(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we now come a group of amendments about strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPPs. These were much debated at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. As noble Lords will be aware, SLAPPs is the rather ungainly acronym to describe the abusive threats of litigation and actual litigation by deep-pocketed individuals with the intention of preventing journalists or others from revealing the truth, very often about economic crime or, at the very least, economic activity which the claimant would much rather was not revealed at all, or certainly not to the general public. This is a worldwide problem which has received a variable response.
In a sense, there is nothing new about SLAPPs. Powerful men have often used litigation to try to silence their critics, but there have recently been some egregious examples. The difficulty always exists in separating out genuine complaints by powerful men or organisations and those which have been commenced for a collateral purpose. When SLAPPs were debated at Second Reading, it was thought that amendments to prevent or limit such lawsuits would be outside the scope of the Bill. I am glad to say that that has now proved not to be the case, although it is clear that the relevant amendments, either mine or the Government’s, are focused on economic crime as opposed to wider areas of criminal activity which might provoke a strategic lawsuit. The Government’s position at Second Reading appeared to be that they were sympathetic to the notion of legislation in this area. However, they thought that the whole issue needed separate and mature consideration and should not be part of any amendment to this Bill.
I am delighted that the Government have changed their mind and brought forward amendments in this group which we will debate. I understand that the new Lord Chancellor has had much to do with this, and I thank him and the Minister for tabling the amendments.
A number of noble Lords have spoken about SLAPPs, including the noble Lords, Lord Agnew and Lord Cromwell, who gave a graphic description of the mischief at which any change in the law should be directed. My difficulty with any potential amendment was always that the courts have powers already to strike out abusive proceedings, but they tend to be extremely cautious about doing so, on the basis that striking out is a somewhat draconian remedy. Courts tend to be persuaded that it is better to see how the evidence emerges before putting a case out of its misery, but that can be too late. Huge expenditure will have been incurred, often by relatively impecunious defendants. Sometimes they have no realistic alternative but to capitulate—delay is plainly the friend of those who use SLAPPs. The best chance, in my experience, of striking out a claim is when there is a clear point of law, but even then there can be appeals and further expense, which work in favour of an abusive claimant.
The government amendments are clearly aimed in the right direction, but I can already foresee a few difficulties. There will be significant arguments as to what does or does not constitute a SLAPP, for example. That issue of itself has a lot of litigation potential. I am also concerned about the process of making the relevant Civil Procedure Rules. This can be a lengthy process, and is always a carefully considered process. I have studied the recent minutes of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, so as to inform myself as to how the committee approaches rule changes. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to the House how this amendment will make its way into the rules and the likely timescale.
Those reservations apart, my view is that we should go further. As pointed out at Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who has put his name to this amendment, there is no obvious reason why there should not be a criminal offence in this area.
I invite the House to consider a client consulting his expensive lawyers. He wants to take every step he can through litigation to suppress and exhaust the funds of those who would expose him. He utters those words which lawyers tend to love: “I don’t mind how much it costs”. The advice that he will or should receive after the government amendments become law is that there is a risk that the courts might decide to stop the litigation if it is regarded as abusive. “But”, the litigant says, correctly, “It will surely still be a lengthy and expensive process before a court even gets to consider that option”. However, if the Government were to accept my amendment, then the advice he should receive is that he risks criminal prosecution if he, without reasonable excuse, threatens litigation with the intent to suppress the publication of any information likely to be relevant to the investigation of an economic crime. This potential offence gives room for a defence, of course, but its very existence should act as a considerable deterrent against the sort of behaviour we want to stop. If this amendment becomes law then the hypothetical client might think much more carefully before threatening or embarking upon abusive litigation.
This amendment is particularly relevant to journalists, who have a huge role in tackling economic crime. I declare my interest as chair of the Independent Press Standards Organisation. It is also of importance to anyone who wants to reveal economic crime. It is entirely consistent with the aims of the Bill. Let us bear in mind that the opportunity to legislate in this space is unlikely to present itself again, or at least not for some time. I beg to move.
My Lords, I remind your Lordships that, at Second Reading of this Bill, on 8 February, I referred to a legal action brought by Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group, who has been somewhat in the news over the last weekend, against the journalist Eliot Higgins, who had investigated his activities. When his case was justly struck out last May, Prigozhin said that he brought court cases against journalists because
“in any issue there should be room for sport”.
The cost to Mr Higgins was in the region of £70,000, although he won his case. That is the sort of abuse of the English legal system that the current crop of so-called reputational lawyers have brought on behalf of Russian oligarchs and many other large co-operations that resent too close a look into their operations.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I do not really understand this provision. The purpose is to create a basic offence of strict liability—that is what the Minister and the Explanatory Notes say—but the wording that inserts the basic false statement offence says:
“A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a notice … or in purported compliance with a duty imposed… and without reasonable excuse, the person makes a statement that is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”
It is the words “without reasonable excuse” that bother me. I do not see how a strict liability offence can have an excuse. Last week it was well-publicised that someone in the other place said, “Yes, I misled, but I had a reasonable excuse because no one told me. Indeed, I was advised that there was nothing wrong.”
