(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI think the two things are completely different. In Iraq at the end of the war, Britain was a joint occupying power and shared joint responsibility for the occupation commission. We were in control of the territory, exercising all the functions and responsibility of Government. As a result of the decisions that were taken around Libya, British boots were never on the ground, we were never in control of that country and we were never an occupying power, so we did not have it within our capability to take the actions that we should have done.
Let me summarise the most important lessons that Sir John has drawn in this report. First, taking military action should always be a last resort. Only after exhausting all credible alternatives should we consider taking the country to war. I believe—this is my personal belief—that the political price that has been paid for apparently neglecting this important principle will ensure that future Administrations are unlikely to overlook it.
Secondly, how government is conducted matters. The failures of process, of challenge, and even of proper record-keeping identified by Sir John were serious and widespread. In part to prevent such failures in the future, the Conservative-led coalition Government established the National Security Council in May 2010 to ensure that there is proper, co-ordinated, strategic decision making across the whole of Government. The NSC includes the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the intelligence agencies, and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, as well as relevant Ministers—and now the Attorney General—alongside senior officials. It is properly supported by a dedicated secretariat led by the national security adviser, ensuring that all parts of the national security apparatus are properly joined up across Whitehall and beyond.
So we now have a system that ensures that decisions on serious security issues are taken on the basis of full papers and proper challenge and discussion, with legal advice fully explained and considered, and proposals stress-tested by Departments, with decisions formally recorded. Having sat on the National Security Council for six years, first as an occasional member, as Transport Secretary, and then permanently as Defence Secretary and now Foreign Secretary, it seems to me highly improbable that the process of conduct of business in relation to this matter through 2002 and 2003, as set out by Chilcot, could be repeated now.
I think that the Foreign Secretary’s last comment was particularly complacent. Looking at, for example, the Attorney General, why is that not an independent appointment? Why do we still allow the Attorney General to be an appointment of the Prime Minister? It should be somebody who is independent and legally qualified in this area, and that certainly was not the case during the Iraq war.
The Attorney General’s office is of course filled with expert lawyers. The Attorney General produces his advice on the basis of the advice provided to him by his expert lawyers. I have no doubt, from my extensive experience of Attorney General advice, both as Defence Secretary and as Foreign Secretary, that it is impartial, fearless, and quite often gives us advice that we perhaps do not like, and we have to change course accordingly, as is appropriate. [Interruption.] No, the hon. Lady is taking a conspiracy theory too far. If we get advice from the Attorney General that steers us away from a course of action, then we move to a different course of action. I can tell her, from my own direct experience—my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary will have similar examples from the relatively recent past—of advice from the Attorney General causing us to think again and go in a different direction.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIran, having acquired a nuclear weapon, would have triggered at the very least a nuclear arms race in the middle east. At least two other powers in the middle east would clearly not tolerate Iran possessing a nuclear weapon without going for one themselves. It could be even more stark than that. Almost certainly at some stage and by some means or another, the real alternative to a deal to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb would have been war. What we have averted with this agreement is the threat and prospect of a war to resolve the issue. We have resolved it through diplomacy, which I think is hugely to be welcomed.
In the light of this very welcome agreement and noting that, in May, Iran joined 112 non-proliferation treaty member states in signing the humanitarian pledge initiated by Austria to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, will the Foreign Secretary explain what steps the UK Government will take to decommission our own arsenal, instead of spending billions on locking ourselves into yet more nuclear weapons?
As the hon. Lady will know, we have reduced the number of warheads to the absolute minimum necessary to maintain our continuous at-sea deterrent and the UK remains committed to the principle of a world free of nuclear weapons, but we will be able to get there only when there is consensus about multilateral nuclear disarmament—and we are not there yet.
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman will have been at the heart of the angry and temper-ridden debates that went on in the Prime Minister’s office and No. 11 at the time. Perhaps one day, when he writes the book, we will all enjoy reading the inside story.
I want to press the Foreign Secretary again on the question of extending the franchise to 16 and 17-year-olds. The answer he gave about why we should not do it—because it is an issue of national importance—is the main reason he should do it. He said that he did not want to deviate from the franchise for Westminster, but he is already doing that by extending it to peers. Why not let young people have a say on their future, which is what this Bill is about?
My personal view on the extension of the franchise is that we would be better expending our efforts on trying to get a decent turnout rate among 18 to 24-year-olds before we start worrying about 16 and 17-year-olds.