European Arrest Warrant

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 29th October 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that the United Kingdom is able to opt back into the European Arrest Warrant.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are close to agreeing a package of 35 measures with the European Commission and other member states that the UK will seek to join in the national interest. That package includes the reformed arrest warrant, with increased domestic powers to block arrest warrants where the offence is disproportionately minor or where the relevant conduct that occurred in the UK is not a crime. The discussions continue in Brussels.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

Given that nearly 100 foreign criminals are removed from this country under the European arrest warrant every month, can the Minister give us a guarantee that we will have opted back in by 1 December? When will this be put to the House of Commons? When it is, because of the level of opposition to the European arrest warrant by the Taliban majority of the Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party, will the Government be relying on Labour votes for us to opt in, in the national interest?

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, the noble Lord is right to point to the importance of this; 5,000 foreign criminals have been deported since it came into effect in 2009. Of course the desire is to opt back in by 1 December, but this needs to be negotiated and there need to be agreements. Those negotiations are continuing. Her Majesty’s Government’s position is that we want to be there by 1 December. In terms of when the House will have the opportunity to discuss this, discussions are ongoing between the business managers to make time for that to happen before 20 November.

Parliament Square: Occupy Protests

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I understand the point my noble friend is making, but what is a light touch when you are faced with a protest that begins at 50, grows to 100, and then grows overnight to 150? The potential for that to get out of hand, and the risk to the public, is something which the police clearly take seriously, and they are right to do so.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

What communications were there between Ministers in the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police on the nature of the policing of this protest?

[Lord Bates]

The noble Lord will be aware that as a result of passing the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which this House did, the Home Office published specific guidance, which I have here and which I will place a copy of in the Library, stipulating exactly what was permitted, what was not permitted, what approval needed to be sought and even stating on page nine the enforcement actions which we would ask the police to do. Having done that, and having published it in this place, the police deserve our support.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 28th October 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

46: After Clause 66, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection of children from sexual communications
(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence where A intentionally communicates with another person (“B”) in the following circumstances—
(a) A is aged 18 or over,(b) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13,(c) the content of the communication is sexual or intended to elicit a response that is sexual, and(d) subject to subsection (3) below, A’s purpose in sending the communication or seeking a response is sexual.(2) The communication may be in any form including verbal, written or pictorial (which may include still or moving images) and may be conveyed by any means whatever.
(3) A does not commit the offence in subsection (1) above where the purpose of the communication is for the protection of the child to which the communication is sent.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a person acts for the protection of a child if he acts for the purpose of—
(a) protecting the child from sexually transmitted infection,(b) protecting the physical safety of the child,(c) preventing the child from becoming pregnant, or(d) promoting the child’s emotional well-being by the giving of advice, and not for a sexual purpose.”

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to create an offence where an adult engages in a sexual communication with a child or—this is very important—seeks to elicit from that child a sexual communication in response.

The amendment covers verbal, written or pictorial communication. It includes video communication and it covers all forms of communication whether by telephone, the internet, instant messaging and even gaming systems, such as the Xbox. This brings the law in this part of the United Kingdom into line with the law in Scotland, so this is not new territory. I am grateful to the NSPCC for the discussions and briefings I have had, and I know it has had discussions with a number of other noble Lords on this matter. I note that on Friday it launched an online petition on precisely this issue and that by last night it had already achieved 20,000 signatures, so there is a degree of interest and of belief that this is necessary. Indeed, if you speak to many parents, you come across the argument time and time again about why this is important and their concerns for their teenage and younger children.

The reality is that the current law that purports to cover these issues is fragmented and confused. It makes it hard for the police to bring suitable cases against perpetrators and what legislation there is by and large pre-dates the widespread use of the internet and social networking sites. In practice, the current law fails to recognise the nature of grooming. In grooming the perpetrator is not trying to be offensive to the child, to frighten the child or to intimidate the child. The abuser is trying to flatter the child and to persuade the child that they are the person who matters and the only person who cares for them and, as part of that, to persuade the child to respond to them sexually and send them sexual or indecent communications.

This is a widespread problem. Last year, ChildLine reported an increase of 168% in contacts of this nature. ChildLine is receiving reports daily of large numbers of these cases. For example, a 15 year-old girl was groomed by someone who she thought was 17. In fact, he was 44. She met him through a social networking site, and they chatted online most nights. In his guise as a 17 year-old boy, he said that he was in love with her. He started talking about more sexual things. At first she was not too worried as her friends told her that this was just what boys did. She then sent him a picture of herself naked. He had elicited that picture. At this point, he admitted that in fact he was 44 but said that age did not matter and that he really loved her. When the girl said that she was going to stop the contact, he threatened to share her images on the internet and tell all her friends what she had done. That is a real case from ChildLine of the sort of thing that happens. It would have been quite difficult to take the man concerned to court, as I understand it, on the existing basis.

By contrast, there is a case study from Scotland. It concerns a Mr James Sinclair who was 25. He gave a 14 year-old girl a mobile phone and sent her a series of sexual text messages. The girl’s family found the messages and contacted the police to report the matter. The family had reportedly tried for some time to stop the victim having any contact with the accused, but those efforts proved unsuccessful. Police officers examined her mobile phone and traced and detained the offender. Sinclair was put on the sexual offenders register. Under the current law in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, he could not have been prosecuted because he could have mounted a defence that he did not intend to cause distress or anxiety as the child seemed willingly to engage in the sexualised conversation. That is the context in which we are talking here. The current law is inadequate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I shall try not to intervene too often, given that we are on Report, but I would be grateful for this clarification. The Minister has referred to Section 127 of the Communications Act, which requires the message from the perpetrator to be,

“grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”.

He also referred to Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act where the offence is,

“with intent to cause distress or anxiety”.

In the sorts of cases that I have been talking about, there is no intent to cause distress or anxiety. There is no need to be,

“grossly offensive … indecent, obscene or menacing”,

because this is about coaxing the young person through flattery to send a naked image of themselves. Clearly, if it falls into these categories, there is no question that the Act covers it, but these are communications of a different nature.

[Lord Bates]

I accept that—and this may not endear me to the noble Lord, but I am only halfway through my speech. I will go through some other laws that could catch that particular matter. If it is not the case, I shall certainly come back and address the specific one that he deals with.

It has been pointed out that the Section 1 offence in the Malicious Communications Act is not suitable because it is a summary one and subject to a six-month time limitation on prosecutions. I assure the House that the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill includes an amendment to the 1988 Act, making that offence triable either way, which would have the effect of removing the six-month time limit. The material, depending on the content, could also be caught under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. There was a recent conviction under the Act which captured a paedophilic sexual discussion being held in a private e-mail conversation between paedophiles. This significant conviction demonstrates that the offence can be made out by a publication to one person.

If the contact or messaging involves the creation of indecent photographs of children under the age of 18, legislation such as the Protection of Children Act 1978 could be used against those circulating such images if, for example, an adult is inciting a child to self-produce indecent images. That was a specific issue that the noble Lord focused on. Section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 covers the simple possession of these images. There are a range of offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, including laws on attempting these offences, which would very likely cover this behaviour, its consequences or intended consequences. I shall spare the House a list of all the offences in the 2003 Act that might be engaged, but let me offer one example. Under Section 10 of the 2003 Act it is an offence for a person over 18 to cause or incite a child to engage in sexual activity. This carries a maximum 14-year sentence. Depending on the individual circumstances, this offence would very likely come into play when sexual communications were exchanged with children, or when they were coaxed, or when non-sexual communications were intended to elicit a sexual response.

There are other offences to deal with exploiting children through involvement in pornography and prostitution. I take the point that the noble Baroness took from the example in Manchester. But this is something that is constantly under review, and has to be, as part of wider efforts to tackle this issue. We have had conversations with the Crown Prosecution Service, which does not feel that there is a gap in the law at present. We have had conversations with the national policing lead, who also does not feel that there is a gap at present. These discussions are ongoing, and I will be very happy to include noble Lords—and specifically the noble Lord, Lord Harris, in the context of this amendment, as well as the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe and Lady Benjamin, in some of the discussions with the CPS and the police to see what needs to be done and whether the provisions are sufficiently robust to deal with the specific examples and case studies that they have given.

Even if the messages are not themselves illegal, if their distribution or sending to a child is carried out as part of a course of conduct that alarms the child or causes distress—something raised by a number of noble Lords—this could amount to a criminal offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. On the face of it, therefore, it would appear to be the case that the current law, if applied properly, already does what the amendment seeks to do. We should be very wary of adding new offences to the statute book if to do so would result in an unnecessary and undesirable duplication of the existing criminal law. However, the Government are always open to suggestions that could strengthen the law in this difficult and sensitive area.

