(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt would not be wise, on either side, or feasible to depart on the basis of an understanding that was being turned into a legal agreement but without that legal agreement existing. Legally, we would move into a very strange status. It is perfectly possible to envisage a deal that can be turned into a legal agreement during an extension period but it is impossible to do that by 31 October and it is unwise—I do not think that either side would want to do so—to go on the basis of a political understanding with no validity in law. I am afraid that I do not agree with the noble Lord.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, the idea that a 2016 vote, three Prime Ministers ago, can be permanently determinate does not seem to be the will of the people today. You can ask, “Do you want to be consulted or do you want to leave it to Parliament?” If you assume that there is a deal and you ask, “Do you want to be consulted?”, they say by a margin of almost two to one, “Yes, we want to be consulted”. If you assume that there is no deal and ask, “Do you want to be consulted or should it be left to Parliament?”, they say, “Yes, we want to be consulted”, by a margin of more than two to one. Moreover, it is a fact that since September 2017, the opinion polls have consistently shown that the country is now of the view that it would prefer to remain. This year more than 70 polls have been taken of which one gave a victory for leaving. I do not think that a second referendum is just the least worst way out of this fix; it is now the will of the people.
If the noble Lord is justifying a second referendum on the basis that public opinion has changed, of course while it can change, I think his bona fides would be absolutely crystal clear to everyone if he said that three years after the second referendum, public opinion could change again and we should then have a further referendum. You cannot hold referendums every five minutes. Even general elections are now legislated for every five years. We had 41 years between what the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, rightly referred to as the first referendum and the second referendum. People were asking for a second referendum after the 2016 vote in 2016.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberAt paragraph 4 of their guidelines, they say that it is the UK’s positions,
“which limit the depth of such a future partnership”,
and that:
“Being outside the Customs Union and the Single Market will inevitably lead to frictions”.
But they also say at paragraph 6 of their guidelines that if the UK’s positions on the customs union and the single market,
“were to evolve, the Union will be prepared to reconsider its offer”:
in other words, to improve its offer. We do not know how far-reaching such improvements would be but, if we go on refusing to allow our negotiators to explore the idea of a customs union, we will never find out, and that in my view will be irresponsible—hence the wording of the amendment. I do not recall at the time of the referendum any debate about a customs union.
My Lords, the noble Lord should be allowed to develop his arguments. The amendment is not on the table yet—it has not been put by the Speaker. So I ask the noble Lord, out of courtesy, to let the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, finish speaking.
Perhaps I may continue. I recall no debate at all at the time of the referendum on a customs union. The country voted narrowly to leave the European Union, but no one can argue that it voted knowingly to leave the customs union with the European Union.
The red line was laid down in October 2016 in the “citizens of nowhere” speech. One hears that there had not been much discussion in the Government; there certainly had been no discussion with Parliament. One wonders to what extent the economic consequences of the decision on customs union had been fully assessed and analysed within the Government; I have no idea. Other red lines have since been sensibly blurred; in my view, it is time to blur this one.
The House knows that I was and remain a keen remainer. I believe that, when a deal is struck, the country should be given a chance to say whether it is what it wants. That would be fair, but it is nevertheless our duty to help improve the deal and see how it could be made better. If in the end we do leave, it should be in a way that limits the damage to the country’s well-being and to the future of our children. That is why I believe that it makes sense for the Government to be asked to explore customs union. I beg to move.
I simply wanted to ask for information on the wording of the amendment, which requires the Government to put a statement to both Houses about the contents of an agreement on a customs union. I simply want to ask this: if such a statement is presented to both Houses, as his amendment requires, and if the House of Commons says yes and the House of Lords says no, what happens next?
