Queen’s Speech

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 12th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I also enjoyed the two excellent maiden speeches today, and I reassure my noble friend Lady Blake that, even as an ardent Chelsea fan, I too think Leeds should be in the Premier League.

By the end of this year the economy will still not be back to where it was at the beginning of last year, even according to optimistic forecasts such as that from the Bank of England. We will not know till next February how far short of its pre-pandemic level GDP fell in 2021 and how much lost ground we still have to make up. But breaking free from lockdown and bouncing back to pre-pandemic levels of economic activity sometime in 2022 present a far simpler challenge than delivering sustained growth between now and 2030.

Right now the economy is suffused with spare capacity and eager to get back to work. What is missing, as the Resolution Foundation think tank has pointed out, is a clear path to prosperity. The Queen’s Speech presented platitudes about freeports, planning reforms and new rules for public procurement, but could not conceal the fact that our starting point is weak, the legacy of decades of inadequate investment.

The evidence on productivity, skills, infrastructure and superfast internet links tells its own sad story. Following Labour’s investment 10 years ago, the number of new apprenticeships in England exceeded 520,000; last year it was only 320,000. In the World Economic Forum’s latest league tables Britain came 21st for the quality of its port infrastructure, 36th for road infra- structure, and 79th for its number of fibre internet subscriptions. This is not a firm foundation on which to develop a strong economy, one able to generate faster, fairer, greener growth. It smacks more of make do and mend, not a 21st-century economic powerhouse. Like once proud Premiership clubs that spent big on property but failed to invest in new players and suffered repeated relegation—names such as Bolton Wanderers and Wigan Athletic come to mind—the British economy has been steadily slipping down the league table. Yesterday, Canary Wharf; today, “Canary Dwarf”.

The lack of clarity about Britain’s economic prospects is reflected in claims made by Ministers. The Chancellor says that his March Budget gives the economy a big boost this year; what he has really done is to slow the rate of fiscal withdrawal in 2021 and speed it up in 2022. Only in Tory Treasury-speak does withdrawing fiscal support at a slower rate count as a bigger fiscal stimulus. The Chancellor still plans to withdraw 90% of the 2020 stimulus by the end of 2022, and he intends to begin pulling the plug on the furlough scheme and the business rates holiday for hospitality businesses only nine days after the end of the Government’s road map. That will be six weeks before he learns from the Office for National Statistics what happened to GDP in the second quarter of this year.

Whatever happened to the Prime Minister’s pledge to lead a “data-driven” Government? What became of the Chancellor’s claim to be “going long” by backing recovery well beyond the end of the road map? Perhaps events will prove the Bank of England’s latest forecasts right. The economy might make a relatively quick recovery over the next 18 months, but the Office for Budget Responsibility expects growth to drop below 2% per year after 2022. This would simply mark a return to the pathetically poor performance of the austerity years of George Osborne and Philip Hammond.

The Queen’s Speech lacks clarity and ambition. Ministers talk a good game about levelling up and increasing capital spending on public infrastructure for years to come, but when the Institute for Fiscal Studies points out that the March 2021 Budget made some £16 billion of cuts to current public spending relative to the Chancellor’s pre-Covid spending plans, Ministers hide behind a smokescreen of technical mumbo-jumbo about inflation. The Government’s efforts to turn the economy around and set it on a new growth path pale in comparison with the audacious stimulus measures taken by President Biden. His is an example well worth following—but, sadly, this Government’s miserly economic agenda fails miserably to do so.

Education (Guidance about Costs of School Uniforms) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 19th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I praise my noble friend Lady Lister, not just for moving the Bill but for her fantastic social policy work over decades. Nearly one-quarter of parents say that the cost of a school uniform means that their child has worn ill-fitting, unclean or incorrect uniform, leading to cases of bullying, feeling left out or even being excluded from school through no fault of their own. It has been estimated that nearly half a million children have been sent home from school because the costs involved meant they were wearing incorrect uniform.

I congratulate the Labour Welsh Government on introducing in 2018 their pupil development grant access funding to help families cover the costs of school uniforms, sports kit and IT equipment, as well as equipment for activities outside school, including sports clubs and trips for outside learning. That funding goes directly to the families who need it most. The Welsh Government introduced new statutory guidance in 2019, providing advice for governing bodies and head teachers on issues relating to school uniform policy. Governing bodies are expected to consider ways of keeping down the costs of uniforms, which could include stipulating basic items and colours but not styles, meaning that items could be bought from more than one outlet. Schools are also expected to consider whether school logos are strictly necessary and if they should apply to just one item of uniform or be provided free of charge. I ask the Minister to look carefully at this admirable Welsh initiative.

However, the truth is that even if the Bill passes, as I hope it will, school uniforms will still be an unaffordable expense for too many. Uniform dress codes often involve a badge, sweatshirt and dark trousers and, typically, shirts, ties, blazers and PE kits, indoor and out, all branded and often available from only a single supplier. In some areas, more than half of children live in poverty, the number rising year on year, and that is before the terrible impact of Covid-19. In such areas, as many as one-fifth of children have been sent home for wearing incorrect uniform as a result of being unable to afford the uniform specified by the school. In some cases, children miss school altogether because either they or their parents feel ashamed of the condition of the uniform that they could not afford. Tragically, too many families wanting their children to go on school trips have to choose between those trips and either feeding them properly or paying for uniforms.

We have to make guidance on affordable uniforms a statutory duty, as it is in Wales. I therefore ask the Government to provide generous funding to implement the Bill and speed it to Royal Assent.

