Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Beecham

Thursday 23rd June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hart of Chilton]

I want to make just one contribution to this fascinating debate. The arguments alleging bias are few and far between and almost invariably fail, for the reason that the noble Lord, Lord Newton, gave; that is, it is almost impossible to get to the bottom of whether somebody is biased. The issue here, however, is that, in relation to a planning application, councillors are charged with giving full consideration to all material factors and the local plan, and reaching a decision in the light of the officer’s report that they have received. This is not to preclude councillors saying whatever they want and they can campaign until the cows come home on particular issues, but here we are talking about a particular councillor considering a planning application. Any councillor can go the planning committee, make representations and argue the merits of a case, but we are concerned here with a decision-maker who has said unequivocally that he is on all accounts against a proposal. It does not matter what he has heard; he will be voting against. In those circumstances, how can that person, sitting there and evaluating the application, be deemed to be fulfilling his duty to give due consideration to the application before him? The words rather indicate that, from now on, this will be a bias charter. Those who wish to campaign in that way will always then have a defence, saying, “You cannot indicate that any of the things that I said up to the moment of the application being considered is evidence of bias”. It will now make situations where bias was always difficult to prove almost impossible. Bias in relation to an application considered by councillors is not a proper course to take.

[Lord Beecham]

I recall at Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, speaking very passionately about how one needs to respond to constituents. The assumption is that a councillor will always be on the side of his constituents, but that may not be the case. A councillor may decide that a particular project—let us say, an application for a bail hostel or something of that kind—is one that he, having heard the evidence, would want to support. It might be an incinerator or an abattoir, which may not play terribly well with his constituents. How would those constituents feel, as opposed to the commercial developer who might be the applicant—which is assumed normally to be the case—if they believed that their councillor had made up his mind in favour of something that they did not want without being open to persuasion and hearing their arguments and representations at the decision-making meeting? If one takes that point of view into account, one has the grave concerns which both my noble friends have advanced and which require detailed consideration by the time we get to Report. This is not a one-way street. We have to be very careful about how we might seek to change the balance within what is, as I implied in my earlier intervention, a quasi-judicial function. It is about only those that I think we are concerned.