(10 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have a separate bilateral dialogue with the Iranians in which we urge them, as I said earlier, not to meddle in the internal affairs of other countries and not to take actions that would destabilise the region, but these nuclear discussions are taking place at P5 plus 1 or E3 plus 3, whichever people choose to call it. On many of the issues that my hon. Friend listed we would not get agreement among the P5 plus 1 about what is happening on the ground, so we have chosen—I think it is the right decision—to keep these nuclear talks ring-fenced and separate from all other bilateral and multilateral strands of discussion with Iran.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that Iran must be asked to provide details of its previous nuclear activity? Otherwise a mechanism for monitoring Iran’s future actions will be fundamentally flawed.
Yes. An essential part of the agreement will be a proper investigation into, and understanding of, past breaches of Iran’s international obligations in respect of nuclear weapons.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons Chamber17. What assessment he has made of the potential effect that a reduced number of nuclear-armed submarines would have on the UK’s ability to maintain a continuous-at-sea deterrent.
The 2006 White Paper, “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”, stated that the minimum number of Vanguard class submarines required to maintain a continuous-at-sea nuclear deterrent was four. The number of submarines required to deliver CASD into the future will be determined in the main gate investment decision for the successor replacement for the Vanguard class, which is expected in 2016. This is a technical, rather than a policy, question.
I have learned not to read too much into newspaper reports. The main gate decision in 2016, which will define the number of submarines required to maintain CASD, will consider the case for four or three submarines, but I can say without equivocation that there is no possibility of maintaining CASD with two submarines.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that any cost savings from a proposal to reduce the UK’s fleet of ballistic missile submarines to just two would need to take into account the requirement to maintain the UK’s sovereign submarine manufacturing capability?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Simply reducing the fleet, even if that were possible while maintaining CASD, would not generate proportionate savings. Many of the costs are fixed—the costs of development and maintaining industrial capability, not merely at Barrow-in-Furness for submarine building, but in the nuclear propulsion industry. No one in this House should ever forget either that these high-end, high-technology platforms support the very top end of British manufacturing industry—the high-precision, high-technology engineering industry on which the revival of manufacturing depends.