Industrial Training Levy (Engineering Construction Industry Training Board) Order 2020

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I very much agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, especially on the vital necessity for new skills on green projects. Wales, of course, has many to offer, not least the Severn barrage, which is capable of harnessing the enormous power of the Severn estuary, but also the tidal lagoons and other forms of tidal power and marine energy. Anglesey has developed a marvellous strategy as an energy island. I hope that the skills needed for that will be supported by the Government in the UK, by providing the funding to the Welsh Government. I also welcome the Minister’s acknowledgement at the outset of the vital role of key engineering workers in keeping going the essential infrastructure of the country during the Covid lockdown.

Although the Explanatory Memorandum is candid about the policy background to the order, it is hardly comprehensive in its coverage and it is short on significant detail. It is indeed true that industrial training boards have operated in the UK since 1964—since March 1964, in fact, because industrial training boards were originally set up in the dog days of Alec Douglas-Home’s Conservative Government.

Today’s Tories seem shy about acknowledging one of their party’s more important initiatives aimed at tackling UK skills shortages. We know why: the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, put 16 of the 23 industrial training boards to the sword nearly 40 years ago. The Engineering Construction Industry Training Board was one of the few that survived his cull. It also survived a more recent review, in 2017, by shrinking its board and taking the nonsensical step of cutting its training levy.

There are several reasons why the Engineering Construction Industry Training Board has lived on where others have been sacrificed; some are identified in the Explanatory Memorandum, and others are acknowledged in the board’s 2019 annual report. The overwhelming reason is market failure, which Ministers never seem willing to acknowledge. There are few incentives for individual employers to train, since the work is often short-term and the labour force highly mobile. This means that long-term skills needs get overlooked, and these are vital, in engineering especially. The board is right to claim that it helps to make the labour market in engineering construction more efficient and more effective.

The board’s chair, Lynda Armstrong, is also right that it faces an emerging skills shortfall as an ageing workforce retires. The 137% rise in the number of recruits starting apprenticeships in 2018—to 1,171—is a positive development, and I welcome the priority that the board is attaching to promoting the recruitment of a more diverse workforce.

I also welcome the fact that the board has an advisory council that includes trade unions and not just employers, trade associations and other stakeholders. However, I note that this falls a long way short of the provision made in the Industrial Training Act 1964 for equal numbers of representatives of employers and employees. Perhaps the Minister will say something about that.

The Engineering Construction Industry Training Board is an example of successful intervention that the Government are reluctant to build upon in other industries. It is a love-child that the Government are too embarrassed to acknowledge openly. Its very success highlights the discomfort that the Tory party feels when its free market ideology comes up against the practical consequences of free market failure. I hope—although I fear my expectations are very low indeed—that the Government will take heed of this story and begin to invest properly in the vital skills we need for the future. They have not done so for more than 10 years.

With not only the green projects of which the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, spoke, but with robotics and artificial intelligence coming up fast, surely the Minister must agree that the Government should start investing massively in skills now, or see Britain continuing to fall behind badly on productivity and the new jobs of the future.

Trade Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th March 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hain]

22: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Continuation of North-South trade and prevention of customs arrangements at borders
An international trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union may not be ratified under sections 20 to 25 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 unless the agreement—(a) is compatible with the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and(b) does not—(i) negatively affect any form of North-South trade in goods or services or the operation of the relevant North-South implementation bodies, or(ii) create or facilitate customs arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland after exit day which feature—(a) physical infrastructure related to customs checks,(b) a requirement for customs or regulatory compliance checks,(c) random checks on goods vehicles, or(d) any other checks and controls related to trade, that did not exist before exit day and which are not subject to an agreement between Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of Ireland.”

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment stands also in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Bruce, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. This amendment, which has cross-party support, is consistent with the previous amendment carried by your Lordship’s House, and which the Government accepted when the European Union (Withdrawal) Act was adopted last summer. However, it is vital that those provisions in Section 10 of the withdrawal Act are reflected in this Bill, which concerns not our divorce deal, as that Act did, but our long-term trading relationships.

In principle, the UK has joined Ireland and the EU in a shared objective of avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland in order to help protect the hard-won peace process delivered by the Good Friday agreement—a peace process that is still just that: a process that, in my view, has dangerously reversed these past couple of years. The border is often described as the Irish border, a description which seems to absolve the UK of any ownership of it, but it is a UK land border with Ireland. If we leave, it will be a border between the UK and the EU, so it is our responsibility as much as it is Ireland’s and the EU’s responsibility under any circumstances.

Only last week, the head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, David Sterling, warned of potentially grave and profound consequences of a no-deal Brexit—including a sharp rise in unemployment, the collapse or flight of businesses and potential unrest—for Northern Ireland, which, lest we forget, voted by 56% to 44% to remain in the European Union in 2016. Senior civil servants do not usually speak so candidly and compellingly. Advocates of a kamikaze Brexit might take notice and might also take notice of the strong words of the 50 or more Northern Ireland businesses which wrote to MPs in similar terms over the weekend.

The extent of trade and traffic over the Irish border is huge: 110 million person crossings take place every year; Northern Ireland, with its population of 1.8 million people, exports £3.4 billion over the border, by far its biggest export destination outside the UK and the first export destination for new and growing enterprises; at least 5,000 Northern Ireland companies trade with their neighbours over the border with Ireland; tens of thousands of people live on one side and work on the other; supply chains operate across the border without impediment; more than 400,000 lambs and 750 million litres of milk are exported across the border to Ireland for processing; and 177,000 heavy goods vehicles and 208,000 light vans cross the border every single month, which is 4.6 million crossings a year, and there are 22 million car crossings, and they take place all along a 300-mile border with nearly 300 crossing points.

By way of comparison, the Norway-Sweden land border is 1,000 miles long with only 57 crossing points. That is a hard border accompanied by infrastructure at the frontier, yet it is the very one most cited by those Brexiteers who seek to brush aside our border with the Republic as something which can be solved with a few cameras and some online programmes.

