Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Kennedy of Shaws

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, the full incoherence and madness of the Bill has just been exemplified in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. The many possibilities here are incredible, such as the idea that asylum seekers may well receive the advice that when they get to Rwanda they should not apply for asylum. What do the Rwandan people do then? We should ask ourselves that question: where do you send them back to? To Britain, whence they came—they are not applying for asylum here—or back to France, our great partner in trying to deal with the crime that is emanating across Europe, with which we need to be collaborative, and need intelligence and serious investigation into criminal gangs?

I was rather attracted by the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that we change the tense and make it about the future: that if Rwanda does become the safe country we are being asked to vote that it is, that we feel it has a legal system capable of making these assessments, and it is properly monitored, and we receive evidence—I have mentioned evidence before—we must be sure of that, and putting it into the future might be rather appealing. The one thing I had concerns about was when the noble and learned Lord said that this would not cause delay. I am hoping that there will be delay.

I do not want to see people being flown to a place in which this great project of modernising and improving the system will take place. If it is going to happen at all, I want it to have happened before we send anybody there. I happen to take the view, unpopular among many, that exporting people and sending them away is part of the problem. We are not doing as Italy’s ultra-radical, proto-fascist leader Ms Meloni is doing, which is asking the Albanians to do on Italy’s behalf what the Italian system would be doing. We are not asking for that; we are sending them there. We are exporting a problem.

I am concerned about the issue of delay and perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will respond at some stage. I see him getting to his feet; maybe he can help me.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I do not quite understand the point that the noble Baroness is making. When I talked about delays, I meant the delay of implementing the Bill—putting the various people in place for the monitoring to take place. The fact is that the committees I mentioned already exist. The distinction is between that situation and setting up new independent monitoring, which will take time. That is my only point, but of course I appreciate that all the time that is necessary should be taken to be absolutely sure that implementation has been achieved. That is a different question.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Kennedy of Shaws

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I will add a footnote to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I join them in welcoming Amendment 18A and Amendment 18B, which falls to be read together with it. Two questions lie behind one’s examination of Amendment 18A. The first concerns the point mentioned by the Minister once, if not twice. Is the wording of the provision compatible with our international obligations? The second concerns how the provision will work in practice. This will be the subject of the reviews referred to in Amendment 18B.

On the first point, the Minister said—I think twice, possibly more often—that the wording of the provision is deliberately narrow. He said it was narrowly worded and precisely targeted; it had to be narrowly worded and precisely targeted to meet the requirements of the convention. The international obligations are found in the European convention on nationality of 1997. It is worth reminding ourselves that the preamble says that it is concerned to avoid cases of statelessness “as far as possible”. The principles set out in Article 4 include that,

“everyone has the right to a nationality … statelessness shall be avoided”,

and,

“no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality”.

I think it is well known that Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, as substituted by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, was framed with very close regard to the provisions of that convention. One can see it, too, in the amendments introduced by the Bill. The second condition set out in new Section 40(4A) refers to the situation where,

“the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom”.

The phrase “the vital interests” is a precise quotation from Article 7(1)(d) of the convention and one can see how closely tied the wording of the statute is to that of the convention. It is important that the wording should be narrowly framed in order to meet what the preamble and Article 4 were talking about, but that has another significance when one looks at how the wording will work in practice. It is well known that the courts will construe legislation on the assumption that Parliament has intended to legislate in accordance with this country’s international obligations. One would expect a court to have regard to the wording of the convention and to construe the words narrowly. They are narrowly worded but they will be narrowly construed, too. The key words already identified are “is able”. It is not “maybe” or a possibility; it is “is”, in the present tense. “Able” is itself a powerful word, and the new Section refers to being able to become a national of a country, not to an ability to apply or be considered.

One other point is worth mentioning to appreciate the full package with which this House has been presented. Section 40of the British Nationality Act, as amended, describes the obligation of the Secretary of State in the event of an order being made under that section. It states:

“Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying … that the Secretary of State has decided to make and order”—

this is really important—

“the reasons for the order, and … the… right of appeal”.

