Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Berridge

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Monks, makes a good point: the insurance industry has its share of responsibility for what has occurred in its eagerness to settle claims which may not have been genuine to save the cost of going to court to argue the matter, but to describe this as an insurers’ Bill may be to overstate the case. In the Bill, we are all concerned to stamp out what has been a widespread fraud—not at the expense of genuine claimants, of course, but I do not think anyone looking at the statistics could deny that there has been a serious and long-standing problem that needs a solution.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentions the Chief Medical Officer in one of his amendments. Of course, the definition of whiplash and the approach to it should be informed by medical opinion, but I respectfully suggest that, ultimately, we as a legislative body have to grasp that definition and approach, bearing in mind medical evidence but nevertheless seeking to identify what is going on in the real world, rather than simply tying ourselves to a medical definition which may of itself be imprecise.

As to where the cut-off should come—whether it should be 12 months or two years—it will always be somewhat arbitrary. However, there seems to me a risk that if we reduce it to 12 months rather than two years, we can anticipate a number of medical reports suggesting that matters should resolve themselves in, say, 18 months—not the more reputable medical experts, but, I am sad to say, not all of them have in the past been in that category.

The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Primarolo, about the availability of therapy in various contexts is good but, as I understand it—my noble and learned friend will correct me if I am wrong—we are concerned here with damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. That does not preclude damages for loss of earnings or for the cost of medical expenses, whether for therapy or otherwise, which can be recovered in addition to the tariff claim. I hope that that is some answer to the question of whether those matters can be attended to following an accident.

As to the argument about whether employment should be an accepted category, while that might have some initial attraction, I would counsel against that approach. I can imagine a revision to the standard message following any such amendment. It would be, “We understand you have recently been involved in an accident while you were driving in the course of your employment”. That would inevitably follow if we narrow or exclude incidents arising from employment. Whether you are driving in the course of your employment, recreation, or whatever the reason, you are equally likely to—

[Baroness Berridge]

I hate to interrupt my noble friend, but in principle, what is wrong with a call saying that? If someone is driving in the course of his employment, it is in a different category because the employer will have to give evidence that he was indeed driving in the course of his employment. There is a danger that we are saying all these calls are a bad thing, or that all claims management companies are a bad thing and all insurance is a good thing. What in principle is wrong with a call of that nature that can be substantiated by evidence, and would need to be from the person’s employer?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that intervention. My point is that if someone has been genuinely injured, whether in the course of employment or not in the course of employment, they are entitled to make a claim, and nothing should preclude that, regardless of whether they receive a message in the current form or in an amended form. It seems to me that it would be inappropriate to make a distinction between the circumstances in which you may or may not suffer a whiplash injury. My point was simply that if there is an amendment to the law, those seeking to encourage not the genuine claimants—of which there are certainly some—but those who are not genuine may revise their message to take into account the revision that we make in the law. Of course I am not against genuine claims. On the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson, although I understand the disaggregation that lies at the heart of their amendment, I am not for the moment persuaded that this is not a matter that is catered for under Clause 2(3) and (4). I shall listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend says.

Magistrates

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Berridge

Thursday 7th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord is right; it was as long ago as 2003 that this potential increase in sentence was statutorily allowed. A number of factors have been taken into account by successive Governments. He makes an important point about cost savings. He is quite right; it is, of course, much cheaper to use magistrates than go to the Crown Court and, if they have appropriate powers, it is more likely that magistrates will deal with the matter. We have to bear in mind—I think the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, directed his question towards this matter—the possible effect on the prison population and how magistrates will feel able, or want, to use any increase in powers. It is a difficult question.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend mentioned the incredibly high level of training and expertise that magistrates have. When looking at this Question in relation to today’s first Question, of course the overwhelming majority of motoring offences are also dealt with in the magistrates’ court. On training, will my noble friend the Minister please outline what plans the Government have to ensure that when driverless cars become a reality on our roads, with the potentially complex issues to do with the programming of those cars in the eventuality of an accident, we will still have the expertise in the magistrates’ courts to ensure that the overwhelming majority of such cases are tried in those courts?

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend makes a good point. The senior presiding judge and HMCTS review the needs of the magistrates’ courts annually, including training for district judges and magistrates. All interested parties are consulted such as local Bench chairmen and local branches of the Magistrates’ Association. The training would include any new potential offences or situations identified through various routes. Clearly, they should include a new concept such as that to which my noble friend refers.