There are unique arrangements under the Good Friday/Belfast agreement for north-south co-operation. The Department for Exiting the European Union lists no less than 157 different areas of cross-border work and co-operation. Many of them have been facilitated by the common legal and policy framework provided by Ireland’s and the UK’s common membership of the EU since 1973. These areas are the things of everyday life—the precious signs of normality in the post-conflict border region—and there must never be new barriers or controls erected to block or discourage them. They include: food safety; tourism; specialist schools; fighting crime; tackling environmental pollution; water quality and supply; waste management; bus services; train services; cancer care; blood transfusions; and gas and electricity supply. We must never disrupt these arrangements, either through a divorce deal or—the amendment is directed at this—any new trade agreements.

WTO rules, which primarily remove barriers to trade and prevent unfair discrimination, will not allow these areas of north-south co-operation and everyday cross-border movement to be maintained. WTO rules and the obligations of an EU member state would strictly limit the kind of bilateral co-operation between the Republic and the UK as an EU member state which has made the border invisible in everyday life.

Some find all these essential facts to be tiresome obstacles to their Brexit dream. They argue that the border in Ireland will never need any new barriers, that the UK will never erect any on its side and that somehow Ireland, which by law has to obey EU and WTO customs and regulatory rules, will not do so either. The same people go on to use the word “technology” as a magic solution, repeatedly citing reports by one or two alleged experts on how, maybe, such solutions might work and might be ready someday, somehow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I recognise that and know that the noble Lord is passionate about the Republic of Ireland—as he said, he resides there. There is a fundamental point here: that anxiety would not be necessary if the withdrawal agreement, which was agreed in December, had been passed in the other place last night. That must be the best solution to remove the anxiety to which the noble Lord refers. He also alludes to a very important piece of work, which needs to start immediately—namely, rebuilding those friendships and links, and that partnership, which have served us so well in recent decades, to ensure that the progress that has been made has not been lost. That needs to start immediately. As I say, I take on board very much the point that he has raised.

[Lord Hain]

I thank my noble friend Lord Puttnam for the point he made. I have lots of friends on the island of Ireland, on both sides. I know that there is a real feeling of hurt among citizens of the Republic, given our tangled history—our colonial history, going back centuries—which created enormous distrust and suspicion from Dublin towards us. It was overcome by building trust almost day by day, week by week, over the last 20 years, by Governments of all colours—in particular, those led by John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and subsequently. That sense of pain is very deep.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his generosity towards me. What I feel very strongly goes to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, whose interventions are always interesting and intellectually testing; I often agree with them. The point is this: we have no idea what sort of future awaits us. We do not know whether we will have an agreement with the European Union at all. There are vociferous voices, some in this House but particularly in the House of Commons, that do not want a deal with the European Union. Therefore the terms of the amendment are absolutely right. The default position that we can fall back on is that we need at least to agree with the Irish Republic in the terms of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement how the border issue is to be managed. I do not see that that is the obstacle in the terms of the amendment that the noble and learned Lord and the Minister have suggested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

It could be that the Germans are planning to leave the European Union, but while they remain their external trade will be conducted by the European Union.

[Lord Hain]

I was going to make exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has just made with far more authority. The European Union negotiates as a bloc and the Brexiteers want to break free of that, for their own reasons.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I would love to vote for this amendment if I thought it would achieve what the noble Lord, the Irish people and indeed all of us want. Unfortunately, it outlaws agreements between the UK and the European Union only in the circumstances narrated. My belief is that if this happens, it will not be as a result of any agreement between the EU and the UK but because there is no agreement between the EU and the UK. This is possibly my blindness, but I do not see how this goes anywhere towards preventing the evil that all of us—I cannot speak for anyone but myself, strictly speaking, but certainly most of us, judging from what I have heard—want to avoid. We want a soft border whatever happens between Northern Ireland and the Republic. I am sure that people in the Republic want that and the Northern Irish people want that—and certainly I and all who love them want that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hain]

Perhaps I may say to the noble and learned Lord that, while we may all want it—in fact, we all say we do—unless we will the means we cannot actually ensure and guarantee it. That is what the amendment does in respect of future trade agreements. The same wording was accepted by this House and by the Government in the other place, and has become part of the withdrawal Act—but that is part of, if you like, the divorce settlement. What we need to do is ensure that the same principles apply to our future trading relationship.

[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords—

[The Earl of Courtown (Con)]

My Lords, with apologies to the House, we are on Report and we should get on with it.

[Lord Hain]

Perhaps I may conclude with something that might help the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. It is what this amendment does not say that is important. This amendment does not tie the Government’s hands, except in terms of the exact requirements for the future, because that is not appropriate in a clause of this kind, which I hope will be accepted and put into the Act. It spells out for new trade the principles that the Government have already accepted in the withdrawal agreement. So it is already in statute, and I am therefore puzzled as to why the Government are not accepting this agreement by approbation.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, it may be helpful to the House if I explain our hesitation on precisely that point. Section 10(2)(b) of the EU withdrawal Act prohibits regulations creating new border arrangements —that is, arrangements that did not exist before exit day—unless they are in accordance with agreements between the UK and the EU. This amendment would prevent any arrangements unless they were subject to an agreement between the UK and the Government of Ireland. Such an agreement, in our view, would be unlawful for Ireland to enter into, as customs and a common commercial policy fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. I want that point to be clear on the record.

[Lord Hain]

I understand that point. However, under the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—we are bound and obligated, including with the approval by treaty of the European Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said, to agree things with Dublin. That is the way it works. That is part of the Good Friday agreement that has the blessing of the European Union.

