Emergency Services: Central London

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the availability of emergency services in central London, and what steps they are taking to reinforce them in the light of the attacks in Paris on 13 November.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register and beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, working across government the Home Office has developed a police-led capability to deal with large-scale firearms attacks. We are reviewing the attacks in Paris to see if there is anything further we can learn. Further communications will be made in due course.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that Answer. No doubt he is aware that the London Ambulance Service has failed in virtually every London borough in every month to meet its emergency response targets, that the number of authorised firearms police officers has dropped by 760 since 2009 to below 5,000, and that the Police Federation says that the police would struggle to cope with an incident such as occurred in Paris if it were to happen here. Does the Home Secretary support the view of my honourable friend the shadow Chancellor that police emergency response teams and neighbourhood teams should be exempted from the worst of the Chancellor’s cuts to be announced next week?

[Lord Bates]

On the specifics, the noble Lord will realise that we will have to wait for the announcement to be made as a result of the spending review next week. On the points that he made, he will be aware that since the 7/7 attacks in the capital there has been a counterterrorism strategy. There are regular operations as a result of the coroner’s report into those attacks in London. She recommended that there should be much greater interoperability between the different services. That has happened. Only this summer we had Operation Strong Tower, which was a 1,000 personnel strong exercise, following which the Metropolitan Police Commissioner said that he believed we were ready to meet the challenge should such attacks happen in the capital. We want to maintain that at all costs.

Modern Slavery Act 2015

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 26th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I had not seen a report of that, but if the noble Baroness would draw it to my attention, I will certainly make sure that we follow up on it, because that is a crucial gap in the system if that is happening. I am sure that that is not happening in UK detention centres, but if she shares the information, I will ensure that it is thoroughly investigated.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

The noble Lord’s own department has produced figures estimating that there are up to 13,000 victims of modern slavery in the country. Given the enormous workload in terms of enforcement, in terms of the work with private businesses and in terms of the work internationally in trying to reduce the flow of trafficked people into this country, is the Minister satisfied that, with a team of staff that is only going to reach seven, the Anti-slavery Commissioner has the resources necessary to carry out this important work?

[Lord Bates]

The noble Lord will be aware that, last week, the Anti-slavery Commissioner produced his report—his strategy document—as he was required to do under the Act. He has set a very clear measure as to where he is focusing: the identification of victims, and the need to encourage prosecutions. As a former police officer, he is well placed to do that. In a lot of cases, it is not a resource question; it is an issue of will and intelligence to identify those people who are at risk to ensure that the perpetrators are tackled and those who are victims are helped.

Asylum: Sexual Orientation

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I pay tribute to the noble Baroness’s work in her role as a DfID Minister. We continue to work through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and public diplomacy to try to ensure that discrimination of that nature is tackled at source. I will look into the projects she referred to, but perhaps we can compare notes to ensure that we are looking at the right ones. However, I will be happy to look into them and ensure that they continue to receive funding.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand that the former chief inspector of borders had some issues with the flexibility he was allowed in the investigations he could conduct and the publishing of his reports, rather than waiting for the publication of his annual report. Have those issues been resolved for the new inspector of borders?

[Lord Bates]

That matter was looked into by the Public Accounts Committee, which made some observations on how those reports are laid. They are laid in accordance with the UK Borders Act 2007, so we feel that that is consistent. The only reason why there was a change in the way they were routed through the department was to ensure that the Home Secretary had an opportunity to look at them, as is consistent with other reports, and in line with national security and public safety.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Rosser. As some of your Lordships know, I have spent a certain amount of time in the last year or so visiting prisons in respect of the review that I have carried out for the Ministry of Justice on self-inflicted deaths of young people in prison. Psychoactive substances were not a prime element of our report, although the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s report issued in the last few days highlighted their increasing significance. I was struck by a discussion with the head of healthcare in an establishment who, when I asked about the level of drug use in the prison, said instantly one word, “Rife”, to the embarrassment of the deputy governor accompanying us. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, about the prevalence of drugs in prisons, and the growing proportion of them which are these new psychoactive substances. The reason they are a growing proportion is because of their undetectability and the fact that it becomes more difficult to identify and prevent them. That is why it is important to have an aggravating factor with regard to the supply of these substances in prisons.

