Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside and his wide-ranging speech. I am very glad that my noble friends on the Front Bench have tabled Amendments 21, 22 and 23.

What is provided for in this Bill is trial by petition. The petition process will be the trial of the suitability of a particular Member of Parliament to continue to represent his or her constituents in the House of Commons. A Member of Parliament thus placed on trial deserves a fair trial, just like anyone else who is arraigned.

The principle of fair trial goes all the way back in our history to Magna Carta. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, alluded to Magna Carta earlier today. Many of us have been very conscious, particularly in recent days, of how we should measure our democratic and political standards against the precepts and standards initiated in our history through Magna Carta. It derives from common law and the Bill of Rights, which the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, also referred to this afternoon. It was most importantly articulated in recent decades in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The principle of equality of arms, which my noble friend Lady Hayter espoused, means that each party should be placed in a position in which they are able to present their case in a manner that does not put them at a disadvantage by comparison to their opponent. The process must be equitable and neither side should be privileged.

Of course, trial by petition is not trial in accordance with any known court procedures or court rules. There are no safeguards provided in the legislation to ensure that there is fairness for the MP whose conduct and future is in question in the process of recall. But we should, as long as possible, in designing these procedures seek to uphold the principle of fairness: it is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law. It is extraordinary that the Government have presented us with the Bill in which, as I understand it—I am ready to be corrected by the Minister or any other noble Lord because the legislative drafting is often quite impenetrable—there is no limit to the number of accredited campaigns that can be run to seek to unseat the Member of Parliament. Each of them will be entitled to spend up to £10,000. There is no limit to the number of non-accredited campaigners who can be in the field, each of them entitled to spend up to £500, and there is no bar against funding to support the campaign against or indeed in favour of the Member of Parliament coming in from abroad. The system that Ministers are presenting to Parliament has been stacked against the incumbent MP who is having to defend themselves and whose future is in question. A system so weighted and inherently unjust must be unacceptable.

As my noble friend Lady Hayter pointed out, three or four political parties could join to try to unseat a Member of Parliament for the particular party that happens to hold the seat for the time being.

In our present fragmented condition of politics, three-way, four-way, even five-way marginals are part of the reality of life. There will be intense national interest. The amendments of my noble friends are right. They provide for equality of arms in terms of the capacity to spend for and against the petition. In the provision in the amendment on permissible donors, they would keep out foreign money, pretty largely. They will ensure that donations for and against the continuation of the Member of Parliament are aggregated, so it is essentially a yes/no binary campaign. There are just two campaigns.

I am puzzled—and I have not understood, from our previous proceedings—why, under this legislation, only donations of more than £500 are regulated. Unless I am mistaken, I think under election law donations of more than £50 in other contexts are regulated. I would be grateful to be advised on that. Possibly I have that wrong.

As I understand it, the definition of a permissible donor still allows donations from people living abroad but registered on an electoral register in the United Kingdom. They do not have to be registered on the electoral register in the constituency in question. Equally, businesses that are perhaps registered abroad, based abroad, carrying on the greater part of their business abroad but also carrying on some part of their business in this country are also eligible. They do not even have to be carrying on their business within the particular constituency.

The Electoral Commission offers us reassurance that these recall petitions and campaigns will be essentially local constituency affairs. I beg to differ. I think there will be not only intense national interest; I think there could even, in certain circumstances, be international interest. I think that we have to put in place the strongest safeguards we possibly can to ensure equality of arms and to ensure the process of petition campaigning is not inherently unjust because of the advantages it gives to one side against the other—that it gives to the petitioners against the Member of Parliament.

Although it may well be the case that these amendments do not do everything that we would ideally wish, I support them because they will go a long way to mitigate the worst inequities in this undesirable process.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, those who have been patient enough to watch these proceedings at Second Reading, in Committee and now on Report might have detected certain differences of opinion between the Opposition Front Bench and the Opposition Back Bench. Those noble Lords with forensic skills will have spotted that that is certainly true. The difference is that the Front Bench think it is a good Bill, and many of us on the Back Bench think it is a bad Bill but recognise that this is not the Chamber which throws Bills out, even were that possible.

