European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Goodhart and Lord Howell of Guildford

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My Lords, I hope that I will be forgiven if I say that I have a faint feeling of having been here before—and forgiven also for not responding to every strongly held view and argument put forward in this debate that was put forward again and again in the past. The Government and I regard some of these arguments as deeply flawed and consider that they do not understand or come to grips with the realities of political life today, either here or in the rest of the European Union. I will also deal briefly, as is the custom, with the Motion—it is not the custom to make long second speeches on a Motion—and with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, which goes very much further than anything standing against the Government’s Motion that the amendments be resisted.

On the decisions involved in Clause 6, none is in the grey or insignificant category. They are all there for very strongly established reasons that are largely supported by many other countries. Many vetoes are maintained because the signatories to the Lisbon treaty did not want them to go into the QMV category. They are there because their use could only ever provide for a transfer of competence and power from the UK to the European Union—for reasons that we have explained from this Dispatch Box and that many of my noble friends have explained again and again—and so should be subject to the referendum requirement.

It is difficult to accept that any of the decisions in Clause 6 would not be significant in constitutional or economic terms. Those who say that it stretches their imagination to understand the significance of the measures listed in Clause 6, or Schedule 1, which springs from it, surprise me. Surely a decision on whether to give up our vetoes on, for instance, the multiannual financial framework, border controls or joining the single currency—I refer now to the amendment of the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Triesman, not to the main one that accepts them—would all fall, under Amendment 13B, into the bracket of something that had to be judged according to whether or not it was significant. This is a completely unnecessary process. Clearly they are of the most profound significance.

I know that the shadow Minister for Europe said on Monday that he considered other items in Clause 6 to be not so important. He exempted the important three—border controls, the European currency and one other—but dismissed the others as paperclips and minutiae. We do not accept that analysis. We firmly believe that the other issues are also of great significance and, when understood in terms of their impact on jobs, work and the processes by which our law system operates, certainly could be subjects of conversation in the pub in Burton-on-Trent, where the noble Lord, Lord Lea, has been listening to conversations.

On the European public prosecutor, I know that it is regarded by some of my noble friends, and by some noble Lords opposite, as not being of constitutional or economic significance. However, it is because it involves affording a supranational body the ability to prosecute citizens of this country within the scope of its own criminal justice system in respect of alleged crimes affecting the EU's financial interests. Someone must decide what that financial interest is and whether the crime has been committed. Is that a paperclip or minutiae issue?

What about the vetoes listed in Schedule 1? Why are they not significant when they all relate—that is why they are there—to the red lines adopted by successive Governments, fought for very hard by the previous Government and sustained by this Government, covering foreign affairs, security and defence policy, economic and tax policy, including issues of the EU's budget, which all of us admit is a red-hot issue, social security, employment policy, justice and home affairs policy, and citizenship and elections? Are these all minutiae, paperclip decisions and things that are never discussed in any pub? I have to ask where some of my noble friends, and some noble Lords, have been if they think that these matters are of no significance, because they include not only domestic issues, where after all Parliament can make and unmake laws, but transfers of power, sovereignty and competence that would almost certainly be irrevocable—in fact, they would be irrevocable.

The amendment before us would, for instance, allow the British Government to relinquish their veto over decisions relating to the multiannual financial framework without first getting the consent of the British people. That is a hugely important decision that Members in the other place were particularly concerned with, and rightly so. The Minister for Europe rightly pointed out that the forthcoming decision on that framework will in effect set budgetary decisions and ceilings for the next five to seven years of the EU's life and development. Are these minutiae, paperclip decisions or matters that people will not understand? I ask my noble friends and noble Lords who think that these matters are insignificant to think again. Their significance is obvious.

It is vital that these matters remain subject to unanimity and that whichever British Government are in office—this matter should be above party—continue to have the right of veto. Similar views are taken in almost every other country in the European Union. We all know what happens when one gets casual about the veto and lets it go. This was the case in the surrender of the veto on Article 122 of the TFEU, which opened the way to fearsome, huge and titanic new financial commitments to the funding of Europe in its present financial difficulties.