The Government have already legislated to prevent people throwing things over the prison wall. Although that has been reported to me as a significant problem, I am not convinced that it is the main source of drugs in prisons, nor do I think that it is the most difficult source of drugs in prisons to deal with because it is pretty obvious where things have been thrown over the wall and no doubt somebody could pick them up before the prisoners do so. However, drugs brought in from outside are often brought in by individuals. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, talked about issues with visiting families and friends. I think that we should also examine the possible role of prison officers in this regard. Although this is not relevant to the report I was doing, I noticed the very different search regimes that exist in prisons for visiting dignitaries such as myself and those who are visiting because they are friends or family of prisoners, all of whom are subjected to fairly rigorous search regimes these days, and the apparent complete absence of similar search regimes for prison staff. These things should be examined as there is clearly a mismatch in that area.

Again, it was right for the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, to highlight the fact that there seems to be an underlying current of people saying, “The only way that you can maintain good order in prisons is for there to be a certain level of availability of these things”. That is not the right approach—the right approach is to ensure that there is sufficient staffing, purposeful activity and focus on education and rehabilitation in the prison to ensure that availability of these things is no longer the mechanism to deliver good order. In the context of the report from the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman in the last few days and the report issued today by the Chief Inspector of Prisons, and given the level of the problem that exists in prisons, I hope that the Minister will feel able to accept my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, there is no doubt that one can think of serious aggravating factors in relation to these offences. In Committee I supported the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. However, I understand the difficulty that there are so many possible aggravating factors that it is very difficult to cover them all adequately, and that as they change and the circumstances change, the description of these aggravating factors may change. One of the problems is that, if you specify aggravating factors, the courts are apt to proceed on the basis that these are the aggravating factors that Parliament thought were important. Therefore, when the judge comes to pass sentence, he is inclined to give these full emphasis and possibly place less emphasis on other aggravating factors that may occur in a particular case.

At the time of the introduction of the Misuse of Drugs Act, when provision was made for aggravation, the statutory system of sentencing guidelines which has since been introduced did not exist with its statutory authority, which is binding to a substantial extent on the discretion of judges. That system has the great advantage of flexibility. To take the example of children’s homes, let us suppose it emerged that the people who were seeking to take advantage of vulnerable children had changed their method and, instead of trying to give these drugs out near the children’s home, found some way to get them into the children’s home so that they were possibly given to the children by others. I do not know exactly how this sort of thing might happen, but these situations can develop. These people are set on trying to overcome any obstacle to distributing their drugs to all who will take them, and to a greater and greater extent, if possible. I wonder whether it would be best no longer to have a provision for particular aggravation in the individual statute, but to rely on—and if necessary make reference to in the individual statute—the sentencing guidelines system, which is a flexible, influential and effective system within the criminal justice system as a whole. That has certain advantages, but it certainly would not work against a background in which a new Bill had other aggravating factors. Then, the question is: are the sentencing guidelines’ aggravating factors more or less important than those in the statute, if they happen to be different?

As I have said, I support the theory behind the amendments, but I wonder whether the more effective way of operating this within the criminal justice system is to make these amendments references to the sentencing guidelines. Instead of having a list of aggravating circumstances—conditions A, B and C—perhaps the statute before us should refer to the fact that aggravating circumstances are set out under the sentencing guidelines, for which the Coroners Act has statutory authority. That might be a more effective way of dealing with this matter—focusing on individual circumstances that are important and may change. Both the circumstances referred to—involving children, and prisons—are vital in the fight against the damage caused by such substances. Therefore, whatever happens, I want an effective method of treating these circumstances as aggravating circumstances to be before the courts on all occasions.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, these amendments seek to reframe the definition of a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. This Bill is designed to capture substances supplied for human consumption that have psychoactive effects. Its aim is to capture substances that are not currently controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, but, as with all drugs when misused, carry health risks.

Subsection (2) provides that,

“a substance produces a psychoactive effect in a person if, by stimulating or depressing the person’s central nervous system, it affects the person’s mental functioning or emotional state”.

We accept that this definition has been drawn purposefully wide. The nature of this market and of experience to date shows that producers of the substances are constantly and actively looking for loopholes to exploit, thereby fuelling this reckless trade. This learning has been central to how we have designed this Bill and in particular our definition.

By using a definition based on a substance’s effects rather than the chemical composition of substances, this legislation will avoid the issues that we have continued to face with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Many new psychoactive substances are still legal due to the speed at which they are produced, with manufacturers inventing new substances by tweaking chemical formulas in order to avoid the existing controls. The need to capture such a wide range of substances, and any that might be invented in the future, necessitated a broad definition. The definition is in two parts: the trigger and the effects. The main effect of psychoactive substances is on a person’s brain, the major part of the central nervous system. By speeding up or slowing down activity here, psychoactive substances cause an alteration in an individual’s state of consciousness.