What is meant by a reasonable excuse? How can it be, as put forward, a strict liability offence in circumstances like that? This of course goes to officers who are in default, which is another contradiction within that proposed new paragraph. I ask the Minister to take this proposed new clause back to those advising him and ask whether it is correctly drafted. I do not think it is.
Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the use of the phrase “false statements” rather than “inaccurate statements” is quite significant. A false statement carries with it the connotation of a deliberate inaccuracy, whereas simply getting something wrong is rather different. I agree with him that without reasonable excuse the prosecution would have to prove the absence of a reasonable excuse, which is contrary to the concept of a strict liability offence.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Bethell is to add an offence of treason to the Bill. The offence of treason, or high treason, has a rather chequered history, I readily admit. The 1351 treason offence remains on the statute book. It focuses significantly on the safety of the sovereign and prohibitions on aiding the sovereign’s enemies. Important though these matters are, it is now generally accepted that that Act is not fit for purpose, and having an offence on the statute book that cannot be used is not satisfactory.
There are now a considerable number of terrorist offences that exist to augment the criminal law. They derive mainly from the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006. This Bill seeks to add to those offences, in recognition of the changing nature of the threat and to provide a nimble response, in legislative terms, to what is happening on the ground. If the nature of terrorism is changing as fast as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said at Second Reading, there will inevitably be something of a legislative lag, but the Bill seems for the most part to be a sensible response. The reviewers of terrorism legislation have been vigilant in the past—two of them are Members of your Lordships’ House and are present in the Committee today—and this has very much helped the Government to consider what laws need to be updated. Ultimately, though, it is a matter for the Government how they respond to the threats and, in so far as possible, anticipate the nature of terrorist threats in future.
When I first heard the suggestion that we might need a modern law of treason, I was doubtful about either the wisdom of such a move or the need for it. Surely what was required was a much more nuanced response, and I was a little concerned about the potential risk of attracting martyrs if there was seen to be a somewhat heavy-handed response to the various threats from terrorism. I then had the opportunity to read Policy Exchange’s publication Aiding the Enemy, to which I referred at Second Reading. Its distinguished authors make a compelling case. The enthusiastic responses to the study came from a number of important sources, including the former Home Secretary, a former commander at New Scotland Yard and head of Counter Terrorism Command, and a former director-general of the Security Service.
This Bill increases sentences and creates more security at the border, together with some new offences. However, the debates we have already had in Committee illustrate how difficult it will be to satisfy Parliament, and in particular this House, that the various provisions in the Bill adequately reflect the balance between the need to protect citizens from terrorism and the need to preserve civil liberties. After all, the Liberal Democrats have given notice of their intention to oppose each of the first four clauses standing part of the Bill. In particular, I note the debate in relation to Clause 4 two days ago in this House.
It seems important to step back a little. At the heart of this new offence of treason is the question of allegiance or loyalty owed to this country by a subject or citizen of this country, or by someone who is settled here—settlement being a term of art in immigration law. Australia, Canada and New Zealand have responded to this challenge, albeit in slightly different ways. As recently as June, Australia legislated to deal with citizens or relevant others fighting Australian forces abroad. Many other countries have laws in relation to treason.
Let me make it clear that the creation of this new offence is not intended—nor would it act—as any brake on free speech or the right to express dissent or criticism of the Government in relation to any of their activities, and in particular their foreign policy or decision to wage wars. Criticism and overt expressions of dissent are part of a healthy democracy. However, such dissent should not extend, in effect, to waging war against your own country, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, Nor should it include helping, planning or preparing an attack, giving military or other intelligence, or in any way assisting such attacks.
What is the scale of the problem? It is one with multiple dimensions, including British citizens or permanent residents who go abroad to fight with ISIS in Syria or with the Taliban, but also British citizens and others who help those groups or others who intend to attack the UK or fight UK forces in the UK itself. It is estimated that about 900 British terror suspects went to Syria and Iraq during the wars. Those who have not been killed, or who are not currently prisoners, have been described by our senior counterterrorism officer as a “big national security threat”. It is true that when they return they will—or should—face immediate arrest and questioning and will be encouraged to enter deradicalisation schemes. But it is said that prosecution will be difficult, particularly against the many women involved—the so-called brides of Jihad—who will or may claim duress or in other ways try and distance themselves from what others may have done.
What about Anjem Choudary, released from prison on 19 October, half way through his in my view inadequate sentence for supporting ISIS? Now he will be placed on a deradicalisation or anti-extremism course, and a considerable amount of our resources will be spent on monitoring his activities, having regard to the range and scope of his encouragement of so many other terrorists. What he did was undoubtedly a betrayal of his country. He acted as a recruiting agent for a group that intended to cause and has caused attacks on the United Kingdom, and which the UK faces abroad. He would be guilty of treason.
