Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to add a word in support of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, particularly with reference to the concerns that some people have expressed about money being moved out of the very closely and properly regulated regime of English trust law to offshore organisations and jurisdictions which are less careful about how people’s money is handled.

I should declare an interest as Chief Justice of the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts. I am not suggesting that this has anything to do with Abu Dhabi, but it has introduced me to an aspect of trust law with which I was not previously familiar, and it bears closely on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He referred to Jersey as one of the jurisdictions of concern. One aspect of its legislation which has come to my attention through my connection with Abu Dhabi is the Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009. This is a structure set up by statute under Jersey law which is matched with an equivalent statute in Guernsey. It creates a form of trust which is, as it were, a hybrid between a trust and a corporation with a number of aspects that are described very well in Sections 25 and 26 of the Jersey law.

One of the points about the foundation, which appears in Section 25, is that a,

“beneficiary under a foundation … has no interest in the foundation’s assets; and … is not owed by the foundation or by a person appointed under the regulations of the foundation a duty that is or is analogous to a fiduciary duty”.

So the beneficiary under that system is rather different from a beneficiary under our system, where undoubtedly they have an interest in the foundation’s assets. But also to the point is Section 26, which provides that foundations are,

“not obliged to provide information”.

That has its counterpart in the point made about the Data Protection Act in that jurisdiction. It says that except,

“as specifically required by or under this Law or by the charter or regulations of the foundation, a foundation is not required to provide any person … with any information about the foundation”.

It goes on to say in subsection (2) that the,

“information mentioned in paragraph (1) includes, in particular, information about … the administration of the foundation … the manner in which its assets are being administered … its assets; and … the way in which it is carrying out its objects”.

I do not wish in any way to criticise how the foundation laws are run in Guernsey or Jersey, but it is a pattern which, if repeated in less scrupulous jurisdictions, has obvious attractions. People move into a foundation and nobody knows what part of the foundation money they own, because they are not supposed to own any part of it, and the foundation is not obliged to disclose any information at all. There is a risk that those who are keen, for whatever reason—it could even be for matrimonial reasons—to conceal their assets could move them offshore from a trust such as we have in this country, closely regulated and subject to the ordinary rules, to one of these other bodies, which we would not wish to encourage. One has only to look at the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and some of the clauses in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill that is before the House to see that we are taking a completely opposite line to the foundations laws, because we are insisting that we should be provided with information about what organisations of this kind hold and, indeed, who holds what assets. We have not got as far as actually requiring trusts to do that but, certainly, anyone who puts his money into a company, in an attempt to conceal his assets within the company, will be forced eventually to have that information disclosed.

I add these points to suggest that the point that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made has a great deal of substance, which one can trace through the foundations law. I stress again that I am not criticising how this is administered in Jersey or Guernsey—that is not really the point. The point is that those who would wish to copy their systems are subject to less close scrutiny. I also emphasise that I am not suggesting that we in this country would want to adopt a foundations law; that would really be quite contrary to how our current legislation is proceeding. So there is an important issue here about protecting ourselves—and those who set up trusts here and administer them properly according to our rules and conventions—against a loss of business, which would be detrimental not only to those who run the businesses but to the whole ethic by which we practise our trust law.

I hope that the Minister and those advising him will look carefully at the Jersey and Guernsey examples, with a view not to criticism but to sensing the risk to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, drew our attention.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 80A and 83A are in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and come from the Bar Council. In their unavoidable absence, I have again been asked to speak to the amendments. The Government have amendments also to paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 2—and no doubt we will be asked to agree them shortly. These amendments deal with other aspects of that paragraph and relate to legal professional privilege. The paragraph, as amended, refers to the disclosure of data but disclosure is only one of the acts of processing. The Bar Council is concerned that we need to deal with processing more widely so as not to disrupt the activities of the court and to protect privilege, which is something we have debated on many occasions and which we all agree is not only important but a fundamental right for persons and organisations.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I thank noble Lords for taking part in this debate. I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that these are probing amendments designed to tease out how collaboration may be varied. It is of course vital that collaboration agreements can be amended where appropriate to reflect local developments and to ensure the best outcomes for the public they serve. There may be a number of reasons to vary a collaboration agreement, perhaps to include a new partner to the agreement or to change participant roles and responsibilities. Clause 4(8) is simply intended to make it clear that such variations may be made. In locally agreeing to vary the terms in an existing collaboration agreement, the parties will in effect create a new or subsequent collaboration agreement. Such an agreement would be subject to all the provisions that pertain to collaboration agreements. I hope that clarification reassures the noble Baroness and that, accordingly, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think it may have become not a probing amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

