Paragraph 7 says:
“‘Might’ implies speculation as to whether an interest is relevant. ‘Would’ implies more certainty”.
Surely in this area we need certainty, not speculation.
We need certainty as to when the obligation arises and the interest has to be declared. Surely, the whole object of this is to allay the public’s concern and allay a reasonable person’s suspicion that your interest might influence what you are going to say. That is what paragraph 11 currently provides for. You cannot sit quietly and not declare an interest merely because a reasonable person might, rather than necessarily would, think that it is going to affect what you are going to say. That would be an absurdly low test and completely out of harmony with all other public bodies, with the code in the House of Commons and the rest of it. I respectfully urge your Lordships to consider that, if you crossed out “might” and put “would” in the governing paragraph 11, this House would be brought into disrepute because it would be said, “They don’t have to declare an interest unless a reasonable person not might but would think that it would affect them”. Is not that an absurdly high test for when this obligation is brought into being?
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak from a position of deep ignorance, having had no relationship with the aid programme nor in any shape or form with the Treasury—except that I used to think myself a rather overgenerous contributor to it during my years at the Bar. I support this amendment, but I see the force of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, about the messages sent. I appreciate of course that one cannot amend the amendment today, but there is an opportunity between today and Third Reading; one could, after the proposed addition set out in Amendment 1, include in parentheses something to the following effect, which would accommodate the noble Lord’s point. After saying:
“Subject to the assent of the Treasury following each Spending Round”,
one could add, in parentheses: “which shall not be withheld, save only to promote the most effective use of the committed fund”. That, with respect, would indicate plainly in the statute that the only point about this amendment is to have the scrutiny to ensure the efficient, effective use of this fund, so you do not escape—as unamended you would escape—all discipline at all in the use of this money.
My Lords, I will make a brief point in response to the point that was made, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. It would appear that some noble Lords are under a misapprehension about what the Bill does. All it does is require the Secretary of State to have a target of 0.7%, and where under Clause 2 he or she has established that target, they have to make a statement to Parliament if they have not met the target. Clause 2(3) says that a statement made,
“must explain why the 0.7% target has not been met in the report year and, if relevant, refer to the effect of one or more of the following”,
which are, in paragraphs (a) to (c),
“economic circumstances and, in particular, any substantial change in gross national income … fiscal circumstances and, in particular, the likely impact of meeting the target on taxation, public spending and public borrowing … circumstances arising outside the United Kingdom”.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, thinks that that is a flag, but it is more of a dish-cloth. All it does is to say, “This target is desirable, but if it’s not met, you’ve got to give a statement to Parliament, and these are the range of reasons”.
Circumstances outside the United Kingdom could be anything whatever. There could be a crisis in euroland or a whole range of things such as difficulties in Ukraine. The Bill does not impose an absolute statutory duty to spend 0.7%, as has been suggested by some noble Lords; it simply imposes a duty to tell Parliament if this has not been done and to give a reason for that. What it does do, however, is to mess up the procedures by which our country has accountability for public expenditure and to confuse the fiscal year with the financial year, and it does so because it is a flag-waving Bill in terms of meeting an international target. Those of us in this House who are seriously concerned about getting money to poor people in poor countries, and ensuring that that money is spent wisely, ought to support this amendment. Far from weakening the Bill, it would strengthen it as it would bring the Treasury into the process from day one and avoid the situation whereby the Secretary of State can say, “I didn’t meet the target because the economy wasn’t right and the Treasury wasn’t too happy”. This amendment would strengthen the Bill and preserve the integrity of our financial control.