Should the authorities simply wait for a British citizen to commit serious offences—in other words, to wait for a returning traitor, as they seem to have done with Khalid Ali, a British citizen who spent five years serving with the Taliban in Afghanistan before returning to the United Kingdom in late 2016? Apprehended in Whitehall with knives in his possession, he was sentenced on 20 July to life imprisonment for preparing acts of terrorism, but he ought to have been prosecuted for treason as soon as his activities in Afghanistan came to light.
Then there is Rabar Mala, an Iraqi national who had remained in the UK unlawfully after his visa expired in 2008. He became the first person to be convicted for possession of property for the purposes of terrorism. He activated some 360 SIM cards for fighters in Iraq and Syria and co-ordinated ISIS communications. He was also planning possible attacks in the United Kingdom, inviting funds and personnel to be sent to enable an attack on a major civilian target. Being neither British nor a settled non-citizen, had Mala served ISIS outside the UK he would not have breached the offence I propose. But while voluntarily living among us he owed a duty of allegiance to the United Kingdom which he betrayed by serving ISIS, aiding its military and intelligence operations in Iraq and Syria and planning attacks on the United Kingdom. The offence for which he was convicted and sentenced to eight years manifestly fails to recognise the true nature of his wrongdoing or to provide adequate punishment for it.
May I say a bit about the drafting of this amendment? I am, as ever, indebted to the Public Bill Office for its swift and helpful engagement with my proposed amendment, although I was somewhat disappointed at the changes that it insisted I make to it—as I say, it was based on an Australian version of treason—in particular the scattering in the amendment of the word “terrorist”. This apparently was to bring the amendment within scope. If you are fighting or aiding the fight against the United Kingdom outside the United Kingdom or inside it, there does not seem to be a significant distinction.
It would be odd if a British subject assisting the fight abroad was not guilty of a terrorist attack whereas the domestic equivalent constituted one.
Could the noble Lord help me? Is he saying that his amendment covers an attack on British forces operating outside the United Kingdom? I do not read it in that way.
It does not, which is why I was expressing regret at the final form of the amendment. If we are to return to this amendment, I shall seek perhaps to expand its scope—I hope not having an undue squabble with the authorities—so that it comes squarely within what the noble Lord suggests. If it is necessary to bring the amendment back with further refinements, they may include additional conduct which might be regarded as treason, such as impeding the operation of Her Majesty’s forces or prejudicing the security and defence of the United Kingdom.
Clearly, a prosecution under this offence would be no small thing. It would need the consent of the Attorney-General to bring a prosecution since it is an offence against the state. I also accept that many offences which might be regarded as treason would be caught up in all the many other terrorist offences on the statute book, and thus I would not expect it to make a frequent appearance. Nor would I claim that the existence of this offence would be a panacea, but there is a significant gap and filling it might avoid some of the complications, say, of the designated area offence in Clause 4.
Those who live and benefit from life in the United Kingdom yet involve themselves in attacks against the United Kingdom either here or abroad are surely guilty of treason. Are we too timid to call it that? Is it because allegiance to our country is considered unfashionable? If so, that seems to me to verge on the decadent, or at the very least it shows a country lacking in self-confidence. Those who reject the values of this country have the option of relinquishing their citizenship. But while they remain here or regard it as their home, surely they owe a duty to other citizens, who have their own human rights. This new definition of treason is a way of underlining that duty. I beg to move.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough reminded us that corruption in the modern world is a moral issue—and so it is; perhaps one of the greatest moral issues that we face. I was reminded by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, that the great moral issue of the late 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century was slavery. It was the judgment of Lord Mansfield in the 1780s that put an end to slavery in this country.
The anti-slavery movement then began to campaign on the basis that if slavery is abolished in this country, how can it be that we permit it in our colonies, so that when a slave from the colonies comes to this country, the shackles fall away? It took until 1833 for William Wilberforce to lead a movement to pass the anti-slavery Act. Even then, it did not abolish slavery in the East India Company territories or in Ceylon.
However, at that time slavery continued in the United States; it took a civil war to put an end to slavery in the United States. The arguments advanced then were that if we abolished slavery in the colonies and the West Indies, it would undermine the economies of those territories. The same argument again was used: how will those colonies in the West Indies be able to compete with the United States in the production of sugar and cotton if slavery is abolished there?
The important point is that this country laid down the standard. We did not wait for global standards to be brought about; we took the lead. I urge the Government to take the lead, along the lines that have been advanced today by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, who sees not only the importance of having registers in the overseas territories but that there should be something behind it—the possibility of an Order in Council to deal with that moral issue if they do not take up the cudgels in the way that they should.
I have a very short and slightly less theatrical point than the noble Lord’s—although the point he made was good. It relates to Amendment 169, which concerns the Crown dependencies. As at Second Reading, I declare an interest as the former Minister with responsibility for the constitutional relationship between the Crown and the Crown dependencies. It is a relationship of considerable importance to all parties involved, and of particular importance now with the prospect of Brexit. It is important that we maintain the competence of the Crown dependencies and it is also important that we do not exceed our constitutional role, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, in seeking to make laws that in my view are not consistent with the specific constitutional relationship that we have with the Crown dependencies.