However, on this issue of fairness of campaign funds between the two sides, there is absolute unity between the Front Bench and the Back Bench of the Opposition. I thought that that fact alone, given that we have been pretty frank about our divisions during the course of the passage of the Bill, might give a little pause for thought to the Government, as two groups of opposing views on this issue are united in what needs to be done. The reason is one of incredible simplicity, it seems to me: a petition campaign is a binary choice. There are only two options—you either sign the petition, or you do not. It is an absolutely fundamental principle of electoral fairness, the possibility of a just contest, a fair contest in our democracy for at least 100 years—I suppose since secret ballot times in the 1870s, or whenever it was—

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 19th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

But there are no limits to the number of organisations that are able to mount such campaigns. The Minister is rejecting the amendment that my noble friend has proposed, but he does not seem to have any other safeguards.

[Lord Grocott]

I put the question in a slightly different way. If the Minister is confirming what I think that he has been saying, it is really alarming. I was most interested in the earlier parts of the Bill. Whereas we all know that in a local election campaign for a particular Member in a particular constituency, there are controls over what each candidate can spend which have been there since about the 1870s, I think that that—not the figure, but the principle—is understandable, because a number of different choices are available: Labour, et cetera. In the case of whether there is or is not to be a recall, there are only two possible positions: you are for it or against it. You may be for it or against it for a variety of different reasons, but the decision to be made is binary, there are two choices.

It seems to me so fundamental as to be hardly worth stating that there must be a balance between the expenditure on the two sides of that simple argument. Is the Government’s position that there is no need to worry about that and that, on a range of different issues, one side in what I repeat is a binary decision can spend vastly greater sums of money than the other? Are the Government comfortable with that?

Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I do not think that my noble friend Lord Foulkes should apologise at all. I congratulate him on the way in which he has threaded his way through these thickets.

There is a common theme in this group of amendments. The proposal is that legislation should lay duties on the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Speaker. I would be grateful if the Minister, when he comes to reply in a few moments, would share with the House his understanding of the constitutional rights and wrongs of legislation that lays duties on the Speaker. Are we risking breach of privilege? I refer here to the independence of the Speaker of the House of Commons. Are we once again risking the possibility of running up against the ancient tradition embodied in the Bill of Rights, or not? There may be many precedents in legislation that lay specific duties on the Speaker, but my impression has been that the Speaker should be unconstrained by legislation and that the Standing Orders of the House of Commons may lay duties upon the Speaker. So I question the appropriateness of the measures not only in the Government’s Bill as we have it, but also in my noble friend’s amendments, which refer to the role and functions of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

The position of the Lord Speaker is of course entirely different and is not analogous to that of the Speaker of the House of Commons, but none the less there may already be a body of practice and precedent that establishes certain customs, conventions and proprieties in relation to any attempt to legislate on the role of the Lord Speaker. It would be helpful if the Minister would guide us on these points.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, perhaps I am slightly out of turn in mentioning this at this point, but it will save time. My suggestion that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill is included in this group. I tabled it simply to enable me to make a point that I cannot find a way of making by means of an amendment, but it is something which goes to the heart of the Bill. My view is very simple indeed, because I like simplicity. We have a very good system for recalling MPs—it is called a general election. That is the point at which MPs should be judged and perhaps removed by their constituents; that is, on the basis of their performance over the preceding period of time.

I love the word “anomaly”, which has been used today. It seems to me to be rather anomalous, or perhaps inconsistent, that this Government, who deliberately and as a matter of public policy decided that general elections will be held less frequently, should be introducing a Bill to provide for recall. Of course, if you have general elections every four years instead of every five years, then as we know from Clause 5, the recall does not operate during the six months prior to the election. If there were elections every four years, there would be more occasions when the recall provisions would not apply, which I suppose is a legalistic way of saying what I am arguing. Recall becomes redundant when general elections are held.