I repeat that we have no idea as yet of our future trading relationships with anybody, including across the Irish border—no idea at all. This amendment spells out the principles that have already been accepted in the withdrawal Act, and agreed in statute by the Government. I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

Trade Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

I am not speaking on behalf of my noble friend Lord Teverson, the absolute expert on these Benches on these issues, but simply to ask a number of questions in support of those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. He rightly points out that one of the core relationships that currently exists between Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, is energy. It is something that has perhaps not had the same profile or publicity as border checks, but it is very significant to consumers on both sides of the Irish Sea. It is of interest to me, as someone who represented a Scottish Borders constituency, that Northern Ireland’s security of electricity supply depends on the supply of natural gas from Moffat, which is just outside my former constituency and supplies 100% of its gas requirements. After the UK’s exit from the EU, Northern Ireland will continue to source 100% of its gas from Great Britain. As a consequence, the integration of the energy market for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland now depends on an integrated single electricity market. The interconnectedness of energy is something that political agreements will have great difficulty disentangling. The request for clarity on the current position is very important. It is even more important given that there is now a real prospect of leaving the European Union with no agreement. The Government have said in their position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland that,

“the new framework relevant to the energy market in Northern Ireland and Ireland should … facilitate the continuation of a single electricity market covering Northern Ireland and Ireland”.

But how this is to be done separate from the European Union raises significant questions. I hope the Minister is able to respond to this.

The evidence provided by Minister Richard Harrington to the Lords committee is interesting. He said:

“Whether we are in the EU or not in the EU, it is in the interests of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to continue a shared electricity system  …  We are held up in sorting this out only by the progress of the general talks in Europe”.


The question mark over where we currently are with these general talks in Europe means that it is urgent that we have clarity on the current position on securing agreement on a shared electricity system. The real question in leaving without an agreement with the EU is whether that raises issues with regard to maintaining the single internal energy market.

The final point on which I ask for clarification from the Minister is that it is not just the operation of the market on a regulatory basis that is of importance. The market operates primarily because of the free movement of people and professionals and the regulatory systems that surround it. We also know that when it comes to the operation of the market there is the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. What is the Government’s position on the jurisdiction of the legal supervision of how such integrated electricity markets will operate?

Free movement of people and clarity on jurisdiction are core elements of why we believe that moving from the European single market will cause real damage. The integrated single electricity market is a case study in itself in how it operates effectively at the moment and why question marks over its future need to be addressed. Clarity, as sought by the amendment, is necessary. I hope we can secure it from the Minister’s response.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, who made some important points about the energy market, especially on the island of Ireland.

Amendment 46 is consistent with the provision of the EU withdrawal Act after a near-identical amendment passed by your Lordships’ House was accepted by the Government last summer. The central purpose of the UK’s, Ireland’s and the EU’s shared objective of avoiding a hard border is to protect the hard-won peace and reconciliation. That peace process was begun by the Good Friday agreement of 1998 but is still just that: a process—which is now, I think, sadly in reverse. Although it would be wrong to overstate the link between that and recent dissident IRA activity, specifically the car bomb in Derry/Londonderry, it does demonstrate the willingness of paramilitaries to exploit the current Brexit uncertainty and devolved government limbo to undermine the fragile peace, as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said last week in this House.

The border is often described as the Irish border. It is not just that: is the UK’s land border with Ireland and the EU. Therefore, it is our responsibility as much as it is Ireland’s and the EU’s. Some 110 million person crossings take place over the border every year. Northern Ireland, with a population of 1.8 million, exports £3.4 billion over the border. It is by far its biggest export destination outside the UK and the first export destination for new and growing enterprises. At least 5,000 Northern Ireland companies, and probably many more, trade with their neighbours over the border. Tens of thousands of people live on one side and work on the other. Supply chains operate across the border without impediment. For instance, each year, more than 400,000 lambs and 750 million litres of milk are exported from Northern Ireland to Ireland for processing; 4.6 million heavy goods vehicles and light vans cross the border every year, along with 22 million cars. These crossings take place all along a 300-mile border with 300 crossing points.

A little-noticed document published on 7 December by the Department for Exiting the European Union lists no less than 157 different areas of cross-border work and co-operation on the island of Ireland, many of which have been facilitated by Ireland and the UK’s common membership of the EU. Almost every one of those areas concerns people’s everyday lives, and almost all are linked to the European Union and Ireland’s and the UK’s common membership of it since 1973.

Life has become pretty normal for most people in Northern Ireland over the past 20 years or so. Like anyone else in the UK, people there go to jobs near to them or in the next town. They go to doctors, chemists and hospitals near to them. They buy local fresh food. They use trains, buses and roads to get around.

The difference is that for many in Northern Ireland, the next town can be in a different jurisdiction. If we get Brexit wrong, it will cause serious inconvenience and cost. But for British and Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland, getting Brexit wrong will bring immediate and harsh consequences; many aspects of normal life will be much harder or even impossible. People live on one side of the border and work on the other. Because of EU rules that the UK helped to make, cancer care and ambulance services are run jointly across that border. You can get a prescription on one side and medicines on the other because of more EU rules that we share. Cheaper energy and more choice across the island of Ireland again exist thanks to those common EU rules. Cross-border work and co-operation on the island of Ireland, facilitated by EU laws, covers livestock movement on farms straddling the border, food safety, tourism, schools, colleges, farming, fighting crime, tackling environmental pollution, water quality and supply, waste management, GPs, blood transfusions, bus services, train services, gas supply, electricity supply and so on.

All those things add up to making life feel normal after, just 20 years ago, the Good Friday agreement all but finished the violence and murder which killed thousands of people, including many in Britain. The border being invisible today is a big part of that peace process and we must not let Northern Ireland go backwards by putting up any new barriers.