The amendment before us would reduce precisely the clarity that we all seek. It would also risk the possibility of judicial review on a decision by the Minister not to consider one of these clear-cut decisions to be significant. The so-called pragmatic flexibility that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, keeps reminding us about and seeks could well be impeded by his own amendment. He would end up in a quagmire of pragmatic flexibility of his own making. It was too much of this pragmatic flexibility approach in the past that caused antagonism—the turn-off, if you like, of popular support for the European Union and for Ministers’ actions. The ministerial discretion that some of my noble friends and noble Lords call for has become the ministerial indiscretion and undermining of trust and support for the European Union that we are trying to correct.

[Lord Goodhart]

Would my noble friend accept that it is impossible for a court to make decisions on what is done in the Houses of Parliament? If the Minister declares, therefore, that he believes something to be—or not to be—a matter of importance, it is not a matter that could then go to the courts. It would be settled by the House itself.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Ministerial decisions are open to judicial review. That is not a matter that we discussed much in Committee or one that we would necessarily want to see operate very fully in this or any other area of ministerial decisions on any aspect of policy. However, judicial review is there and ministerial decisions can be challenged.

The House of Commons has twice approved the scope and operation of Clause 6 following a clear exposition from the shadow Europe minister and his views on party policy on Amendments 6 to 13.

I do not want to take further time meeting the marginalisation argument. Frankly, it is a chestnut, as there is absolutely no impact on Ministers’ discretion and flexibility merely because they have sanctions behind them. Most European member states’ Ministers have sanctions of various sorts lying behind them on the decisions that they reach.

The plebiscitary democracy issue, frankly, belongs to the pre-internet age, before the web and the internet system. We see all around the world the wider public’s insistence on having a say where major issues about the transfers of power and competence away from their sovereign control are involved. That is exactly what would happen here. The idea that there would be 56 different referenda coming along is pure fantasy and does not relate to the actual way in which these issues would arise. There would be no great frequency of referenda; this is not the pattern for the future. It will not be the result of this Bill and it certainly would not be the outcome of the way in which the European Union has operated, is operating, or is likely to operate in the future. It is not in the interests of the 27—maybe soon 28—members to proceed in that way.

I think that the noble Lord would be wise to accept the Motion and the view taken in the other place. He would be wise to reject the amendment and therefore I ask him to withdraw it and accept the Motion so ably moved by my noble friend.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Goodhart and Lord Howell of Guildford

Monday 13th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodhart]

I accept that other countries in the European Union have been very reluctant, as have our Government, to join up to the EPPO and I think it is unlikely that there will ever be an EPPO, but that is mostly because of the inadequacies of the legal system in a number of those countries. For this country, under Article 86 of TFEU:

“The European Public Prosecutor's Office shall be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment … the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, offences against the Union's financial interests, as determined by … regulation”.

That makes it perfectly clear that those who would suffer would not be ordinary citizens in this country. If the EPPO was brought into this country, those who would be subject to it would be international criminals and some major commercial companies. It would not affect the ordinary people in this country in the slightest.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I respect what my noble friend is saying, but one has only to pause for a moment and think about the phrase, the European Union's financial interests. Who will interpret that? How widely or narrowly will that be interpreted? Will offences be generated by the misuse of structural funds or other arrangements to do with the EU's finances? We do not know. We do not know who will define these things, but we can see clearly that they may well lead to a prosecution authority outside the UK, when we have our own prosecution authorities which are perfectly adequate in most—indeed, in all—cases to deal with those matters. We will have a prosecution authority from outside the United Kingdom for the first time charging and prosecuting British citizens. That is one reason why a huge uncertainty hangs over that.

Furthermore, once set up, although it is confined to EU financial interests now, the range can spread. Who is to say that it may not? We do not know. All those matters are reasons why many European countries—possibly the majority—are reluctant to see a development of that kind and why, if a Government in this country decided to change their mind, flatly against what the previous Labour Government wanted and flatly against what the present Government want, that should certainly be one item that should be put to a referendum.