With great respect to the Minister, she did not address my point. One has a choice: either one varies an agreement or one replaces it with something else. The example given is a very good one of a variation, leaving the existing agreement in place. We are at a very early stage of this Bill and all I am suggesting is that the amendment might be taken away and looked at again. It is a question of the proper use of the English language, which is why I have taken the liberty of standing up and making my point.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to add just a small point in support of what my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood has said, and that is to stress the word “legitimacy” which he used in the course of his address. It is crucial that this particular system should not be open to challenges in the court to any extent; one must try to the maximum to minimise the risk of challenges. This is a very difficult area, as shown by these cases to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, just referred. It is the interaction between Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights, which deals with detention, and Article 8, which deals with respect for the family life of everyone. Where you get these human rights in play, it opens up the possibility of arguments being raised by way of challenge to orders of this kind.

The strength of the amendment which is being suggested is that it cuts back the open door—if I might put it this way—to challenges, and limits them in the most sensitive of all areas, which is the kind of relocation to which the noble and learned Lord has drawn attention. It is right that this is not a probing amendment. It is actually a very important point to try to secure these TPIMs in a way that makes them robust enough to stand up against possible challenges which, if the amendment was not made, would be very likely to come.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my support for the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is for real, to use his own term. I was reading a little—obviously I do not have the experience of other noble Lords, including my noble friend—about control orders at the time they were to be abolished and TPIMs introduced. One could not help but feel quite disturbed by some of the experiences undergone and the impact, as has been said, not only on the individuals subject to the orders but on members of their families so, as I say, I support this amendment.

I have just one question for the noble and learned Lord. It is about whether it is necessary—he must consider it is because he has included them—to have the words about the individual having “no connection”. As I read it, but I might have missed something, the amendment to Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act takes out the references to having a connection with a locality because the 200-mile limit is being introduced. If that is so, and we are losing references to there being a connection in the Schedule, is that reference necessary in the amendment?

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 7. Amendment 6 is one of those probing amendments which may seem a bit unexpected or counterintuitive coming from me. It seeks to inquire whether the reference to intention in paragraph 1(10) covers recklessness. The words I have used are, “recklessly as to the consequences”. Will my noble friend share with the Committee the Government’s thinking on restricting the term to intentionality?

My second amendment, already trailed by the noble and learned Lord, refers to humanitarian assistance. This is another probing amendment to ask how the Government plan to deal with workers travelling out who are associated with reputable organisations such as the Red Cross. I accept that this is a difficult area because there can be individuals who are not with such organisations but who, in their own minds, are going out to provide humanitarian aid. They might be so closely associated with those who are fighting that they would be seen by others as providing something which is closer to military support than the broader humanitarian assistance.

We need to find a way through this difficult area, but at this stage perhaps my noble friend can explain the Government’s thinking on this issue and what work they have done with the big, overstretched—I am sure they could do without a further consultation, but there you go—humanitarian organisations working in the Middle East. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, as I hinted earlier, I wish to add a little more detail in support of Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness. The background to what I am going to say comes from my experience chairing the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill, which has been considering a clause which would seek to add offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 to the list of offences a conviction for which will result in automatic disqualification from being a trustee of a charity. That may seem a little bit removed from what we are considering this afternoon, but we have heard evidence on that issue from various witnesses speaking about the chilling effect of the risk of prosecution under the terrorist legislation on the efforts of those who seek to provide humanitarian assistance in areas which are under the control of, for example, proscribed organisations.

Among our witnesses was the chairman of the Muslim Charities Forum, who said:

“I go to difficult areas like Afghanistan, South Sudan and Chechnya. Recently, two weeks ago, I was in Iraq, in Baghdad. I have been in Somalia, in Mogadishu and other countries. I think counter-terrorism legislation is preventing us from having access to the neediest people. There are proscribed groups in those areas, and we know them. They are the gatekeepers. How can we go through the gatekeepers to reach the neediest people in Syria, Somalia or different parts of the world?”

That was the problem to which he drew our attention.

Among our other witnesses was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation, David Anderson QC, to whom the noble Lord rightly paid tribute early this afternoon and I entirely endorse his remarks. He said that charities operating in these areas run the risk of falling foul of terrorism law—for example, by delivering relief to a general population which may include individuals or groups designated as terrorists. He suggested that increased risk could deter charities and their trustees from delivering humanitarian support. He was talking about the risk that would be created by extending the definition that disqualifies people from being trustees on conviction for these offences. As I mentioned earlier, we are talking about a rather softer mechanism, which is very important but depends on a decision taken by a constable at the point of entry.

