(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my observation is simply on the practicalities of this. I do not know what would happen in these signing places, the number of which we have just agreed should be extended to a maximum of 10. What would actually happen to them in weeks two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight? Surely, the overwhelming evidence shows that, with the kind of build-up that is being described by my noble friend Lord Howarth, anyone who wanted to sign this petition would, I imagine, have built up to a sufficient level of frenzy that they would be virtually queuing at the station where the petition could be signed. Certainly, they would have dealt with it by week two or week three. There is an idea, somehow, that we need to keep these stations open for 10 weeks. For heaven’s sake, consider a general election campaign, until this dreaded Fixed-term Parliaments Act came along, about which I have expressed opinions in the past. Normally, there were five or six weeks of intense campaigning, which constituted a general election campaign. That was more than enough for most of us, I think. As far as I was concerned, I found it exhausting.
We know, from the evidence, about postal voting. Experts such as my noble friend Lord Kennedy on the Front Bench will no doubt know more about this than I do. Is not the evidence overwhelming that people either cast their postal vote within a day or two of receiving the ballot or they do not do it at all? I think exactly the same principle would apply to this. I think it most unlikely that this Act, as it will become, will come into operation very often, if at all, which makes the whole operation seem rather a waste of time. Assuming, however, that it comes into operation, I would safely predict that the poll clerks in these up to 10 signing places would be sitting there reading newspapers for weeks 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. I can see no conceivable practical reason, let alone in the arguments that my noble friend has advanced, why we need such a long period for signing.
I want to emphasise what I said in my intervention. Bear in mind that when Bobby Sands starved himself to death, there were constant displays outside all sorts of places relating to government in Northern Ireland and southern Ireland. If we have this, there will be something similar. It will not, I hope, ever be as dreadful as that period again, but do bear in mind a very important point: people get sentenced for offences as a result of a political situation.
I shall give another example, which has been given here in the past and concerns the First World War and conscientious objectors. There is a whole range of issues on which, in the past, Members of Parliament have committed offences which are illegal and get them into trouble with the law. Under this legislation, it would result in their losing their seats. If you want to look at a situation, of course it is easy to identify ones where MPs fiddled their expenses. That is the easy option. However, when they are linked into a political-style offence, it is a very different ball game and there are all sorts of dangers. To my mind, that is a much bigger danger in the whole of this Bill, not just this individual question of three or eight weeks.
(9 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler—two apologies, to get my mea culpas out of the way: first, because I missed some of his opening remarks on these amendments, and secondly, because he was good enough to send them to me in detail a week ago or so by e-mail, and ask for a response. I have not given him that response yet—he is about to get it now. I have to say that this is a seriously bad idea. A core reason is that it brings judges into a direct role with Parliament, which judges themselves will resist very strongly. They will be right to resist it, because once we blur that line between parliamentary democracy and the judiciary we get into very murky waters, where you end up drawing lines where you do not wish to draw them. I am sure—and if there are lawyers here at the moment, they will be the first to agree—that the thing judges hate more than anything else is trying to deal with political cases. So I strongly recommend that we do not go down this road. I will go into just a little more detail—I do not want to spend long on it. The principal point here is the all-important one: judges and Parliament should be kept separate as far as possible.
On the secondary matter of misbehaviour, the misconduct issue is incredibly hard to interpret when it takes place in the context of politics. Many examples have already been given of elected Members of Parliament who might get into a situation where they clash with the law because they are either supporting a demonstration or a strike, or opposing it, or taking a stand on any number of other issues, and who may themselves fall foul of the court. In the e-mail the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, sent me he said that he was trying to address some of the points I had raised at Second Reading. However, this does not deal with them—it aggravates matters.
We need, as far as possible, to follow the Burkean principle that parliamentary representation is decided by the electorate, and that by and large you overrule that only in the most extreme cases—murder or other very serious offences of that type. Otherwise, we get into a position where the court decides. That is why I have such a strong objection to what happened in the case of Phil Woolas MP, where the court decided that he could not stand again. It is so profoundly wrong. It goes right back to the battle that Bradlaugh had with Parliament. He refused to take the oath on the Bible, so the House of Commons refused to let him become a Member. He promptly went back to the electorate, who elected him again and so on. One might say that that makes the case because he won, but there are examples where it would not.
The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, did not think that there was much in the slippery slope argument. One case in which it would have been a very slippery slope would have been when an MP objected to the First World War. If we consider the attitude and atmosphere around the country in the context of the First World War, an MP taking a pacifist position might well have been in very serious difficulty. As I said in my Second Reading speech, it is a mistake just to look backwards: look forwards. If people were to campaign for one of the opposition groups in Syria—not ISIL—and if the legislation here on terrorism were so tough that they got arrested when they came back, but the group they had been supporting in Syria was not one of the extreme groups, where would we be?
There are umpteen examples where this goes wrong. We should stick with Burke on this. If the electorate decide that somebody is their MP, that should remain the case until the next general election, unless there are some very special circumstances. The more we pull back from that practice, as Burke himself pointed out, the more difficulties we get into. I know how much thought the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, puts into these things, but I will add that members of the judiciary dread cases where they are pulled into a political process—and they are right to dread them. It is all-important that we keep a clear distinction between the law and Parliament.