Court Proceedings: Written Transcripts

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Berridge

Tuesday 28th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure that there is open justice, and in particular open access to transcripts of proceedings in open court, in the light of the availability of digital technology.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, we recognise the importance of a transparent and open justice system. Transcripts of proceedings in open court are available on request, although safeguards are in place to protect vulnerable parties. Our reforms to courts and tribunals will make much better use of digital technology to ensure a more efficient, proportionate and accessible system for all.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s Answer, but on 27 April he stated that Her Majesty’s Government would make court proceedings more accessible and make it easier for the public to understand court proceedings. In April this year, I made a request via the Library for the sentencing remarks in a hearing in open court, and the cost per hour turned out to be £144 plus VAT. Will my noble friend undertake not only to use digital technology but to ensure that the Ministry of Justice gets value for money and that our courts are accessible? On investigation, it seems that numerous companies are operating to record proceedings in numerous parts of the country, so there also seems to be scope for economies of scale in this area.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to my noble friend. She is quite right: she drew the ministry’s attention to her difficulties. There are a number of contracts in existence, and some of them have been extended at various times. The ministry is currently progressing a re-procurement of all court and tribunal transcription services, and new contracts are anticipated by the end of 2016. The cost of transcripts depends on the length of the hearing. There is a difference between sentencing remarks, by which we mean the remarks accompanying the judge actually passing sentence, and the sentencing hearing, which can be very much longer and cost something like £800 or £900 per day in the Crown Court and rather more in the High Court. If you can refine your search, it tends to be very much cheaper.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Berridge

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to address the House on this clause. As the Minister will be aware, I am very much in favour of the architecture of this Bill and very sympathetic to its aims. However, as in life, not everything is perfect, and I fear that I cannot give my endorsement to this clause, which gives the court additional powers to order possession in relation to secure and assured tenancies in the event that the,

“tenant or a person residing in the dwelling-house has been convicted of an offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the United Kingdom”.

That distinguishes it from other parts of Part 5, which are concerned with matters that take place in the locality—or the vicinity, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, would have it.

I understand that the additional ground for possession has been included in the Bill to reflect the seriousness with which the Government view participation in riots, particularly those on a scale seen in this country during the summer before last. Those who committed offences during the riot on that occasion were dealt with speedily and firmly. Sentences of imprisonment were the norm, and some were lengthy. To some extent, one could say that they were deprived of the right to remain in a dwelling house by that very process. The courts have sufficient powers to deal firmly with offenders caught up in a riot and appeals against sentences were, for the most part, unsuccessful. The criminal justice system—some would say “for once”—in general responded very well to what occurred.

I am concerned that this measure is a step too far. While a court would still have to be satisfied that it was reasonable to grant possession, the fact that the relevant offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in a riot could potentially lose their home. I do not think that this is a necessary or appropriate provision, given all the other powers that exist elsewhere in the Bill. I am also concerned that what is essentially a procedure by way of civil remedy should carry with it a criminal offence of this sort connected with the civil recovery of possession. Although I share the Government’s concern that those involved with riots should be dealt with in a way that sends out a message to any potential rioters, I take the view, as did the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, that this clause is a step too far.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and wish to speak to Clause 91. I sympathise with the Government’s reasoning and motivation for this additional ground for possession being included in the Bill and appreciate the strong signals that are needed for people involved in rioting. I was in London in the summer of 2011 so I can directly share the concern of the Government and the general public about the serious nature of the offences of those who participate in riots, especially on that scale. However, as my noble friend Lord Faulks outlined, the criminal courts have sufficient powers to deal with those matters. If I recall correctly, some courts even sat through the night, and many offenders were clearly extremely shocked to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. The criminal courts were not found wanting and sentences reflected the gravity with which the judiciary viewed this behaviour.

It is important to note the distinctive nature of the power in Clause 91. Unlike the powers in Clauses 86 to 90, this power is exercised in relation to behaviour that is not necessarily either of any impact on the landlord or in relation to the premises themselves or connected to the dwelling house. I also share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. When speaking of the old ASBO regime, he stated that we are,

“using the civil law to do the work of the criminal law”.—[Official Report, 18/11/13; col. 750.]

Repossessing premises is a civil law matter, but this provision is akin to bringing criminal penalties for riot into our civil courts. As my noble friend Lord Faulks has outlined, the courts have to be satisfied that it is reasonable to grant possession. However, the fact that the offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in rioting could lose their home. That is unjust.

Such a tenant could argue that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects their right to a family life and home. However, such arguments can often be lengthy and expensive. Many of these arguments will end up being funded by the taxpayer. Although I share the Government’s concern that rioting should have potentially serious consequences, I am left wondering why if rioting is a ground for repossessing premises, other serious offences, such as paedophilia, are not. I maintain the view recorded in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This clause will be an unhelpful precedent.