I agree with this amendment to the extent that we want to be absolutely sure that offenders who communicate sexual messages to children or elicit sexual replies are appropriately dealt with by the criminal law. We are therefore investigating with the Crown Prosecution Service and the police to ensure that there are no such gaps that could let those who offend against our young people in this manner escape justice. I am very happy to include noble Lords in that discussion. As part of our ongoing consideration of this issue, I have extended that invitation to discuss. I trust therefore that the noble Lord might accept that, in this regard, it is not a “resist” but that the Government are considering carefully what is being proposed, in the light of the existing legislation and to continue that discussion. In the mean time, I ask him to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful for the support that this amendment has had from the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe and Lady Benjamin, as well as my noble friend Lady Smith. The Minister said clearly that he shared its objectives. I have the advantage of seeing his colleagues behind him and I noticed that not only did quite a number of them seem to share the objectives but they were also not entirely convinced by some of his suggestions that these offences were met by the Bill.

I shall deal quickly with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She did not disappoint us in that she made her usual series of very precise and small points on the amendment. I am clear that this is not a professionally drafted amendment or one that would meet all the best requirements of those who sit in garrets in the Home Office or the Ministry of Justice producing these things. My hope was that the Minister would say that there were sufficient points here that he would come back to us at Third Reading with a beautifully professionally drafted amendment. However, I am not sure that the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made were terribly helpful. She talked about the recent amendment on revenge porn. The issue there was publishing material that had been shared in a private capacity more widely because the relationship had broken up. This does not apply in this instance; this is about eliciting an image from a child, not necessarily to share—although that might happen—but simply to obtain the image. So I am not sure that that change necessarily helps us on this issue. I am sure that we could all struggle with defining age and knowledge of age and we could no doubt find ways in which this proposal could be improved. I hope that the Government can accept that there are at least some points here that need to be looked at.

The Minister then went through, as predicted, some of the various sections that we talked about. Most of them require an intent to cause distress or anxiety, or that the matter is grossly offensive, or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character. As I have said repeatedly—I do not think that the Minister has addressed this issue—those are not the circumstances in which such messages are sent. They are sent not to cause offence to the child concerned, but to make children feel sufficiently comfortable to be able to share naked pictures of themselves.

The Minister referred to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity. I appreciate that there is a fine line to be drawn here, but I wonder whether it would be sufficient to achieve a conviction under Section 10 of that Act if all that the perpetrator has done is to persuade the child to stand naked in front of a webcam. No sexual activity is taking place there, so there are some issues around that.

The provision in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 depends on whether the sender knows or ought to know that what is happening amounts to harassment of another. Harassment includes alarming a person or causing a person distress—but the child concerned may not be alarmed or distressed at the point when the actions take place. The child may only realise many years later what they have done, and what the implications are. Again, I am simply not convinced that this is covered. Scotland has legislation covering this point; there is a gap in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

I am disappointed in the Minister’s reply. I take his offer for further consultation at face value, but I am conscious that Third Reading is only just over a week away, and I hope we can make some progress before then. Without that, I would feel that we need to return to these issues at that stage. However, on the basis of the promised discussions, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

47: After Clause 67, insert the following new Clause—
“Protection of children: duty on internet service providers
(1) Internet service providers which provide third parties with any means or mechanisms to store digital content on the internet or other location remote from the third party must consider whether and to what extent the services they provide might be open to abuse by such third parties to store or transmit indecent images of children, contrary to section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (indecent photographs of children).
(2) Where an internet service provider considers that there is a material risk that their network or other facilities could be misused as set out in subsection (1), they must take such reasonable steps as might mitigate, reduce, eliminate or other disrupt said behaviour or restrict access to such images.
(3) In this section, “internet service provider” has the same meaning as in section 124N of the Communication Act 2003 (interpretation).”

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I am grateful to the Lord Chairman for allowing me to collect my thoughts on this amendment while he was going through those other amendments. The purpose of this amendment, which is rather different from that of the previous one, is to create a requirement for an internet service provider that provides a facility for the storage of digital content to consider—no more than that—whether and to what extent that facility might be open to abuse by the storage of indecent images of children. Where the service provider,

“considers that there is a material risk … they must take such reasonable steps as might mitigate, reduce, eliminate or … disrupt”,

such actions.

The context of the amendment is the fact that there are tools available to internet service providers to find out whether such indecent material is contained on their systems. As I am sure noble Lords are aware, images are reduced to digital content as a series of zeroes and ones, so even a very complex image, whether pornographic or otherwise, is simply reduced to a series of zeroes and ones. Most abuse photographs are circulated and recirculated. Many of them are known to the law enforcement authorities, and it is possible for those authorities to search for identical images, so that they know whether a particular image has appeared before, and in what circumstances.

However, I am told that increasingly, abusers are making tiny changes to images—sometimes no more than one pixel—so that the images are not identical, and are not picked up in the same way by those methods. However, I understand that Microsoft has developed a system called PhotoDNA, which it is making available free to providers. This converts images into greyscale and breaks the greyscale image down into a grid. Then each individual square on the grid is given what is called a histogram of intensity gradients; essentially, that decides how grey each square is. The signature based on those values provides a hash value, as they call it, which is unique to that particular image—I appreciate that these are technical terms, and until I started looking into this I did not know about them either. This technique allows people to identify images that are essentially the same.

Until now, the way to identify which images are essentially the same is that some poor police officer or analyst has had to look at all the images concerned. But it is now possible to do that automatically. Because the technology can operate in a robust fashion, it can identify what images are appearing, and whether they are essentially the same. It is not possible to recreate the image concerned from that PhotoDNA signature; it is only possible to scan systems or databases for signature matches. What is more, because the data for each signature are so small, the technology can scan a large volume of images extremely quickly. Apparently there is a 98% recognition rate.

I have gone through that in some detail simply to illustrate that there are such techniques available. I believe that Google is working on something—which would, of course, have to be bigger and more complex than what has been produced by Microsoft—which will do the same for videos. It will then be possible to identify similar videos in the same fashion.

The benefit of these techniques is that they make it possible for ISPs to trawl their entire database—to trawl what people are storing online and to identify whether some of the previously known indecent images are in the system. They will then be able to see whether there is a package, or a pattern, and whether particular users are storing more than others. That then gives them the opportunity to raise that issue with law enforcement officials or take disruptive action, perhaps by withdrawing service from that user.

The benefits of the specific technology are that humans do not have to scan the individual images. A number of noble Lords have seen the suites used by CEOP or New Scotland Yard whereby a row of police officers sit viewing indecent images of child pornography, which is distressing for those officers and possibly harmful to them in the long term. That does not need to happen in this case. The service providers do not have to store the images that they are matching to carry out this exercise because all they are storing are the DNA hash values of the images concerned, and they are therefore not exposing themselves to potential charges as far as that is concerned. The technology makes this comparatively easy and simple to do and does not involve a great deal of data. It also means that the service providers are not interfering in any way with the privacy of their users other than to check, in this anonymised way where they do not view the images, that no images contained there are of known child pornography.

The purpose of this amendment is to place an obligation on service providers to make use of these technologies as they are developed. Some providers already do this and are willing to do this. I think that Facebook has quite a good record as far as this is concerned. However, the amendment would place an obligation on all of them to consider whether they should use these techniques. As I say, in this instance Microsoft is making the technology and the system available free to providers.

Before the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, goes through whatever drafting faults the amendment may contain, I should point out why I think it is important. In our discussions just three months ago on the DRIPA legislation it was suggested that one of the reasons why the relevant changes were being made was to provide service providers with legal cover against legal challenge in other countries in which people asked why they were allowing law enforcement officials to do these things. The amendment would provide some legal cover for those service providers—in exactly the same way as the DRIPA legislation does—against challenges that this measure somehow infringes the freedom of speech of people who want to store pornographic images of children. The purpose of this amendment is to require service providers to consider whether or not they might be at risk of this misuse and then to take appropriate reasonable steps using the best available techniques to,

“mitigate, reduce, eliminate or … disrupt”,

it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak in support of Amendment 47 of the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Some may take the view that internet service providers cannot be held responsible for information that people use them to hold. Although, in my view, ISPs certainly do not have responsibility for generating content, they do, however, play a very important role in facilitating it: first, in the sense that storage protects the material in question and thereby helps to guarantee its continued existence; and, secondly, in the sense of providing a basis from which the said material may be transmitted. In so doing, they have a responsibility actively to take all reasonable steps to ensure, on an ongoing basis, that they are not facilitating the storage and/or transmission of material of the kind set out in subsection (1) of the clause proposed in the amendment.

For myself, I would also like ISPs to have to demonstrate that these active steps have indeed been taken, and are being taken, on an ongoing basis. We must foster a legislative framework that exhibits zero tolerance of all aspects of child sex abuse images, including ISPs facilitating the storage and/or transmission of such images. I very much look forward to listening to what the Minister has to say in his response to this important amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is absolutely right again, in the sense that technology is the problem and therefore technology needs to offer the solution. Simply put, the numbers and the scale—of course, she has had those briefings and I have had them, too—are both distressing and mind-blowing in terms of their reach. As the technology is not limited to, and does not respect, geographies or jurisdictions, the matter is a global one. Therefore, we need to work very closely with the industry to ensure that this can be done.

