is committed if the person

“obtains, copies, records or retains protected information, or … discloses or provides access to protected information”.

Clause 1(b) provides that the person’s conduct has to be

“for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

In the next group, I will make the point that the interests of the United Kingdom concerned ought to be the “security or defence interests”, not just interests in general. But in this group, our point is that, in order to be guilty under this clause, the person should actually have to know that their conduct was for a purpose that was prejudicial to the UK. It should not be sufficient to constitute guilt that they merely “ought to have known” that, even if they did not. That is the point of our Amendment 1.

Another unsatisfactory feature of this and other clauses is that the clause presupposes an actual purpose—that purpose, presumably, being the reason for the defendant’s actions. It would be very odd if, the prosecution having established the purpose, the additional requirement of knowledge could be met not by showing that the defendant knew that that purpose, which was his or her own, was prejudicial to the national interest but merely that they “ought” to have known that.

Under Clause 2, which is the trade secrets offence, the defendant’s conduct, under the Bill, has to be “unauthorised”. However, as drafted, the defendant does not have to know that the conduct is unauthorised; it is enough if the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 7 would change that.

Under Clause 3, “Assisting a foreign intelligence service”, it should be required, we say, that to convict a person of this offence, they actually knew—the Bill says that they ought to have known that it was “reasonably possible”—that

“their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

not merely that they should have realised that the possibility existed. Amendment 14 would address this. We also say that the word “likely” would be more effective than the words “reasonably possible”, but that is addressed in a later group.

In Clause 4, the offence of entering a prohibited place suffers from the same inherent problem as the Clause 1 offence. The purpose has to be proved, but the defendant does not actually have to know that the purpose was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom; it is enough that they “ought reasonably” to have known. The clause heading, “Entering etc a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK”, highlights the illogicality. How can you have that purpose if you do not actually know that the purpose is prejudicial at all? Yet the clause as drafted says that you can; that should go, and our Amendment 17 would remove it.

Clause 5 is the summary offence of unauthorised entry to a prohibited place. Under the Bill, proof of actual knowledge of the lack of authorisation is unnecessary; again, merely the defendant “ought” to have known that. Our Amendment 22 addresses that.

Regarding Clause 12, the very serious sabotage offence, the same point applies to the purpose as in Clauses 1 and 4. Again, we say that guilt ought, crucially, to depend on actual knowledge that the purpose was prejudicial. Amendment 36 addresses that.

Amendments 46 and 48 make similar points about the defendant’s knowledge of the source of benefits provided by a foreign intelligence service. Amendment 65 would amend the application of the foreign power condition in Clause 29, which states that

“the person knows, or ought reasonably to know,”

that the conduct is carried out

“on behalf of a foreign power.”

The foreign power condition in the Bill is a very important condition for liability for a number of these offences. How can it possibly be just for the law to provide that the condition can be met if a person does not know that their conduct is carried out on behalf of a foreign power and naively does not catch on, just because it is later decided that even if they did not know at the time, they should have realised? Juries can, and frequently are asked to, come to a conclusion about what defendants know or knew or even what they believe or believed. Juries are good at determining actual states of mind, drawing conclusions from the evidence they hear and see.

To take a simple example, the Theft Act defines receiving stolen goods as:

“A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods”.


But here we are concerned with the proposal that juries should decide cases not on the basis of conclusions they reach about an actual state of knowledge or belief but on views they may take about what the defendant did not know but should have done. These are value judgments, not true decisions of fact.

We are not suggesting that imputed knowledge is never used in the criminal context, but where it is the context is very different. It is used, for example, for insider trading in Canada, where professional insiders receiving tips are able to be found guilty on conclusions that they ought to have drawn. It is used in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in respect of defendants who should have known their own conduct would amount to harassment. In the Official Secrets Act 1989 the reference is broadly to unlawful disclosures by Crown servants and contractors or others to whom confidential information was entrusted. They have a defence to unlawful disclosures if they show they did not know and had no reason to believe that the disclosures were unlawful. The burden of proof is reversed, I accept, but I suggest that is because of the positions the defendants hold or held. However, lack of knowledge or of the reason to believe in a state of fact amounts to a defence even then, so that liability is a long way from these cases because these provisions may catch anyone with no special relationship to the Government on an assessment that the defendant did not know the relevant facts but ought to have done so. Our position is that that is unjust. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I venture a few thoughts on this phraseology. The crucial question is: how much would the prosecutor have to prove about the state of knowledge of the defendant? In some contexts, when phraseology of this kind is used, it is necessary to show what the individual knew was the state of the law and what information that individual had at the relevant time from which a conclusion should be drawn.