It is those very low-level, ordinary aspects of daily life that are the real signs of the precious achievement of the peace process. Although I strongly reject the Prime Minister’s deal, I cannot and will not join those attacking what is known as the Irish backstop. Any Brexit deal of any kind must include this insurance policy or backstop. It is an insurance policy: a rainy-day back-up plan in the event that a new UK-EU trade deal is not ready by the end of 2020—or beyond. It is a sensible policy to be used only if needed—and everyone hopes it will not be—to ensure that the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland remains open and invisible.

It is not just that Ireland and the EU will not accept it any other way; nor should we in the UK. Whatever happens with Brexit, it is vital we protect what we have achieved together in Northern Ireland in the past 20 to 30 years and avoid any hardening of the border in any way. I call on our fellow politicians to stop playing politics with Northern Ireland, as so tragically happened in the House of Commons yesterday, and insist on an insurance policy regarding the border. We should also demand an end to attacks on the Irish Government, who, in insisting on the backstop, are merely fulfilling their obligations under the Good Friday agreement, as we in the UK should also be doing.

The UK and Irish Governments, along with the EU, were right to prioritise the Irish border in the Brexit negotiations. Your Lordships’ House has rightly focused on it too, not least because the blunt truth is that maintaining an open border always was the Achilles heel of a hard or no-deal Brexit.

Experts argue that there are four key ingredients for successful border management: first, trust and co-operation between authorities and agencies on both sides; secondly, the harmonisation of these agencies’ approaches; thirdly, the application of common standards to minimise the need for checks and controls in the first place; and, fourthly, the use of technology to improve efficiency. Those arguing that technology can solve all the Irish border Brexit problems are plain wrong. It may help, but whether a border is frictionless depends on the rules being applied to movement across it being the same either side—it is the rules themselves, not so much the means used to facilitate enforcement of those rules. Yet Brexiteers seem unwilling to acknowledge that leaving means a growing divergence of the rules on either side of the border. Their conundrum is that divergence is something they favour to build their free-trade, deregulated, low-tax nirvana— fantasy, I think—otherwise, they argue, what is the point of Brexiting?

The UK and Ireland have their common—I stress, common—obligations under the Good Friday agreement to ensure peace, stability and progress. The agreement contains two approaches to this that directly affect the border: intensification of British-Irish and north-south co-operation, and de-securitisation. De-securitisation meant not only the removal of security installations but the British Government’s commitment to bringing about measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal, peaceful society. The last remnants of the militarised border were removed only 12 years ago.

It is simply no good politicians or commentators saying, “Nobody wants a hard border so there won’t be one”. There will be if we do not stop it, because if we Brexit without a deal or without a backstop, both Ireland and the EU will have responsibilities to ensure protection of the single market and customs union. The UK will have its own responsibilities, including meeting World Trade Organization requirements, which in turn mean a hard border.

Trade Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for outlining the amendments so clearly. I want to add something in only a couple of areas. In doing so, I welcome the fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is in his place. He and other colleagues will recall discussing—in debates on the withdrawal Bill—translating EU retained law into domestic law in a number of areas that either impinge on or link directly to what are currently devolved competences. At that stage, the Government made a number of concessions and changed their position so that the presumption was to devolve powers—and that was welcome.

Therefore, the sticking points, to some extent, were issues in what the Government termed the “framework agreements” with the devolved Administrations, where there had been no agreement with the devolved Administrations on what was in the reserved or devolved competences basket. In the previous group, state aid was one such major issue. Of the 157 areas, there was no issue with 49 of them; in 82 of them, the Government and the devolved Administrations agreed that the common framework would be needed; 24 areas required further discussion; and in 12 areas, the UK Government believed that the competences were reserved but the devolved Administrations believed them to be devolved. That is relevant to discussions about how the regulations for the continuity agreements will take place and will give an indicator for the future, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said. I seek further clarification on the other areas.

These issues are not esoteric. The 12 areas are: equal design and energy labelling, which is an important part of trade agreements now, as we discussed in Committee on Monday; product safety and standards relating to explosive atmospheres; elements of the network and information security directive; environmental quality in the timber trade, which is of considerable significance to the Scottish economy; data sharing; food geographical indications and protected food names, which are core parts of trading relationships; medical devices; migrant access to benefits; data protection; radioactive source notifications; state aid, as mentioned; and vehicle standards, including the various types of approvals and directives for roads.

Those 12 areas are part of existing trade agreements and will be key elements of future trade agreements, but in 2018 no agreement was reached with the devolved Administrations on them. It would be helpful if the Minister could update us on whether agreement has been reached on them, so that our concerns can be allayed, or whether discussions are continuing on them. This is important for both continuity and the future, because—as the International Trade Committee in the Commons has discussed and as the Scottish and Welsh Governments have published—there are proposals for how future trading arrangements would need to be put in place.

One of the options—as the Scottish Government have called for and as the UK Trade Policy Transparency and Scrutiny report called for—was a joint ministerial committee or intergovernmental trade committee to complement the advisory committee that the Government have established. The Commons committee made a very constructive set of proposals that it would be a mechanism through the devolved Administrations as part of the consultation process. There would be a formal advisory role through the mandate process and another formal advisory role throughout negotiations. No doubt there will be further discussions about any dispute resolution mechanisms and whether such measures have to be approved by the devolved legislatures in addition to consultation with the Administrations.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, put forward very constructive suggestions about how intergovernmental relations could operate. These are both necessary for the continuity agreements and vital for any future agreements. I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, highlighted this area, and I hope that the Government will be able to give clarification on where we are with the understanding of where these competences lie and the role of the necessary consultation.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, in speaking in support of both these amendments, in a way I am dealing with the points I raised with the noble Baroness, Lady Fairhead, which she did not respond to—inadvertently, I am sure. Maybe both she and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, could consider writing to me about this. As I described at the last sitting, it gives rise to concern that we will see an action replay of the power grab that Whitehall tried to pull on the devolved Administrations in the course of the withdrawal process. There was an attempt by Whitehall to repatriate to London those policy areas—for example, the environment and many others—that were devolved but held at a European level because of our membership of the European Union. That caused great aggravation with the devolved authorities, particularly—in the absence of Northern Ireland’s Government—with Wales and Scotland, which in the case of Scotland is festering on. An agreement was belatedly reached with Wales.