I want to cover some of the issues that are being addressed at present which noble Lords may not be aware of. We recognise the concerns that the noble Lord has raised about the use of the internet to store and circulate indecent images of children. We fully accept that more needs to be done to address this issue, but I hope to be able to persuade the noble Lord that legislation is not required at this point, although we continue to keep that option under review.

We believe that the internet industry operating in the UK has taken significant steps, on a self-regulatory basis, to tackle the availability of indecent images online. The internet industry in the UK has worked closely for many years with the Internet Watch Foundation and the Child Exploitation and Online Protection command of the National Crime Agency to tackle illegal images. We recognise the support that responsible internet service providers have given to the Internet Watch Foundation, both financially and through taking action on the Internet Watch Foundation’s list of web pages identified as containing illegal images by either taking down such sites, if they are hosted in the UK, or blocking access to them if they are overseas.

The public and businesses can report images to the Internet Watch Foundation, which assesses them and determines whether they are illegal. Indeed, the Internet Watch Foundation took more than 51,000 reports from all sources last year. If the site containing the image is hosted in the UK, the details will be passed to law enforcement agencies, and the ISP will be asked to take down the web page using the “notice and take down” process. In 2013, the Internet Watch Foundation found that 47% of UK child abuse web pages were removed within 60 minutes. Thanks to the work of the Internet Watch Foundation, and the internet industry, less than 1% of the global total of indecent images of children is hosted in the UK.

However, we are not complacent, and we recognise the need to adapt to changing uses of technology by paedophiles. As the Prime Minister made clear in his speech to the NSPCC in July last year, we need to do more to eradicate these images from the internet and, in particular, ensure that the internet industry plays its full part in doing so. We have been working closely with the industry, and with its support we believe that significant steps have been taken towards removing these images. We have asked internet search engine providers such as Google—which was referred to by the noble Baroness and also by the noble Lord—and Microsoft to make changes to their search mechanisms, and these measures have been effective in preventing access to child abuse images.

We are also creating a new child abuse image database, using much of the same technology that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, referred to in setting out and introducing his amendment. This will enable the police to identify known images more quickly on suspects’ computers and will improve their ability to identify and safeguard victims from the images. A key part of this is not just about lining up prosecutions by identifying these images or getting the images taken down; it is about realising that the children behind them are vulnerable victims and need to be protected and get the help and support that they need.

Not only do we want the industry to remove such images, we want it to use its technical skills and capability to help develop the technical solutions to prevent the dissemination of these images online. The Home Office and the US Department of Justice have created a taskforce that provides a platform for industry to develop technical solutions to online child sexual exploitation. This work is ongoing under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Shields.

The UK will host a summit in December on online child exploitation. We have invited representatives of key partner Governments and organisations, including the internet industry, to participate in the summit, which will focus on protecting the victims of online child abuse and examine how we can work internationally to prevent children being exploited online.

The Government are very clear that those who provide services online, particularly those where images can be stored—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, made—have a responsibility to take action to prevent those services being used for the purposes of storing and sharing indecent images of children. In that regard, as she rightly said, we should have zero tolerance. We believe that internet service providers operating in the UK have a good record in this respect, both through their support for the Internet Watch Foundation and through the actions that they are taking to support the Prime Minister’s call for action.

Against this background of good co-operation and progress at present, we believe that the current system of self-regulation has been effective, and we are not persuaded at this time that more would be achieved by placing a legal requirement on these companies. In that regard I hope that, having heard the progress that has been made and our undertaking to keep this under review, the noble Lord will feel sufficiently reassured to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and my noble friend Lady Smith for the support that they have given to this amendment. To the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I say that, as I am not doing this on behalf of the Government or anyone else, I am not engaged in a lengthy process of consultation with internet service providers, but I would make the point that this is a very soft change. It is simply asking them to consider and, where they think there is a material risk, to take reasonable steps. It is difficult to imagine any internet service provider, unless it wants to provide a service for expressly illicit purposes, finding this difficult.

I am of course encouraged by what the Minister has described. Most of it does not in fact apply to the issues that I have raised, because this is about images stored for private purposes rather than public purposes. The web page stuff and the work of the Internet Watch Foundation, with which I am very familiar—I think I am an ambassador or a champion; I cannot quite recall what the certificate says—are clearly about public-facing material which people may access. All that work is extremely good. I accept that many internet service providers are extremely responsible and are operating as one would hope in a self-regulatory way. I think this would have helped encourage those that are not being quite so public-spirited or sensitive to these issues to be more so in the future.

However, in the light of the Minister’s undertakings that this is something that will continue to be looked at, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Foreign National Offenders

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I hear that. The Government will make their announcements in due course. Of course, just because we are not part of the Schengen agreement in terms of the movement of people does not mean that we cannot share information. That will be helpful not only to this country but to the countries in the Schengen area.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Smith told us that on occasion people have not been deported because the airline tickets have not been booked. Will the Minister tell us how many cases of that have taken place, and whose responsibility should it be to book those tickets?

[Lord Bates]

I think that the figure was taken from a couple of case studies mentioned in the NAO report; they are not actually grouped. But we absolutely recognise that there needs to be better co-ordination across government and that is why we now have a cross-government team that comes under the National Security Council taking this issue seriously, taking it forward and introducing the measures that we have put forward.

Police Reform

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That takes us back to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I think that I explained that the issue appears different from different points of view. I am not sure that a change in size or relocating a responsibility to a regional level or whatever would necessarily lead to more effective policing—in fact, my own prejudice suggests that it would not. However, I agree with the noble Lord’s dictum. It goes back further than Jim Callaghan to Peel himself, who said that the people are the police and the police should be the people. That is the concept that lies behind the British police force, which certainly differs from police forces in other parts of the world.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, we are grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement and for telling us of this blizzard of inquiries that the Home Secretary is setting up—I see him shaking his hand as though he feels that that is being pejorative. The point to which I hope the Minister will respond is that these are all interrelated issues; they have an impact on each other. Single, separate inquiries are not necessarily the best way to resolve all these matters. There is a question of how all this will be made to cohere and to be effective in delivering the sort of police service that I am sure all noble Lords want.

The Minister also referred to requirements that would be placed on the police to report—I think that it was in relation to whistleblowers and what happens to the issues that they report. Does the Minister agree with me, with those in Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and with those in the Independent Police Complaints Commission who think that one aid to transparency would be the proper recording by the police of those instances in which they use restraint or force against members of the public, and for those statistics to be publicly available so as to be measured against any complaints that may be received?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

When I was waving my hand, I was not making an offensive or hostile gesture to the noble Lord, Lord Harris; I just wanted to explain that they are not inquiries but reviews. They are reviews that are taking place with the Home Office. He wanted to know how the reviews would work together. They are all short term and are designed to report within the next six months, with some even shorter, in order to bring together, as the noble Lord quite rightly pointed out, the parallel policy formation that will be necessary to make sure that we have coherence.

On the accountability of restraint, I will suggest that that is something that the College of Policing could consider. It is the sort of issue on which it quite rightly makes recommendations and issues guidelines. I am sure that it will be interested in the noble Lord’s comments, but I cannot comment today.

Child Abuse

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the two inquiries that the Home Secretary has announced are of course welcome. Does the Minister recognise that an eight-week review into an existing review into whether the Home Office handled things properly and a more wide-ranging inquiry into whether public and other bodies have carried out their duty of care will not address the central, corrosive concern that is all over today’s newspapers, which is that it is not just about celebrities who have managed to get away with child abuse over many decades, but about people in power—Members of your Lordships’ House, Members of the other place and former Members of the other place? How will these processes address and restore the confidence that people in power are not being allowed to get away with things?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The inquiry will be entirely independent and able to make whatever recommendations it makes without fear or favour. I would not be supportive, and I do not think this House would be, of anything that smacked of a cover up. This is about finding the truth and making the truth evident. If people have done wrong in the past, that will be revealed by the inquiry. The review is designed to check that all aspects of the review conducted by Mark Sedwill, in the first instance, and the review into the Paedophile Information Exchange were properly conducted and whether there were any failures in the Home Office. I should say that the inquiry that Mark Sedwill set up found no evidence of wrongdoing by prominent figures. However, that is not to say that it will not be discovered; that is a matter for the inquiry to find out when it comes to it.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

3: Clause 7, page 7, line 3, at end insert—
“13C Application of assets arising from the proceeds of crime to investigating, prosecuting or enforcement authorities
Any proceeds of crime in the form of assets arising from the operation of Part 1 of this Act shall be applied equally to the investigating, prosecuting and enforcement authorities for reinvestment in the communities and neighbourhoods affected by the relevant criminal act.”