The problem with the phraseology here is that it is so general that it is not clear whether the knowledge the individual had is to be the actual knowledge which that person had, which is one thing, or, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, imputed knowledge. If we are dealing with imputed knowledge, the situation becomes much more serious, particularly having regard to the fact that one is concerned with not just the safety of the United Kingdom but the interests of the United Kingdom, which itself is an unfortunately vague expression. I think it would help the Committee if the Minister would explain exactly what a prosecutor would be expected to have to prove in order to establish the offence.

Putting myself into my former position of prosecutor, I would find it quite troublesome to have to face up to proving not only what the individual knew about the law but what the individual knew about the facts. But it would be quite reasonable for me as a prosecutor to have to do that. To impute knowledge of facts to an individual with an offence as serious as this is to take the matter a long way from a reasonable punishment with the extreme penalties mentioned in this clause. It would be helpful if the Minister would explain exactly what would need to be proved in order to establish the offence so that the noble Lord and those supporting know exactly where they are.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I recommend that the noble and learned Lord refers to Treasury 2 because I made exactly the point that he was trying to make and I was overruled by the others. They said, “You can’t do that”, and they would not make the suspended order. We are in Committee and we cannot prolong the discussion, but that is the problem that I was faced with. I tried to do exactly what the noble and learned Lord suggested but I was overruled. That is the problem that I think the Government are trying to address; the Minister will correct me if I am wrong.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I enter this discussion with some trepidation. Nevertheless, it raises very important points of principle, which have been essentially analysed in the last few minutes and the last few exchanges. As we have heard, the effects of Amendments 1, 4 and 5, in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Ponsonby, would be to remove from the Bill the power to make a quashing order prospective only. That is the problem: it is prospective only. We are not arguing for the removal of the power to delay. I will come back to that in a moment, but I start from the position that I agree entirely with the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that a (1)(a) order could solve all the problems outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I venture to suggest that it is significant that when the committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, considered its recommendations for this type of order, it recommended only the power to delay, not the power to validate past unlawful action in the way that a quashing order made prospective only would do. Our amendments are premised on the proposition that, when the courts find that an Act, or a decision or regulation of any organ of government, is unlawful, it should not then be able to decide only to quash it with future effect. As the amendment’s explanatory statement puts it, and as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained, the proposed power would thereby validate

“what would otherwise be quashed as unlawful”,

and unlawful for all purposes. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, emphasised the provisions in proposed new Section 29A(4) and (5) for the all-embracing effect of a prospective-only quashing order.

New subsection (4) makes it absolutely clear that the impugned act—which is ex hypothesi an unlawful act because a quashing order is being made—is to be upheld in any respect in which the provision under new subsection (1)(b) prevents it being quashed. That has no flexibility. If the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—as well as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, as referred to in his speech—are seeking flexibility, a (1)(a) order is not the way to do it. Our Amendments 1 and 4 do not seek to debar a court on judicial review from permitting either officials to put right a decision taken unlawfully by remedying the unlawfulness or, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, Parliament to alter unlawful regulations without the need to wield the blunt instrument of a quashing order immediately.

We suggest that the power to suspend by delaying the quashing order eliminates that risk. It mitigates the risk that a quashing order would have the effect of indiscriminately overruling all government action, for example a regulation, without distinguishing between what was lawful, or ought to be lawful, and what was unlawful. We say that enabling a decision to take effect on a delayed basis would enable the law or the government action to be corrected so as to regularise the unlawful government action. So, the quashing order, if it took effect immediately, would be senseless, but it must stand once the delay is over, to deal with the past unlawfulness. It deals with the Ahmed point, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and it is a far cry from the courts permitting past unlawful action to go uncorrected.