These things must be set out in the written statement. Particularly important is the reference to reasons, which will be examined with great care should the matter go to appeal.

There is just one point that is worth bearing in mind: the reference to rights of appeal. Concern has been expressed by Liberty, and perhaps others, about the situation in which somebody would find themselves when faced with a written statement of this kind when abroad and the prospect of an order of this kind being made against them. It would seem to require exercising the right of appeal from abroad. That is a practical problem which those individuals might face.

My concern is whether the review referred to in Amendment 18B would be capable of picking up practical issues of that kind. It is difficult for us at this stage and in these situations to forecast the future with any precision, but that is the kind of practical point—envisaging how the issue will be worked out in practice—that will require very careful consideration. The more disadvantaged somebody would be by having to exercise his right of appeal abroad, the more concerned one would be about the fairness of the provision and, indeed, its compatibility with the convention. When the Minister replies, will he be good enough to cover that point about the scope of the review and whether it would include the kind of practical problem to which I have just referred?

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

I have concerns about the shift by the Government, although I welcome that there has been a shift in the way that has already been described. My concern is that reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be able to acquire another nationality does not really deal with the difficulty we face in the circumstances in which these cases arise. The cases that have taken place so far in which people have had their citizenship removed have almost invariably—certainly in my experience—involved persons abroad. The reason given is that the person is a threat to national security. I raise this question, among those already raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope: would another country seriously consider giving nationality, even to someone who might have the ability to apply for nationality of that country, if it knew that British citizenship had been removed on the grounds that the person was believed to be in some way linked to, or to condone, international terrorism? Do we seriously believe that another state is likely to grant nationality to someone where that has been the basis for the removal of citizenship by Britain? My grandparents were Irish, and I am sure that I am entitled to apply for an Irish passport, although I have never done so, but would Ireland seriously be interested in acquiring a citizen who has already been deemed by Britain to be involved in supporting, condoning or in some way furthering terrorism? We have to be real about the circumstances that we are contemplating.

I want to add a number of questions to the ones that have already been asked.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Kennedy of Shaws

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I have had reservations about the use of the power to stop and search without having reasonable suspicion. I think it lends itself to a certain amount of abuse and undermines relations with minority communities. I know this because of cases that I have done and I have heard this point expressed frequently by families in those minority communities.

The amendment raises the issue of stopping and searching and then going further. It involves more intrusive powers than simply stopping and searching. Often stopping and searching is used—I think the House should know this—as a way of recruiting informants. It does not very often produce a case against anybody but it provides opportunities for those involved in the security services to have a word with young men and to see whether they are likely to be of assistance and might be recruited as informants.

The concern that we have with this amendment is about the facility that is open to the powers that be at the airports and ports and wherever people are stopped to take computers and clone their contents. That should involve some reasonable suspicion before it is done. We should be able to move to that higher threshold of an officer being able to justify why that is being done. It would be very rare that it would be done without some explanation by an officer as to why they had made the decision to retain the content of mobile phones or whatever it is. This is another of those steps of intruding into the lives of citizens. We should be very anxious that this is not done without officers knowing that they will have to give some account of why they have sought to do this. That is not expecting too much of those who are at the borders and who are providing us with this kind of protection.

That is why the amendment has been put together. We are talking about the next stage. I do not believe officers usually move to that next stage without their having reasonable suspicion and without therefore being able to give an explanation as to why they need the extra powers that are involved in this new legislation.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I put down my name in support of this amendment for the purpose of drawing attention to a case decided by the Supreme Court in October 2013. It was not mentioned or discussed in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but it has a bearing on this issue in connection with the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Pannick. Before I do that, I should like to express my appreciation of the amendments tabled by the Minister in relation to the protection of people who are detained and also the timetable which is set out in the amendments.

I had occasion to look at this very closely in a case from Scotland following on a decision by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in a case called Salduz. It is clear that the amendments which the Minister has tabled are necessary in order to meet the requirements of the convention for the protection of people who are detained, in particular the right to consult a solicitor. I appreciate the careful way in which that problem has been addressed.