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, aren’t we doing well? When was the last time that we got through the first seven clauses of a Home Office Bill within an hour of starting Committee stage? The Minister must be doing something right on this occasion.

However, I will try to improve our batting average now. At Second Reading, I declared my interest as chair of the National Trading Standards Board. In that capacity, I was invited four months ago by Yeading Junior School to attend an assembly that was based around lesson plans which had been funded by the Proceeds of Crime Act. The lesson plans were produced by the Illegal Money Lending Team for England, based in Birmingham, which my board funds. They were designed to teach junior school children how to use their money, how to save, how they should avoid debt and, above all, how they and their families should avoid loan sharks.

The Minister’s right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education, with whom I know his department has a continuing feud, would no doubt be delighted to discover that those nine and 10 year-olds put on a play that included a section on avoiding loan sharks conducted entirely in Latin—which is not something that I thought many children in the London Borough of Hillingdon were used to speaking. None the less, it was an interesting performance; it was not, I hasten to add, a core part of the lesson plans produced by the Illegal Money Lending Team.

The point about the initiative was that it inspired young children to learn about the dangers of them and their families being ensnared by loan sharks. The funding for it had been provided by POCA moneys taken from loan sharks who had been convicted in the courts. It is an example of some of the community work that the Illegal Money Lending Team supports through funds confiscated from loan sharks, but it also demonstrates the value that can be gained from the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

It is clearly a valuable and important mechanism, and I think that all noble Lords who have spoken in Committee today share a desire to see it strengthened. It is good, because it hits criminals where it hurts most: in their pocket. They are often less concerned about the formal penalties that they might incur than the fact that their ill gotten gains will be taken from them.

The Minister has told us how the Bill will make it more difficult for criminals to evade confiscation. That is all to the good and welcome—although, as we have heard, there are possibilities for making the provisions stronger and no doubt we will continue to pursue them as the Bill proceeds. This amendment would ensure that a greater share of the assets recovered from offenders was reinvested in the communities and neighbourhoods affected by their criminal activities and that those funds should be put towards preventing crime and addressing its consequences.

At Second Reading the Minister said that there would be a review of ARIS, which on this occasion is the asset recovery incentive scheme rather than a foreign terrorist organisation with a similar name,

“to ensure that it works to support front-line agencies”.—[Official Report, 16/6/14; col. 697.]

When the Minister responds, I hope that we will have some clarification from the Government about the terms of the review and whether they will consider placing ARIS on a formal legislative basis and allow local authorities in particular—although the same arguments apply to the police—in their role both as investigating authorities but also as prosecuting authorities to receive a greater share of the proceeds of crime. The most likely use of these funds is that they would be applied within local government to funding accredited financial investigators in trading standards and community crime prevention projects. They could also support community crime prevention projects that had proved very successful.

The amendment would place ARIS on a formal legislative basis and would allow local authorities in their roles as both investigating and often prosecuting authorities to receive potentially more than 50% in the division of the proceeds of crime, which could then be applied to crime prevention. The most common use of the incentive payments that local authorities receive is to fund the posts of accredited financial investigators. The reason that these are important is that they make a very significant contribution to the work of trading standards. They enhance investigations by providing intelligence support. They undertake the money-laundering investigations and ensure that the proceeds of crime are recovered through confiscation and cash forfeiture.

There are a number of examples of the positive work that accredited financial investigators do. This includes dealing with landlords who have illegally converted properties into houses of multiple occupancy and then rented them to vulnerable members of the community. I believe that the London Borough of Hounslow prosecuted a case such as this in 2010, which resulted in a confiscation order of £180,000. There are also examples where one of these accredited financial investigators has had an essential role in identifying the victims, resulting in them being compensated. What often happens in these cases is that a lot of material is seized but it requires detailed financial investigation to track down where the moneys have come from and who has actually been defrauded by the fraudsters concerned. A major case was undertaken by Cambridgeshire County Council involving rogue traders, which resulted in the successful prosecution of 15 defendants, who between them received combined prison sentences of 40 years and were served with a £250,000 compensation order—all of which was then paid to the victims who had been defrauded of their life savings.

The reason why the incentivisation scheme is so important—here I am talking about local authorities but exactly the same arguments apply to the police—is that it enables them to fund the specialist resource to pursue some of the financial aspects. It means that the financial investigation can be integrated into the rest of the investigation right at the beginning. That is much more cost-effective than pursuing it at the end of the investigation to see whether assets can be saved. It also means that there is much more depth in the investigation that takes place. It is important to see if the provisions can be strengthened in that way.

The London Borough of Enfield has used the money that it has obtained from the Prevention of Crime Act scheme since 2011 to fund a specific post. That has had a series of impacts: it has allowed it to undertake the first prosecution nationally for money laundering against an illegal poker den, where the defendant was sentenced to 15 months, and to provide financial evidence in a case against a trader convicted of operating a fraudulent HGV training school, resulting in a 44-month conviction following a month-long trial. There is a series of examples of where the presence right at the beginning of an accredited financial investigator has enabled the local authority to pursue the case in much more depth and enable it to go forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have been trying to think of a nice adjective to describe the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. I know that he did not really like me calling him mischievous. However, this amendment has been very worth while because it has enabled the House to discuss this matter. The noble Baroness is absolutely right; along with other noble Lords, I was not particularly aware of the working of this mechanism, so it has been useful to have this debate. The description the noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave of how the system works is absolutely right; it is dealt with under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme, ARIS, which was introduced in 2006 to replace the previous police incentivisation scheme.

The objective of the scheme is to provide law enforcement agencies with incentives to boost asset recovery as a contribution to reducing crime and delivering justice by giving them a direct stake in the proceeds they generate from that work. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was very useful; I do not care whether his sentences are short or long, they are of high value. It was an extremely interesting contribution, as were the contributions of all noble Lords, including that of my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury. They were very much to the point, because making the most of the potential of this money is really important. The scheme is a non-statutory mechanism which has advantages for returning to law enforcement, prosecution agencies and the courts a proportion of the assets they recover. Public bodies with the functions of an investigator, a prosecutor or an enforcement authority can use the powers within POCA to recover criminal assets and can become part of the scheme thereby.

It is also important to remember that the scheme does not just apply to money recovered under confiscation orders but also, as the noble Lord demonstrated, to assets recovered through the other routes to recover assets provided for in the Proceeds of Crime Act, such as the seizure and forfeiture of cash, the civil recovery scheme and the taxation of criminal proceeds. Under the existing scheme, for assets recovered by means of a confiscation order, the Home Office retains 50% of the recovery receipts and returns the remainder to investigation agencies, which receive an 18.75% share of the receipts, prosecution agencies, which also receive an 18.75% share of the receipts, and enforcement agencies—in most cases this is the Courts Service—which receive a 12.5% share of the receipts. For cases where cash has been forfeited under the cash seizure powers in the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Home Office retains 50% of the receipts and the investigative agency—in the majority of cases this is the police, but it is not always so—retains the other 50%.

The use to which each agency decides to put the money received under the scheme is a matter for that agency. Because amounts received through asset recovery are unpredictable, and given that it depends on the nature of the cases dealt with by each agency each year, we have not laid down any specific guidance on the use of such money. However, we have previously expressed a desire that the money should be reinvested in asset recovery work to drive up performance. I sense that noble Lords would feel that that is the right thing to do. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, made clear her support for the needs for resources to drive up performance. My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury felt that that was a primary objective for this money. But also, when appropriate, it can fund local crime-fighting priorities on behalf of the benefit of the community.

The Home Office has monitored the scheme annually since its inception. The results of that monitoring show that more than 90% of money distributed through the scheme is reinvested in asset recovery work, such as the recruitment of financial investigators. If we get more money, we will be able to have more investigators—and I think that everybody can see that this vicious circle could be a virtuous circle, if we implement it correctly. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, these investigators carry out the recovery work, and there is a balance that can be spent on police operations and community projects. Some examples of the community work that has been paid for include alcohol awareness and crime reduction projects, mentoring programmes and assistance for elderly and vulnerable people. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, gave a classic example of community work in the confiscation of money. His own field case, which he also mentioned, is a very good example.

Over the past three years, more than £238 million has been returned to front-line agencies. However, we believe that the proposed changes that are being made in the Bill will ensure that agencies are able to apply for and enforce more orders more successfully. This in turn should lead to more funds being received by front-line agencies through the scheme. The share of the money that is retained by the Home Office forms part of the department’s core budget line and, as such, is put towards the delivery of front-line services through mechanisms such as police grant.

One key objective of the Government’s criminal finances improvement plan, which was published on 19 June, is to ensure that the Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme works effectively for front-line agencies. It is with that in mind that the review has been set up, and we intend to complete it by the end of the year. I hope that it will please noble Lords to note that the emerging findings from the review will be presented to the board in September, so if this Bill takes its normal course we should be able to update the House on Report on how that review is going.