In this process, particularly when making regulations, we will potentially see these same issues arising. There is therefore a strong argument for the proposal put forward by my noble friend Lord Stevenson in Amendment 17 for the joint ministerial committee or some equivalent body to be given the overall supervising authority here. Having been a member of the JMC at various times in government, I was never very impressed with it. It was a bit of a talking shop. Since 2010, under the coalition Government and now, I hear from successive First Ministers of Wales and individual Ministers for Wales, with whom I am in direct and regular contact, that nothing has changed.

Yet the issues over Brexit are even more serious and of even more constitutional and policy importance than prior to this whole sorry horror show unfolding. The Government need to consider putting in place, preferably in this Bill and in the form specified by these amendments or some equivalent form, procedures that are recognised and have to be abided by, before we run into the same kind of problems that arose earlier in this whole Brexit saga.

[Viscount Trenchard]

My Lords, surely it is not necessary to set up a joint ministerial committee for this purpose. Insofar as the novation of FTAs affects devolved powers, the Government will in any event be bound to consult. Surely a joint ministerial committee, such as the amendment proposes, would make the process of rolling over the EU’s FTAs much more cumbersome and time-consuming, especially if the EU persists in refusing to enter into a reasonable, equitable agreement without a backstop.

On Monday, in the debate on the GPA, the noble Lord, Lord Hain, referred to this matter, and has just spoken again in similar vein. He referred to a power grab by Westminster but actually, if the powers being returned to the UK from the EU relating to devolved matters were all to go immediately to the devolved Administrations, that would represent a power grab by the devolved Administrations. Surely the powers that were devolved relating to matters that are partly or wholly EU competencies preserve the need in many areas to maintain a UK-wide market; while we have been in the EU that has meant an EU-wide market. We are shortly to recover our sovereignty over our own UK market, I trust, but that in no way obviates the need to maintain the UK-wide market in many sectors. Furthermore, as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, also pointed out, the amendment requires membership of the joint ministerial committee by a representative of the Northern Ireland Executive, which suggests that they might not be operational for some time.

[Lord Hain]

May I clarify a number of points? First, the original Bill, over which there was the power-grab tussle, was actually amended by the Government in response to the Welsh and Scottish Governments’ complaints. They recognised that the original procedure, which the noble Viscount seems to want to wave through again, was the wrong procedure and that it was not right to set out on the course on which they originally set out. I hope that he will accept that point, because I was rather worried about the tone and the content of what he said.

Secondly, since the joint ministerial committee exists already, and its machinery is in place and operates already, the amendment is saying that these regulations under the umbrella of the Trade Bill would formally have to go through the JMC. It need not be a complete convening of a meeting which, I accept, is time-consuming and resource-consuming, but I recall well from my days in government that cabinet committees sometimes operated by a process of written consent and amendment between the different Whitehall departments. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and many others will remember that operating in that way. It could operate in that way for the purposes of these regulations, but there would be a statutory obligation to process these regulations in that fashion. As I understand it, that is the point that my noble friend Lord Stevenson is seeking to get cemented in.

[Viscount Trenchard]

I thank the noble Lord for correcting my ignorance about the joint ministerial committee already being in existence, although there is obviously no Northern Irish representative on it at present. On the other matter, I still do not understand why it can be sensible in the case of powers that are EU competencies today but which are also devolved. If those powers are repatriated to the UK, it is still necessary to maintain a UK-wide market because, by virtue of being members of the EU market, we have had a UK-wide market within the EU. Therefore, if the entire powers are delegated to the devolved Administrations, we effectively break up our single UK market.

--- Later in debate ---

That point was accepted by the Welsh Government. The Scottish Government refused to accept it, for reasons I explained at the time I did not understand. There were politics about power grabs and whatnot that I have read about since then. But the issues are clear. I see no reason why the joint ministerial committee set up to deal with these matters should not also deal with that aspect of them. One thing that has to be decided is the nature of the power in question. Once that has been decided, it is a question of which ministerial group in the Governments of the devolved Administrations has to deal with the matter. If it is a UK matter, it would be dealt with by the Westminster Parliament and Ministers under regulatory powers referred to them by the UK Parliament. If it is a question of purely Scottish legislation, it would be a Scottish ministerial order under powers delegated by the Scottish Parliament. The same would apply in Wales and in Northern Ireland. The issue is one that is appropriate for the joint ministerial committee to deal with in due course.

[Lord Hain]

I apologise for prolonging this discussion. I urge the Government to reflect on this: given the trouble that we have already run into in this process with the devolved Administrations, if there were a process where these regulations automatically had to come under the umbrella—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, implies and which I agree with—that would impose a discipline on all the parties concerned to use that process to resolve any common issues that are outstanding. It is an established process, but it has not really been used. In the post-Brexit situation, which I think will be a nightmare, these procedures will be needed even more to ensure the constitutional stability, success and indeed viability, given what is going on in Scotland and Northern Ireland over Brexit, of the whole of the union.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, the Committee will notice that we have another change of driver—or perhaps a navigator having temporary control of the wheel. If I read the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Purvis, correctly, the intention behind the amendments is to ensure that the voices of the devolved Governments are heard in relation to trade agreements. That is something that the UK Government entirely support. Indeed, the Department for International Trade is in discussion with the devolved Administrations on their role in future trade agreements.