Amendments 7 and 8 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to restrict the definition of a psychoactive substance so that it captures only synthetic substances. The nature of this market and of experience to date shows that producers of new psychoactive substances are constantly looking for loopholes to exploit, thereby fuelling their reckless trade. There are any number of natural products—such as fly agaric mushrooms and salvia divinorum—that are openly on sale in head shops and elsewhere which are far from safe though they are not banned under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The Bill should give us a proportionate way of dealing with these substances as well.

Amendment 9 seeks to import the definition of a psychoactive substance—

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I would like to understand—maybe if I had heard some of the other amendments I would have understood, but I am not sure I would have done given the comments that have been made—how, if the police, for example, have seized a product which may or may not be a psychoactive substance, they assess whether it is going to have these effects on somebody’s brain. Do they feed it to a tame police officer, or to a young person whose brain may be less developed? How is this going to happen? Is that something that then has to be replicated in a court room? What is the process going to be for saying, “This is definitely a psychoactive substance”? How will they tell?

[Lord Bates]

That is a good point. There are a number of ways. Perhaps I may make the point that I have been trying to set out the terms so that a future reader of the Official Report may actually be able to deduce—I will be careful here—what the Government intended when they set out the definition in this particular way. The noble Lord’s intervention is entirely appropriate and I do have an answer which I will give to him, but I want to make sure that we do not lose the flow of what underlies this, which is the rationale behind the definition.

There are a number of ways, and these include data based on a human user’s experience, argument by analogy and in vitro neurochemical profiling. Working with the Centre for Applied Science and Technology at the Home Office, we will identify and build the capability in the UK to meet the demand for this new forensic requirement, as well as working with the Office of the Forensic Science Regulator to ensure that the high standard of quality that forensic evidence meets is maintained.

The Home Secretary has written to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs seeking its views on how we can strengthen the UK’s forensic capacity and capability to support the implementation of the legislation. We remain ready to consider carefully any recommendations the council may have about other aspects of the Bill. We will continue with the forensic early warning system, which has enabled forensic providers more easily to identify new psychoactive substances coming on to the UK market through the provision of reference standards and establishing a new psychoactive substances community. I am sure that that has entirely answered the noble Lord’s point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I will send her chocolates.

I can assure noble Lords that we are dealing here with the trade in new psychoactive substances. In looking at the workings of the Bill it is necessary to consider the definition of a psychoactive substance alongside the elements of the offences in Clauses 4 to 8, which we will come to shortly. It is not correct to equate the effect of a scent wafting through the air with the direct inhalation of fumes, such as from a solvent, and the offences apply only where a substance is likely to be consumed for its psychoactive effect. We may all appreciate the sight and smell of a fine bouquet of flowers, but we are not consuming the flowers or their scent for their psychoactive effect.

The noble Baroness asked whether the reference to “allows” in Clause 2(3) goes further than the recklessness test in the offence clauses. The noble Baroness is, I fear, seeking to compare apples and pears. In Clause 2 we are not dealing with the mental elements of criminal offences. The phraseology in Clause 2 is designed for a wholly separate purpose compared with that used to determine the mens rea of the various offences, so the question whether “allows” is a higher or lower test than recklessness does not arise.

I shall respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The ban will come into effect as soon as the Bill is brought into force. What we are debating here is the quality of evidence required to pursue a successful prosecution. As I have said, we have asked the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to provide advice on how we can strengthen our forensic capacity to this end. It goes without saying, therefore—given that we are consulting widely on this— that the opinions and views of your Lordships’ House will also be helpful at arriving at that definition of minimal harm.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

For the avoidance of doubt, I think that something should be done in this area and I am concerned that the Government’s proposals may not work.

I understood what the Minister read to us, in terms of the guidance on how you would test. It seems to me that the case rests on this: you have a substance that you think is psychoactive and you need to test it, because you need to establish whether it raises or depresses someone’s mental state. Does this mean that it has to be tested on a human being? If so, what are the arrangements for doing it? What are the safety provisions, given that some of these substances are extremely dangerous? Is there, therefore, a process that we can use when we think something is a psychoactive substance but the only way to find out is by finding a human being and testing it on them?

If that is not the case and the intention is to look at whether a substance is chemically similar to something else, you are back in the same routine of demonstrating that this is a small variant on something seen before. That is what I am trying to establish—the practicalities. Here is something. We have found it. We think it is psychoactive. Can we do something about it? Most Members of this House—there are a number of exceptions —think that something should be done. How do we know that something is psychoactive?

[Lord Bates]

That is a fair point, in that it is asking how this will be tested. We will come to those points because we are going to deal, to some degree, with medical testing and how it is possible to license some of these drugs so that they can continue to be tested. We were talking earlier about how universities and research institutions can continue testing on drugs such as cannabis. That is a key point: that testing will go on. I will make sure about that before Report.