If the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is to reply to this debate, I should say that I have found that not many members of his party agree with me on getting rid of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, but I am heartened by the fact that I know members of his party—I do not want to disclose names—who think that fixed terms, if they exist, should definitely be every four years, not every five years; indeed it used to be his party’s policy. That is a less bad situation as far as I am concerned, and it is undoubtedly and unarguably a more democratic and accountable system. In trying to appeal to the values that are frequently claimed as being a particular characteristic of the Liberal Democrats, perhaps I may put it to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that on the grounds of democracy and accountability, it is better to have elections every four years rather than every five years. Should that happen, we would have less need to invoke the provisions of this Bill for recall.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

What a persuasive argument—I am completely convinced by that.

If the Government are going to reduce the power of the voters over their Government, they must give us a very convincing argument as to why that is desirable. Of course, I very much hope that my amendment becomes entirely surplus to requirements, because I very much hope that the Committee will decide later that we should have four-year gaps between Parliaments. I do not agree with fixed terms, but if there is to be one I hope it is four years. For the first time in my life I am operating entirely in accordance with the Liberal Democrats’ manifesto and I hope they will be voting with us on four-year Parliaments. However, if the Government unilaterally reduce the power of the electorate to have general elections and to make their decisions about Governments, I hope that they will only take this power away on the authority of the electorate in a referendum.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I am very happy to support the spirit of my noble friend Lord Grocott’s amendment. I have tabled two amendments—Amendments 57 and 58—which also require that a referendum should take place before we move to fixed-term Parliaments in this country.

I do not, in general, favour referendums, but there is a particular case for holding them when major constitutional change is being proposed. I think that is a view that the Constitution Committee reluctantly came to. The basis of that has to be that the constitution belongs to the people—it is not the property of those politicians who happen for the time being to have the privilege of serving in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Those who are Members of Parliament in either House, and certainly those who are in Government, should regard themselves as holding the constitution in trust on behalf of the people, by whose authority they have been given and entrusted with the opportunity to serve. They should treat that constitution with the very greatest respect and should move to change it with the very greatest caution. That applies even more particularly to a Government such as this present coalition Government, which does not have a mandate from the electorate for its policies.

It is, as my noble friend Lord Grocott suggested, curious that this Government—which makes great claim to be a liberalising Government who want to improve the quality of our democracy and increase the accountability of Government, and indeed Parliament, to the people—are proposing legislation that would mean that we would in practice have fewer general elections than we have had in the past. The average interval between general elections since the war has been three years and 10 months; if the Government have their way on this Bill, it will be not less than five years. That is one of the reasons why I, like my noble friend Lord Grocott, believe that—although I am no enthusiast for legislating to fix the term of Parliament—if we are to fix the term, then we had better fix it at four years. We do not want to see accountability diminished in a major measure of constitutional reform.

It is also curious that the Government believe that it is appropriate to hold a referendum on changing the electoral system and that it is appropriate to hold referendums when there may be some transfer of power—possibly no very great transfer of power—between London and Brussels, but they do not think that it is appropriate to hold a referendum on whether we should move to fixed-term Parliaments. My noble friend Lady Farrington raised the question of whether there might be a referendum on reform of the House of Lords, which would be a very major constitutional change by any standard. It seems extraordinary that the Government should propose to take that forward without incorporating provision for a referendum in the legislation.

I am not necessarily a devotee of consistency in constitutional matters, because I believe that there are many anomalies in our present constitutional arrangements, which have grown up for compelling historical reasons, that actually provide flexibility and enable the constitution to accommodate different traditions and to adapt itself as time goes by. If we are slavishly schematic in our approach to constitutional change, we shall be even more likely to get it wrong; but I wonder why the Government are quite so inconsistent in their approach to holding referendums on constitutional reform. Surely the Government should conduct themselves on a certain set of principles.

