Exiting the European Union (Structural and Investment Funds)

Debate between Lord Harrington of Watford and John Redwood

Tuesday 19th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Richard Harrington]

I totally agree with everything my hon. Friend said, other than not asking my views were on no deal. I think he knows those, and I hope most people in the House do.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend just tell us what the dispute resolution procedure is?

[Richard Harrington]

If my right hon. Friend would bear with me, I will address that later in my remarks—I thought he was going to ask me the same question.

This instrument includes a transitional provision that enables the guarantee to be paid out to bodies involved in a European territorial co-operation programme. The power to fund beneficiaries of cross-border programmes currently comes from European law, and therefore needs to be continued in domestic law through this instrument to protect beneficiaries in a no-deal situation. That will enable the United Kingdom to continue to participate in cross-border European territorial co-operation programmes involving Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Scotland. Those programmes, known as Peace and Interreg V-A, support peace and reconciliation on the island of Ireland.

The EU has made special provisions to enable the United Kingdom to continue in both Peace and Interreg V-A in a no-deal situation, if the United Kingdom continues to pay for its share of those programmes. The transitional powers in this instrument enable the United Kingdom to make such payments to the EU to enable our continued participation in the event of a no-deal. That is consistent with our general commitments to Peace and Interreg V-A. In this arrangement, the European regulations do not need to be retained. The United Kingdom will sign an agreement with the EU to ensure that programme beneficiaries continue to follow relevant rules. The transitional provision to pay the guarantee to European territorial co-operation beneficiaries also ensures that beneficiaries of cross-border programmes other than Peace and Interreg V-A can be paid sums from the guarantee. Specifically, this provision gives Her Majesty’s Government and the devolved Administrations the appropriate powers to ensure that UK partners of such cross-border projects can receive the guarantee through domestic arrangements, to safeguard for all possible no-deal scenarios.

Among such scenarios, the House should note that in a no deal, without further changes to the European Commission’s regulations, UK organisations would be unable to continue in the majority of European territorial co-operation programmes, other than Peace and Interreg V-A, as they would not have third country access to the programmes. This instrument is designed to enable UK partners to access funding in such a scenario. The EU has published a no-deal regulation that would allow the UK to continue participating in EU programmes in the event of no deal until December 2019. However, that would depend on the UK agreeing to continue to contribute to the 2019 budget as if we were a member state. This proposal is subsidiary and without prejudice to the EU’s specific proposal on Peace and Interreg V-A. The Government are currently analysing the Commission’s proposal, but hon. Members should rest assured that this instrument will allow the guarantee on European territorial co-operation programmes to be distributed in any scenario.

Without this statutory instrument, delivery Departments would not have the powers to pay out the guarantee to beneficiaries of European territorial co-operation programmes.

Without legislation, the United Kingdom would not be able to pay for its share of the Peace and Interreg V-A programmes involving Northern Ireland. That would mean we could not take part in these two important programmes, and current beneficiaries of those programmes would be at financial risk.

I mentioned briefly the separate legal provision being made by the EU for the UK to continue to participate in the Peace and Interreg V-A programmes. That provision is intended to enable continued access to the programmes in the event of no-deal, but it does not resolve the problem of payment powers. That is why we need both the EU regulation and this statutory instrument to safeguard these programmes and to ensure the continuation of their benefits.

[John Redwood]

Before the Minister moves on from the money, will he explain how the money would be calculated, and whether we would have to make a contribution to the administration costs or just to the actual costs of the programme?

[Richard Harrington]

If I may, Mr Speaker, I will use this opportunity to answer my right hon. Friend’s earlier question about the dispute resolution. Any disputes in relation to how funding is spent are dealt with through the audit and default functions and the provisions set out in the existing funding agreements. As for his second question, I will have to give the matter some thought, as I must confess I do not know the answer. If I do not think of it in the next half an hour or so, I will certainly write to him with the answer on that. My memory is quite good and usually things come back in due course, as I know they do to you, Mr Speaker.