Police and Crime Commissioners

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd June 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to give additional powers and responsibilities to police and crime commissioners.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, we will develop the role of our elected and accountable police and crime commissioners to shape policing services to local needs and priorities, as they are now doing in commissioning victims’ services, setting out policing priorities and driving reform. During this Parliament we will set out further proposals to enhance collaboration between police and fire authorities.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his Answer. Given that these police and crime commissioners are elected and accountable and were the flagship policing reform of the Conservative Government, what is the objection to allowing them properly to set the budget of the police service in their area? Why is there an arbitrary cap of 2% on the increase in the precept that they are allowed to impose?

[Lord Bates]

There is a limit because we have to control expenditure. However, the noble Lord makes a very fair point, which is that these are elected and accountable individuals. In Bedfordshire, for example, under the rules permitting a referendum to take place, there was a referendum on raising the precept beyond 2%. That was defeated by two-thirds to one-third just last month on a 65% turnout. I think that demonstrates that we support that principle.

Airports: London

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I always find the noble Lord’s lessons in history extremely enlightening. As I said, we will wait for the report; once it is published, the Government will respond accordingly.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

Could the Minister try to answer the question? If the Davies commission recommends only one new runway, will that be the only runway that the Government consider or are there other runways that might go forward as well?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, patience is a virtue, and I would ask the noble Lord to be patient. The commission is going to report very shortly and he will have his answer then—and the Government’s support accordingly.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 16, 22, 23 and 28. Control and order is a fundamental foundation of prison life. Without it, safety cannot be guaranteed and the rehabilitation of prisoners cannot take place. It is known that the throwing of packages containing contraband, including psychoactive substances—often inappropriately referred to as “legal highs”—is a key method of supplying drugs into prisons. In some cases, it is co-ordinated by criminal gangs involved in a wide range of criminality. The presence of new psychoactive substances in prisons, now drugs of choice among many prisoners, is a significant and growing problem that we must address urgently. These drugs are having an increasingly destructive impact on prison security, order and the welfare of individual prisoners, with increasing evidence of links to mental health problems and violent behaviour.

While it is currently a criminal offence under the Prison Act to convey a number of items including controlled drugs into a prison, non-controlled substances are not covered by that legislation. As such, those caught trafficking a range of new psychoactive substances have been able to evade justice. This is not acceptable.

Commons Amendment 9 will create a new offence of throwing or otherwise projecting any article or substance into a prison without authorisation. The clause will criminalise the trafficking of new psychoactive substances into our prisons and also captures the throwing of other articles into prison that could pose a threat to prison staff and prisoners. We must not tolerate those who damage prison health and order by throwing items such as new psychoactive substances into prisons. This new offence will help to stop this harmful practice.

Commons Amendment 10 seeks to prevent the unauthorised use of mobile phones in prison. The unauthorised use of mobile phones presents serious risks to prison security. They have been used to plan escapes and support the commission of serious crimes by organised criminals. In January, we saw the sobering reports of the conviction of a prisoner in Wandsworth prison who had used his mobile phone to arrange the importation of machine guns into this country from Germany. I am sure that we all agree that such use of mobile phones in prison is completely unacceptable.

The National Offender Management Service uses a range of techniques to detect and seize phones in prisons. However, despite the success of these methods, as mobile phone technology advances and the size of handsets decreases, it is becoming easier for prisoners to conceal illicit phones in prison. Disconnecting phones would be a cost-effective and future-proofed method to prevent the unauthorised use of phones in prison. Mobile network operators have asked for a clear legal framework to support disconnection. Amendment 10 will therefore enable the Secretary of State—or, in Scotland, Scottish Ministers—to make regulations conferring a power on the civil court to make a telecommunications restriction order. Such an order will require a mobile network operator to disconnect those SIM cards and handsets that are found to be in use in prisons without authorisation, effectively putting those devices beyond normal operational use.

In the unlikely event that a genuine customer’s phone is disconnected in error, NOMS will advise the mobile network operator that the telecommunications restriction order no longer applies. This will allow the network operator to expedite the reconnection of the service. This will be done quickly, without the need to return to court to vary the order. The customer’s phone can still be used to call the emergency services, should that need arise. As an additional safeguard, NOMS will report annually to the Interception of Communications Commissioner, providing the details and frequency of any erroneous disconnections for scrutiny by the commissioner’s office.