To give a little more information to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the UK Government are committed to working closely with the devolved Administrations to deliver a future trade policy that works for the whole of the UK. But it is important that we do this within the context of the current constitutional make-up of the UK, while acknowledging that international trade policy is a reserved matter. To go further, we are currently having detailed discussions with the devolved Administrations at official level on their role in future trade arrangements, with the aim of agreeing new working arrangements before EU exit. In fact, we are continuing this engagement later this week.

I am happy to provide assurance to the House that our clear intention is that there will be a formal and regular intergovernmental ministerial forum to consider future trade agreements. The devolved Administrations already participate in other ministerial forums, such as those for EU negotiations. Frequency and any terms of reference are subject to further discussions and agreement with the devolved Administrations. However, we expect the forum to include our Minister for Trade Policy and his or her counterparts in the devolved Administrations.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked some questions on this point. The UK Government view securing an agreement with all the devolved Administrations as the best possible scenario, and it is the one that we will continue to work towards. We are committed to securing LCMs for the Trade Bill and have worked closely with the devolved Administrations to understand and respond to their concerns. As a result, we have made amendments to the Bill that answer many of those concerns.

The requirement for Ministers of devolved Administrations to seek the consent of the UK Government when making regulations that come into effect before exit day, or that relate to quota arrangements, has changed to a requirement to consult, of which I suspect the noble Lord will be aware. We will continue to respect the devolution settlements as they relate to trade agreement continuity and future FTAs. We will not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without the consent of the devolved Administrations, and certainly not without first consulting them.

The amendment, however, would apply to existing trade agreements only and is, in this context, not proportionate. Clause 2 will be used only to ensure the continuity of existing trade agreements that are already in force. It will not be used for future trade agreements. Therefore, Amendment 17 would add risk to the swift and timely rollover of existing trade agreements. Given that these agreements are or will be already in force and that the purpose is to ensure continuity, the amendment is, at best, disproportionate and could mean that we were unable to deliver crucial continuity for businesses and consumers throughout the United Kingdom. For that reason, the Government cannot support Amendment 17. I hope that I have provided sufficient assurances on our intentions for engagement with the devolved Administrations in trade agreements.

Trade Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansarad): House of Lords
Monday 21st January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this amendment. As far as it goes, I support it, but I shall take up a point that was made a moment ago by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, from the Liberal Front Bench that trade agreements will certainly need not just consultation with, but the agreement of, the devolved authorities. Let us think of, for example, the trade in lamb in Wales and how basic it is to the rural Welsh economy. Pressure is coming from New Zealand, which is threatening to block movement in the international trade discussions on these matters. If New Zealand were pressing for certain agreements that would undermine our Welsh lamb sector, that would be devastating. The devolved authority has responsibility for economic development, agriculture and rural affairs in Wales. That is an example from Wales. I can well imagine examples from Scotland, such as in the whisky sector. There should be more than just consultation. As I said at Second Reading, there should be a requirement for statutory agreement, a statutory endorsement by the devolved authorities in these areas. It may not be necessary in all areas, but there are certainly some where it is needed.

Therefore, between now and Report I hope there will be an opportunity to explore this area more in conjunction with the devolved Administrations to make sure that at this stage, before a specific difficulty arises, these matters are thought through because when a difficulty does arise, the tension builds up and it becomes a battle of attrition. We need a system that avoids that, and now is the time to get the system right.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for coming into the Chamber just a couple of minutes into my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s speech. I hope that it is in order to continue to make a brief contribution.

I follow the speeches of my noble friend Lord Wigley and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as well as that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson, in saying that it is vital that, particularly in respect of the devolved Administrations— I speak as a former Secretary of State for Wales and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—we do not see an action replay of what we saw earlier in this whole fiasco. I am talking about a power grab by the Government that repatriated to Westminster powers that had already been devolved but were under the European Union’s aegis. That showed a cast of mind in the Whitehall machine of the Government that I encountered as a Secretary of State, whereby the natural instinct of other departments—particularly Defra and the Home Office, although it went more widely—is to centralise, grasp and keep power, not to devolve it. It is essential that, as the amendment seeks, there is a recognition by Ministers that the natural instinct will be to consult the devolved Governments—and in the case of Northern Ireland, whatever is there; maybe senior civil servants, as now. That should be the immediate instinct of every Minister and every senior official in every government department as they process all this.

My second point relates to paragraph (e) in the amendment, which refers to “appropriate consumer groups” and so on. Will the Government consult the CBI, the FSB, the IoD, the TUC and consumer groups, let alone all the other NGOs that might have an interest? Will that be a natural reflex, as in consulting the devolved Administrations, or will they have to come back in right at the end? I hope that the Minister will be able to give us some reassurance on the record about all that.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, perhaps I may start with Amendment 3 in this group. I am not sure that I understand why it is necessary to do this, as Parliament is approving our membership of the government procurement agreement by virtue of this legislation. It seems to me that we are going through that process now, and the amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Again, I am not sure that I understand why Amendment 2 is needed. Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act makes provision for how legislation can be modified by subordinate legislation. I do not see anything in the Bill that disapplies Section 7 of the withdrawal Act, and therefore it applies. We do not need to say it in order for it to apply.

I think that there is a point in Amendment 1, although the drafting is not quite right. In so far as the regulations would relate to changes to government entities for the purpose of the rules on public procurement or the annexes to the GPA, surely it should particularly draw attention to consultation with those government entities or specifically focus on the business organisations or others that would be affected by that public procurement issue. There is a drafting issue about who is likely to be affected. I know that the amendment states that they should be consulted but we need to focus on the entities concerned and how they are changed by virtue of these regulations.