One of the points to which David Anderson drew our attention was that there are examples in other countries where this issue has been addressed. The Minister might be interested to know that the kind of exception which the noble Baroness is suggesting can be found in connection with the broad definition of terrorism when one studies, for example, legislation in Australia or New Zealand. They have specific exceptions in terrorism law to meet that point, including that of association with proscribed organisations for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid. That is very important and it is rather odd that it is raised as a tiny, probing amendment in a debate on a temporary exclusion order. It runs right through the effect of the broad definition of terrorism, which Mr Anderson described as quite disturbing because of its breadth, and adds a great deal of force to the noble Baroness’s amendment.

I invite noble Lords to think carefully about that because the humanitarian effort is something all of us would wish to support. Given the amount of effort that the Government rightly put into providing aid overseas, it would be most unfortunate if it is being cut off because of this kind of measure. Of course, there are ways in which it can be done without embarking at all on this kind of risk area, but those who are right at the frontier in these very difficult areas should not be discouraged by legislation of this kind if it is possible to protect them against its effects. The humanitarian exception may be one of the more important issues that we are considering today. I would be very interested, and I am sure that the noble Baroness would be too, to hear how the Minister would wish to consider the point.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 27th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I add my appreciation of the work that the Minister has done with the Scottish Government to provide an amendment which is compatible with Scots law. Having read it carefully, I think that it is a very valuable addition to the armoury in Scots law to deal with this very difficult and obnoxious problem.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I, too, add my thanks. This issue exercises noble Lords around the House, as well, of course, as many people outside the House. It is not a party-political matter; there may be a range of views as to the nuances of how to deal with the issue. I say to the Minister that this is a great and very important step, but he will not have heard the last of the issue of forced marriage.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 22nd January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I want to add just a very few words to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, has just said. If one stands back from this debate, everybody in this Chamber will recognise that there will be some cases, although no doubt very rare, where the state should compensate an acquitted person for the trauma, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, referred, of being put into prison and detained there for perhaps a very long time on a completely false basis.

There are two ways of going about this. One is, as it used to be in this jurisdiction and still is in Scotland, to have an ex gratia scheme. That is, it is left to the Minister to form his or her own view in light of all the facts, without being constrained by any kind of statutory definition. In this jurisdiction—I mean England and Wales—we have departed from that and therefore we are up against the requirement of having to define in statute the nature of the exercise that the Minister performs.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, put his finger on the origin of what we are trying to do, which is to be found in Article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That states that when a final decision,

“shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice”,

the person should,

“be compensated according to law”.

There are three requirements for that: you should find that in the decision; it should show it conclusively; and it should show that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Our question is therefore what we mean by a miscarriage of justice.

I do not want to elaborate on what my noble and learned friend Lord Phillips said, but of course one bears in mind the presumption of innocence. That point emerges not just from the Strasbourg jurisdiction. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, said in the Supreme Court in the case of Adams, on which many of us sat, the way in which the courts operate in this country does not require innocence to be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court before a conviction is set aside. As he said,

“to prove innocence … is alien to our system of justice”.

Our methods do,

“not provide a forum in which”

that question can be examined. The question for the Appeal Court is whether the conviction was safe or unsafe.

There are some jurisdictions—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Kerr, referred to New Zealand—where a tribunal could address that issue. Of course, then it would be properly examined but we do not go that far; we do not need to because we have always believed that there was a presumption of innocence. That drives us back to the question of whether it makes sense for us to use the very words of the presumption to set out the test that is to be applied. Of course, one bears in mind the point that emerges from the European Court decisions that one should respect the presumption of innocence in the language that is used when dealing with the rights of an acquitted person.

Without elaborating, the better choice—to put it that way—is to follow the wording of the amendment that my noble friend Lord Pannick proposed, rather than the wording of the Bill proposed by the Government which has these various flaws in it that I suspect would lead to challenges one would wish to avoid.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, at the previous stage of the Bill, I said, not quite in these words, that I was glad to be able to follow those far more expert than I, as they did the heavy lifting on the amendment. I feel much the same today. Colleagues have said that they feel somewhat out of their depth on this subject. To that I say, “Yes, but you understand the concepts of proof of guilt and proof of innocence”. I congratulate the authors of the amendment, if that is not too presumptuous, and its mover, who seem to have found a way to achieve the Government’s aims, which as I understand them are greater certainty and to reduce costs—that is, not the costs of compensation but of proceedings.