It is unacceptable that prisoners should continue to use mobile phones to carry out criminal activity outside prison. Having the power to disconnect illicit phones in prison will help to tackle that flagrant disregard for the restraints of their incarceration. Our view is simple: we must constantly seek ways to improve prison security. These new offences will do exactly that. The other amendments in this group are consequential on these two new clauses. I commend these amendments to the House.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, this is pure curiosity on my part but, in relation to Amendment 10, might I understand how it would be possible to tell the communications providers that they should apply a telecommunications restriction order to a specific SIM card unless said SIM card had already been seized and obtained by the prison authorities—in which case, why would it be needed? Also, what steps have been taken to look at technological systems that would jam the signals inside prisons?

[Lord Bates]

Those are very reasonable points to make. On general jamming in the prison compound, I recognise of course that some individuals working within that compound need to have mobile devices, which can be used to communicate. By that, I am referring to the staff prison officers.

On the specific issue of SIM cards, the National Offender Management Service currently uses a range of different techniques to detect and seize phones already in prisons, including the use of detection technology and regular cell and prisoner searches. However, despite the success of these approaches, as mobile phone technology advances and the size of handsets decreases it is becoming easier for prisoners to conceal illicit phones and move them around the prison estate. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether to prosecute an individual for possessing a mobile phone in custody. Due to the way in which mobile phones are typically used in prisons, with multiple prisoners potentially sharing one phone, it is often not possible to attribute handsets and SIMS to specific individuals.

In many ways, I agree with the noble Lord that identifying the number on the SIM card is tremendously difficult when you are still searching for the device. However, in the light of experience, we are simply trying to make it as difficult as possible for the individuals concerned to do this. NOMS uses a range of measures to stop phones and SIM cards getting into prisons. However, due to the high number of deliveries, post items and individuals entering and leaving prisons each day, it is impossible entirely to prevent SIMs and handsets making their way on to the prison estate.

Those are the points that I have, which I hope have been some help. There might just be some communications data on their way to help me. The signal of an unauthorised phone or SIM card can be detected without physically seizing the phone SIM in question. Blocking has a role but can be expensive to use. The answer is therefore probably quite straightforward—it is now, anyway. Through the detection devices we can identify a SIM, even if we have not managed to locate it, and block it in the process. I hope that with that general reassurance, the House will accept these amendments.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment and wish to address the comment made by my noble friend previously. It is quite a serious matter for a family, who may have spent a great deal of money purchasing tickets and planning a holiday, to arrive at a port or an airport to leave and then to have their passports, or one family member’s passport, seized. It seems to me quite reasonable to provide that person with a summary as to why their passport is being seized.

There is also the issue that there needs to be some accountability; otherwise, there is a danger of the whole system being seen as racially profiling people for whatever reason. We have learnt lessons from what happened with stop and search—there was not always sufficient intelligence or reasons given for people being stopped and searched. Further, a report published in 2013 by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary documented the poor training of officers who are exercising the power. It seems eminently sensible to have an extra layer which provides a safeguard and a degree of accountability around what is a no small matter of a passport being seized.

Recently I was travelling back from Paris with my son, who happens to have a Muslim name. He was questioned when we got to immigration control and we almost missed our Eurostar back home. He was asked whether he had been to Turkey recently. He does have family in Turkey and it would be entirely reasonable for him to go there, but he was singled out because of his name; there was no other reason. As it happens, he has not travelled to Turkey in the past year, but we were detained for some time and it was a worrying thing. His passport was not seized or anything like that, but the incident indicated to me that because of my son’s name, and for no other reason that I could see, he was questioned. My son is not a frequent traveller to Turkey and we had been on a day trip to Paris. He was questioned very seriously and we were within a minute of missing our train back. That showed me that this can be done quite randomly and with no proper intelligence.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, this would be a safeguard without substance. What is required here is that a person is given a summary of the reasons for suspicion. The noble Baronesses who have spoken in support of the amendment have said that the summary obviously could not include the full intelligence, and quite rightly so. Presumably, the summary of the reasons will be, “There may be intelligence which suggests that”, which is hardly a reason that will satisfy anyone and seems essentially to be pointless. Surely the fact that someone is told that this is being done under Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act is all the summary of reasons that will ever be given. Dressing it up by saying, “You are being provided with a summary of the reasons: namely, that you are thought to be a person to whom Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act applies”, does not provide much of a safeguard. Is this not just gesture politics?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, this is not gesture politics. There are many areas of the law where an obligation to provide a gist of the reason is imposed precisely in order to try to achieve a compromise between the duty of fairness and the demands of security. In these areas of the law, providing a gist does give individuals the substance of the allegations against them. In this context, the constable can exercise the relevant power only if he or she has reasonable grounds to suspect. In general, the constable must be able to provide at the least a summary of the reasons why they have reasonable grounds.

