(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend is right that if Iran gives up its nuclear ambitions it is a huge move forward in regional and global security, but if we are to have confidence in verification it must be unfettered and unrestricted. Can my right hon. Friend guarantee to the House that under this agreement Iran can be forced to grant access to any site that is designated, and how quickly would Iran be forced to do so? He is right that there are wider potential positive implications for this agreement, but there are also wider potential negative implications. If Iran has sanctions lifted and money pours back into that country, what assurances and guarantees have been sought that it will not simply be used to fund proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and provide greater instability to the region?
My right hon. Friend makes a series of good points and he is right that access for verification is the crucial underpinning of this agreement. If we had not been able to secure robust access and monitoring arrangements, we would not have been able to make this deal; there would have been too much risk attached to it. In response to the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) I described the arrangements for the identification of sites for inspection, and reference of any Iranian objections to the commission. We are confident that those arrangements will work. It would mean typically a period of around 20 or 21 days between initial demand and mandated access. Of course, if Iran continues to deny access to a site that the commission has mandated should be accessed, that would be a breach of the agreement and subject to snap back under the UN Security Council resolution.
My right hon. Friend asked about Iran’s assets. Ultimately, if the deal is fully implemented it will lead to the unfreezing of about $150 billion of Iranian assets, which are currently frozen outside that country. This will not happen overnight. It will be a progressive process.
My right hon. Friend asked two questions: what will happen with that money and how can we be sure it will not be used to foster interference in the region? Of course, we cannot be absolutely sure that it will not, but let me say two things. First, Iran has a huge deficit of infrastructure investment in its country—in its energy exporting infrastructure and in its transport infrastructure; it needs a new fleet of civilian aircraft—so there are huge demands for the use of those assets. The reformers in Iran, of whom President Rouhani is one, understand very well that this deal has to deliver real benefit to ordinary people in Iran as they go about their everyday business, and they will want to invest in those things. Secondly, with very little money available and under the full burden of international sanctions, the Islamic revolutionary guard command has made a pretty effective job of interfering in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere. It is not as if this body was itching to do things but was unable to do them because it did not have the funds. It has been able to be pretty effective on a shoestring and we do not think, frankly, that the release of these funds will make a material difference.