Turning to the particular amendments that I have tabled, I suggest to the House that they incorporate a better design for a referendum than the design of the one we are to have on 5 May on electoral change—there are differences between what I propose and what Parliament has enacted at the behest of the Government. The referendum that I have proposed would be advisory only and would leave scope for Parliament to meditate upon the message that voting in a referendum sends to Parliament. Amendment 57 would also provide that, if less than a threshold of 51 per cent of the electorate support the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, then the question would be dismissed. That latter point should have applied also in Amendment 58—it was an omission on my part not to have included that in the drafting of that amendment. If we come back to this issue on Report, I can repair that then.

My amendments would provide for two questions. The first would be to ask the people whether they favour the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, as provided for in the legislation. The second would ask them the other key question: if we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, do they think it right that the term should be fixed for four years or for five years? We all agree, I think, that this is quite the outstandingly important issue that remains to be resolved in this legislation apart from the overall issue of whether there should be fixed-term Parliaments, which has been approved in Second Reading. However, the question of four or five years remains wide open. I put it to the House that that may also be something that should be offered for the decision—or at least for the advice—of a wider electorate.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I simply want to say a couple of words on this because I suggested an amendment in Committee and as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has said, he raised this at Second Reading. At whatever time of the night it was during Committee, I moved an amendment which, I admit, was not as good as this. I tried to find a way in which we could debate the effect of changing the size of the House of Commons and its relationship with what was happening to the size of this House.

This is an extremely important amendment. I hope that it does not embarrass the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, if I tell him that I agreed with absolutely everything that he said about the relative size of the two Houses and the effect on this House if it grows and grows. Like him, I need to put in the caveat that this is in no way a criticism of the people who have been appointed to this House, many of whom have already made a tremendous contribution. However, there has to be a limit. I say this in the spirit in which the House is operating at the moment: I think that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, assured us on the previous amendment that the Government really were taking an overview of the three key constitutional reforms that are taking place. However, the constitutional changes are connected not just with the legislation involved in this Bill and the two Bills that are to follow. They are also affected, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has said, by the way in which the composition of this House alters, irrespective of any change in the legislation.

I conclude with my only point of disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. He quite rightly said that a fully elected House could easily end in gridlock. That is certainly one end of the spectrum, but there is another, which is particularly relevant to this Bill. This is no criticism whatever of the coalition, which is the first time I have been able to say that. It is that had this been a fully elected House on proportional representation, this House would have had a huge government majority. This Bill, far from being gridlocked, would then have gone through this House whipped—and how can I, as a former Chief Whip, criticise a Whip? It would have gone through quickly and almost certainly have been guillotined. I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord McNally, explains the position in relation to the two Houses, while he cannot respond on the proposals that he is bringing forward on abolishing this House in its present form and replacing it with an elected House, he will have something to say on the almost absurd disparity where, just as we are moving the House of Commons down to 600, the House of Lords exceeds 800.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said. The coalition appears to have invented a new-fangled constitutional doctrine: that the strength of the parties in the House of Lords ought to reflect the electoral support that they obtained at the last general election. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, will indeed expound to us that doctrine. I do not know that but I would certainly be most grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, when he comes to his concluding remarks, would let us know what his own opinion of that doctrine is.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 2nd February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours has done the Committee a good service by drawing our attention to the possibility that what we have seen is a cut-and-paste job. We have seen the transference of slabs of the 1983 legislation into this 2011 legislation. It would be helpful to know just how much thought has gone into this and whether the Minister thinks there is any case for reviewing these schedules before the Bill comes back on Report to make sure that he and his officials are entirely happy that in all aspects they make good practical sense.

[Lord Grocott]

I hope that this does not sound flippant, but an anomalous situation could arise, given what my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours says about off-duty policemen being in any way involved in any kind of electoral activity, when we are shortly to receive a Bill from the other end of the Corridor providing for elected police commissioners. It would be rather odd, would it not, if one level of the police force was expressly required to involve itself in elections and all the activities associated with them, but not the bobby on the beat?

