Turkey

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 13th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, Turkey, which in the last quarter of the 20th century had often seemed set to requalify for the title of,

“the sick man of Europe”,

has now gained its place in the new G20 group—the primary co-ordinator of global economic issues—and is developing a new, active foreign policy in place of its vulnerable immobility in the front line of the Cold War. The case, therefore, for us to take stock of this major strategic shift and to try to draw some conclusions for our own policies in Europe and beyond is therefore compelling, and a reason for congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, on having provided the opportunity for this House to do so.

I suggest that the first thing to be clear about is that Turkey’s enviable economic growth record, barely dented by the recession which began in 2008, is good news for other European countries, including Britain. It provides a major market for our capital and consumer goods and an attractive pole for foreign investment. The fact that the European Union already has a customs union with Turkey has done much to create and now underpin this advantage, but the fact that Turkey is growing considerably faster than other European countries is more than that. It means that the frequently evoked nightmare of excessive Turkish emigration to the rest of Europe in the context of Turkey as a member of the European Union becomes steadily less likely. It also means that the gap between Turkey and the more prosperous members of the European Union is steadily narrowing—well ahead of any realistic date for accession. Already, Turkey is more prosperous than a number of the newer member states.

The new foreign policies pursued by the trio of Prime Minister Erdogan, President Gul and their hyperactive and imaginative Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also have many good features. It is surely in the general interest that Turkey should pursue the so far rather tentative rapprochement with Armenia and should play an active role in stabilising the Caucasus and searching for solutions to its territorial disputes. Similarly, a Turkey which has developed a good relationship with Syria has potential to lend a hand in the Middle East peace process and the better relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, taken together with continued efforts at reconciliation with its own ethnic Kurdish population, serves wider western interests in the region.

Is everything in the garden perfect? Not quite, I would suggest; there are some risks ahead. Turkey has yet to demonstrate that it can undergo a transfer of power from one party to another, or to a coalition of parties, without putting at risk the economic and political gains of the past 10 years. That could be put to the test following this year’s general election or perhaps later, but it certainly cannot be postponed for ever. Turkey surely needs to put its rising self-confidence to good use by tolerating press criticism and religious minorities in a much better way than it has done up to now. And an electoral law that excludes from its parliament any party that does not get 10 per cent of the vote is surely a European oddity.

In the foreign policy field, too, there are risks. A Turkey that sustains a dialogue with Iran is highly desirable, but a Turkey that appears to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as seemed to be the case at the time of the Security Council vote on sanctions last year, would surely be putting at risk its own interests as well as those of the wider world. Mr Davutoglu’s precept of “zero problems with the neighbours” is a fine policy slogan, but Cyprus is a neighbour and so too is Greece. The present impasse in the United Nations-led negotiations for a settlement on the Cyprus problem, although far from being solely the responsibility of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, will remain a pebble in their shoe for as long as it is not definitely removed.

What conclusions should Britain be drawing from these positive developments, and can it contribute in any way to reducing the risks? First, the development of a strong, confident bilateral relationship with Turkey such as the coalition Government have already embarked upon must make sense. Secondly, I believe that we are right to maintain unwavering support for Turkey’s EU membership bid. The auguries may not look particularly promising in the short term, but a country like our own, which took “We will not take no for an answer” as its own motto when vetoed by General de Gaulle for the second time in 1967, is well placed to argue that if Turkey does likewise, it too will succeed over time. We should be pushing strenuously for the freeing up of some of the blocked chapters in the negotiations so that they can continue to move forward, while still leaving those opposed to Turkish entry the possibility of blocking it at a later stage. I doubt myself whether an impasse in the negotiations later this year, when the chapters available run out, is in anyone’s interest—least of all, I suggest, in the interest of Cyprus, since decisive progress in Turkey’s accession bid is surely the key that will unlock the door to a solution of the Cyprus problem. Thirdly, we should be doing all that we can to help move those Cyprus negotiations forward. The United Nations faces the usual Sisyphean task and needs all the help it can get; unaided, it will not succeed.

On this analysis, Turkey’s emergence as a rising power has plenty of positive factors for us as well as for Turkey. That country’s success in avoiding the inevitable traps that we face is very much in this country’s interest and something that we should be doing our best to help it to achieve.