I understand the point that there may be security reasons why the constable is either unable, or is concerned that he or she may be unable, to provide even a summary. I wonder whether the Minister might consider, prior to Third Reading next week, coming back with a revised amendment that would impose the obligation set out in the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but subject to an exception—if the constable believes that there are or may be security reasons not to provide the summary. In the context of the exercise of a power as serious in its implications as this—that is, seizing someone’s passport—surely there ought to be an obligation, at the time when the power is exercised, to tell the individual why it is being exercised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness mentioned my name in her speech in support of this amendment. I put my name down to support it for reasons which I shall go into very briefly. As I mentioned in Committee, my attention was drawn to this problem by evidence which we received in the Joint Committee on the Draft Protection of Charities Bill. That evidence came in part from the independent reviewer, David Anderson QC, and in part from Muslim organisations which are interested in providing assistance to people who need humanitarian aid in places like Somalia which are difficult to penetrate without the assistance of the people who effectively run the country.

I shall make two particular points, without repeating what I said in Committee. First, David Anderson was critical of the definition in the legislation which he described as “monstrously” broad. It was broad for a particular reason, which one can see from looking at Section 1(5) of the 2001 Act, which contains the definition put into this Bill for its purposes. It states:

“In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation”.

It is that kind of scenario that may give rise to problems for a reason which was explained to us by one of the charitable groups. It said that when you go to these difficult countries, in order to get anywhere within those areas, you have to encounter and deal with the gate-keepers. The chairman of the Muslim Charities Forum asked:

“How can we go through the gatekeepers to reach the neediest people in Syria, Somalia or different parts of the world”,

if doing so would be caught by the Section 1(5) definition?

One can see how the thing might build up. The police might have information that the individual passing in front of them has previously gone to these areas and has provided money, as we were led to believe is necessary, in order to get through the gate. The proscribed organisation says, “All right. We’ll let you through, but you have to pay us a certain amount of money to do that”. It is a real trap. Of course, to give money to a proscribed organisation is prima facie assisting the purposes of the organisation, but the real reason for giving such money is to penetrate through the gate to provide the assistance which would otherwise not be available. These are my two points: first, the breadth of the definition and, secondly, what the evidence suggested to us is a very real problem in dealing with these areas.

Noble Lords will remember that in Committee we discussed an amendment to the primary legislation and, in particular in view of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I see that that is a very difficult thing to do at the moment without a good deal of further study and, no doubt, this is not the proper place for it anyway, although I suggest it may have to be dealt with sometime. What the noble Baroness is suggesting in her amendment is that there should be something in the code of guidance for officers so that they are alerted to this problem. Therefore, if they have that kind of intelligence, although what individuals say will not be conclusive, at least they will be aware that these people may have good reason for whatever they are said to have done which prima facie might seem to conflict with the definition in the statute.

On reflection, it would seem that the code is a better way of dealing with this without getting into the difficulties of amending primary legislation, which would go right across the board and might have rather deeper effects than we can contemplate at the moment. I suggest that the noble Baroness’s amendment is quite carefully crafted and there is real merit in the proposal that she has made.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who has identified and talked about an issue that potentially has problems for humanitarian organisations under certain circumstances. However, the amendment remains irrelevant to that. While it may be quite attractive to use a code of practice as a means to identify this issue and make sure that officials are more aware of the potential complications, this code of practice relates to circumstances in which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that person of the intention of leaving Great Britain for the purpose of,

“involvement in terrorism-related activity”.

It would be to stretch that definition to suggest that there is a suspicion that you are personally involved in terrorism-related activity because your organisation may have paid a sum of money to a gate-keeper in one of these circumstances, because this is about involvement in terrorism-related activity. I am therefore not sure that this is the right mechanism for addressing what I suspect is a real and valid problem that we need to find some way to address. Perhaps we can do that next time we revisit terrorism legislation, which will probably be in about four months’ time.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, I urge the merit of these amendments very briefly. First, there has been a slight tendency in our discussions in the first part of this afternoon to assume that the actions by the officer at port would almost invariably be on the basis of intelligence that had been supplied before the person reached the port. However, the code stressed that there are two possible scenarios, which appear to be put on an equal footing. One is that information is provided to the police before or when a person arrives at port; or it can take place at port, on the basis of observation of behaviour,

“information obtained from any other source; or a combination of these”.

Therefore, there is fully in the code the scenario where observation of behaviour leads to the reasonable suspicion. That is the context in which these amendments play a part.

The draft code also stresses, in paragraph 24, the obligations under the Equality Act 2010 which police officers must bear in mind when exercising these powers. However, there is not really any reference to specific training on the use of these powers in this context as opposed to rather broad Equality Act obligations.