The prospective-only quashing order power undermines the central principle on which judicial review jurisdiction is based: government action is required to be in accordance with law, and if it is not in accordance with law, it will be corrected. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, sensibly conceded in her speech that there may be conditions or limits but they can all be dealt with by the power to delay. A crucial point that a prospective-only order ignores is that “corrected” means corrected for everyone; that is, all litigants, future and potential, even those who have not yet brought cases.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the support that I have had for my Amendments 71 to 78 from Members of the House and for all the contributions to this important debate. I am also grateful to the Minister for his response. However, when one analyses it, what he was saying about discretion cannot survive a proper reading of what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. Certainly, it is the case that authorities have analysed exceptional circumstances, including the Court of Appeal authority of Nancarrow that he mentioned.

Nevertheless, the nub of it is that “exceptional circumstances” means circumstances that are very unusual, and what the Minister did not address was my point that there are many situations which in general experience are commonplace, and the circumstances are common- place, but where it would nevertheless be unjust—contrary both to the judges and to any normal sense of justice—to impose the minimum sentence. Because the circumstances are not exceptional, the judge would be bound to impose that sentence.

In answer to the points of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, of course it is the case that judges are daily addressed on the basis that they should take an exceptional course of leniency, and it is not surprising that, as a recorder, he has been asked to take that course many times. However, that does not mean that he has been asked to find that circumstances are exceptional. It is interesting that the test for the sentencing guidelines and departing from them is “contrary to the interests of justice”, and not a requirement that there should be exceptional circumstances.

On the matter of policy, I respectfully suggest that the answer to the Minister’s point was comprehensively expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He used the word “wise”. It may be that the Government are entitled to legislate in this way, but is it wise? The Minister said that there was a difference between “wise” and “constitutionally proper”. The point I am making is simply that, although it may be a matter of policy in the sense that the Government can have the policy and can legislate—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, Parliament can do what it likes—the question is: is it bad policy? We say that it is bad policy because it forces judges to do what they would not otherwise do, having regard to the interests of justice.

In respect of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, of course it is right that it may be easier to apply a test of exceptional circumstances, because the authorities are so clear, but the point about the interests of justice, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, picked up in Committee, is that sentencing decisions are difficult.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My point is that I would be drawn into arguments with myself about policy in deciding whether to do what Parliament has asked me to do. I am afraid that, as a judge, the constitutional position is that I have to accept what Parliament has laid down. I do not like minimum sentences; they are a very blunt instrument, and I can think of cases where I would not want to be driven down that road. But that is not my position as a judge. I have to follow what Parliament has said, but I have leeway with the phrase which has been inserted in the Bill. That is my point.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I understand that point. It is very rare that I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, but it is still the fact that what Parliament decides, judges must implement. If they decide that there is an exceptional circumstances test, that is far more limiting than an interests of justice test. That is my point and I will close on it—except to say that the default position under my amendment is to accept minimum sentences and simply to allow the judges to depart from those sentences where it is just to do so, having regard to all the circumstances. I do not believe that there has been any answer presented to that central position, on which I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I will simply respond to that, because in a sense it is an intervention on me. I accept that this is conditional in the sense that the noble Lord mentions. However, my fundamental point was that the importance of this aspect of no deal has been woefully underestimated in considering how dangerous the concept of no deal is. To that extent, I regard the points I have made in highlighting that danger as valid, because no deal is profoundly to be shunned.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In fairness there is an EU sub-committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I cannot remember which sub-committee it is.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Justice.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Thank you. The Justice Sub-Committee prepared a detailed report drawing attention to exactly what the noble Lord has referred to. There was an impassioned debate—I do not know whether the noble Lord was present—at which these points were made. The criticism is not against us, as it were, because in this House we have been taking our responsibilities seriously. However, I understand the point the noble Lord makes about the effect of leaving the EU and the distress he feels.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very much in sympathy with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral. He was inviting the Minister, I think, to examine the entire clause to see whether what he is proposing fits in with all of it. I draw the Minister’s attention to just one point. Clause 49(3) states:

“The duty under subsection (2)”—

which is one to dismiss a primary claim—

“includes the dismissal of any element of the primary claim in respect of which the claimant has not been dishonest”.