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My noble friend has a great talent for a kind of lateral thinking that is always fruitful in our debates. His point is a little wide of the amendment; I must reprove him to that extent. However, it would be rather curious if we were to be presented with legislation that proposed that in elections for police commissioners, police officers should not be entitled to play a part or exercise any persuasive powers.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Tuesday 25th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, over the centuries, rivers have been essential to the characters and fortunes of the cities of this country. My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey has given an account of the significance of the Thames in the life of London. In Our Mutual Friend, Dickens compellingly describes the myriad human lives on the Thames; the power of the river is a symbol of the power of the city.

The noble Lord, Lord Cavendish of Furness, suggested, as a general proposition, that rivers unite while mountains divide. However, some of the speeches in this debate have demonstrated that that is too simple an antithesis. My noble friend Lady Morgan of Huyton has described convincingly the divide that the Mersey creates. Equally, I agree with my noble friend Lord Harris that the character of London south of the river feels and is profoundly different to the character of London north of the river. On the other hand, Newport, which I had the honour to represent in the House of Commons, is a city united by its river. Notwithstanding that the River Usk has one of the largest tidal rises and falls of any river, the history of Newport as a port astride the River Usk—and its subsequent history when the port was less important to its economy—has produced a state of affairs in which the Usk unites Newport West and Newport East very satisfyingly. In Norfolk, where I now live, the fortunes of the city of Norwich grew with the commerce and traffic on the River Yare, while the fortunes of King’s Lynn depended on the traffic on the Great Ouse. The tragedy of King’s Lynn was that the Great Ouse silted up and the town’s greatness waned from that point onwards.

Whether rivers unite or divide—or whether, indeed, there is no river, in which case it is not an issue—almost all our major cities and towns have grown up astride a river and, I would say, have been unified by a river. Birmingham is an oddity; it is perhaps the one great city in this country that does not have a river. I broadly accept the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Cavendish of Furness—with the important exceptions that have already been discussed—but the point is that this matters and people have strong feelings about it. It is foolish of the Government to design legislation that will, in practice, make it difficult for the boundary commissioners to take adequate account of this extremely important factor.

The Government will certainly say that, under rule 5 in Clause 11, the Boundary Commission has a measure of discretion to take account of important geographical factors. However, as we have argued almost to the point of wearying ourselves and others, because of the other constraints in the Bill it is not possible for the boundary commissioners to give proper attention to this. Given the exceptions outlined in rule 5 to take account of geographical considerations, the alignment of local authorities—presumably one of the problems about the creation of the constituency of Tyne Bridge was that the Member of Parliament representing Tyne Bridge would have to relate to different local authorities on either side of the Tyne—local ties and inconveniencies, on all the grounds set out in the rule it must be right for the boundary commissioners to be able to take account of the significance of rivers.

The consideration of the significance of rivers has underlined the point that we have been making again and again. We need two things: a wider tolerance than 5 per cent either side of the numerical norm; and a continuation of the rights of people to give evidence to the boundary commissioners in public inquiries. If they were able to do so, my noble friends Lord Graham of Edmonton, Lord Dixon, from Jarrow, and Lady Armstrong of Hill Top—all of whom have spoken eloquently and with strong feeling about the significance of rivers in the parts of England that they understand intimately in political terms and about which they care deeply—would give evidence to those public inquiries and press on the boundary commissioners the fact that, while appearing to be, perhaps, an accident of geography and history, this is a factor of emotional, almost visceral, importance to the people whose lives are made on these riversides.

[Lord Grocott]

On this point, I should say to my noble friends of many years, Lord Graham and Lord Dixon, that the idea of a member of the Boundary Commission sitting in London reading their written submissions on the feelings that they have about the communities in which they were born and brought up is evidence of the unacceptable way in which the Government have decided how boundaries will be determined in the future. In no way can the feeling behind the words that we have heard today—which will not be allowed under the legislation—be conveyed by means of a written submission.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My noble friend is right. Communities and territories will be divided up, presumably on a computerised calculation, in a way that entirely ignores the feelings that, rightly and powerfully, animate people in their political views.