Finally, can the Minister consider strongly the need for the monitoring of the individual exercise of the powers—not just to monitor them broadly but to record? There is a difference between monitoring in a broad sense and recording when and in what circumstances these powers are exercised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, at this stage there is no need for me to rehearse all the arguments in favour of this group of amendments. The terrorist threat has increased and is increasing, and those upon whom we rely to prevent and detect terrorist crime depend on access to the communications data of those intending and planning to commit terrorist crime. I will not go in detail into everything that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said, although I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, or I could agree with all of it.

Those agencies have been increasingly conscious that the provisions in RIPA 2000, now nearly 15 years old, badly need updating to take account of technological changes. The agencies have enjoyed the voluntary co-operation of many of the service providers, but many of the companies concerned, as we heard in the committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, would like to see that voluntary co-operation underpinned by statutory provision. There are no doubt some who are reluctant to co-operate without there being statutory provision.

The Bill provides us with an opportunity to put in place some of the statutory provisions which would have been provided by a revised—“Blencathrated”, if I may call it so—communications data Bill, for the introduction of which we shall now have to wait until the next Parliament. These amendments are designed to take advantage of that opportunity. Their scope has been reduced since similar amendments were proposed in Committee. We have been denied the possibility of Blencathrating these amendments because the Home Office is not willing to produce a revised communications data Bill or the relevant parts of it. Therefore, these amendments are no more than a stop-gap, as the noble Lord, Lord King, described them, and they are no more than temporary to fill a stop-gap because there is a sunset clause which ensures that they will disappear in their present form in December 2016. Most of this limited stuff is taken up with safeguards, and more than three pages are taken up with an interpretation clause of definitions.

We know that the police and the intelligence and security agencies feel the need for these provisions and would welcome these amendments, limited and imperfect though they are. As has already been said, in passing these amendments your Lordships would not be deciding that they would be part of the Bill before us when enacted; we would be giving the other place the opportunity to take that decision. Surely that is where the final decision should lie.

If the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, were to decide to press these amendments, I would support them because I would not wish to have on my conscience any sense of shared responsibility for what might ensue if failure to include these provisions in the Bill resulted in failure to prevent a terrorist attack which might have been prevented, as well as all the consequences which might result from such an outrage, as was vividly and notably referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, this is something of a mess. I was certainly alerted—and I know that other noble Lords will have been alerted at the same sort of time—to the developing problem of a gap in terms of communications data eight or nine years ago. It was so long ago that I can no longer remember exactly when it was. The gap is occurring because of the nature of the way in which communications take place using the internet, and it is a gap which is worsening and getting bigger.

Communications data, as opposed to intercept, are used in virtually all major crime and terrorist cases. They are an essential component, concerning who was there, who was where and who was communicating with whom. That is nothing new; what has changed is the way in which those messages are transferred from one place to another. It is a fact that it is no longer easy, using conventional means and conventional mechanisms, to keep track of that information, and that is causing the problem. It is a problem and a gap which has been getting worse over the last few years.

Something urgently needs to be done to remedy that gap, but it has not happened. The previous Government and this Government have failed to do something about it. We are now moving inexorably towards a general election, which is a few weeks away, and it will be down to whichever Government are in place after that to deal with this. I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord King, that, following the election, that may not be a rapid, simple or straightforward process.

What do we do now? The first thing is not to oversell the importance of either these amendments or the mythical Blencathra’d amendments that may or may not exist somewhere else. The amendments will not be a magic bullet. The mere passage of these proposed new clauses, or a version of them, does not mean that terrorism will be prevented or that serious crime will stop, but they would be an essential and necessary tool in trying to minimise the risk. Let us not pretend that the failure to include them will automatically mean that there will be a terrorist atrocity. However, it will mean that such an atrocity will be that bit more likely and that it will be that much more difficult to deal with it and stop it.

This is not just a question of the legislative provisions and the fact that we are being dilatory in getting round to dealing with this issue. I understand and have all sorts of sympathy for Ministers in the context of a coalition where one side of the coalition is less keen on such a provision than the other and starts to position itself in advance of a general election. I have lots of sympathy for all that, but the fact is that collectively Governments over the past eight to 10 years have failed to address and deal with this issue.

There is a second vital element, which is that there is a degree of public support for and public buy-in to the changes that have been made. That is why not pretending that this is a magic bullet is so important. In the past, security measures have been oversold as the one necessary thing that will stop all these atrocities, and every time that excuse is used it has bred public cynicism about these measures.