Trade Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, who, I am sure, will recharge the flailing Brexiteer case in this House with her great eloquence.

This Bill could have huge significance for people’s jobs, people’s rights and the economy, because it illustrates how Brexit puts at risk not only our trade agreements with the other 27 member states of the EU, but agreements with around 70 so-called third countries around the world that collectively account for around two-thirds of the UK’s trade. In a no-deal scenario on exit day—which is enthusiastically advocated by many Brexiteers—we risk losing not only tariff-free access to the biggest single market in the world but the benefits of our participation in the EU agreements with these third countries.

It is also important that we debunk the Brexiteer myth that Britain will be freed to conquer new global trade markets if, and only if, we leave the single market and the customs union. Germany is in both, and its biggest trading partner is China. There are absolutely no barriers within the EU preventing us getting a greater share of global trade.

A further problem, once the UK ceases to be regarded as EU territory, is that for the purposes of complex rules of origin which define when a product benefits from tariff-free quotas, UK component parts and products will no longer qualify. This could have a huge impact on UK trade, especially in sectors such as the automotive industry and aerospace, where complex supply chains currently operate freely within the EU.

All these difficulties are exemplified—noble Lords will not be surprised to hear me mention it again and again—in the case of the Irish border. InterTradeIreland’s report last March, Cross Border Trade and Linkages, found that the vast bulk of cross-border trade is accounted for by firms that trade simultaneously in both directions. Although these two-way traders amount to just 18% of firms, they account for over 60% of imports and 70% of exports. The data also shows that most cross-border trade occurs in intermediate inputs—components of final products—and highlights the considerable interconnectedness of cross-border supply chains on the island of Ireland.

In addition to being exposed to costs from customs duties and increased administration, two-way trade also risks disruption from delays, particularly where supply-chain links are concentrated in perishable food products such as milk. Milk tankers cross the Irish border about 33,000 times a year. Northern Ireland produces around 2.2 billion litres of milk a year, of which some 30% is processed in the Republic. Milk and dairy products move in both directions, sometimes several times. For example, cream from Northern Ireland milk is removed in Virginia, County Cavan, in Ireland and sent back to the Baileys Irish Cream plant in Mallusk, County Antrim, in Northern Ireland. We should not think of trade across the Irish border as being confined to the island; much of it is connected to global trade as well. For example, this complex cross-border supply chain underpins global exports in powdered milk products from the island of Ireland, north and south. It is exposed on two fronts by Brexit. First, in the event of a hard Brexit, the north-south milk trade would become unprofitable due to tariffs ranging from 40% to as much as 64% depending on fat content. The second concern is that when the UK exits the EU, it will no longer be included in EU export agreements. It could take a period of years to put new export agreements into place for key milk powder markets. What is supposed to happen in the meantime to those dairy farmers and the thousands of other jobs dependent on these supply chains? The Brexiteers have absolutely no idea.

And for those no-deal zealots, in July, Pascal Lamy, the former director-general of the World Trade Organization, described as “pie in the sky” the idea that there would be no border on the island of Ireland if there was no deal. Therefore, as Labour has rightly argued, a new comprehensive customs union with the European Union after Brexit is the best way to protect jobs and the economy, as well as avoiding a potentially disastrous hard border on the island of Ireland. That is what the TUC, the CBI and major businesses such as Jaguar Land Rover and National Grid want.

For the last 40 years, when trade deals have been negotiated by the EU on behalf of its members, scrutiny has been delivered through the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade and in the UK by the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons. These mechanisms will no longer apply after Brexit. But surely trade negotiations must be transparent and open to scrutiny by stakeholders and the public. As things stand, these new arrangements with third countries which the Government call “continuity agreements” would be excluded from the Government’s new arrangements, admittedly still lacking in detail, for structured engagement with stakeholders in relation to the new trade agreements announced by the Secretary of State for International Trade on 16 July.

My Labour colleagues in the Commons successfully argued that the Government’s Bill as introduced was woefully deficient in that it accorded yet again a number of Henry VIII powers to Ministers but made no provision for parliamentary scrutiny, as takes place in other countries including Germany, New Zealand and Australia. Following an unprecedented campaign by trade unions, the trade justice movement and industry and consumer representatives, the Government, in fear of their own Back-Benchers, tabled amendments very late in the day addressing at least some of the issues. However, the Government simultaneously tabled an amendment that would allow Ministers to ignore these scrutiny provisions should they so choose. So much for taking back control. Furthermore, those provisions for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny did not extend to the clauses relating to the UK’s future membership of the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement covered by the Bill. This is very worrying, as protections relating to public procurement need to be in place for public services such as the NHS and the public sector more generally in the UK. The Bill remains seriously deficient and still needs significant amendment to be made fit for purpose on these scrutiny issues.

I find it mind-boggling that, with the clock fast running right down, we still have absolutely no idea how, after Brexit, we will be trading with our biggest partner, Europe, or any other country outside. No wonder that investors and traders are giving up on the British economy and that Jacob Rees-Mogg has had to volunteer that we will be poorer for decades. He asserts that it is worth it because we will be free of Brussels: free, free, free at last, but poorer, poorer, poorer as well.

As they confirmed recently, Boris Johnson, David Davis, Liam Fox, Jacob Rees-Mogg, Iain Duncan Smith and the rest—and quite possibly the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—have no plan for their cherished Brexit. Meanwhile, government Ministers admit that we have no idea where we are going but we are going there anyway. What a way to run a country—no wonder the rest of the world thinks that reliable old Britain has gone barmy, with this Parliament a willing accomplice to what is rapidly becoming a national tragedy. The trade unions and others are providing a lead to rescue the country from this madness by demanding a people’s vote on the final deal. I hope that we will all support that.