The Boundary Commission in its wisdom—or in its unwisdom—made a judgment some time ago that the constituency of Tyne Bridge should be created and no doubt vigorous representations were made then. However, the fact that it got it wrong on that occasion—if it did get it wrong, and I am persuaded by my noble friend Lord Graham of Edmonton that it did—does not mean that it should not have to take account of the expressions of public opinion that would come to it through public inquiries.

Building into the Bill one exception after another to take account of specific circumstances is not the right way in which to legislate on this matter. It would be much better if the Bill were constructed on general principles that enabled the boundary commissioners to make sensible judgments and decisions.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 24th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, every noble Lord who has so far spoken in this debate, and indeed in the debate on the previous group of amendments, has put forward the view that it is highly desirable that parliamentary constituencies are aligned as far as possible with local authority boundaries.

The only noble Lord who has demurred from that to any extent is the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace. He did not deny that, all other things being equal, it would be desirable, but unfortunately he makes the factor of numerical equality between constituencies paramount. He therefore spoke of there being a conflict of factors with which the Boundary Commission is obliged to wrestle. I would not put it in those terms; I would say that there is a tension between a variety of legitimate factors—numerical equality, community, history, geography, and of course alignment with local authority boundaries. The Boundary Commission’s task is to do its best to reconcile those factors to arrive at a judgment that holds them in an appropriate balance, as my noble friend Lord Grocott stressed, in consultation with local people. The present system is a good one, and it seems reckless to upset it in this way.

Local authority areas, like constituencies, ought to contribute to defining and expressing people’s sense of their local community. That is a point that we have been arguing and no doubt will continue to argue in proceedings on the Bill. Unfortunately, they are too much discounted in the Bill. If members of the Government consider that questions of identity—people’s sense of who they are and where they belong—are negligible considerations in politics, I respectfully suggest that they are seriously mistaken. Indeed, any system of parliamentary representation that systematically discounts those emotions within our national life will not last. Supposing that the Government are successful in legislating to bring this into effect, the system of frequent boundary reviews, within the straitjacket of numerical equality that the Government are designing, might work once or even a second time, but I fancy that after the 2018 boundary review the people of this country will say, “This won’t do”. I very much doubt that the system will survive, should it be legislated, and we will do our best to persuade the Government that it is not, after all, a very good idea.

The Government ought to understand that themselves. As my noble friend Lord Graham of Edmonton just mentioned, the Government make much play of localism and the big society, but how can you seriously advocate the virtues of those things if at the same time you design your political structures to inhibit and distort localism and disregard people’s own sense of where they take their place within society?

If the Government think that these considerations are too sentimental or imprecise, I appeal to them at least to consider the practicalities of the working relationships between MPs and elected members of local authorities. My noble friend Lady Farrington wisely advised the Government to look at this from the point of view of local authorities. The reality is that local authorities take decisions overwhelmingly within a context of policy made by central government—of legislation and policy emanating from Whitehall and Westminster. Unfortunately, we have a highly centralised system of government in this country. Indeed, until we have radical decentralisation and greater autonomy for local government in this country, we will continue to need more MPs.

That is partly because so much policy-making and legislation comes from the two Houses of this Parliament; therefore you need an adequate number of Members of the other place to do justice to the policy-making and legislation. It is also partly because local authorities, rather than being free, as they ought to be, to get on and do their work on behalf of their local communities, must endlessly look to the centre for authorisation and make representations to the centre to see whether they can persuade officials and Ministers to modify their policies so that they make more sense for their local concerns. Key intermediaries in that process of frequent negotiation between local and central government are local Members of Parliament. It is therefore very important, in practical working terms, that Members of Parliament have a satisfactory operational relationship with their colleagues and counterparts in local authorities.