It is conceivable that there could be elements in the broad formula which the noble Lord has proposed in Amendment 128 which would not be tainted by the dishonesty. I do not believe that it is his intention that that should actually be struck out. If the Minister and his advisers are considering the wording, one point to look at with care, I suggest, is whether some allowance should be made for the possibility that there are claims within claims which are not tainted by the dishonesty—which of course everybody would like to see visited with the sanction that Clause 49 is designed to impose.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, in Committee I moved an amendment suggesting that the duty to dismiss personal injury claims tainted by fundamental dishonesty should be a discretionary power rather than a duty. In other words, courts should be entitled to dismiss such claims, but not bound to do so. I also suggested that there should be a power to reduce such claims in appropriate cases rather than to dismiss them altogether, which is a view that I have long held.

I recognise now, as I recognised then, that the Government are concerned to tackle the challenge posed by the proliferation of thoroughly dishonest, largely small, personal injury claims following accidents, particularly motor accidents. I agree that this is a serious problem that needs to be met head on. I was particularly impressed in Committee by the speech of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral on the issue. He speaks of course with a wealth of experience of cases in this area and of the challenges faced by the insurance industry in dealing with them. He spoke then of the evil of the proliferation of whiplash claims. I agree with his Amendment 128 today that any claim included in a personal injury claim should be caught by the section. In answer to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, I say the section as amended by my amendments—because the problem at the moment is that the whole claim has to be dismissed. That is one of the problems that is addressed by my amendments.

I have in this case modified my amendment substantially for Report in the light of the debate in Committee. My Amendment 128B draws a sharp distinction between smaller claims and more substantial ones. I recognise that the problem that the Government seek to address—the multiplication of fundamentally dishonest claims—arises mostly in the case of smaller claims. My new amendment today would effectively maintain the Government’s position in respect of any claim worth less than £25,000 overall.

However, I maintain my concerns in respect of more substantial personal injury claims. I have conducted over the years a great many claims in this category and I refer to my interest in the register as a practising barrister in this regard. Unfortunately, many of these substantial claims are also tainted by fundamental dishonesty. In Committee I gave the example, hypothetical but not untypical, of a very substantial claim for damages for personal injuries following a serious accident. Out of a total claim value of about £6 million, one element—or head of claim—was a claim for loss of earnings of about £500,000. That head of claim was fundamentally dishonest, because the claimant had suppressed a notice of redundancy given to him before the accident so that the substantial loss of earnings claimed would in fact have been sustained had the accident not occurred. It was therefore, of course, irrecoverable from the defendant.

Nevertheless, the claimant had a valid care claim—a different head of claim, untainted by dishonesty, to take the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—worth about £4 million. That claim would have covered the cost of his full-time residential care, with carers, for the rest of his life. The nub of this point is that he himself would not suffer injustice if his whole care claim was dismissed because his care would be paid for by the state in any event. The exception in the clause covering the case—that the claimant would suffer substantial injustice—would therefore not bite.

However, it would certainly be wrong for his entire claim to be dismissed. The right course would be to reduce his claim. Obviously, his loss of earnings claim would be dismissed because that would fail in any event, but the court might also decide to reduce other elements of his damages as well—notably his personal award, which is not tied to specific loss, for general damages, pain, suffering and loss of amenity—to mark the dishonesty. However, without the discretion to reduce the claim instead of dismissing it altogether, the outcome would be that the entire claim would be dismissed—all its heads—and in this example that would cost the state a great deal of money that the negligent defender’s insurers ought to be paying.

I suggest that the clear way to resolve this difficulty is for there to be a power in larger cases either to dismiss a claim tainted by fundamental dishonesty or to reduce the award of damages in such a way as the court deems just. Judges have plenty of experience in dealing with dishonest claims. They can tell what is fundamental dishonesty and what is not, and they can tell what is just and what is not. As one might expect, judges generally dislike dishonest claims intensely and can be trusted to deal with them with appropriate toughness. I invite the Government to agree that mandating courts to dismiss small claims, unless to do so would cause the claimant substantial injustice, but leaving judges free to deal appropriately with larger cases, would be a sensible and proportionate way to approach this issue.