I notice that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, eschewed any reference to the Crown dependencies. Amendment 169 does not, however. Quite apart from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, in relation to subsection (4), I invite the Minister to accept that there is a real problem legally with this amendment and to endorse what I said at Second Reading: that all the Crown dependencies have made very real progress in co-operating to produce a register which is available to all law enforcement agencies.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure that there will be a lot of sympathy around the House and elsewhere for what the noble Lord says. Of course, we must not interfere with police operational independence. However, the points that he eloquently makes about proportionality in view of the death of Sir Edward and the likelihood of any significant evidence one way or another being unearthed at this stage are valuable, and I take them on board.
My Lords, there are sound public policy reasons for keeping the anonymity of a complainant throughout the trial and beyond, but are there not also sound public policy reasons for giving the trial judge the discretion, after an acquittal, to consider whether the identity of the complainant should be released if he is satisfied that it is a false accusation and not tainted by mental illness?
The noble Lord makes an important point. But of course, he will know only too well that someone who has had a false complaint made against them is vulnerable to prosecution for perjury, perverting the course of justice or wasting police time, and that an individual has the right to sue for malicious prosecution or defamation. So remedies do exist.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is quite right to draw the House’s attention to the very major problem of the significant increase in the number of claims and our large number of claims in comparison with other European countries. One of the reasons that insurers give for settling these claims is that it costs them too much to fight the case. Of course, if our plans to raise the small claims limit to £5,000 come into effect, this will no longer continue to be a valid reason for not contesting claims. Anyone who is notified of what sounds suspiciously like a fraud should not do anything to encourage it. If individuals are invited to take part in such an endeavour, they are potentially committing a criminal offence.
My Lords, the Minister referred to the court costs. Have the coalition’s policies of banning referral fees produced any results? Has the number of frauds gone down? Are there any statistics on that as yet, following the Insurance Act 2015?
The Government are attacking this problem on a number of different fronts. Referral fees is one; the LASPO reforms is another; and there is the MedCo portal, which means that all whiplash injuries must go via a neutral evaluation with limited costs. All are contributing to a decrease in the number of whiplash claims, but there are still too many, and we still feel that there is fraud at the root of all this.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is a fast-unfolding story. I am sure we can be generous enough to acknowledge the major contribution the United States Department of Justice has made to this matter. In the mean time, we stand ready to assist. It is a fast-developing situation. The SFO has been aware of allegations relating to FIFA for some years. It is keeping the situation under review and is ready to assist in any way it can. We do not think there is a lack of resources. Although the SFO is involved in a number of high-profile and difficult cases, including the LIBOR manipulation, resources are not an issue in this case.
My Lords, soliciting a bribe is a crime. Will the SFO make inquiries of the members of the England bid team for the 2018 World Cup, which achieved only two votes out of 22 from the committee, about whether they were approached by anybody for a sweetener in relation to their bid?
The Swiss authority’s investigation is particularly focused on the 2018 World Cup bid on the basis that the jurisdiction is based on FIFA being a Swiss private company. If there is any information that we have in this country, we stand ready to assist on that, too.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very surprised that the noble Lord thinks that somehow the Ministry of Justice has failed to notice that it costs the Government a great deal of money to keep prisoners in custody. It is painfully aware of that, and of the cost. However, the ministry is also aware of its obligation for the protection of the public, and it is in balancing these issues that it comes to the very difficult decisions that it has to reach.
It is right that offenders serving indeterminate sentences—IPPs—should continue to be detained post tariff if their detention is necessary for the protection of the public and they are therefore not safe to release. There is evidence that IPP prisoners who take the opportunities presented to them to reduce their risk are beginning to achieve release in greater numbers. Since 2010 the number of IPP releases has grown, and we have seen over 400 IPP releases in 2012 and 2013. The percentage of IPP cases considered where release was ordered was 6% in the 2010-11 report, whereas in the 2012-13 report the figure was 16%.
Of course, we keep the matter under review. The amendment, as I understand it, would effectively lead to the prisoners who are within the scope of the amendment being automatically released, as it would mean that there was no discretion for the Parole Board to do other than to direct release. That is not the Government’s policy, as noble Lords are aware, and I will be unable to accept the amendment on those grounds.
I should also say that there would be difficulties with the amendment as it stands, regardless of the acceptability of the principle. The amendment would add a subsection to Section 128 of the LASPO Act directing the Parole Board to release IPP prisoners who had a tariff of less than two years. Section 128 is not about the duty to release indeterminate sentence prisoners but, rather, gives the Secretary of State the power to change the Parole Board’s release test by order. The amendment, however, appears to direct the Parole Board to release certain prisoners without any consideration of a test whatsoever.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to whom I pay tribute, as others have, for his tenacity and his great concern for these prisoners—indeed, concern has been expressed for them all around the House—suggests that the amendment would be a gentle push. With very great respect to the noble and learned Lord, as it is currently expressed the amendment would be a very firm shove indeed. However, I understand that the intention is that these particular prisoners would be released at the point at which they would naturally fall due for Parole Board review, thus phasing their release. Presumably, the retention of the Parole Board’s role in the process is designed to align as much as possible with the current statutory arrangement. However, it would be problematic to give the duty to release to the Parole Board if in fact there was no discretion for the board under this proposal. For these reasons, I do not think that the amendment is the right way to achieve the noble Lords’ objectives.