The noble Lord asked about the terms of the review. The whole purpose is to investigate the process and see how we can make it better. It is being developed with the aim of ensuring that the scheme works effectively for all agencies charged with asset recovery responsibilities. All will be involved. For example, the Local Government Association will be a consultee within the process, with anyone else who is currently involved in the asset recovery process.

I was asked—or rather, challenged, “Is it appropriate to leave an organisation for distributing money on this non-statutory basis, or should we consider a statutory alternative?.” I think that the debate has shown that there are ways of making the process work well without a statutory basis. But of course, that is the sort of thing that any review should properly consider.

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, will be generous and withdraw his amendment. We in our turn are grateful to him for giving us the opportunity of describing the working of ARIS, and the review that we have in mind.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I am also grateful to the other noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate, especially the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his comments on hypothecation. I have always appreciated—although this may be a difficult thing for someone with his religious commitment to hear—that he is something of a heretic in such matters. His is a heresy that I share, in terms of making things happen, and in the belief that a bit of hypothecation can sometimes mean that we achieve results all over the place.

Some of the points that have been made require a moment’s clarification. I do not think that the identification of neighbourhoods, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, is necessarily a problem. As the Minister has made clear, 90% of the money distributed through the incentivisation scheme is ploughed back into financial investigators; the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, also made that point. Only a small proportion goes beyond there, and the authorities concerned, whether they are local authorities or the police, make good use of it. I was involved with the board of the Safer London Foundation, which made very good use of the Proceeds of Crime Act moneys that the police received, in connection with local community projects around London. The authorities concerned spend a great deal of time in deciding what is and is not an appropriate use of those resources.

The important point behind the amendment is the need to think carefully about how we maximise the money recovered, and I hope the review will do that. I know that the Minister is part of a wing of the Government that is committed to the reduction of taxes, but in this context there is, essentially, a 50% tax, because the money goes into either the Home Office or the Treasury, depending on the precise route—although I rather suspect that the Home Office does not “feel” the money that comes back to it, because it all disappears into the Treasury and goes through into the main funding of the Home Office.

If 50% of the money is retained by the Home Office or the Treasury, there may be little incentive for the agencies concerned to pursue complicated financial investigations that are not essential to achieving a conviction but are additional to achieving a conviction. If the proportion distributed through the incentivisation scheme were higher, substantially more money might be recovered, because people would be incentivised, and would say, “This really is worth investing those resources in”. The Home Office and the Treasury might then find that they got more resources rather than less. I hope that the review will consider these issues, and I look forward to hearing—perhaps by Report—about its developing findings. On that basis I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2014

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Thursday 19th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move that the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2014, which was laid before this House on 16 June, be approved. The five groups named in the order are the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known as ISIL, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS; Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi, THKP-C; Kateeba al-Kawthar, KaK; Abdallah Azzam Brigades, including the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions, AAB; and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, PFLP-GC. We propose to add these groups to the list of international terrorist organisations, amending Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. This is the 15th proscription order under that Act.

All five groups have links to the conflict in Syria, which is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world. Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist activity is not tolerated wherever it happens. The reality is that the Syria conflict has seen a proliferation of terrorist groups, with multiple aims and ideologies, and little regard for international borders. For example, in the past week we have seen significantly increased violent activity in Iraq by ISIL. Today, the UK is proscribing terrorist organisations that support the Assad regime, those that are fighting against it and those with ambitions beyond Syria that have taken advantage of the collapse of security and the rule of law.

Terrorism, from or connected to Syria, will pose a threat to the UK for the foreseeable future. Travelling to Syria for jihad can provide individuals with access to training, combat experience, a network of extremist contacts and a reputation that can substantially increase the threat that those individuals pose on return to the UK. The threat from returning foreign fighters was clearly demonstrated by the case of Mehdi Nemmouche. He is believed to have spent at least a year in Syria during which time he developed connections with ISIL before returning to Europe. He is the prime suspect in a shooting on 24 May at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in which three people died. Another person subsequently died of their injuries.

The Government advise against all travel to Syria. Anyone who travels there, for whatever reason, is putting themselves and others in considerable danger. Syrians have been clear that they want aid and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, not foreign fighters. Both the regime and extremist groups have attacked humanitarian aid workers. The best way to help Syrians is not to travel, but to donate or volunteer with UK-registered charities that have ongoing relief operations.

We are committed to finding a political settlement to the conflict that will deliver a sustainable, inclusive transition process and allow the country to rebuild, communities to heal and extremism to be rejected. We will also continue to back the moderate Syrian opposition, which is a bulwark against the terrorism of the extremists and the tyranny of the Assad regime.

The Government are determined to do all that we can to minimise the threat from terrorism from Syria, Iraq and elsewhere to the UK and our interests abroad. Those who travel to Syria to engage in terrorism face prosecution on their return. We are investing resources in understanding individuals’ motivation for travel and how they are being recruited and then using this to inform public messaging and community events to deter individuals from travelling to Syria in the first place. Our operational partners are disrupting those individuals intent on fighting in Syria, using the range of tools available. For example, following his return from Syria, Mashudur Choudhury was successfully prosecuted for engaging in conduct in preparation of terrorist acts. We are working intensively with international partners to improve border security in the region. Four groups operating in Syria are already proscribed.

Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is currently concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Home Secretary takes a number of factors into account. These are: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the United Kingdom and to British nationals overseas; the organisation’s presence in the United Kingdom; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

Proscription in effect outlaws a listed organisation and makes it unable to operate in the UK. Belonging to, inviting support for or arranging a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation is a criminal offence; as is wearing clothing or carrying articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. Proscription can also support other disruptive activity, such as the use of immigration powers such as exclusion, prosecutions for other offences, messaging and EU asset freezes.

The Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after a thorough review of the available relevant information and evidence on the organisation. This includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-Whitehall proscription review group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of the particular case and must be approved by both Houses.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that ISIL, THKP-C, KaK, AAB and PFLP-GC are currently concerned in terrorism. As noble Lords will appreciate, I am unable to comment on specific intelligence. However, I can provide a brief summary of each group’s activities in turn.

ISIL is a brutal Sunni Islamist terrorist group active in Iraq and Syria. The group adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. ISIL aims to establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in the region and uses violence and intimidation to impose its extremist ideology on civilians. ISIL was previously proscribed as part of al-Qaeda. However, on 2 February 2014, AQ senior leadership issued a statement officially severing ties with ISIL. This prompted consideration of the case to proscribe ISIL in its own right.

The House will also be aware that ISIL not only poses a threat from within Syria but has, in the past two weeks, made significant advances in Iraq. The threat from ISIL in Iraq and Syria is very serious and shows clearly the importance of taking a strong stand against the extremists. We are also aware that approximately 400 British nationals have travelled to Syria and some of these will inevitably be fighting with ISIL. It appears that ISIL is treating Iraq and Syria as one theatre of conflict, and its potential ability to operate across the border must be a cause of great concern for the whole international community.

In April 2014, ISIL claimed responsibility for a series of blasts targeting a Shia election rally in Baghdad. These attacks are reported to have killed at least 31 people. Thousands of Iraqi civilians lost their lives to sectarian violence in 2013, and attacks carried out by ISIL will have accounted for a large proportion of these deaths. ISIL has reportedly detained dozens of foreign journalists and aid workers. In September 2013, members of the group kidnapped and killed the commander of Ahrar ash-Sham after he intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity. In January 2014, ISIL captured the Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, and it is engaged in ongoing fighting with the Iraqi security forces. The group has also claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik.

ISIL has a strong presence in northern and eastern Syria, where it has instituted strict Sharia law in the towns under its control. The group is responsible for numerous attacks and a vast number of deaths. The group is believed to attract foreign fighters, including westerners, to the region. The group has maintained control of various towns on the Syrian-Turkish border, allowing the group to control who crosses, and its presence there has interfered with the free flow of humanitarian aid. ISIL is designated as a terrorist group by both Canada and Australia, and as an alias of AQ by the US, New Zealand and the UN.

THKP-C translates as the People’s Liberation Party/Front of Turkey. It is a left-wing organisation formed in 1994. THKP-C is a pro-Assad militia group fighting in Syria and has developed increased capability since the Syrian insurgency. THKP-C is assessed to have been involved in an attack in Reyhanli, Turkey, in May 2013, killing more than 50 people and injuring more than 100. The leader of the group, Mihrac Ural, holds Syrian citizenship and was born in the southern province of Hatay, where the organisation has always been most prominent. Ural has formed a number of other groups under the THKP-C umbrella including Mukavamet Suriye—Syrian Resistance—which is reported to have been responsible for the recent Baniyas massacre, killing at least 145 people.