As for the timetable, it is appropriate that this should be in the Bill. In 1980 a provision was introduced in Scotland to give the police the power to detain somebody prior to arrest. In that provision, the timetable was set out. It had to be amended in the light of recent developments following the case of Salduz, but again the timetable was in the Bill. I believe that, for the protection of the subject, that is where it should be, so I welcome the way in which these amendments have been framed.

In the Supreme Court, the case R v Gul was concerned with the definition of terrorism, which is set out in Section 1 of the relevant Act, and the concerns expressed about the breadth of it. Terrorism, as defined in that, has a succession of various acts. People’s perception of what amounts to terrorism can vary according to what their perception is of what is going on and where these activities are being conducted. It is not necessary to discuss that issue today, but it has a bearing on what may be passing through the mind of the port officer who has the power to detain and on the need for some protection of the subject because of the way in which that power may be exercised.

I should declare an interest as I participated in that judgment and was particularly concerned about this issue in our discussions. At the end of the judgment, in paragraph 64, the Supreme Court noted that,

“under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act the power to stop, question and detain in port and at borders is left to the examining officer. The power is not subject to any controls. Indeed, the officer is not even required to have grounds for suspecting”,

which is of course the whole point to which the amendment draws attention. Although the court went on to add that it was not concerned with that issue in that appeal, the last sentence of the judgment reads:

“Detention of the kind provided for in the schedule represents the possibility of serious invasions of personal liberty”.

It is worth bearing in mind in support of the point that has been made that that has been a concern expressed by the Supreme Court in addition to others.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was kind enough to mention what I said in the case of O’Hara, which was the first judgment I ever delivered in this House many years ago. The test which I set out, and which has been recognised, is not particularly exacting. It is partly subjective and partly objective. The subjective part is important because it looks only to what the officer says was passing through his mind at the time. The objective part is that somebody else stands back, takes what was passing through the officer’s mind at the time he was exercising his judgment and asks the question “Did that justify what he did?” That was how the power given to the police was expressed. It does not set a particularly high standard, but it is a protection. It is that protection which is absent at the moment and which I respectfully suggest is in need of being written into the Bill to meet the concerns that have been expressed by various people, including the Supreme Court.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Kennedy of Shaws

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I hope that I may be forgiven for adding one more lawyer’s speech to those which have already been given, and particularly that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, will forgive me for doing this. My reason for wanting to speak is that I presided over the case of In re J in the Supreme Court. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, expressed great concern that the issue was being brought before the courts on a hypothesis; I think I am right in saying that he said that it is not the business of the court to judge hypothetical cases. We took the view that we should decide the case on the material that we were given, but it is right to stress, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, stressed, that the situation we were presented with was highly artificial in order to test one particular point: whether the “sole fact”, as it is put in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, was enough to cross the threshold.

I do not want to add anything to the clear description which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, gave us as to what the case of In re J was all about, but I should like to say briefly why I join with the noble and learned Baroness in resisting the amendment. In my case, it is particularly on account of its wording, given the use of “sole fact” and the reference to “real possibility”. My objections can be summarised on three simple grounds: first, the amendment as it stands is wrong in principle; secondly, when you look at the structure of the statute it is unnecessary; and, thirdly, from the point of view of family life in circumstances that are quite likely to occur, it could indeed be damaging.

First, on the principle, I respectfully suggest that the golden rule is that a prediction of future harm has to be based on facts which have been proved on a balance of probabilities. It is only then that the state would be justified in removing a child from the family; in our democratic society, it is not enough that there should be suspicion. It has to be based on proof, so the state should be required to demonstrate that it has real and current concerns about the child’s safety before the child is taken into care. I appreciate that I am moving through all sorts of stages in making that proposition, but that is the background to the point I wish to make. I stress that if we look at the wording of Section 31(2) of the Children Act, which we do not have on the paper before us, when it states that a child may be taken into care only if,

“the child … is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm”,

it is using the language of proof, not of possibility. That was a point made by Lord Nicholls some 18 years ago in the case of In re H.

