Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Goodhart and Baroness Hayman

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goodhart]

My Lords, I have supported the statements of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, at Second Reading and in Committee. I will take the same position yet again on Report.

I agree that terrorism is a great threat to the United Kingdom and that steps must be taken to prevent it. I agree that those steps may include civil penalties that restrict the activities of those who are probably involved in terrorism. But there are conditions that should be applied to those requirements and included in this Bill. The most important of those conditions is that the rule of law must be applied and observed. A fundamental rule of the rule of law is that penalties must be imposed only by people who are independent—either judges or, in the case of serious criminal proceedings, by a jury. In particular, the prosecutor should not also be the judge. Under this Bill, that is exactly what happens. The Secretary of State is both the prosecutor and the judge. That is doubly objectionable, not only because the Secretary of State imposes the penalty but because the defendant cannot give his own story in defence of the prosecution being brought against him.

It is true that under Clause 6 the court must give permission to the Secretary of State to impose measures that she has decided to apply. But as is stated by Clause 6(6), the court is applying a judicial review, which is not the same thing as a trial of the evidence. This means that the court cannot, in effect, question evidence supplied by the Secretary of State; it must refuse permission to impose the measures that the Secretary of State proposes, if, as is said in Clause 6(3),

“relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed”.

But what on earth does that mean? To whom must the flaw be obvious? I question the whole concept of something being obviously flawed, when more than one person may well be applied to in deciding whether the flaw is obvious or not. As I said, to whom must the flaw be obvious? Can counsel for a defendant argue that the flaws are obvious? I think probably not but one does not know. The fact is that the court has only a limited power over the imposition proposed by the Secretary of State. It is pretty clear that the court has no power to examine the facts of the case as presented by the Secretary of State.

This simply does not satisfy the rule of law. The rule of law is not wholly inflexible. We accept that, in certain circumstances, it is necessary in the interest of the nation to exclude relevant evidence from the presence of the defendant. But there is no justification for denying the court the right to consider the adequacy of that evidence. If it deals with this matter simply by a review process, that cannot happen.

I refer again to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, published on 19 October. Paragraph 1.6 of the report, which I quoted in Committee on that date, states that,

“the well-established principle is that executive restrictions on liberty are such a radical departure from our common law tradition that they always require prior judicial authorisation after proper legal process. It is for the Government to justify this Bill’s departure from that fundamental principle”.

That is a statement with which I entirely agree and which I think those who were responsible for drafting this Bill should have taken into account. It does nothing to prevent procedures being taken up against the person who is understood to be involved in terrorism. It does not make the matter seriously more difficult for the Government. I do not think it does at all. The Secretary of State will clearly have come to a view that this person is liable to be prosecuted and made the subject of an order. I believe it is really a matter for the Secretary of State not to impose the measure herself but to present the evidence that she has to the member of the court who is in charge of this. It is for the member, or the members of the court, to take this up.

I will add one reason which might actually encourage the Government to accept the amendments. Having the judgment made by the court on the basis of an application by the Secretary of State—if the judgment is actually made by the court in all respects—would make the situation simpler or cheaper. In particular, since the court would not need to give itself permission to make the order which it wishes to make, the need for a directions hearing under Clause 8 would simply disappear. It would not only be a more justified and proper treatment of the evidence, it would also make it a simpler system for the Government.

[Baroness Hayman]

My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments and, given the speeches of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, I can be relatively brief. I certainly will not challenge them in terms of legal expertise, having ended my legal career with a first degree in 1969, but I feel strongly on this issue because of my own experience as a parliamentarian. I had the honour to be a member of the Privy Council committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, who I am glad to see in his place, which reviewed the provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, particularly Part 4 of that Act, which was considered by us and by many others to be unsatisfactory. The Government paid little heed to the results of that committee’s deliberations until the courts made them do so. We ended up with the 2005 Act, in which I played some part on the duration of control orders, an issue to which we will return, mutatis mutandis, later in today’s Report stage.

I came out of that experience, particularly the experience of the Privy Council review committee, with two clear views. One was that there was a problem that needed to be addressed and that there was some justification for going beyond the normal criminal legal procedures in terms of the threat of terrorism. Some of that was in terms of creating new offences—we saw the offence of “acts preparatory to terrorism” that came out of that review, which I believe has been helpful—but even that was not enough and there was the need, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has just said, for measures that were extraordinary. I do not need convincing on that score.

The other thing that became clear to me was that we should, as legislators, try to make those extraordinary measures deviate as little as humanly possible from the fundamental principles that we normally apply, through the criminal justice system and the whole of our legal processes, to the deprivation of liberty and to constraints upon movement and actions—the fundamental human rights of those living within our country, particularly our citizens. I look at the provisions of the Bill, which I believe are an improvement on control orders—limited but an improvement—and ask myself whether we are deviating as little as humanly possible.

I believe there would be a great improvement, without a balanced increase in risk to security, if we transferred that initial decision on the imposition of such measures from the Secretary of State—the Home Secretary—to the courts. That is the fundamental and simple reason why I support these measures. I was emboldened to do so partly because of the comments made by the chairman of the Privy Council committee, the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, as I always pay great respect to those who have been my chairs on committees. Perhaps we will hear from him later. However, I remember that, when we were discussing the 2005 Act and talking about analogous issues and the role of the judiciary, one of my colleagues who was not in sympathy with the position that I was taking turned on me and asked, “What’s so special about the judges?”, to which I replied, “They’re not the politicians”. That fundamentally remains my position today, and it is why I added my name and give my support to this group of amendments.