However, in turning away and facing the principle rather than the detail, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has chosen to concentrate on those with tariffs of under two years, who he suggests have been particularly disadvantaged as they could not have received an IPP after the 2008 changes to the IPP statute. In fact, it remained possible to receive an IPP with a tariff of lower than two years until IPPs were abolished, where the offender had a serious previous conviction, and a fair number continued to do so. While between 2005 and 2008 courts were obliged to impose IPPs in certain circumstances, this was only where they found the offender to meet the dangerousness threshold. The statute, however, did not oblige courts to find the offender dangerous if he had a previous Schedule 15 conviction and it was clear that the court need not conclude that a previous conviction made the offender dangerous if it would be unreasonable to do so.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and some other noble Lords have seen an analysis of the management information that was put together last year relating to the situation of IPP prisoners who were sentenced before July 2008 with tariffs of under two years who remained in prisons and whose tariff had expired. It is the Government’s view that this analysis supports that position in respect of the group. It provided clear evidence that the continued detention of short-tariff IPP prisoners remains justified and that the Parole Board still considers that in many cases they pose an unacceptable risk to the general public and to themselves. The majority—80 prisoner cases of the 100 sampled—were assessed as at high risk of serious harm, whereas none was assessed as being at no risk of serious harm. Almost all of that sample had had recent parole hearings and were deemed unsuitable for release. However, the fact that 11% of the sample were in fact approved for release clearly also demonstrates that, where risk has been reduced enough to be safely managed in the community, short-tariff IPP prisoners are being approved for release by the Parole Board using the current release test.
I know that many noble Lords keep themselves closely informed of the National Offender Management Service’s ongoing work to enhance support for this group of prisoners, but a brief reprise of those efforts bears repeating. We have come a long way in terms of management and support since the introduction of the sentence. For example, NOMS has made substantial improvements to the waiting times for IPP and other indeterminate-sentence prisoners. Once they have been approved for open prisons, in addition IPP prisoners have improved access to accredited programmes and they remain a priority group for interventions. Sentence planning instructions have been overhauled to emphasise that there are a range of interventions, not just accredited programmes, that can provide useful evidence for parole hearings. This has also been emphasised in discussions with Parole Board members. Measures have been taken to ensure that programmes can be delivered more flexibly, supporting greater access and the inclusion of offenders with more complex needs, such as learning difficulties. NOMS will continue to oversee positive changes to the management of IPP prisoners. As I said earlier, the reality is that IPP prisoners are now achieving release in greater numbers under the current arrangements.
Before the Minister moves on, regulations were passed to permit lie detector tests to be carried out in respect of prisoners who are subject to IPP provisions. Are those tests carried out and, if so, what is the result? I have been informed by an experienced organisation that it is necessary to pass a lie detector test in order to establish that the particular offender is not at risk.
I am not aware of the question of lie detectors and whether or not they are used. I will write to the noble Lord when I have some information about it.
Measures have been taken to ensure that programmes can be delivered more flexibly, supporting greater access and inclusion, including offenders with complex needs, as I was indicating. I was asked about the case of James, Wells and Lee. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, pointed out that the decision was that the retention of those prisoners was contrary to Article 5.1 and was therefore an arbitrary detention. I dare say that he will know, from having studied the decision, that the European Court of Human Rights did not hold that the sentence itself was unlawful. It was the unavailability of courses that was considered to be a breach of Article 5.1. I am sure the noble Lord would accept that it is simplistic to suppose that attendance at a course would automatically result in someone being appropriate for release. Clearly, it is carefully managed to ensure that so far as is possible those courses are reached. Those who attend the courses will not necessarily be eligible for or suitable for release. Equally, some who do not will be. However, I accept it is a matter of considerable assistance.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the construction of a statutory duty is a matter of the purpose as construed on examination of the relevant statute. In response to a debate about this section, the Lord Chancellor’s predecessor, Kenneth Clarke, said that he would look at progress after the LASPO changes had taken effect. I mentioned earlier that the rate had increased. The position is—I am afraid this is more or less the same answer that I gave in the debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley—that there are no current plans to review the release test for prisoners serving IPP sentences whose minimum term has expired, although we continue to use a range of measures to improve their progression and reduce the risk that they pose. The Government’s position is that it is right that IPP prisoners continue to serve their sentence until they are assessed as safe to be released into the community by the Parole Board. The Government were left with this rather crude device by the previous Government. They repealed it, but none the less they have to be extremely mindful of what lay behind the introduction of this provision; namely, the protection of the public. I accept that there is great concern that those who would have received a lower tariff sentence might seem on the face of it to be languishing in prison for far too long. However, there are factors which I have attempted to draw to the Committee’s attention which do not, in the view of the Lord Chancellor and the Government, warrant a change of approach to that discretion.