KaK describes itself as a group of mujaheddin from more than 20 countries seeking a “just” Islamic nation. KaK is an armed terrorist group fighting to establish an Islamic state in Syria. The group is aligned to the most extreme groups operating in Syria and has links to al-Qaeda. KaK is believed to attract a number of western foreign fighters and has released YouTube footage encouraging travel to Syria and asking Muslims to support the fighters.

AAB is an Islamist militant group aligned with al-Qaeda and the global jihad movement. It is currently fighting in Syria and Lebanon. The group began operating in Pakistan in 2009. Its Lebanese branch uses the name the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalion, named after the Lebanese 9/11 hijacker Ziyad al-Jarrah, who participated in the hijacking and crash of United Airlines flight 93. Since the onset of the Syrian insurgency, AAB has increased its operational pace. It claimed responsibility for a rocket attack launched from Lebanon into northern Israel in August 2013. On 19 November 2013, the brigade claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut, which killed at least 22 people and wounded more than 140.

The group’s media wing announced on Twitter and YouTube on 19 February 2014 that the group claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings near the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut, killing 11 and wounding 130, in revenge for actions by Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. The group has threatened to launch further terrorist attacks and has demanded that the Lebanese Government free imprisoned jihadists. It has also threatened attacks on western targets in the Middle East. The group was listed as a terrorist group by the US in May 2012.

PFLP-GC is a left-wing nationalist Palestinian militant organisation based in Syria. The group is separate from the similarly named Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. From its inception, the group has been a Syrian proxy. PFLP-GC has been fighting in the Syrian war in support of Assad, including in the Yarmouk refugee camp in July 2013. The group also issued statements in support of the Syrian Government, Hezbollah and Iran. PFLP-GC has been designated as a terrorist group by the USA, Canada, Israel and the European Union.

In conclusion, I believe it is right that we add these groups—ISIL, THKP-C, KaK, AAB and PFLP-GC—to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Subject to the agreement of the House, the order will come into force on Friday 20 June.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his very helpful and detailed introduction of the order. Indeed, it was so detailed that I think he read almost verbatim the entire Explanatory Memorandum in terms of the details of the groups concerned. I agree absolutely with his analysis of the unpleasantness, nastiness and danger of these groups.

However, my reason for speaking is that I have never quite understood the purpose of proscribing organisations in this way. First, the organisations concerned have a capacity to change their names and identities with remarkable rapidity and ease. Does proscription mean that, if any of those organisations change their names or identities, a new proscription order must be found?

Secondly, what additional and valuable powers does the order actually give over the individuals who may be covered by such proscription? For example, in the various cases that the Minister cited, he talked about individuals who have fought as part of those groups overseas and might be returning to this country. Are they not therefore covered by other offences under the Terrorism Act, which means that, in fact, the key issue would be their combatant status elsewhere, engaging in and promoting acts of terrorism elsewhere?

Then there is the question of what the order actually covers. It would now be a criminal offence for a person to belong to those organisations. Which of them have an explicit membership? Surely the issue here is one of association rather than membership. I cannot believe that the extremely nasty Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has a membership card. I cannot believe that it has a formal roster of members. There may be a series of people who are associated with it, who have fought with it or worked with it, but I do not believe that it is likely to have a membership structure. I may be wrong; it may be that some of these organisations have a membership structure, but it would be useful to know from the Minister which of them do.

It will become a criminal offence to arrange a meeting to support a proscribed organisation. When, in respect of each of those organisations, has anyone organised a meeting in support of them? By a meeting, does the Minister mean a public meeting or does he mean a gathering of like-minded individuals? If it is the latter, I see that the order might have some function, but I wonder whether there have been public meetings organised in that way.

Finally, I ask about the proscription on wearing clothing or carrying articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of one of those organisations. I have already made the point about whether those organisations have membership, but what would constitute clothing or articles that may be carried in public that would arouse that suspicion? If they have a membership badge which reads, “I am a member”, no doubt that is covered, but I do not think that that is what the Minister is talking about. Is it a scarf in a particular colour? Is it a particular style of dress? It would be helpful to have some clarity as to what that means in practice.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey, I thank the Minister for his explanation today—and for writing to me earlier this week with the details of the Government’s proposals and much of the information that he gave today.

This is not the first time that such an order has been debated in your Lordships’ House—by my reckoning, it is the fifth such order that I have been involved in debating—but it is right that we have an opportunity to have a serious debate, so I appreciate the time that the Minister took to put on record the information that he did, because the proscription of any group or organisation is not a matter to be taken lightly.

The Government have to be confident that the information that has led them to propose proscription is robust, accurate and up-to-date. This is a very tough measure. As my noble friend Lord Harris just said, it makes it illegal to belong to or in any way support a listed organisation, so it can be used only when it is essential to protect the national interest. Although as the Official Opposition we do not have access to the same security and intelligence information as is available to Ministers, we base our judgment in support of proscription orders on the assurances of Ministers. That is why we are grateful for the explanation given by the Minister today, and why we support the order before us today.

A group can be proscribed under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 if it,

“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism, or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism”.

The Minister spoke of the care taken by the Home Secretary in considering these matters. I would also place on record some kind of tribute to or appreciation of those agencies that undertake the gathering of such evidence. That obviously takes considerable time and requires painstaking attention to detail, while of course at times it can be very dangerous to seek to gather such information.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by declaring my interests. I advise Lockheed Martin and UK Broadband, which have interests in the policing sector. I chair the National Trading Standards Board and I co-chair the All-Party Group on Policing.

Following on from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Henley, while we have to look at this Bill, there is a danger—the noble Lord, Lord Henley, called it “legislation for legislation’s sake”—that some of the content of the Bills we receive in this Session is being rather oversold. The Bills are no doubt worthy, but they do not necessarily address the major issues that they purport to address.

I suppose that is symptomatic of this stage of a fixed-term Parliament, with an ill-matched coalition whose members loathe each other and can barely mask their disagreements—that is just the Lib Dems. On the Conservative side of the coalition of course, we know there is perfect harmony. Indeed, not a scintilla of difference can be detected between the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Education. Indeed, they are so united that they did not have to go through the charade, like Nick Clegg and Vince Cable, of having a pint together, which incidentally sets a very poor example for hard-working families of drinking during the working day. Mrs May and Mr Gove have none the less to go through a series of rituals: a ritual exchange of written apologies, the ritual firing of a special adviser or two—not that firing a special adviser does anything to solve the problems. One has only to look at the front page of today’s Times to realise that. Now all is sweetness and light between the two departments. The briefing campaign is apparently over. Or is it? I detect a guerrilla war going on between the advisers of the different government departments concerned. We have all seen the Home Office briefing on the Bill. It tells us that the purpose of the Bill is,

“to ensure we can continue to effectively and relentlessly pursue”.

Take that, Mr Gove: see how we have split the infinitive to show how pointless is your crusade for back-to-basics education. This is the level to which infighting in the Government has gone.

The Bill is the usual ragbag of Home Office measures: it must not contain anything that is too frightening for the Lib Dem portion of the coalition, but none the less everything within it has to be built up as more significant than perhaps it is. As usual, some of it sounds as though it has not been thought out as well as it might be. I was much taken by the briefing that we have no doubt all received from the Institute of Chartered Accountants, which says that the part targeting crooked lawyers and accountants will not make prosecutions easier because it sets a higher standard of proof than Labour’s Proceeds of Crime Act. What is worse, it will have a series of unintended consequences and potentially choke off valuable intelligence to help the police target serious crime. These are no doubt important issues that we will need to look at in your Lordships’ House.

The Bill is designed to make it easier to recover criminal assets. That is welcome, although there seems to be an element of catch-up on Labour’s proposals to do the same. However, we need to be satisfied that the Bill will have the effect of closing the loopholes that allow criminals to hide their assets with family members or overseas. Is that going to be achieved by the changes before us?

There is another problem here. I refer to the extent to which the agencies involved feel it is appropriate to invest the sometimes quite substantial resources required to pursue POCA proceedings. For many of those agencies, too high a proportion of what is seized, often after quite a protracted legal process, is retained by the Treasury rather than being available for the agency concerned to reinvest in crime-fighting. Will the Bill do anything to remedy that? I certainly hope that it is something that the Home Office will look at, perhaps with Treasury colleagues, to see whether more of those resources can be ploughed back to improve the quality of the work that is done in fighting serious and organised crime.

In that context, one of the groups that the National Trading Standards Board funds is the illegal money lending team for England, based in Birmingham. It works hard to recover POCA money from the loan sharks who prey on the vulnerable. It uses the receipts it obtains, after the Treasury has had its take, to plough back into local communities on programmes of education about money management and how to avoid loan sharks. That is a very useful and positive thing that can be done. A trading standards department in North Yorkshire puts great emphasis on working right the way through the prosecution process. It starts with obtaining material and evidence that can be used in Proceeds of Crime Act proceedings at a later stage and works right the way through the investigation. That enables it to plough some of the money it recovers back into further investigations of those who scam the public. I hope that the Minister will tell us what more is being done to try to ensure that more of the resources obtained from criminals can be invested in crime-fighting.