As we have heard, there have been very few claims and fewer have been successful. It is not a matter of compensation for every failed prosecution, more for every quashed conviction—and there are very few of those. On those occasions, the sky has not fallen for the Government but it has for the individuals concerned. That is why compensation seems inadequate—I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, on that—but money is how we deal with it, so compensation is appropriate and important. For the integrity of the system, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, referred, we must not let the sky fall because of the application of the test in this clause in the Bill.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was kind enough to mention me, and perhaps I may add a footnote to what he said about Scotland and the measure that deals with emergency workers. Of course, an assault, in both the law of Scotland and the law of England, is a crime, and in a sense you could say that it was not necessary to pass that measure at all because any court when presented with evidence of an assault would pass an appropriate sentence if the individual was convicted.

However, the value of the measure, which got a lot of publicity, was its deterrent effect. After all, the last thing that one wants is to have the assault committed. The Government in Scotland were trying to reduce the very unfortunate crescendo of assaults on emergency workers—firemen, ambulance people and so on—and to some extent the measure appears to have had that effect. Therefore, the deterrent effect is as valuable as any sentencing. As I said, in an ideal world, if something was a crime, the individual tempted to do the act described as criminal would refrain from doing it. It is because of the deterrent effect that I think there is a good deal of force behind the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thought that at the previous stage the noble Lord, Lord Condon, had it right when he said he feared that,

“the real mischief they and we might seek to address is not the absence of suitable offences but the absence of action”.—[Official Report, 4/12/13; col. 255.]

I asked questions of my noble friend about sentencing, the aggravating nature of that type of offence and so on, and I am afraid that I have not changed my mind about those two aspects.

I am interested in the definition of “worker” in the noble Lord’s amendment. One qualifies, as it were—that is not quite the right term but he will know what I mean—only if one is “physically present”. Reading that, I wondered how that works with his requirement for malice in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. When I saw the word “malice”, I thought that he had in mind, for example, someone who—possibly for very personal reasons—does not like people who work in jobcentres but then discovers that his neighbour works in a jobcentre. Is that malice towards all such people for that sort of reason or are we talking about something very personal? Does it mean being in the workplace or in the sort of situation that I have suggested, hanging around until one’s neighbour comes out of the house and having a go at him for that reason?

I was also interested in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause. If I remember rightly—I have not gone back to check—I think that on the previous occasion the noble Lord talked about “evidence from a single source”. That seems to be a matter for the courts. We should not tell the courts how to assess evidence. If he is saying that there is some restriction on the way they are working at the moment, it may be a different matter—but, again, that made me wonder where the noble Lord was going with this.

On the aggravating nature of the offence, we have to be careful not to devalue the importance of that approach to sentencing. This, of course, is not the only aggravating factor for the courts, but the Sentencing Council does a very important job in identifying appropriate aggravating factors.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in Committee, I tabled an amendment on the clause which was an attempt to suggest a compromise before we had even discussed it, because I knew that the Government would be keen to stick to the general approach. That amendment would have meant that the clause applied only to 17 and 18 year-olds.

As the right reverend Prelate said, the existing provisions are not absolute. I have some questions for the Minister arising from them. Given that there is currently discretion to allow reporting that is in the public interest, and given the public policy underlying the Bill, would that not be a strong indicator to the court on how to view the public interest test? Would not reversing it, so that the individual is named unless the court decides otherwise—apart from the consequences for the individual; I entirely take the points that have been made—mean additional process for the courts?

I suspect that there would have to be a pre-trial application for anonymity. If I am right, how does one ensure anonymity before that or in the listing of the application? The right reverend Prelate made the point that that would overturn the culture—in fact, the practice—of the youth court. It would be much easier for it to be able to continue with its current practice.

The existing provisions contain a lot of detail about lifting restrictions. Conversely, if one has reversed the presumption, what is the trigger for restriction to apply? What would be pointed to in an application to restrict reporting? Another question is whether any stakeholders have argued for the provision that we see in Clause 17.

Finally, what consideration have the Government given to how communications have changed, particularly with Twitter, which spreads information almost faster than a heartbeat and certainly before restrictions could be applied? Ironically, the law brought into effect in 1933 seems more appropriate for the age of speedy communications, where you start with restrictions and then consider whether to lift them. That would work much better for communications 80 years on.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I add just a word based on my experience of how these things are dealt with in the courts. The advantage of the present rule is that a uniform rule applies throughout the country and avoids the problem, which is commonplace in the courts, of different practices in different areas and different judges taking different views. The uniformity of the rule is one advantage.