Of course, it is a matter of anxiety. While others are attending the opera, I am—as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would have it—having sleepless nights. However, the duty of the Government remains to protect the public, notwithstanding the persuasive arguments that have been put forward by noble Lords. I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, at the present time, any researcher into this area has to obtain authorisation sponsorship from HM Courts & Tribunals Service and then apply to the data access panel, whereafter various safeguards, including anonymity and safeguards to ensure that the conviction or the innocence of a particular defendant is not called into question, will be made part of that condition. There is research. For example, Professor Cheryl Thomas has provided valuable research on this issue.
The Minister has referred to Professor Cheryl Thomas of UCL, who produced a report for the MoJ in 2010, Are Juries Fair? One of her findings through talking to 797 jurors was that only 31% of them understood the directions in law that the judge was giving to them at the end of the trial. She recommended that, in every case, written direction should be given by the judge to the jury. Has that been carried out?
Directions to the jury are a matter for the judge in the individual case. Judges are making ever more use of written directions, particularly in difficult cases. Very often, they will provide a direction having heard submissions from both prosecution and defence counsel so that they can arrive at an agreed direction. They will give the direction orally and then again in writing. In simple cases, that may not be necessary, but in other cases it is clearly desirable.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before the Bill was introduced, the Government said that they were expecting 5,000 to 7,000 applications a year. In fact, in the first year there were 893, of which only 23 were granted, which represents 1%. Is it not nonsense to suggest that this provision is a safety net for those who seek justice?
I can update the noble Lord by saying that in fact the total number of applications received is now 1,030, and the number granted is 31. I agree that it is a small percentage. It was difficult for the Government to predict exactly how many applications would be received. In fact, in some areas, including the area in which I practised, that of clinical negligence, there have been virtually none when it was expected that there would be very many. Trying to anticipate what might or might not be considered to be a violation of Article 6 has confounded many courts, not only in this country but also in Strasbourg.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe greater test will always include the lesser, but areas that may or may not be considered by a court to get over that hurdle may be profoundly distressing in the non-technical sense to the individual but may not be regarded as sufficiently distressing to come within the definition. There is inevitably a degree of vagueness about any definition, whether you choose the one that the Government choose or the one proposed in the amendment. But I fear that the test is too low.
Could my noble friend deal with a major objection? An order can be obtained on hearsay evidence, so the judge does not have to hear from somebody who says, “I’ve been distressed or annoyed”; it would be sufficient for someone to say, “I’ve heard someone else describe himself as annoyed because of the behaviour in question”.
The question of hearsay evidence is important, and I am glad that my noble friend raised it. One difficulty about the orders is that individuals are often terrified of those who are responsible for the anti-social behaviour. They are terrified of being identified as the source of the complaint. If they have to give evidence, they will not want to do so. They therefore provide their perfectly bona fide complaint to an agency. Hard-pressed agencies will have to assess whether this is de minimis or of sufficient gravity before deciding whether to proceed.
Is my noble friend saying that the procedure can be based on an anonymous complaint?
It can be on the basis of an anonymous complaint, though a judge will need to be satisfied of its substantiality. There are individuals who simply would not seek an injunction if they thought that they could be clearly identified as the source of the procedure. Of course, judges are used to weighing up hearsay evidence, which has less weight than direct evidence. A judge is unlikely to make an order if they think that it is double-hearsay or comes from an unreliable source.
Before making an order, a judge also has to decide that it is proportionate and necessary, in accordance with the Human Rights Act. As I submitted, it is no light thing for the agencies to assemble the evidence necessary to satisfy a judge. The Law Society has carefully considered the arguments against Clause 1. Although more than happy to criticise government legislation—and even this Bill, in some respects—it remains absolutely firm in its support of the existence of the power described in Clause 1, fearing otherwise that the hurdle would be too high and that the power to prevent anti-social behaviour would be damaged.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Justice and Security Bill demands justice and security. We have been quite rightly reminded by, among others, the noble Lord, Lord Reid, how important it is to consider security. In human rights terms, Article 2 of the convention places a responsibility on the Government to protect life and to take all steps appropriate to ensure that the human rights of citizens generally are protected, so that human rights are not just for the litigants involved in these proceedings but for all of us. However, justice is to be done by this Bill and there is undoubtedly a justice gap. I thought that, during Committee stage, we had moved towards a consensus that CMPs, although not a desirable option, were nevertheless a necessary evil in order that justice should be done.