I turn now to some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, which were very reasonably put. I know that he felt that he was in a consensual and concessionary mood and looked for some reciprocity from the Government. In that, I fear that he will be disappointed. The passerelles allowing for a move to QMV, which are listed in Clause 6(5), have been included simply because they are covered by Schedule 1. That is obvious to most of your Lordships. It would be wildly illogical to provide for a referendum on an amending treaty which abolished those vetoes without also providing for a referendum on any decision to use the passerelles attached to the specific articles listed in Clause 6(5), which would achieve exactly the same result. That would be tantamount to locking the front and back doors of the house—not closing them, locking them; and not throwing away the key either, but giving the key to the British people—but leaving the kitchen window open.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Goodhart and Lord Howell of Guildford

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodhart]

Does my noble friend agree, however, that a situation might arise in which it is desired to change from unanimity to a qualified majority vote on the ground that some member states might become very obstructive to the choice of particular members of the judiciary or the advocates-general, and that it, might be the only way of ensuring that the problems did not become overwhelming?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

It becomes a matter of hypothesis and judgment. This is an area where, somehow, one has to have solidarity and consensus. Given that it requires unanimity to go to QMV, it would be a pretty odd action by the country that did not want to go to QMV to act totally against its interest. It is an inconceivable situation. However, if a country did so, it would be a very bad basis for supporting the independence and overall quality of the EU judiciary and of the key figures like the advocates-general and judges. It remains the view of this Government that to move away from a consensus and concord of agreement and support for these kinds of appointments would be very unfortunate. I think this would be the view of future Governments, too. I do not regard this as binding; I simply regard it as common sense.

Neither under this amendment nor under Amendment 47—which I also want to speak to because the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, put his point so keenly and strongly—is there any question of not being able to operate or contribute to the election and appointment of advocates-general or anything else under any of these articles. The issue is simply whether it is right that we surrender the veto, so that in a future situation it might be possible that we would not be able to resist measures and proposals that were directly against our own national interest and judgment.

Let me turn to Amendment 47, which would remove key justice and home affairs provisions from Schedule 1 and therefore from the referendum lock. I know that the noble Lord is a keen expert in this area. As I said before, Schedule 1 does not prevent the use of these articles. This is a narrow exposition of a much broader point which I would urge many noble Lords who have spoken to comprehend. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, talked about a meeting of minds, and I would love to see one, but it is difficult if it is not understood that the central point is about whether we abandon vetoes, not whether we use the articles and competences that are already there.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Goodhart and Lord Howell of Guildford

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The Maastricht treaty and other treaties make clear that common defence means common control and common finance. There may be all sorts of arrangements short of that with some aspects of existing competencies already available to the European Union for all kinds of co-operation. I am going to come particularly to the question of enhanced co-operation and other military aspects in a moment. The noble Lord is splitting hairs. In the treaty it is perfectly clear what this step would involve. He says that there might be just one small step and it will be all right because we can have adjustments later on; that is not how it really works and certainly not how it works in law and under the treaties.

Let me move on, as I have plenty more to say on the other areas that were apparently described as trivial. Those included abolishing border controls—I feel it absolutely extraordinary to put that in the trivial category, as it is a major issue. Joining the European public prosecutor system, which is already in the treaty, or extending its powers when we had joined it is a very serious issue affecting the whole of our judicial system. Then we come to—

[Lord Goodhart]

Is my noble friend aware that the EPPO would have virtually no effect on litigation or law in the United Kingdom? It would affect only a few elements which involve entirely cross-border matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goodhart]

Again, is it not distinctly possible that QMV would have considerable benefits for the United Kingdom? With unanimity, things that we want to do can be blocked by another member state. Is it not best to have the decision about whether to go for QMV taken by Parliament?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I have always found this argument very curious. To go to QMV requires a unanimous decision by those involved in taking the decision. The suggestion is that a country that is anxious to protect its national interest by blocking the move to QMV should nevertheless vote for QMV and for the power to be overridden by itself. That seems to be a turkeys-for-Christmas argument that does not add up in the real world. To imagine that by the muscle of QMV—I will not call it a sledge-hammer—one is going to get other countries to fall into line with a proposition that we might like to see pushed through is unrealistic. Why should they vote against themselves? That is not the way the pattern is ever going to work. The truth is this—my noble friend Lord Lamont touched on it—that the reason there is a long list of items in Schedule 1—