My Lords, in one respect at least I feel a considerable empathy with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and that is in terms of marginal seats. When I was first elected, I had an electorate of 91,000. My opponent got 33,000 votes and I got 33,000 and a few more—so with a margin of about 300-odd and an electorate of 91,000, I can say that an acute awareness of the views of all my electors was never far from my mind. So I can understand that point. How easy it would have been for 10,000 or 15,000, perhaps, to have signed a petition very early on saying that they did not think I was much good as a Member of Parliament.
That is where my sense of understanding ends, because, unless I am reading this very badly, the series of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, give effect to the thin end of the wedge argument that we have raised repeatedly, and about which we have been told not to worry. The new clause proposed in Amendment 30, “Hearing of parliamentary misconduct petition”, states, in proposed new subsection (3):
“The parliamentary misconduct hearing may consider evidence adduced by the petitioners that the respondent has”—
in proposed new subsection (3)(f)—
“brought into disrepute the office of Member of Parliament”.
I cannot think of an easier basis on which to claim that a Member of Parliament is not acting as perhaps he should have been.
The noble Lord will no doubt take this as a direct attack on his party, but I am afraid that it is the best example that I can think of. I repeat that information may be adduced that a Member by his conduct has,
“brought into disrepute the office of Member of Parliament”.
I simply put it to him is as neutral a way as I possibly can the example of a Member of Parliament who, immediately prior to an election, appears on video saying, “We will abolish student fees”, and, within six months or so of being elected, becomes a key member of a Government who argue passionately for the trebling of student fees. I do not happen to think that that should be a reason for petitioning—
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords Chamber(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy figures may be slightly dated, but, either way, it is profoundly dangerous. I will end on this note—
Before my noble friend concludes, am I the only one—I am sure I am not—who can see the irony that since we started debating Part 2 of this Bill last Monday, which is basically about reducing the number of Members of Parliament by 50, during just that week 14 new Members have been introduced into Parliament—into this House? Can he explain the rationale of that situation?
It is what I call over-powerful government again. Again I point out what Andrew Tyrie said. I am not attacking Andrew Tyrie. There are things I think he got wrong in that document, particularly about the figures of representation in other countries. However, it is a well written document and well argued. One of the other things that might make my noble friend sleep less soundly at night—assuming he gets to sleep any night in the near future—is that Andrew Tyrie actually said that the MPs who are displaced by this reduction in size should be given peerages, so we will have even more coming in here. It would be quite nice if the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, answers this and says that will not automatically happen, but I have a sneaking suspicion that it might.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords Chamber(13 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI support my noble friend on the Front Bench. The Government could give important reassurance on this. The amendment does not ask directly for more funds now but recognises that what the Government are imposing constitutes a complex and continuing problem for the Boundary Commission, which already struggles at times to deliver what it needs to deliver on time. We all know that at present, when the Government are looking for savings in all these areas, there is a danger that the Boundary Commission will be expected to carry out a task that is beyond it. It seems to me that the wording of the amendment is so reasonable that it would be unreasonable for the Government not to give an assurance that if the Boundary Commission needs more money, it will be given it. It is important in that respect.
My Lords, I seek some figures from the Minister, although he has indicated that he will not give any and has adhered to that stance so far when responding to amendments. Time and again before the election the parties that are now in government said that the reason for reducing the number of MPs was to reduce the costs of democracy. I was never able to work out how that would happen, principally because I knew the cost of a normal Boundary Commission review from Questions that I had posed to my noble friend Lord Bach when he was a Minister long before this was ever an issue. From memory, I was told that it was around £13 million. When pressed on the matter, Nick Clegg has said that the saving to the Exchequer of reducing the number of MPs by 50 would be about £12 million. As I knew that there would have to be an advanced Boundary Commission, it was obvious to me that the cost of the Boundary Commission alone would be more initially than the savings gained from that reduction in the number of MPs, so there are no savings in the costs of democracy.
What I did not realise in those early stages was quite how frequently Boundary Commission reviews would be required under the legislation. We now know, should the Bill become an Act, that because the Minister rejected our various proposals to extend the period between boundary redistributions, those redistributions would be roughly twice as frequent as they are now. They now occur between every eight and 12 years; if the Bill is enacted, they will happen every five years.
Unless my basic maths is completely wrong, the savings to the Exchequer from the reduction in the number of MPs will be £12 million, while the cost of a Boundary Commission review will, I assume, remain at about £13 million, but reviews will occur twice as frequently. I am even being generous to the Government in that respect, because if all these reviews are to be accelerated, they will presumably be costly. More commissioners will be needed to do things quickly.
It is therefore not unreasonable—although I fear that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, appears to indicate that he thinks it is an unreasonable request—for us to know the cost of the Boundary Commission reviews, given that they will occur twice as frequently. Given that the Government’s principal justification has been to reduce the cost of democracy, we ought to bear in mind that the cost of the referendum will be about £90 million.
We know well enough that all areas of public expenditure are being very closely scrutinised as to whether they are necessary, and it is reasonable to ask these questions. If I do not get a response now, I shall have to table a Parliamentary Question on the subject. If the noble Lord cannot provide the figures now, perhaps he would be kind enough to tell the Committee in due course what they are. What are the costs of the Boundary Commission? How much more will they be when the reviews are twice as frequent as they are at present? Can he confirm in passing—I am sure that it is easy for him to do—whether cost of the referendum will be £90 million? If those figures are anything like what I estimate, and I do not have the noble Lord’s resources, can I at least appeal to him and his colleagues on the Front Bench never again to say, as a justification for this legislation, that he is “reducing the cost of democracy”?