(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government how many prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for the protection of the public over the last three years have been foreign national prisoners eligible, pursuant to Section 119 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, for removal from the United Kingdom at the end of their tariff terms without a direction from the Parole Board for their release, and what proportion of such prisoners have in the fact been removed without such a direction.
My Lords, from May 2012, when the tariff- expired removal scheme was commenced, up to 31 March of this year, 261 prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection have been removed under that scheme—that is, without a direction from the Parole Board. A further five such prisoners have been eligible for removal but officials decided that they did not meet the criteria, while 16 have been approved for removal but are awaiting the settling of their removal directions.
I am grateful to the Minister for those figures but I am sure that he will readily understand the sense of injustice and frustration, not to say anger, felt by UK domestic IPP prisoners at this preferential treatment which is accorded to foreign national prisoners. It is preferential because, of course, the foreign national prisoners do not have to satisfy the Parole Board that they can safely be released. Would the Minister agree to see the Lord Chancellor and try to persuade him that this is yet another reason for the Lord Chancellor to exercise his powers, also given under Section 128 of LASPO, to modify the test which the Parole Board applies in the case of the domestic IPP prisoners so that, hopefully, some of them, too, may gain the earlier release that at the moment is given only to these foreign prisoners?
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is the second time that the Lord Chancellor has exercised his power under Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 to prescribe enhanced fees—court fees, that is, that exceed the cost to the Courts and Tribunals Service of doing that for which the fee is charged. This power was first used last year in relation to the fees for bringing court proceedings to recover sums of money. On 4 March last year—a year ago—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, moved a regret Motion, on which I spoke. Frankly, much of what I said then applies with equal—indeed, even greater—force today. I pointed out that there has long been objection even to the basic principle of full cost recovery. The justice system exists for the benefit of society as a whole and really courts should no more be required to be self-financing than, say, the police service.
Of course, orders for enhanced fees go altogether further than mere cost recovery. In a real sense, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, explained, they amount to selling justice—on the face of it contrary to Magna Carta, although now of course regrettably sanctioned by Section 180 of that Christmas tree of an Act we passed two years ago, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. As I pointed out in last year’s debate, that Act stretches to 186 clauses and 11 schedules, occupying 232 pages of the Queen’s Printer’s copy. Small wonder that by Clause 180 we had grown a little lax or careless in our scrutiny of that Bill.
Today I want to focus briefly on the increased fees now to be exacted for a decree of divorce or nullity, an increase of about a third from £410 to £550. In the Government’s January 2015 response to part 2 of the consultation on the so-called reform of court fees, it was recorded at page 40 that the senior judiciary, who were, naturally enough, a statutory consultee in the process,
“noted that the current divorce fee was above cost”.
The recent 20th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee confirmed this, noting at page 4 that the Ministry of Justice’s own estimate of the average cost of dealing with an uncontested divorce application is only £270—this new enhanced fee being therefore just over double that.
Of course, that earlier consultation related specifically to the then-proposed increase of the fee to £750—a proposal later abandoned. However, the objection remains essentially as to the original proposal, summarised in the case of the higher judiciary at paragraph 8.5 of the Explanatory Memorandum to this order. The objection was that,
“it will be a disincentive for divorce and in particular, women that are victims of domestic violence”.
Essentially, that echoed earlier objections that an increased divorce fee,
“could lead to parties being trapped in unhappy or violent marriages”,
and could prevent people from marrying or remarrying and being therefore,
“without the protection the law affords to married couples”.
At the conclusion of last year’s debate, noting that the Motion was one of only regret and not a fatal Motion, I expressed the hope that at least it would persuade the Government that enough is enough and really there must be no more use of this enhanced fee power. Alas, the Government have now chosen to go still further down this sorry road. This order is to be not merely regretted; it is to be deplored.
My Lords, this debate has been short but not lacking in power nor indeed in criticism of the Government. It feels almost nostalgic to hear in this Session of Parliament criticisms of the Government generally in their handling of the economy and of the Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State. We are on familiar ground. It even included, from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the customary disavowal of anything being wrong with the economy at the time of the election in 2010.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe Ministerial Code sets out clearly what the Prime Minister expects of his Ministers. If they depart from that code, it is evident that they have departed from it and there are modes of dealing with that. I take the noble Lord’s suggestion, but at the moment the situation seems to be satisfactorily dealt with.
Am I right in supposing that this amendment is really a prelude to the introduction of a British Bill of Rights in place of the existing Human Rights Act, and is intended principally to clarify the fact that our own domestic primary legislation trumps unincorporated treaty law?
The noble and learned Lord is quite right. He points to the difference between the dualist system, which we have, and the monist system whereby unless law is incorporated in an Act of Parliament, it does not become automatically a part of the law. The question of the amendments to the Bill of Rights, when or if it comes before Parliament, is somewhat separate but he accurately states the necessary constitutional principles.