As I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, accepted, the amendment has the effect of lowering the threshold to some degree. It assumes that the state cannot prove that the carer in question was the perpetrator—that all it can prove is that she was a possible perpetrator—and that that bald fact is all that can be done. Even allowing for the point at the end of the proposed amendment, that this is a “real possibility” and something that cannot sensibly be ignored, I suggest that we are still below the threshold which Section 31(2) sets.

Secondly, on necessity, it is important to appreciate that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, was not saying that the problem which the amendment is addressing is rare in itself. She was not saying, I think, that it is rare for two people in the situation in which the carer in this case was placed to blame each other, so that the court is unable to decide between the two. What she was saying was extremely rare was the situation which the court was being presented with: that this was the sole fact. As she put it in her judgment, the issue hardly ever comes before the court at the threshold stage packaged in that way. The point which she was making, and which one can see by studying the structure of the Children Act, is that in Part V, and in particular in Section 47, powers are available to the local authority to make inquiries and, if it is thwarted, to take further steps which may ultimately lead to an emergency protection order being applied for and so on, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, explained to us.

In the case of In re J, there was a difference of view as to whether the sole fact which has been referred to was relevant at all. In my judgment, I used the words “relevant” and “sufficient” to try to explain the difference of view. Lord Wilson and Lord Sumption said that it was not relevant at all; the rest of us said that the fact of the possible perpetration was relevant and could not be ignored, but it is not enough and is not sufficient to cross the threshold and therefore something more must be found.

The problem with the amendment is that it has absolutely no context attached to it. The sole possibilities are stated in the amendment in the starkest possible terms. However, as soon as you start to examine a particular case—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, did when he talked about the number of injuries inflicted in that tragic period of three weeks—you are adding something that is not in the amendment. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that the amendment is dealing with the situation of two possible perpetrators only, but it does not actually say that. It just says “a possible perpetrator”. As soon as you begin to make inquiries and search around, you are going to add things in which begin to build up a context which the social worker will be able to put together before the threshold stage has to be crossed when the case is brought into court. My objection to the amendment is really that: that it does not give you any context at all. Surely, that is taking the matter too far.

The third and final point is the risk of damage. Let us contemplate a situation which is not far removed from the situation of In re J, where the woman—and let us take the woman because it was the woman in In re J—is living in an abusive relationship. That was indeed the case here because she had separated from the previous partner because he was violent to her repeatedly and eventually she left him. All sorts of reasons can be imagined why she did not blame him. She may have been under pressure from him. She decides to create a new life for herself, as indeed she was doing in In re J, making a relationship with somebody who is absolutely blameless, who has children of his own already. There she is, now in family with him with a further child of their own.

My concern is that, if the amendment is passed in its stark form, it holds a threat over that relationship from the very beginning. There must be a question about, “Is it wise for me to enter into this relationship? Am I always going to be at risk of being before the court for a full threshold inquiry, simply because of what happened in the past?” The amendment pays no regard to the length of time that may have elapsed between the incident when the perpetration occurred and the moment at which the inquiry is being initiated. Without elaborating further, it is the starkness of the amendment, which lowers the threshold, that is a cause for real concern.

I wrote to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, with a suggestion about how one might approach the problem—because I do appreciate that there is a problem—by suggesting that, without using the word “sole”, one might be able to reassure social workers that this factor is relevant, which I believe firmly would be the case. If an amendment were to be framed which made that point and put it beyond doubt, then I would be entirely happy and I hope very much that it would reassure social workers. However, the amendment as phrased goes far too far and is too stark and for that reason I support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in resisting the amendment.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, oppose the amendment. I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has mentioned the difficulty where there is background of abuse against the mother of the child. I have been involved in cases where that has been the situation. That can often be the reason why a woman at trial does not testify, or at the police station does not give an account, of what has happened at the hands of her abusive partner who has also abused her child.

I was glad to hear the discussion that has just taken place, but my concern is the narrowness of the drafting. Before any judgment was made, I would want to be sure that one was able to explore the context and the situation that the mother was in at the time. Very often, battered women are frozen into a situation where they do not act to protect their child, and we should be very careful about not letting someone have a chance to make a new life with a new partner in very different circumstances where they would be perfectly good as a parent.