Am I allowed to respond? I thank the noble Lord for his question. The Government would be required to negotiate for a customs union and make a statement about the outcome of the negotiations, which would be before the withdrawal implementation Bill came to the House. It seems to me that the requirement on the Government is simply to negotiate. I may be wrong about the willingness of the other side to envision a customs union—we cannot require the Government to come back with a customs union—but we can require the Government to explain how hard they have tried and what kind of customs union they think might be available.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord. The first of my two quick points is to clarify the issue of irrevocability raised by the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein—and I am glad that he did so. We discussed the issue extensively at Second Reading and he told his readers in the Times that we did not mention it at all, so I am glad that he is here this time. I also pay tribute to the skill of the Lord, Lord Pannick, both in court and in this House. When he won his case in the High Court—not the Supreme Court—the No. 10 spokesman was asked about revocability and said that,
“as a matter of firm policy, our notification to withdraw will not be withdrawn”.
After our extensive debate at Second Reading, the Minister was put on the spot by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, about whether it was revocable or not. The Minister is a very clever man and replied:
“As a matter of firm policy, our notification will not be withdrawn”.—[Official Report, 21/2/17; col. 320.]
That is very similar to what was said by the No. 10 spokesman, which is always wise in a Minister. Last Wednesday, in Committee, the same issue of revocability was raised. When the Minister replied to the debate on the amendment, he said that,
“as a matter of policy we will not withdraw our notice to leave”.—[Official Report, 1/3/17; col. 923.]
The wording was slightly wrong there, but I am sure they will forgive him.
Every time the Government say that,
“as a matter of policy”,
firm or infirm, they will not withdraw the notification which the Bill authorises, they implicitly confirm that, in law, they could withdraw it—and they could. If you want a definitive source, do not look at me, listen to the President of the European Council, who has said so on the record. If you want a definitive EU legal view, and this would be an EU legal question if it were ever tested, try the present head of the Council’s legal service or the one who advised me when I was writing the wretched thing. Just a point of clarification: it is revocable.
My second point relates to the discussion of subsection (4) of the new clause proposed in the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, detected deep evil in it. What is being said there is that it is for Parliament to decide whether no deal is better than a bad deal and to make a judgment on whether the deal is bad and that the chaos and disruption of leaving with no deal is preferable. I struggle to think of a deal which could be worse than no deal. Last week, the president of CBI said that the worst possible scenario was leaving with no deal. However, that is not the point: the point is about parliamentary sovereignty. The issue of whether no deal is worse than the deal which is available on the table on that day is for Parliament to decide. That is what subsection (4) of the amendment says, and I support it.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quite rightly—and entertainingly as always—referred to the crucial element of parliamentary sovereignty. We have heard from top lawyers and diplomats and I only offer some thoughts as a run-of-the-mill parliamentarian. I could not possibly vote against parliamentary sovereignty. Voting against an amendment such as this would be like voting against motherhood and apple pie. It is something in which I passionately believe. It was one of the reasons why many people—and I was one of them—were concerned during the course of the European referendum because it seemed incontrovertible that the way in which the European Union had developed involved a steady erosion of parliamentary sovereignty. It would be quite difficult to disagree with this proposition.
When addressing this amendment, we have to decide what a decision by Parliament actually comprises. I am forced to read the amendment. Proposed subsection (1) refers to,
“without the approval of both Houses of Parliament”.
Subsection (3) requires:
“The prior approval of both Houses of Parliament”,
Subsection (4) refers to:
“The prior approval of both Houses of Parliament”.
With great respect to the weight of legal opinion being offered, to propose this amendment without being clear as to what is involved in the approval of both Houses of Parliament is to leave an ambiguity at its heart. It is hardly necessary to add to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has already said.
I was concerned about this from the start. I raised it in Committee. There has been an attempt to move towards answering the question, “What happens if the Commons say ‘yes’ and the Lords say ‘no’?”. The solution is certainly not contained within these amendments.
I made an, admittedly inadequate, attempt with the Public Bill Office to see if there was any way in which I could put down an amendment which would satisfy, or at least address, this problem at the heart of the Bill. If the House will forgive me—as I will conclude shortly afterwards—I will read out the terms of the defunct amendment. It would have said:
“(5) If, under the provisions of subsections (1), (3) or (4), there is disagreement between the House of Commons and the House of Lords as to whether or not the agreement or decision should be approved, the view of the House of Commons prevails over the view of the House of Lords”.
That makes an attempt to explain precisely—or, I hope, resolve precisely—the ambiguity at the heart of the Bill.