Part of what has to happen is a proper public debate about why these powers are needed, why they matter and why they do not constitute the infringement of civil liberties and personal liberty that some people assume. Failing to have that debate has been a wasted opportunity over the last few years. When the Joint Committee produced its report, the Government should have used that as the opportunity to say, “Let’s have that public debate”. Had they done so, we might now be in a position where there was a public understanding of these issues and a readiness to go forward.

The reality is that if the noble Lord, Lord King, presses his amendments, people will say that the parliamentary process has been abused, and we have no doubt already had dozens and dozens of emails and letters saying precisely that. It is an abuse of the process because it does not allow the normal times for debate, but we have failed to give ourselves the time for that, and that is why we are in such a mess.

Should we agree to these amendments? No, because they do not incorporate the views of the Joint Committee; no, because we have not had an opportunity for the public debate; and no, because we have not had the report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I do not want to get into why we have not had all those things but the fact is that we have not. It would therefore be wrong to press ahead with these amendments at this stage, much as I personally believe that something along these lines is necessary and much as I personally believe that we should have taken action much sooner. However, the reality is that those other things are not in place. I blame the Government—of course I would because I am on this side of the House—for failing to have those other elements in place and for failing to ensure that there has been the necessary public debate. However, to press today without public support and public debate, and in the absence of having the views of the independent reviewer, clearly would be a mistake, particularly in the context in which people would see that the legislation had been rushed through by some sort of legislative sleight of hand.

The noble Lord, Lord King, gave the Government a week’s opportunity to move forward. The Government have not taken that opportunity. For the very reasons I have given about not having public support or having built things up, I do not believe that they should have responded to the noble Lord’s amendment last week by bringing forward their own amendments to do all this overnight. But it would have been an enormous step forward, and still would be an enormous step forward, if before Third Reading the Government were to publish the revised versions of the legislation that they have, even if they are not the final product, so that that public debate can start. Some of the myths about communications data and what the Government are trying to do could be dispelled.

We are in a sorry mess. Frankly, I do not think that the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord King, solve the problem. They could conceivably make it worse. But for goodness’ sake, we need to treat people like adults, not pretend that this is a magic bullet, and allow the public debate to take place.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, I cannot resist the opportunity to add my ha’penny-worth, to respond to my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, and to acknowledge proudly the label of pesky Liberal Democrat. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Blair, for saying that he at least does not disagree that the Liberal Democrats have a position of principle here. However, I disagree with him about the 2004 Spanish election. The Partido Popular did not lose the election because of the bombing being by Islamists. It lost because it tried to misrepresent those bombings as being by ETA, which was against the advice of its own intelligence services.

My noble friend Lord Paddick has put extremely well, and much better than I could, all the objections of principle. The storage of everyone’s web browsing for 12 months, even if it is only up to the first forward-slash, would blur the boundary between communications data and content. It could reveal an awful lot about people’s health, sexual characteristics, political views, marital problems and other potentially embarrassing personal information. This is simply too much power to give to the state. Yes, 12 months’ storage of everyone’s web browsing history is an objection of principle.

I also stress the practical difficulties of scooping up third-party data and setting up a transatlantic jurisdiction on a war which we are destined to lose. From my time as a Member of the European Parliament in the last few years, I have some experience of this in the wake of the Snowden revelations and the whole impact that had on the attempt to get data sharing across the Atlantic without the framework of a transatlantic data-protection agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who is not in his place, will remember those debates. We need to work co-operatively with US-based companies rather than try to overreach ourselves in terms of jurisdiction. I fear that the reaction to that, which already has happened in the last few years, is that it could lead to fragmentation and balkanisation of the internet. The glory of the internet is that it is global. We in the West look askance at what is happening in China and Russia in trying to cut themselves off from the global internet. I foresee that that could happen transatlantically as well. Companies in the United States are under a great deal of pressure to comply with at least the safeguard provisions of US law, partly as a result of the lively public debate there in the last 18 months, which is unlike in this country where there has not been so intense a public debate. Of course, we know that they are going faster and faster down the route of encryption, with all the problems that my noble friend Lord Paddick mentioned.

Asylum Seekers: Women

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

Certainly, as we have said, if the information is supplied to us, it will be investigated very thoroughly indeed. The circumstances there have been subject to regular investigations by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons. In relation to the UN rapporteur who asked to visit, that was a very last-minute request. We had set up a very detailed programme, including meetings with the Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Home Secretary, and had offered other meetings. We are open to further approaches in due course in the future.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, is it not the case that in a number of instances the women who made these very serious complaints have been deported before they can speak properly to the investigators? Surely, that is not something that the Government condone.

[Lord Bates]

No, it is not, and that is why we want the information to be brought to our attention as soon as possible. We cannot act if it is not shared with us.