Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Follow-up Report (European Affairs Committee) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Frost
Main Page: Lord Frost (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Frost's debates with the Cabinet Office
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and his sub-committee for this excellent and important report. It rightly highlights many of the uncertainties around the Windsor Framework and the lack of clarity about its operation. I too look forward to digesting the Government’s response when I have time.
I understand why the Prime Minister wanted to put an end to the tensions of recent years over Northern Ireland, but I am sorry to say that I regret the way in which it has been done. The Windsor Framework is said to be proof that good faith and a softer approach can pay dividends with the EU; I am afraid that I disagree. For me, it is proof that you never get a good result in a negotiation if the other side can tell that you just want a deal. As a result, I fear that its benefits have been oversold and the temporary reduction in friction over Northern Ireland has been bought only by conceding many of the points at issue. I will briefly explain why and highlight four problems.
First, I do not honestly think the Government have been totally clear about the nature of this agreement. The name may have changed, but we are still dealing with, essentially, the old protocol. The EU is still the goods and customs regulatory authority in Northern Ireland; its provisions are implemented by EU laws, not ours. In my view, the Stormont brake is a trivial and probably unusable add-on to something that was already in the protocol. The committee said and the noble Lord, Lord Jay, noted:
“There has been no substantive change to the role of the CJEU”.
It is not a new solution. Fundamentally, it is the old one and can be expected to generate the same problems.
Secondly, the workability of the framework’s limited new elements looks increasingly questionable. I wrote in February that the red and green lanes and the more relaxed rules on food standards and so on would probably improve the situation. I am no longer quite so sure. We are seeing operators setting out the practical difficulties with the green lane; on food standards, we seem to have agreed that people in Northern Ireland can consume GB-standard foods only if they are imported—they are not allowed to make them themselves. The Government claimed six months ago that there would be “no sense” of an Irish Sea border. We cannot really say that that is the case at the moment.
The third difficulty, which is crucial, is that the Government’s stance has changed. They have now committed to defending and supporting the framework. This is fundamental. The Johnson Government, of which I was part, always took the view—many criticised us for taking it—that the protocol was unsatisfactory and temporary. We always hoped that, ultimately, divergence by GB would produce the collapse of the protocol arrangements, whether consensually through a vote, a further negotiation or otherwise. We always wanted something better. Now, though, the Government are committed to the view that the Windsor Framework is better and should be defended. The consequence is that, as problems emerge—as they will—the Government must ally themselves with the EU, defend these new arrangements and impose them on a deeply divided Northern Ireland. They must actively support rules that destroy long-standing trade arrangements in this country and impose laws without consent in Northern Ireland. When problems emerge, as they do, for example over horticultural trade in Northern Ireland, they deny that they exist. I am afraid the Government will not find that comfortable. I fear the long-term consequences.
The final difficulty is that the Government’s commitment to the framework will shape their broader policy. That is why I cannot entirely share the view of those on my side of the argument who say, “Yes it’s imperfect, but it’s time to move on”. The framework creates a huge incentive to avoid diverging from the EU in relevant areas, because doing so will make its arrangements less and less workable, more vulnerable to EU interdiction and harder to defend as a success. Perhaps we have already seen the first consequences in the watered-down retained EU law Act.
The Windsor Framework exists. It seems that we will have to live with it for some years yet, but it is a sticking plaster and not a real solution to the underlying problems. If the Government had said something such as, “This deal softens the protocol but it does not remove it; it is the best we can get for now because we did not want to use the NI Protocol Bill and the EU knew it, but that cannot be the end of the story”, that would have been a fair statement of their position and much easier for people on my side of the argument to get behind. As it is, we are supposed to believe that the problems have been solved, but they have not. It leaves us where we started, with the British Government only partly sovereign over their territory. That is still a bitter pill to swallow, and in the long run I do not see how it can stand.