House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Debate between Lord Hermer and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. We do not accept Amendment 60 for three reasons, beyond the fact that it falls outside the intended scope of this single-issue Bill.

First, the amendment seeks to fetter the power of a Prime Minister to shape the Cabinet according to his or her own choosing. Under this amendment, if the Prime Minister wished to choose a sitting MP to be Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, as has been the case for every Lord Chancellor since 2007, that person would have to vacate their seat and trigger a by-election; or, if this amendment were to be accepted, the Prime Minister would be required to separate the roles of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. In the Government’s view, that would be a constitutionally inappropriate fettering of the Prime Minister’s discretion to pick a Cabinet of his or her own choosing.

Secondly, there is no constitutional or public policy rationale to justify taking us back to the position that we were in before 2005. One cannot, for the reasons set out by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, simply pick and choose without going wholesale back to the 2005 position—putting the Lord Chancellor back on the Woolsack and as the senior judge—because what else is left of the Lord Chancellor’s role? It cannot simply be a rationale driven by nothing more than to have a member of the Cabinet committed to upholding the rule of law. That should be a commitment consistent with the ministerial code for all members of the Cabinet but, if I may say so, I also see it quite properly as a role for an Attorney-General. As the House will be aware, with the Prime Minister’s and the monarch’s grateful permission, the oath of the Attorney-General was changed when I took it to include an express commitment—although it would always have been implicit—to the rule of law.

Thirdly, the amendments fail to address what we would respectfully say are the most important attributes for a Lord Chancellor in the post-2005 age. Those attributes were identified by the Constitution Committee, which considered the Lord Chancellor’s role in a report two years ago—and I acknowledge the committee’s current chair, who is not in his place, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. In its final analysis, the report said that

“character, intellect and a commitment to the rule of law are the most important attributes for a Lord Chancellor to possess”.

We agree, and we do not consider that the acid test of those attributes is the House in which a Lord Chancellor should sit.

My right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor exemplifies the qualities of a great officeholder committed to the rule of law. More widely, as she has made clear, this entire Government see the rule of law as our lodestar. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister has appointed my right honourable friend in the confidence that the House in which she sits is no hindrance to her in discharging her vital constitutional responsibilities. For those three reasons, I respectfully request that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions in this short but important debate. I make the point, although it really ought to go without saying—but I say it for the avoidance of doubt—that none of this is any reflection on the current occupant of the role, for whom I have the greatest personal respect. What we have to do when we consider constitutional matters is to move away from the personal and to the principled, and that is what my amendment is directed at.

The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General has identified three reasons why this amendment cannot be accepted by the Government. First, he said, it would fetter the PM’s choice of who to have in the Cabinet, but it does not; the PM can still appoint anybody to the role of Lord Chancellor. In fact, the Prime Minister is able to appoint anybody and is not limited to Members of the House of Commons, because somebody could be parachuted in, as has happened on previous occasions. There is no fetter at all—that is a good red herring.

The second point is about what the Lord Chancellor would do. That was the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham—and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, gave the short answer. The Lord Chancellor would be there to oversee the really important parts of our constitution: constitutional affairs, devolution, human rights and international treaties. We should therefore go back to the Lord Chancellor being in charge of a Department for Constitutional Affairs.

As to the last point, that the current Attorney-General is the first one to add into the oath a commitment to the rule of law, of course I share that commitment to the rule of law with him—although I think that our interpretation of what it contains may sometimes differ, but that is not a matter for now. With regard to statute, the Lord Chancellor is in a sui generis position. I continue to think that we have lost something important in the 2005 Act, and I hope that this conversation may continue, but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment this evening.

Attorney General’s Office: Conflicts of Interest

Debate between Lord Hermer and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar

Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, in the other place, the Solicitor-General said that there was a rigorous system for managing conflicts of interest, but she did not say what she meant by a conflict of interest or who decided when one existed; nor did she say whether, because of his work for previous clients, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General has in fact recused himself from personally giving advice to the Government on any current issue. Policy Exchange’s paper has comprehensively shown that none of this involves any breach either of legal privilege or of convention, so please may we have some answers to these questions? What precise definition of an actual or potential conflict of interest is used by the Attorney-General’s Office and who decides when one exists? On what matters has the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General recused himself from personally advising Ministers?

[The Attorney-General (Lord Hermer) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is vital that the public are reassured that the highest standards of propriety are applied by my department, and I welcome the opportunity to answer questions today. As the House will be aware, I am constrained by the law officers’ convention, which prohibits me identifying particular instances in which law officer advice has been sought, even by implication. But I hope that reassurance can be found in the description of the rigorous system for managing conflicts provided by the Solicitor-General in the other place.

May I make it plain that if ever there is or will be reasonable doubt as to whether a law officer should be recused, my department will always err on the side of caution. Compliance with that process has led me to recuse myself from certain matters. As I said, the convention precludes me identifying in those instances, because to do so would inevitably reveal the issues on which advice has been sought. I can assure the House that recusals have no material impact on my department’s work. Where one law officer is conflicted, another is asked to act instead, and I am fortunate to have the support of a Solicitor-General and an Advocate-General for Scotland with highly successful careers in law.