United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Baroness Andrews

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Andrews (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in my name in this group are for the most part identical to those of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, although in some cases they are wider in their supplementary implications. It goes without saying that I agree with everything he said—and everything that I suspect the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is about to say—about the whole range of excessive and inappropriate delegations. Of course, my amendments follow the advice of the DPRRC; I declare an interest as a member of that committee.

I will make a few general points about what the Government are trying to do in these clauses and how they have justified them. I speak for myself but I suspect that I also speak for many members of the committee —certainly for our distinguished chair—when I say that we have reached a point of almost total exasperation with the Bill. The DPRRC was set up in 1992 to monitor and control the excesses of executive power and the temptation for Ministers and officials to try to avoid parliamentary interference and take inappropriate powers. So it is hardly new, but in recent years, we have been sorely tested— not least on the limits of our vocabulary. Indeed, the DPRRC has described these powers as “extraordinary” and “unprecedented”.

We have seen the increasing use of skeleton Bills and statutory instruments not for the delivery of policy but for the design of policy and for carrying the principles of legislation within the secondary framework. Most recently, we have seen mounting evidence of a Government that will go to endless lengths to avoid scrutiny. This Bill is in a class of its own because of the sheer volume and significance of the Henry VIII powers. Of the 12 delegated powers in the Bill, seven are Henry VIII powers, allowing Ministers to amend or repeal significant provisions of the Bill itself, as well as other primary and secondary legislation. We used to protest when only one Henry VIII power turned up in a Bill.

It sets a different tone, too, because the delegated powers memorandum, in its attempt to justify why these powers to expedite the mutual recognition principle and the non-discriminatory principle are necessary, does not even bother to try to find a convincing justification for the powers taken. In the clauses relating to my Amendments 13, 28, 39 and 47, for example, the explanations for using statutory instruments to amend Acts of Parliament cite the need for speed and flexibility to respond to unforeseen developments—the known unknowns and so on—respond to stakeholders and provide certainty. These are profoundly lazy and threadbare arguments, and Ministers and officials know that. I consider that contempt of Parliament. Secondary legislation does not guarantee speed, flexibility or certainty. Primary legislation, as we know from dealing with the pandemic, can be introduced at the speed of light and amended. Indeed, the Government have conceded in their own arguments that the Secretary of State is not required to declare that the making of regulations is required as a matter of urgency, so urgency is a false trail too.

This disingenuous use of language offered in the memorandum in regard to Clause 6(5) is a case in point. It argues that Ministers need to be able to respond swiftly to future-proof the operation of these principles so that they can be changed as and when Ministers decide that it is necessary. The DPRRC dismisses this as an attempt to completely rewrite the non-discrimination principle. When the Government argue that there is no way that they can change the definition of legitimate aims attached to the non-discrimination principles in Clause 8 other than by secondary legislation, they seem to have completely forgotten that such a thing as primary legislation exists. Indeed, in Schedule 2, for example, the assumption is that only secondary legislation is fit for purpose when it comes to making future amendments.

The powers that my amendments seek to remove are described by the DPRRC as inappropriate and ones that should be removed; the Constitution Committee endorses that. “Inappropriate” may seem rather feeble in the parliamentary lexicon; in fact, it could not be more powerful. Among other synonyms, it means unseemly, unbecoming, lacking in propriety, ill-judged and out of order. Nowhere are those and many other epithets more appropriate than what these clauses have to say about the devolution settlement. For in Clauses 3(10) and 6(7), in relation to mutual recognition and non-discrimination —the two main pillars of market access—there is the explicit instruction that, before making regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the Ministers of the devolved assemblies. The Government are required not to seek consent but merely to consult, so they

“can act without the need to introduce new primary legislation or to obtain the consent of the devolved administrations (the Minister being only under a duty to consult) even though the proper functioning of the internal market is essential to all the administrations of the UK.”

That is a direct quote from the DPRRC.

That most eloquently brings us to the fracture at the heart of the Bill, and to the reason for taking these inappropriate powers which removes them from the full attention of Parliament. It comes back to what the Government insist is the purpose of the Bill—to secure, despite the promise and the purpose of common frameworks, that the internal market will need a new regulatory structure flexible enough to meet the unforeseen demands in the future, notwithstanding that they cannot tell us what those demands are likely to be or explain how they are going to prevent lower common standards permitted by law in this Bill, or why the common frameworks are not sufficient in themselves to prevent that, or why the Bill cannot be amended in such a way as to ensure a tight fit between the common frameworks and the common purposes of the Bill. These inappropriate powers are seen as necessary to expedite what might happen in the future, notwithstanding the impact on the devolved nations or the devolved settlements, the role of Parliament, the balance of powers expressed in appropriate legislation or the integrity of the process itself.

There is a great deal at stake in this Bill, as has been said many times already in the process of the Bill. They are grave matters, and they have been drawn to the attention of this House by the two most senior scrutiny committees. I hope the Minister will find he can agree with me that these powers are offensive as well as unnecessary, and that they will be removed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews. I am not a member of the Delegated Powers Committee and never have been, so I think I can, without any embarrassment, praise the work which that committee does so often on behalf of the House and, in particular, the reports it has made in respect of the Bill we are considering today. The issue which it raises, of course, is a very serious one, and it has been very well explained in its own report and spoken to by both the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews. I do not want to say very much more about it. The important point is revealed when you look at the subsection which introduces the power to make regulations in the case we are looking at, first of all in Clause 3(8). There is absolutely no qualification whatever to indicate the purpose for which that power may be exercised. It is a totally unqualified power, which may be used without any control from anybody as to the way in which the power is being exercised.

Twenty years ago, this House was looking at, among other things, the Scotland Bill. It is very interesting for the historian to compare the way in which delegated powers are conferred by that Bill with the way in which they are being conferred by this Bill. Both of them were major pieces of legislation, designed to lay the structure for the future governance of this country. On the part of the Scotland Bill, of course, it was very obvious because it was the first step toward devolution; it had to be carefully crafted, and yet it was moving into an uncertain world. The many powers to make legislation by delegated legislation are all carefully described, so that one knows exactly the purpose for which that power could be used. As the Bill went through both Houses, the reason for the power and the scope that was given to Ministers to use it was carefully scrutinised by both Houses.

We do not have that benefit in this case, in a Bill which is designed to settle the internal market—a Bill of equal importance and, perhaps I might say, equal difficulty. Nevertheless, they have in common that they are major pieces of legislation, and yet, in this case, the power we have to legislate and to scrutinise legislation is really being opened up to Ministers to deal with, without any control whatever. That is the basic flaw which runs through all of the clauses to which these amendments draw attention.

There is, of course, the point that the noble Baroness mentioned, that all that has been required with the devolved Administrations—or the Ministers in the devolved Administrations—is that they be consulted, not consent. That is not in keeping with the Sewel convention, although that is qualified by the word “normally”. I would have thought that in this case, because of the scope of the powers, consent would be appropriate here, because there is no other way of controlling what the power may be used for. That is the reason why the absence of a provision for consent is so important in these cases.

Without saying any more, I must say that I fully support the points that have already been made on these very important amendments.