Housing (Scotland) Act 2010 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2012

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Lawson of Blaby

Thursday 2nd February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I am prompted to stand because of the reference to the Cunningham committee on conventions. I simply put this serious question to the Leader of the House. I recognise the great difficulty at times—which was expressed in the length of his answer—in interpreting financial privilege, and the difficulty that he has in convincing Members of the House, including Members on his own side about if and when it should be applied. But can the noble Lord imagine himself telling 300 elected senators that matters such as benefits received by cancer patients or for disabled children were none of their business whatever and if any of their constituents raised any of those issues with them, as constituents inevitably would, they would have to explain that there was nothing they could sensibly do because it was not within their powers?

His position in trying to justify and hold that line would be quite impossible. Clause 2 of the draft Bill as it stands, which still insists that there will be no change in the conventions between the two Houses in the event of an elected House, is absolute nonsense. I therefore just put it to him as I did in perhaps less impassioned terms yesterday, that this is really an issue that the committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Richard must examine before it reports and advises the two Houses of Parliament.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, I support very strongly my noble friend Lord Newton's point. While the House of Commons is perfectly entitled to claim privilege, it is not compelled to do so. The constitution of this country operates by conventions. It is one of the conventions of the constitution that this is evoked very sparingly and on rare occasions. For it to be invoked promiscuously is completely contrary to the conventions of the constitution. This raises serious issues and the House of Commons would be wise to think again.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Lawson of Blaby

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

I made clear the reasons for my argument. My noble friend is right that I quoted only my noble friends who voted in that way but it was a Labour amendment tabled by George Cunningham and had huge support too in the Labour Party. That was why it was carried.

For the life of me I cannot imagine why anyone would wish to see the alternative vote system. It is a crazy system and the only clear beneficiary might be the Liberal Democrat Party so it is possible that that has influenced its opinion slightly, although I think that is purely a coincidence. But it is very regrettable that the noble Lord is so keen to get the alternative vote system introduced that he is prepared to do it in a hole-in-the-corner way.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, said, except in one respect. He anticipated, or perhaps reflected, on what might have happened, or could happen, in terms of people’s second preferences should there be an alternative vote system, or had there been in his constituency in the past. He made the assumption that every Labour voter would probably vote Liberal as their second preference. However true that may have been in the past, having seen the Liberal Democrats’ performance during the past six months, I would not make that assumption now. Not least, we have a coalition, so where do I put my second preference? I hope that the question will never arise, because, as I have made plain, if we were to have a referendum—and I would prefer that we did not—I would hope that the no campaign won.

I am very mindful of the time, so I shall not go on at any length. However, I have put my name alongside Amendment 44B in this group, which puts the threshold at 50 per cent, and I should like to make a couple of points. The first is to remind the Committee that, as my noble friend Lord Rooker pointed out very clearly, this is not an indicative referendum; it is a referendum which legislates. Should it be carried under the Bill as it stands, even by two votes to one—I know that I shall be criticised by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for going to ridiculous extremes, but we have got to see the logic of the argument—the legislation would be passed. It would become part of the constitution of our country and represent the most dramatic constitutional change for a very long time.

I take it as read—at least, I hope that I can in this Committee—that if a Bill were passed at Third Reading in this House by two Members to one, with the remaining 800 Members wherever they preferred to be, and although it would be unchallengeable in constitutional law, it would be seen as ridiculous. I cannot believe that there is anyone in this House who does not think, though they may not want to put it in the Bill, that there has to be a threshold for a decision of this magnitude. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, made a number of the points that I would have made. I simply say that I wholeheartedly agree with him that we are quite an unusual country—not unique, I think, but close to it—in there being no distinction between ordinary law and constitutional law. The only difference that we seem to apply is that it is increasingly assumed that major constitutional changes have to be ratified by referendum, which is not unreasonable. The reason for having a threshold is that, to quote a seasonal comment, a constitutional change is not just for five years; it is probably for life. If, as I half-anticipated, I had been intervened on and a noble Lord had said that Governments are elected by less than 50 per cent, I would have said that Governments come and go—we are now told that they can come and go only every five years, but they do come and go—whereas I think that we can all acknowledge that, should this change be made, it is incredibly unlikely that it would be reversed in our lifetime. That adds even greater import to the suggestion that we should be absolutely clear about the decision that we are making.

My amendment is for a 50 per cent threshold. It is not a figure that I have plucked out of the air, although “50 per cent” has constantly been repeated by the proponents of constitutional change. I have glanced through the most recent turnouts under the various electoral systems that operate in our country—there are far too many in my view, but that is not the point of this amendment. For local county council elections in 2009, it was 35 per cent; for Westminster parliamentary elections in 2010, it was 65 per cent; for the Greater London Assembly election in 2008, it was 45 per cent; for the Scottish parliamentary election, it was 51 per cent; for the National Assembly for Wales election, it was 43 per cent; for the European parliamentary elections, it was 34 per cent; for the European parliamentary elections in Northern Ireland, it was 42 per cent; for the Northern Ireland Assembly elections, it was 63 per cent; for the local government elections in Scotland, it was 53 per cent; for the local government elections in Northern Ireland, it was 62 per cent; for the Bedford Borough Council mayoral election, it was 30.9 per cent—I bet no one knew that one; and for the Greater London mayoral election, it was 45 per cent.

I hope I can convince the Committee that, for a major constitutional change, a 50 per cent turnout is not an unreasonable figure to validate that change. In fact, it is quite a modest figure bearing in mind that only half of those voting need to have voted in favour for the constitutional change to take place, which means one in four. Is it really an extremist position to suggest that, before we make this huge change, we should require one in four of our fellow citizens to vote in favour of it? That is the simple argument that I am presenting to the House and I hope the House will accept it.