I hope that my noble friend might return at Third Reading, after considering this issue along the lines that I have mentioned, with a solution. I should say that I will not press Amendment 128F in respect of subsection (5), because a combination of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt would meet the requirements of orders to cost. That said, I invite my noble friend and the Government to consider this further.

Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Monday 22nd July 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief general point about judicial diversity in connection with these regulations. The Committee knows that my noble friend is a forceful advocate of judicial diversity. The Government’s commitment was apparent during the passage of what is now the Crime and Courts Act, and in particular in their promotion of the provisions which find expression in Schedule 13 to that Act. While not wishing to make any judgment about the recent appointment to the position of Lord Chief Justice it is, from the diversity point of view, a shame that the extremely highly thought-of female candidate was not selected. That would have been real and very public progress.

These regulations implement the new systems in ways that are both detailed and welcome, but the imperative is to ensure that we move towards a much more representative judiciary with more women, more ethnic minority judges and judges from a far broader range of social background. These regulations can be no more than a step on the way to achieving that. While they are detailed and welcome provisions, to achieve real change we need a deep and continuing change of culture. That was highlighted in the report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger and mentioned by my noble friend. I look forward in the future to Government and the judiciary working together to achieve that change.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall make a short point relating to the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations. Before I explain my point, I should declare an interest. I recently retired as deputy president of the Supreme Court. For the past four years I have been a member of the ad hoc commission and thus responsible, along with the president, for a number of appointments, which have included something like a third of the court now sitting as the Supreme Court across the square.

My point relates to diversity in a rather unusual way. As the Minister has explained, one of the aims of redesigning the composition of the selection commission described in Part 3 of these regulations is to meet the recommendation that the commission should no longer be seen to be appointing or selecting for appointment people in their own image. It may be that that was a fair criticism at the time when I was sitting as one of the two judicial members of the panel since the president and I were both men, but I have just retired and I have been succeeded by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond. In a way, this follows on from a point just made by the noble Lord that one may regret for diversity reasons the choice of Lord Chief Justice. I make no comment on that, but one great advance that has been made in the Supreme Court is that we now have the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who is a very vigorous proponent of diversity and is probably best suited of anyone to sit on such a commission.

It is a great misfortune of timing. If she had been in my position when the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, came with her members to visit us and to discuss the change, I am sure that the noble Baroness would have seen—it would have been perfectly obvious—that the noble and learned Baroness was there and that we had on our team every component for diversity one could possibly have wished for. As the noble Lord rightly explained, when the draft regulations were discussed with us, it was impossible to make the point that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, might be my successor because I had not yet resigned and the selection process for my successor had not yet taken place. Therefore, we were very cautious not to make any prediction about who would succeed me. The succession process produced this result only about four weeks ago.

It is a great misfortune of timing has led us to the position where the noble and learned Baroness will now be excluded from participation in the selection process. The regulations are very carefully drafted because the composition of the selection commission in Regulation 11 provides for a senior UK judge to be nominated to take the position which I previously occupied. It is quite clear, if you read Regulation 11(1)(e) with Regulation 14 and Regulation 2, that the senior UK judge can be any senior UK judge other than a judge of the Supreme Court. So it is quite clear it can only be the president who would be the Supreme Court member, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, has no prospect of playing any part in the work of the commission.

The way that the appointments have gone in the Supreme Court in recent years means that there will be no fresh vacancy, I think I am right in saying, for two or three years. Now that I have gone, the way is clear for the court to settle down without any real change. However, in two or three, or possibly three or four years’ time, a significant number will retire and fall to be replaced, and the noble and learned Baroness will still be there. The composition of what one might call the next but one Supreme Court will be greatly influenced by the work of this commission. It is a great pity that the reform has taken this form. As I said earlier, I doubt very much whether it would have done before, but I must concede that the Minister is absolutely right to say that the regulations were shown to us. We did the best we could in our discussions to make this point without naming names.

The purpose of my intervention is to express regret at this turn of events and hope that perhaps one day it may be possible to recognise the enormous qualities of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the major contribution she would be able to make to increasing diversity in a way which concerns us all.