(7 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction to the measure before the Committee. It is not contentious, and there is generally no difficulty in approving measures that seek to improve safety and security. All the necessary information has been helpfully provided in the Explanatory Memorandum. I thank my noble friend Lord Jones for his comments on the measure in relation to Wales, and look forward to Wales continuing to contribute in the development of the nuclear industry, most notably, perhaps, through the development of modular reactors.
Although we recognise that the security aspect of all operations at civil nuclear sites is under constant review and that the measure to upgrade the regulations is not in response to any particular occurrence, nevertheless, anxiety has been expressed recently about some incidents across both civil and defence aspects in the nuclear industry, most notably the straying of a test missile in the Atlantic. While the measure refers to civil nuclear sites, the regulatory triage assessment states that defence sites are exempt. I am sure the Minister will say that we must not misread the exemption but will she confirm that there are indeed specific regimes and reviews in place for all defence sites, both fixed and mobile, where analogous conditions would be covered, such as Aldermaston and Harwell? Are these subject to separate SIs?
We certainly agree that the UK has one of the most robust security frameworks. What assurances regarding this high standard can the Minister give to those of a more doubting nature, when we do not discuss lessons learned from any mishap or even recognise that mishaps and deaths have occurred? We agree with and approve the measures being implemented in the regulations, especially the upgrades necessary to improve cybersecurity, against a backdrop of reports on the activities of Russia, which we trust are not being directed at or compromising the civil nuclear industry. The protocols in the measure to cover this scenario are vital and welcome.
The Minister and the Explanatory Notes have both highlighted that each nuclear premises must have its own approved site security plan in place. While I appreciate that every site will need a distinct plan in so far as geographical layouts may differ, I wonder how far different sites may have different practices, as the Minister in the other place stated regarding this measure. Can the Minister explain whether different plans carry any implications of differing standards, which could give rise to confusion or misunderstandings between sites and practices that could compromise security? I concur that the objective of the regulations is to raise the bar on security across all sites. Is there an appraisal of the differences between sites and why there are any, so that the differences are monitored and controlled?
My final point concerns the treaty background to the regulations. I understand that being a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material requires the UK to have in place the legislative and regulatory regime to ensure the safety and security of civil nuclear materials stored or in transport. Furthermore, the treaty sits outside Euratom, of which the UK is also a member, and Euratom has signed up to the treaty. Without wishing to encroach on tomorrow’s proceedings on the amendments to the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, there is some debate over whether Euratom is a separate entity from the EU, and over the UK’s membership of it. The Explanatory Memorandum to that Bill states that the UK’s departure from the EU will trigger an automatic leaving of Euratom as it is part of the same treaties. Whether or not this is the case, I ask the Minister: how will the UK find a way back into Euratom? What will this look like?
I understand that the Government recognise the importance of Euratom and wish to have the closest possible relationship with it and its members. I thought that the Minister in the other place was rather splitting hairs—if I may use the word “splitting” in this context—when he stated that Euratom,
“does not have a role in setting security standards, regulation or inspection of UK civil nuclear security arrangements”.—[Official Report, Commons, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 21/2/17; col. 7.]
While this measure is implemented discretely in the UK, it is vital that the UK continues to participate in Euratom; JET, which is based in the UK and employs many EU nationals; and the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—an organisation set up under the auspices of the United Nations and based in Vienna. Having said all that, I am content to approve the regulations before the Committee.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on this Motion. First, I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Jones, although it is with some trepidation because I am a little afraid of trying to pronounce the names of the stations he referenced: Wylfa and Trawsfynydd—that is my attempt.
Of course I would be happy to write, if I fail to provide the noble Lord with sufficient reassurance.
All staff have responsibility for ensuring effective security at civil nuclear sites. Having an effective security culture is, of course, very important. There will be a number of security-specific roles at civil nuclear establishments, and these vary depending on the site. All sites are subject to the same requirements and standards. In line with the graded approach, the level of security at each site will be determined by the nature of materials and equipment and the information held.
I welcome the very positive response from the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, to the measure and agree that it is non-contentious. He asked a number of questions, and I will deal first with Euratom. If he will allow me, I want to spend a few moments on this because it is important to be as clear as I can. Leaving Euratom is a result of the decision to leave the EU, as they are uniquely legally joined. However, the UK supports Euratom and will want to see continuity of co-operation and standards. We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear safety, safeguards and support for the industry. Our aim is clear: we want to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom. The statutory regime for civil nuclear security is based solely on UK legislation. There are no Euratom or EU directives relating to nuclear security that the UK is required to comply with. In fact, the EU has no competence in relation to nuclear security. Euratom has no role in setting security standards, regulations or the inspection of security arrangements in the UK civil nuclear sector.
The Government do not comment on specific security or intelligence arrangements at individual sites. The most sensitive commissioned civil nuclear sites and transportations of nuclear materials in the UK are protected by the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. The CNC is a specialised, dedicated elite firearms force, with a Royal College of Policing firearms licence, charged with the protection of the most sensitive civil nuclear sites and nuclear materials in England, Scotland and Wales.
The noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, asked one other question about defence sites such as Aldermaston; indeed, it is a question I asked officials last week. The answer is categorically no, they are not subject to this SI and are not a part of these regulations. There is a separate regulatory regime that applies to defence sites. I hope I have been able to respond sufficiently fully.
I wonder if I can tempt the Minister with one further question I was concerned about: each site having a specific plan and whether differences between sites meant that there were different practices that could lead to a misalignment of security standards.
If the Minister wants to write to me at a later date, I will understand.
I apologise to the noble Lord. Apparently I have been given the answer to his question but it seems to have chosen to disappear. Ah, it is under the folder. Good. All sites are subject to the same requirements and standards. In line with the graded approach, the level of security at each site will be determined by the nature of materials, equipment and information held.
On that note, I hope I have sufficiently responded to the noble Lords. I thank them for their helpful remarks, and I hope they will agree that the responses I have given have provided the necessary assurances for them to approve this straightforward statutory instrument. As I said in my opening remarks, the overarching aim of these updates is to further enhance civil nuclear security by ensuring that the UK’s regulatory regime remains up to date, comprehensive and robust.