Contrary to what my noble friend Lord Strasburger has said, the JCHR, of which I have the good fortune to be a member, acknowledged, relying in part on the evidence of David Anderson, that there were a limited number of cases in which justice could not be done in the current situation. That is why the Bill has been brought before your Lordships’ House. As to the possibility of justice being done under these provisions, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who has experience of these things, said in Committee that the special advocates were underestimating their capacity to represent those clients. Nobody suggests that it is an optimal position, but my own experience of judges tells me that they customarily do everything they can to remedy any disadvantage that a litigant might have—and of course they will have a disadvantage in CMPs. The suggestion that the Government’s case will simply be accepted by a judge without challenge or question is wholly unwarranted. Within the Bill as it is at the moment, judges have considerable powers; now that these amendments have become part of it, they will have considerably more powers.
I therefore suggest that the Bill presents an opportunity for security and justice, as the name suggests. The amendment proposed will wreck that opportunity and justice will be denied.
My Lords, I have had experience of a torture case, the Baha Mousa case, which involved the death of a hotel owner in British custody in Basra. Your Lordships will recall that there was a long trial in which what had happened in the stinking hellhole of a derelict guardhouse was investigated. Men had been held in stressed positions with their hands tied behind their backs and hoods over their heads, and Baha Mousa, after a night during which passing soldiers from other regiments were called in to have a pop at the prisoners in that position, died with some 90 injuries to his body. What happened as a result of that? There was the trial and then a long inquiry, chaired by Lord Justice Gage, which lasted more than two years. His report has brought significant publicity and changes to what goes on. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, was talking about transparency. There is something that was brought out into the open. I do not think that any commanding officer in the British Army will not have regard to the treatment of prisoners by troops under his command hereafter. That is what transparency and publicity do. I was very interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, cite an interrogation that had taken place in Afghanistan more recently when, no doubt, proper safeguards for the prisoners were in place.
Reputational damage? Of course there was reputational damage to the soldiers, the officers, the regiment and the British Army, but that is the price that has to be paid to put things right. I am not particularly moved by the argument that settling cases causes reputational damage to the security services. Of the civil cases brought in this country, 95% are settled, often without any admission of liability. I have never heard it suggested that there is reputational damage from a settlement from such circumstances. Nor have I heard it suggested anywhere that because the security services have settled cases brought against them, they have suffered reputational damage in any meaningful sense. When one reads what happened in the Binyam Mohamed case, one feels that there should be more transparency about what happens within the security services. Perhaps then, the suspicions with which the noble Baroness is so concerned would go away.
Everything that can be said on the issue of principle has been said, even if not by me, so I do not propose to go back to that. I just want to raise one or two practical points. The first is this. A lot has been said about fairness to the security services—that it is not fair that they should settle. What about fairness to the claimant? Suppose, for example, that a claimant wishes to sue the security services for exposing him to torture or to unlawful rendition. Let us assume that his claim is entirely genuine. Let us not start with the assumption that one hears in certain quarters that of course he is lying. Let us assume that it is a genuine case. There is no legal aid. He cannot find a lawyer to act for him on a no-win, no-fee basis because it will be impossible for a lawyer to assess his chances of success. How can any lawyer take on a case when it is possible for the defendant to go behind the scenes, talk to the judge and disclose evidence which the claimant never sees? How can you take on a case on that basis?
Of course, the special advocate is allowed to see the secret evidence, but can he go back to find out whether there is any possibility of challenging that evidence? How can he go back to his client to talk to him? He is not permitted to under the system. He cannot take proper instructions and, as my noble friend said, use the ordinary method of ascertaining the truth in the British courts of justice for centuries: by cross-examination, by challenging and testing the evidence and the credibility of the person who is giving that evidence. It is just not possible, so nobody is going to take the case on. That is the first problem to get through. We talk as if practical considerations such as that do not count. The claimant never gets his case going, or if he does he loses and never knows why.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it also raises a very interesting question about which all lawyers will be concerned: who pays? When the special advocate is appointed in civil proceedings, does the losing party pay? Does the person who made the application—namely, the state—pay, win or lose? Where do costs lie in an event like that? When you have a provision in the Bill such as Clause 8(4) here, which states that the,
“special advocate is not responsible”,
to the claimant, how can the claimant possibly be responsible for his costs?
My Lords, the whole role of the special advocate is inherently unsatisfactory and is an exception to what we understand to be a normal way of proceeding in accordance with general notions of fairness. However, it is a practice that has become well established; it has evolved. There are a number of special advocates who have performed their roles with distinction and effectiveness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said in a much-quoted judgment. Many of their concerns, referred to earlier in the debate, were directed towards the way in which material was disclosed and the lateness and inadequacy of such disclosure. There may be much in those criticisms. They are fairly familiar incantations from advocates, whether the proceedings are closed or open. They do not reflect well on anyone who is responsible for late disclosure in a case.
We should bear in mind that judges have shown themselves particularly astute at protecting parties whose cases are heard in a closed session. If there is unsatisfactory practice on the part of the Government in terms of late disclosure or not giving special advocates fair access to material that will enable them to do their task, that is not going to improve the Government’s prospects and will be reflected, I suggest, in the way in which the judge approaches the case altogether.