Part 5 of the Bill deals with the protection of children and strengthens and clarifies the law on psychological suffering and abuse. I am pleased to see those measures. It follows the lead of my late right honourable friend Paul Goggins, who campaigned on this issue. The Bill also creates a new offence of possession of material on advice on grooming children. That is all well and good, but is that the most fundamental issue in terms of protecting children and young people on the internet? The noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, who is not in her place, has been doggedly pressing ahead with her Private Member’s Bill in successive Sessions of Parliament on precisely this issue and I find it surprising that the Government have not been more positive about its provisions.

Noble Lords who were present at Question Time today will know that I referred to the benefits of the Government doing more to sponsor proper identity assurance on the internet with robust age verification. That would not only protect children but would also do much to combat crime and fraud. Individuals would have the certainty of knowing who they were dealing with, young people would be prevented from accessing unsuitable material and older people would be prevented from accessing sites that were intended to be the exclusive domain of children.

Much of the Bill is about improving the effectiveness of the National Crime Agency, an organisation which is barely half a year old. It is interesting that perhaps some of these issues were not addressed when we first had the legislation which created the National Crime Agency. Some matters are still not being resolved. We still do not know how the work of the National Crime Agency can be extended to Northern Ireland. The issue of whether the National Crime Agency should take on board counterterrorism remains unresolved. My view is that that would be an unwise move to make, particularly given that the National Crime Agency is still so new. Why leave this hanging open? Would it not be better to put that to bed one way or the other, sooner rather than later?

There is also the question of the proper governance and accountability of the National Crime Agency. We have had the Home Secretary giving her instruction that the National Crime Agency, almost before it had started work, should investigate historic child abuse in north Wales. Where in the Bill are questions of accountability of the National Crime Agency being addressed?

Last week, the Daily Telegraph told us that a quarter of criminals tracked by the National Crime Agency and the Security Service have gone off the radar since the Snowden revelations and that hundreds of drug lords have gone to ground after being alerted to methods of surveillance. The noble Lord will recall that two years ago the Home Office warned of the need to address changes in communications data management by telecoms providers, but nothing has been done in the intervening period. This Bill could have provided an opportunity to address that very real problem. Communications data are vital for all sorts of investigations. They are used by trading standards in carrying out the consumer protection enforcement that I talked about, they were critical in the investigation of the Soham murders and they are often critical in many kidnap cases.

I accept that issues around the privacy of communications and metadata are not easy—they need a proper public debate. I have also been one of the first to acknowledge that the previous Government mishandled the public debate when the opportunity for it arose a few years ago. However, what we have had in the past four years has been a total absence of debate and a total absence of leadership from the Government in trying to resolve these issues. The consequence is that there is now a real danger that our ability to fight organised crime is being seriously corroded.

I started my speech by talking about coalition dysfunctionality, but the willy-waving of the Education Secretary and the Home Secretary—I acknowledge that the term may be inappropriate for your Lordships’ House and certainly inappropriate in applying it to Mrs May—is a side-show compared with the failure of the two halves of the coalition over the five years of this Parliament to address the diminishing capacity of our police forces, including the NCA, to access the communications data that they need to fight crime effectively and to protect the public. Therefore, while the Bill contains many worthy elements, it frankly does not address some of the most serious problems that exist in dealing with organised crime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the excellent, detailed and knowledgeable speech of my noble friend Lady Brinton. When I was Home Office Minister, I dreaded speeches like that when I tried to put through a Bill relating to Home Office matters. We called them Christmas tree Bills because every department wanted to hang its own very important bauble on the tree—to deal with terrorism, children and various other aspects. Inevitably, as a Minister, one had to have a grasp of a huge range of subjects and when the Bill came to your Lordships’ House it brought out all the experts from every section. The other reason why I detested Bills like this is that one had to amend the original Act and one was required to have about five different Acts open on the table in front of one and six fingers on each hand to understand them. The final introductory comment I would make is to say to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that she handled nine Home Office Bills in four years. In the final couple of years that I was in the Home Office, in 1996-97, in that frenzy to pass legislation, I think I handled 15 Bills, including Private Members’ Bills. I am not sure whether it did me or the Government any good at the time.

I begin with the proceeds of crime part, which is very important. I am completely supportive of the intention here. I remember talking to policemen. Every single policeman of every rank that I spoke to said that the vital thing that mattered to criminals was cleaning out their money. They factored in going to prison for a few years or even up to 10 years if they had enough money stashed away to live on when they came out. They did not worry about prison. What they really worried about was losing their ill-gotten gains. I would say to colleagues that it is not about the Chancellor making more money, good though that may be, it is about cleaning out criminals and their profits from crime because that acts as a deterrent and a punishment.

Under Clause 10 there is a maximum of 14 years for defaulting on fines of more than £1 million, if the court imposes that maximum penalty, which is then automatically halved or reduced on early release. However, if the money is more than £10 million, the early release provisions do not apply. I admit that sums are not one of my strengths, but it seems that if one had salted away up to £9 million where the maximum 14 years applied and there was early release, and suppose that one was let out after seven or eight years, if the person had invested it reasonably at 7% interest, they would come out to an annual return of about £630,000. That is not bad. I also assume that if the police and enforcement authorities had not been able to track down that initial £9 million, they would not be able to track down the £630,000 per annum—or perhaps the taxman could do it instead. I should be grateful if my noble friend could look at that point and see whether I am almost right. I ask him to revisit the whole area of the figures and the length of prison terms because I do not think that it is adequate.

Clause 36 deals with confiscation orders by magistrates’ courts. Again I suggest that possibly the £10,000 figure may be too low in certain cases. Of course, if the magistrates’ court is attempting to sentence a criminal and feels that its powers are not great enough, it can refer them up to the Crown Court for sentencing. However, I can imagine cases where someone is convicted of burglaries, lower level drugs offences or dealing in stolen goods, where the magistrates may consider that it is not worth while sending it up to the Crown Court for greater sentencing—and the Crown Courts might not like it—but at the same time the only assets those people have may be their BMWs or their cars, which are worth considerably more than £10,000. One needs to look at this clause again to see whether, in certain circumstances, magistrates could have a power to impose penalties greater than £10,000. I understand that at the moment the Metropolitan Police is awash with Ferraris and Porsches that have been impounded because people have not paid their insurance. I am sure that the Metropolitan Police would be quite happy to impound vehicles from drug dealers and others whose vehicles could also add to its resources.

I am totally supportive of Clause 37 on computer misuse, but I am not clear who is capable of understanding it all and prosecuting. Is it the police who prosecute for computer misuse under the 1990 Act? The proposed new Section 3ZA carries a penalty of up to 14 years—or up to life if national security is involved—but the rest of the penalties in Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act are for up to two or five years. Will my noble friend confirm that those other penalties in Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 have also been upgraded to 14 years, or possibly life, in prison?

Parts 5 and 6 of the Bill deal with the protection of children and terrorism. I dislike the term FGM because I do not think it carries the right connotations or expresses the seriousness of this vile, barbaric practice. I recall that for years we talked about people trafficking. It was only when colleagues in this House and in the other place began to talk about modern slavery that we got traction on it—that the rest of us woke up to what it was about. The use of the term modern slavery as opposed to people trafficking really gave more life to that horrible practice. I do not mean to be derogatory here but FGM sounds like a food additive. It is too nice a term. It is vile, evil child torture. I would like those who have spent their lives trying to deal with this to consider whether we should think of using a more vicious terminology which properly describes what it is about.

I conclude my remarks on this business of terrorism, paedophiles and serious crime, because that is the mantra that the Home Office has been using for the past few years to demand better and greater RIPA powers. I have heard that mantra used again in the past few days by the Home Office. It says that unless it has greater powers there will be a data gap in tackling terrorism, paedophiles and serious crime. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is not quite right in saying that nothing has been done on this. I had the privilege a couple of years ago of chairing the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill. The committee was made up of noble Lords from this House and Members from the other place. Members of the committee had widely differing views. There were those who wanted the police to get every power under the sun and those who took a view that privacy of the individual was far more important. However, we ended up with a unanimous report and concluded that the draft Bill produced by the Home Office then—which was nicknamed the snoopers’ charter—was far too sweeping and we were rightly critical of most aspects of it. However, we did not simply crucify the Bill, say it was a load of rubbish and leave it at that; we made considered suggestions on how to draft a better Bill. Our overall conclusion was that there was,

“a case for legislation which will provide the law enforcement authorities with some further access to communications data, but that the current draft Bill is too sweeping, and goes further than it need or should. We believe that, with the benefit of fuller consultation with CSPs than has so far taken place, the Government will be able to devise a more proportionate measure than the present draft Bill, which would achieve most of what they really need, would encroach less upon privacy, would be more acceptable to the CSPs, and would cost the taxpayer less”.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I stand corrected. It was wrong to say that nothing was done. A Bill was produced and a Joint Committee looked at it. Unfortunately, nothing very much has happened since then, which I think makes my point. It sounds as though the noble Lord did all the work for the Home Office and somehow it still has not happened. I suspect that this comes back to my earlier point about dysfunctionality.