The second point, which the noble Baroness just mentioned, is that it is essential, if a reporting restriction is to be effective, that it be asked for at the beginning. There is always a risk that somebody nips out of the court before the order is made and the damage is then done but the individual can say, “I wasn’t there when the order was made”. To be effective, it has to be made at the start.

The third point is representation. I do not want to go into the issues about legal aid, which are not a matter for this debate, but there would be concern that people who are not very experienced and not attuned to all the matters raised by the right reverend Prelate fail to take the point. My impression is that if the point is taken as eloquently as the right reverend Prelate made it, the court would be very slow not to make an order unless there were compelling reasons for refusing the application, but it requires an application to be made, because I suspect that a court will not take the initiative without that.

Those are advantages of the present rule which would be lost. Obviously there is a balance to be struck, but I would be interested to know to what extent study has been made of the effect of losing those advantages, if the Bill is to remain in its present form.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my amendment is grouped with the debate on Clause 17 stand part and Amendment 22DA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. Within the past few minutes, he has sent me a note asking me to apologise to the Committee. Like many of us, his anticipation of what would happen, and when, was rather thrown. He said that he had an impossible diary today with long-agreed speaking engagements outside the House. However, in case the Minister thinks that that lets him off the hook from attack from that quarter, the noble Lord has primed the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, to speak on his behalf on his later amendments. The noble Lord said that he would not dream of considering voting before Report anyway, although I think one might add “ … ” to that.

My amendment is to Clause 17. I have not sought to delete the clause from the Bill because I wonder whether it might be possible to discuss a compromise. I am aware that this is a delicate issue on which there has already been quite a lot of focus. The clause provides that Section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933—it has a long pedigree—is not to apply to proceedings on IPNAs. That section restricts reporting of proceedings in which children and young persons are concerned. That provision restricting reporting also has an exception within it. Is that exception not sufficient for the Government's purposes? The exception is that if the court is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, it may dispense to any specified extent with the requirements of the section. Is that not sufficient? That is Section 49(4)(a). Section 49(5) provides that the court can similarly dispense with the requirements of the provision if it is appropriate to do so for the purposes of avoiding injustice to the child or young person.

We have talked on a number of occasions about one purpose of the ASBI being to avoid criminalising young people, whom we hope to divert from a criminal career—not to consolidate a criminal career. Given the way in which reporting would be likely to happen, this provision would criminalise the young person and have a very unfortunate long-term impact. “Naming and shaming” is not a term I like to use—it means stigmatising and putting a negative label on the young person. There must be a very high risk of perpetuating the problems which an IPNA should be looking to nip in the bud.

We have also talked about positive re-engagement and rehabilitation. I question whether not imposing reporting restrictions would be a deterrent. Is there any evidence that it might be? There are also, of course, safeguarding concerns. This had not occurred to me, but I am told that professionals consider that there is a risk that children who are identified as having been involved in anti-social behaviour may engage in risk-taking behaviour or be more susceptible to being groomed. This is very much in our mind at the moment.

In all, it seems to me that the risks, quite apart from the concerns that have been voiced by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Local Government Association, are too big. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what lies behind this; what evidence the Government have that this is the right way to go; what assessments have been made to evaluate safeguarding risks, and whether the Government have kept in mind the impact on a child’s rehabilitation. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I add just a short point to what the noble Baroness has said. When one looks at the draft guidance at page 26, one can see what the Government are thinking of here. The point is made that making the public aware of the perpetrator and the terms of the order can be an important part of the process in tackling anti-social behaviour. One can follow the thinking behind that proposition. When one reads on, however, one sees that there will be circumstances in which either the police or the council may decide not to publicise the fact that an IPNA has been made. It seems to me that the power—or the discretion, perhaps one should say—to decide whether or not publicity should be given is being taken away from the court and given to the police or the council. Will the Minister explain why that is being done, bearing in mind the point that the noble Baroness has made about the discretion which exists within Section 49?

It is a very big thing to take away from the court the power to restrict publicity, bearing in mind the reach of the whole of Part 1, which is what we are concerned with, including Clause 5, which permits an application for an injunction to be made without notice being given to the respondent. The court would have no power to stop the press if they happened to be there reporting what had taken place. It would be a very serious matter to go as far as the clause goes without a full explanation why exercise of discretion is being taken away from the court and being given to the police or the council, who are not answerable to the court for what they do.