Equally, it is very important that elected members and officers of local authorities know to which Member of Parliament they should turn. It is better, therefore, if the constituency boundaries can be drawn so that whole local authorities are contained within them. Local authorities then know exactly which individual Member of Parliament they need to work with. The more MPs they have to deal with, the more confusing, expensive and time-wasting it is for people in local government. Equally, the more confusing and difficult it is for Members of Parliament to maintain the kind of working relationship that they need. Neither the local authority nor the Member of Parliament should need to duplicate, triplicate or otherwise multiply representations, meetings or the dialogue that they have with their colleagues at the other level of government.

A Member of Parliament should champion the place he represents. He or she can champion a local authority area if he or she has a clear-cut relationship with that local authority area. How much more difficult it is for a Member of Parliament convincingly to champion a hotchpotch of different local authorities that happen to fall within different parts of his constituency.

[Lord Grocott]

What on earth would happen in a constituency that, let us say, crossed county boundaries, where counties could take diametrically opposed views on major regional planning issues, or on school placements and applications to different schools? What on earth does the constituency Member of Parliament do in representations to central government on that? He will seriously let down half his constituency if we go by these rigid rules.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My noble friend is absolutely right. I was just about to make that point; the Member of Parliament is liable to be conflicted if he owes equal loyalty to different local authorities, which might themselves be at odds on important policy issues. Under the provisions of the Bill, as my noble friend suggested, it would be difficult for a Member of Parliament to deal with elected county councillors in two different counties that overlapped with his constituency. In the previous debate I quoted Dr Lewis Baston on the danger that, with the narrow 5 per cent tolerance—or, as the Minister likes to call it, a 10 per cent tolerance: both ways from the norm of 76,000 voters—wards would all too frequently be split.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I agree wholeheartedly with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, said, except in one respect. He anticipated, or perhaps reflected, on what might have happened, or could happen, in terms of people’s second preferences should there be an alternative vote system, or had there been in his constituency in the past. He made the assumption that every Labour voter would probably vote Liberal as their second preference. However true that may have been in the past, having seen the Liberal Democrats’ performance during the past six months, I would not make that assumption now. Not least, we have a coalition, so where do I put my second preference? I hope that the question will never arise, because, as I have made plain, if we were to have a referendum—and I would prefer that we did not—I would hope that the no campaign won.

I am very mindful of the time, so I shall not go on at any length. However, I have put my name alongside Amendment 44B in this group, which puts the threshold at 50 per cent, and I should like to make a couple of points. The first is to remind the Committee that, as my noble friend Lord Rooker pointed out very clearly, this is not an indicative referendum; it is a referendum which legislates. Should it be carried under the Bill as it stands, even by two votes to one—I know that I shall be criticised by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for going to ridiculous extremes, but we have got to see the logic of the argument—the legislation would be passed. It would become part of the constitution of our country and represent the most dramatic constitutional change for a very long time.

I take it as read—at least, I hope that I can in this Committee—that if a Bill were passed at Third Reading in this House by two Members to one, with the remaining 800 Members wherever they preferred to be, and although it would be unchallengeable in constitutional law, it would be seen as ridiculous. I cannot believe that there is anyone in this House who does not think, though they may not want to put it in the Bill, that there has to be a threshold for a decision of this magnitude. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, made a number of the points that I would have made. I simply say that I wholeheartedly agree with him that we are quite an unusual country—not unique, I think, but close to it—in there being no distinction between ordinary law and constitutional law. The only difference that we seem to apply is that it is increasingly assumed that major constitutional changes have to be ratified by referendum, which is not unreasonable. The reason for having a threshold is that, to quote a seasonal comment, a constitutional change is not just for five years; it is probably for life. If, as I half-anticipated, I had been intervened on and a noble Lord had said that Governments are elected by less than 50 per cent, I would have said that Governments come and go—we are now told that they can come and go only every five years, but they do come and go—whereas I think that we can all acknowledge that, should this change be made, it is incredibly unlikely that it would be reversed in our lifetime. That adds even greater import to the suggestion that we should be absolutely clear about the decision that we are making.