[Lord Blencathra]

The noble Lord is getting closer to the possible political reality. To be fair to the Home Office, it studied our report carefully. I and one or two others had the privilege of seeing the revised draft Bill, which took into account everything we had said and delivered about 95% of what our report suggested. Unfortunately, that revised Bill did not find favour with all the members of the coalition and therefore it has not emerged in that form.

I say to my noble friend the Minister that if in the next Parliament the Government produce a Bill largely along the lines of the redraft, I am certain that it will have a chance of getting through both Houses of Parliament. But if they are encouraged from any quarter to go back to the original so-called snoopers’ charter, they will merely tack on more powers to a discredited RIPA. In my opinion, RIPA is no longer fit for purpose. It was designed at a time when we had push-button telephones that could hold two or three messages at most, not the modern communications machinery that we have today. If they go back to that old charter, they will face massive opposition in the country and in Parliament, and they do not need to because the blueprint for a better Bill exists.

Finally, I will make a couple of observations that may be slightly more contentious. As we were deliberating on the powers the police needed to look at e-mails and other data in order to capture paedophiles, stories began to emerge of police forces around the country—for example, in Bradford or Leicester—which had ignored complaints over the past 15 years from hundreds of young girls of systematic and habitual rape. The police turned a blind eye to those cases and have only now started prosecuting. I believe that they turned a blind eye because the perpetrators were mainly from the Pakistani community and they did not want to prosecute because of political correctness. Of course the police and security services must have the powers they need to deal with paedophiles on the internet but they must also prosecute hard cases of children being raped and brutalised in reality in this country.

My very final point, which again comes from my experiences on the Bill, is that we discovered that police training was often inadequate to deal with the amount of communications data available. The executive from Twitter told us that she would often get a request from the police saying, “Give me everything you have on Blencathra’s tweeting”, when the answer was, “Look on the net yourself”. We do not need a special order for that. It is out there in the public domain, and they were not fully aware of that. There is a range of things that our modern iPhones and other Samsung-type devices have and the police need to get up to speed on the information that is currently available on the world wide web before seeking some draconian powers to look at a few hundred million e-mails each year.

With those little caveats and pieces of advice to my noble friend on how to take forward serious crime measures and a new data communications Bill, I warmly welcome the Bill.

Water Cannons

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 12th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Policing and as an adviser to technology companies that, as far as I know, have no interest in providing water cannon to the policing service in this country. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on securing this debate and giving us an opportunity to discuss what I consider to be potentially an extremely important issue.

First, though, we have to ask ourselves why we are discussing this at all. I am normally someone who is regarded as being supportive—some would say oversupportive—of the police service in this country, but I have to say that I have the gravest reservations as to why we are even talking about this. The Daily Telegraph, a newspaper that I know many noble Lords will believe is the fount of all possible wisdom on many matters, told us on 23 January that it is because senior police officers now believe that the risks of future protests against the Government are so great, and those protests will be so large and difficult to control, that only the deployment of water cannon on the streets of mainland Britain will enable public order to be maintained. Indeed, according to the Telegraph,

“Police warn they expect water cannon will be required because ‘the ongoing and potential future austerity measures are likely to lead to continued protest’”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has said that the police have no specific intelligence on this. Maybe the Minister can tell us that he has intelligence about some future plan of the Government which will be so awesome in terms of the austerity measures introduced, or so offensive to the public, that this sort of response will be triggered. I do not doubt that there will be public protest about the Government. There will no doubt be public protest about the Government’s future austerity measures. But really? So large? So difficult to control? So far beyond anything that we have seen before? So much bigger? So much larger? More than the 250,000 or 500,000 who demonstrated against government cuts in public spending in March 2011? More than the 750,000 or 1 million who demonstrated against the Iraq war in February 2003? Water cannon were not needed then, so why do we envisage that they may be needed in the foreseeable future?

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has told us of the views of the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, who is not in his place today. He also spoke to me. He says that he does not believe that the case has been made. His successor as Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Sir Paul Stephenson, said in 2010, following the student tuition fee riots, that he was opposed to water cannon, saying that it would lead to an unsuitably paramilitary style of policing. Only two years ago, the present Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, warned of the limitations of water cannon in these sorts of situations.

Now we are told that the Metropolitan Police want this facility—but for what? It is actually quite difficult to work it out. Chief Constable David Shaw, who prepared a report on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers, concedes that the water cannon would not have been a useful tactic, would not have been effective, during the August 2011 riots. That makes sense. Water cannon are effective at dispersing a large crowd, or at keeping two large crowds apart. That is the experience in Northern Ireland. However, the disturbances in August 2011 were not like that. Rioters were already dispersed. They were highly mobile. That was the problem. The police could not be in a sufficient number of locations quickly enough. They could not be everywhere all of the time. They could not respond to a rapidly moving situation, where crowds and individuals were moving from one place to another very quickly. Why would you want a water cannon to disperse a crowd that was already dispersed? Indeed, if anything, it would make your problem in policing that situation even worse. It would therefore have been no use in the August 2011 disturbances.

The ACPO report cites three occasions in the past decade on which water cannon might have been used: the Countryside Alliance demonstration in Parliament Square in 2004; the Gaza demonstrations against the Israeli embassy in 2008-09; and, potentially—it says “potentially”—the student protests of 2010. On the other hand, the Metropolitan Police are saying that water cannon would be rarely used and rarely seen. In fact, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley has given a pledge that the Met would never use them against protests, which would seem to rule out any of the three occasions suggested by the Association of Chief Police Officers. I am not suggesting for one moment that the Association of Chief Police Officers does not speak as with one voice with the senior leadership of the Metropolitan Police on all matters, but it seems that on this particular issue they were not entirely in accord.

What would have been the implications had water cannon been deployed on those occasions cited by ACPO? Let us consider the Countryside Alliance demonstration; a number of your Lordships may recall what that was like. During that, there was a point when the police were concerned that the demonstrators might break through their ranks and storm Parliament. That was a serious situation, which was eventually resolved by conventional policing—slightly messily, but it was resolved. However, the only way that water cannon might have assisted in those circumstances would have been if they had already been deployed, in advance of the police knowing that potentially they might lose control of the situation and that it was deteriorating. Who could have predicted in advance that the welly-clad, middle-class, pro-hunting brigade would be so violent on that particular day? The only way that the water cannon could have been deployed would have been to park them inside the precincts of Parliament, inside the Palace of Westminster, facing outwards. Does anyone really believe that that would have been sanctioned —in advance and on the basis of no intelligence that anything was going to happen—by Mr Speaker or the Lord Speaker? What sort of message would we have put out to the rest of the world? Imagine the images of the mother of Parliaments with water cannon firing jets of water out from New Palace Yard.

What about the student protests of 2010? The problem there was that an unexpected—I stress that—splinter group chose to attack Conservative Central Office. That was a break-away group which acted unpredictably. That there would be a break-away group may have been predictable, but what they would do and when they would do it was unpredictable. Therefore water cannon would not have been in the right place at the right time. Had their activities been foreseen, normal policing could have controlled the situation—enough police would have been surrounding Conservative Central Office. What if such activities are not foreseen? The break-away faction is a risk in all otherwise peaceful demonstrations, as it is mixed in with all sorts of ordinary demonstrators who are not planning to be as objectionable. Break-away factions are by their nature unpredictable—it is not possible to foresee when they will break away—so you will not have the water cannon deployed and in the right place at the right time.

What is this all about? Is it another mayoral vanity project? Maybe I am being too kind. What psychology is involved with a mayor who wants to have a large hose to douse the lower orders? I suspect that the timeline began with one of the Taliban-tendency Tory Back-Benchers, who said after the 2011 riots: “The Met needs water cannon”. The Home Secretary, who wishes to be the next Tory leader and therefore never says to a Tory Back-Bencher, “You are out of your tiny mind”, replied, “If the police think they will need them, we will consider it”. The mayor, who also wants to be the next Tory leader—possibly even more than the Home Secretary—but who certainly does not want to be out-righted by her and certainly also wants to curry favour with the same Taliban tendency, said to the Met: “Are you sure you might not need them?”. The Met said, “Okay—we’ll think about it”, and so the process starts. Before you know it we are in the process of buying three clapped-out German water cannon no one else wants, which no one knows when they might need to use, and we run the risk of them being deployed, which would make a difficult situation worse and further alienate those with a grievance.

British policing has a worldwide, proud record of managing public order events. Why are we trying to throw that away?