While I have considerable sympathy for what lies behind these amendments, I would respectfully suggest that the position of the special advocates is quite correctly set out in Clause 8(4). It is not an ideal situation but it is a situation that has developed, and I trust the judges to respond appropriately to the demands that this particular procedure presents.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe PII proceedings, which we attempt to define in this amendment, would not normally be secret. The process contains a number of different options for a judge in dealing with an application. It is conceivable that in the course of responding to the particular facts of a case a judge might decide that a certain part of the hearing, even under PII, might have to be under a CMP. However, the purpose of the amendment is not to impose a straightjacket on the procedure but to ensure that the PII procedure is gone through—with all its inherent safeguards—before moving on to CMPs, which are by definition closed material proceedings and therefore do not involve access to the litigants or to the open advocate.
Is not an answer to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the PII applications are heard in just as much secrecy as the closed material procedures? The difference is that in PII applications the judge’s decision over what is to be disclosed and what is not to be disclosed is discarded from consideration, whereas with closed material procedures he is supposed to consider it and take it into account. In terms of secrecy, there is no difference.
I am grateful for the clarification—that is indeed helpful. In dealing with whether or not it is appropriate to go through the PII process first, the Minister in his response to this suggestion at Second Reading said, at col. 1756, that do so would be “costly and illogical”. I do not expect any judge to spend much time and expense undertaking a process that has an inevitable outcome; nor would I expect advocates to insist on it. However, as I said earlier, the obligation to go through the PII process is an important portal. In this context, I would also expect judges to be very conscious of wasted costs. I cannot for the moment see why it would be illogical to go through the process.
The amendments in this group, which include a statutory definition of PII—for which I give credit to the legal adviser to the JCHR—represent an attempt to preserve the option of CMPs while ensuring that the resort to closed proceedings should be undertaken with extreme care and in a way that minimises the risk of injustice. I beg to move.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe have heard a great deal, and very helpfully, about the role of experts in family proceedings. I defer to those with much greater knowledge than I have about the various inadequacies in the arrangements that exist there. But this amendment is not, in fact, peculiar to family experts but covers the whole range of experts that assist the court.
Although all is not perfect in the litigation system, it is worth recording that considerable steps have been taken by the courts in the approach to expert evidence, particularly the various changes brought about by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, that have resulted in the timely exchange of reports, experts’ meetings and even the exciting developments known as “hot-tubbing”, which your Lordships may not be familiar with, involving experts in court at the same time and exchanging views in order to provide a synthesis for the judge in an effective way.
So, the courts themselves are providing a great deal of control over the way that expert evidence is given. The judges and the consumers of experts are in a position to judge the quality of the product, which itself provides a certain discipline that is relevant in deciding which experts are retained and how much use they are. Those of us who practise in the courts are familiar with judges expressing the view that there is no need for expert evidence on this or that case, which helps considerably.
Early directions, timely interventions by judges and the proper application of expertise by the lawyers can result in the provision of expert evidence being satisfactory. The only caveat that I would give from my experience with experts’ evidence, which relates essentially to professional negligence, is that in legal aid cases there is a continuing concern, just as there is in the context of family proceedings, that the rates for expert witnesses is so low that the best experts may not be available.
Subject to that, I am slightly concerned that this is rather outside the province of the Lord Chancellor in terms of accessibility and the quality of expert advice. The courts are making progress and will continue to do so. Nevertheless, I defer to what has been said about the family courts by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.
My Lords, I would like to illustrate the usefulness of experts. This came from a case that I did three or four years ago. There had been family proceedings in relation to a little child of 11 months old who was found dead but with no visible injury. The case for the adoption of other children took about three weeks, with something like three experts on both sides. As a result, the judge held that the father was culpable but was not going to say that he had actually caused the injuries that the child had sustained. Shaken baby syndrome was alleged, but I discovered that there was a huge divide between experts on that issue.
I advised the instruction of a biomechanical expert and the Legal Services Commission found one from Detroit, who had gained his expertise in car accidents. He was able to manufacture a doll that was of the same size and weight as the 11 month-old child. He demonstrated that, as the child was at the age of feeling around the furniture and pulling himself up on to his legs, not even yet climbing on the sofa, if the child fell over, his back hit the ground and his head followed, that would generate sufficient force to cause precisely the injuries that he had sustained. There had been no history of any previous child abuse; there were no marks, the skull was intact and nothing was broken. As a result of that evidence, the prosecution dropped the murder case that it had brought against the father following the judge’s previous decisions.
That indicates how an expert can make all the difference in a case like that, but expensively. It is to the credit of the Legal Services Commission that it was prepared to fund a report like that which ultimately led to a proper conclusion to the case, but one has to think of all the experts who had been involved in the argument about shaken baby syndrome before the judge. It is vital that experts are properly instructed and funded when they are required but I am sure that there are times when far too many experts are employed, and I accept what the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has said previously on that point.