My amendment is for a 50 per cent threshold. It is not a figure that I have plucked out of the air, although “50 per cent” has constantly been repeated by the proponents of constitutional change. I have glanced through the most recent turnouts under the various electoral systems that operate in our country—there are far too many in my view, but that is not the point of this amendment. For local county council elections in 2009, it was 35 per cent; for Westminster parliamentary elections in 2010, it was 65 per cent; for the Greater London Assembly election in 2008, it was 45 per cent; for the Scottish parliamentary election, it was 51 per cent; for the National Assembly for Wales election, it was 43 per cent; for the European parliamentary elections, it was 34 per cent; for the European parliamentary elections in Northern Ireland, it was 42 per cent; for the Northern Ireland Assembly elections, it was 63 per cent; for the local government elections in Scotland, it was 53 per cent; for the local government elections in Northern Ireland, it was 62 per cent; for the Bedford Borough Council mayoral election, it was 30.9 per cent—I bet no one knew that one; and for the Greater London mayoral election, it was 45 per cent.

I hope I can convince the Committee that, for a major constitutional change, a 50 per cent turnout is not an unreasonable figure to validate that change. In fact, it is quite a modest figure bearing in mind that only half of those voting need to have voted in favour for the constitutional change to take place, which means one in four. Is it really an extremist position to suggest that, before we make this huge change, we should require one in four of our fellow citizens to vote in favour of it? That is the simple argument that I am presenting to the House and I hope the House will accept it.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I am conscious of the time but I would like to say a few words because I think this is one of the most important groups of amendments we shall deal with in this Committee. I reject the proposition put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the debate and the vote in the House of Commons should constrain us in the analysis we make, and indeed the decision we take. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, similarly objected and I agree with him on that and I agree with him on everything else that he said.

Plainly, a decision to change the electoral system is a momentous one—it is one of the most important decisions that we could take in our constitutional affairs. It is playing fast and loose with the constitution not to write some sort of a threshold requirement into this legislation. It would be ironic if a reform, which is motivated in part for the very good reason that we have seen declining turnouts in one set of parliamentary elections after another over a long time, should be brought in on the basis of very low turnout indeed. That would be deeply unsatisfactory.

I am sure that it is right in principle that there should be a threshold and I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town for introducing this debate with her amendment. However, I agree with other noble Lords who have put the case that a 25 per cent turnout threshold is simply inadequate. However pessimistic we may be about participation in the other elections that are due to take place on 5 May, I do not think that any of us supposes that they will be less than 25 per cent. As the elections are to be combined with the referendum on the same date, it seems to me that it is all the more important that we should be very clear that people have come to the polls deliberately to vote on this issue of constitutional reform, as well as on the other issues that are before them in the other elections.

We need a high threshold to satisfy ourselves that there really has been—if indeed in the referendum a change in our voting system is to be approved—to borrow a phrase that has been a little tarnished by experience but is still expressive, the full-hearted consent of the British people. We need to be sure that this is a decision consciously and deliberately entered into and endorsed by a sufficient majority of the British people for us all to feel that they have together taken a decision in which they believe and with which, whatever our personal views may be, we must go along.

Grateful as I am to my noble friend Lady Hayter, I do not think that 25 per cent will do. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, for upping the ante but I would be with my noble friend Lord Grocott: I think that 50 per cent of those entitled to vote is a decent minimum for a change of this magnitude. My noble friend Lady Hayter’s amendment would mean that we could introduce this radical change to our political system on a basis of less than 13 per cent of those voting in favour—50 per cent of a turnout of 25 per cent is just less than 13 per cent. That would be inadequate. My noble friend Lord Grocott has stated a decent minimum and I think the debate should proceed on the basis that his proposition is the one we need to examine seriously and to consider precisely what we should do, but certainly to ensure that there is a threshold that enables this decision to be widely regarded as a valid and proper one.