I mentioned that the EU is making separate legal provision for us to continue to participate in the Peace and Interreg V-A programmes. That provision is intended to enable continued access to the programmes in the event of no deal, but it does not resolve the problem of payment powers, which is why we need both the EU regulation and this statutory instrument to safeguard those programmes and to ensure the continuation of their benefits. Not having this instrument in force by exit would also prevent the Government and our devolved Administrations from paying out the guarantee to UK partners of other territorial co-operation programmes, risking their financial viability.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Debate between Lord Harrington of Watford and John Redwood

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Richard Harrington]

The best example I can give is the ratification of the agreement with the US—and this will also explain the difference between signing and ratification. Now that it has been signed, it needs to be approved in accordance with the relevant constitutional requirements of the UK and the US, just as will be the case with the other bilateral agreements, but we have built into our timetable sufficient time to allow for the necessary processes in both the UK Parliament—it will come before Parliament this year—and the US Congress, which has a slightly different arrangement involving several days of congressional business. I am very confident, however, that the process will be completed. In both cases, it is unprecedented for this to be anything other than a formality. Both countries will then exchange notes to bring the agreement into force when required, which we fully expect to be at the end of the implementation period, but we have built plenty of time into the process.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

This all sounds like very good progress. Is it true that the other four agreements the Minister says are necessary will be similarly available and ready by March 2019?

[Richard Harrington]

I have every confidence that those agreements will be ready, signed and ratified. I have no reason to believe anything other than that.

If the relevant agreements or arrangements are not in place 28 days before exit day, the amendment in lieu would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to make a request to the European Council to continue to be covered by the corresponding Euratom agreements—the trilateral agreements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK and the bilateral agreements between the countries I have mentioned. That request would cover only those areas for which the UK had not signed a relevant agreement or made arrangements for the corresponding Euratom agreement to continue to apply to the UK after exit. I think that answers the questions about process.

I have not mentioned the IAEA itself. We have made very good progress in negotiating with the IAEA, having held several productive rounds of discussions, and it has shared with us the draft voluntary offer agreement and additional protocol. Negotiations on these documents have made good progress, and we expect to conclude a final draft in time for them to be put to the June meeting of the board of governors. The UK has a very strong relationship with the IAEA and continues to support it across a range of nuclear non-proliferation issues—something I was able to reinforce in my meeting last week with the director general, Mr Amano.

Lords amendments 1, 2 and 7 were Government amendments placing the definition of “civil activities” in the Bill. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that a definition of “civil activities” be placed in the Bill, so far as is possible, supplemented by a power to develop, where necessary, its meaning in regulations. The definition we inserted takes into account the continuing work on the draft regulations that will underpin the Bill, on which we are intending to consult in July. Although the Committee accepted that it might still be necessary to supplement this definition with a power to embellish its meaning in regulations, I have not found that to be necessary, so the amendments remove the existing power to specify in regulations activities that are or are not to be treated as “civil activities” and replace it with a definition in the Bill without creating another power. They therefore reduce the number of powers created by the Bill.

The sunset clause discussed by the Opposition Front-Bench team places a time limit—colloquially known as a “sunset”—on the use of the power in clause 2. Hon. Members may recall that clause 2 contains the power to amend three pieces of legislation in consequence of a relevant safeguards agreement—an agreement relating to nuclear safeguards to which the UK and the agency are parties. That legislation makes detailed references to specific provisions of international safeguards agreements. Those references, including references to specific articles, are likely to change as a result of any amendment of, or change in, the agreements. We therefore believe that the power in the Bill is necessary to make the changes in the relevant legislation to update the references when the new agreements are in place. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended preventing the use of the power after a period of two years had expired. The amendment addresses the principle of the Committee’s recommendation, but provides for a “sunset” period of five years to ensure that the provision can function effectively in all scenarios, including that of an implementation period with the EU.

Lords amendments 5 and 6 deal with statutory reporting. As I have said, I took very seriously the cross-party requests from parliamentarians for regular detailed updates about nuclear safeguards arrangements in this country. The amendments, as amended by the Opposition, would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to provide quarterly reports on nuclear safeguards, covering both domestic and international matters, for the first year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.