Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to address the House on this clause. As the Minister will be aware, I am very much in favour of the architecture of this Bill and very sympathetic to its aims. However, as in life, not everything is perfect, and I fear that I cannot give my endorsement to this clause, which gives the court additional powers to order possession in relation to secure and assured tenancies in the event that the,

“tenant or a person residing in the dwelling-house has been convicted of an offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the United Kingdom”.

That distinguishes it from other parts of Part 5, which are concerned with matters that take place in the locality—or the vicinity, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, would have it.

I understand that the additional ground for possession has been included in the Bill to reflect the seriousness with which the Government view participation in riots, particularly those on a scale seen in this country during the summer before last. Those who committed offences during the riot on that occasion were dealt with speedily and firmly. Sentences of imprisonment were the norm, and some were lengthy. To some extent, one could say that they were deprived of the right to remain in a dwelling house by that very process. The courts have sufficient powers to deal firmly with offenders caught up in a riot and appeals against sentences were, for the most part, unsuccessful. The criminal justice system—some would say “for once”—in general responded very well to what occurred.

I am concerned that this measure is a step too far. While a court would still have to be satisfied that it was reasonable to grant possession, the fact that the relevant offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in a riot could potentially lose their home. I do not think that this is a necessary or appropriate provision, given all the other powers that exist elsewhere in the Bill. I am also concerned that what is essentially a procedure by way of civil remedy should carry with it a criminal offence of this sort connected with the civil recovery of possession. Although I share the Government’s concern that those involved with riots should be dealt with in a way that sends out a message to any potential rioters, I take the view, as did the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, that this clause is a step too far.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and wish to speak to Clause 91. I sympathise with the Government’s reasoning and motivation for this additional ground for possession being included in the Bill and appreciate the strong signals that are needed for people involved in rioting. I was in London in the summer of 2011 so I can directly share the concern of the Government and the general public about the serious nature of the offences of those who participate in riots, especially on that scale. However, as my noble friend Lord Faulks outlined, the criminal courts have sufficient powers to deal with those matters. If I recall correctly, some courts even sat through the night, and many offenders were clearly extremely shocked to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. The criminal courts were not found wanting and sentences reflected the gravity with which the judiciary viewed this behaviour.

It is important to note the distinctive nature of the power in Clause 91. Unlike the powers in Clauses 86 to 90, this power is exercised in relation to behaviour that is not necessarily either of any impact on the landlord or in relation to the premises themselves or connected to the dwelling house. I also share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. When speaking of the old ASBO regime, he stated that we are,

“using the civil law to do the work of the criminal law”.—[Official Report, 18/11/13; col. 750.]

Repossessing premises is a civil law matter, but this provision is akin to bringing criminal penalties for riot into our civil courts. As my noble friend Lord Faulks has outlined, the courts have to be satisfied that it is reasonable to grant possession. However, the fact that the offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in rioting could lose their home. That is unjust.

Such a tenant could argue that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects their right to a family life and home. However, such arguments can often be lengthy and expensive. Many of these arguments will end up being funded by the taxpayer. Although I share the Government’s concern that rioting should have potentially serious consequences, I am left wondering why if rioting is a ground for repossessing premises, other serious offences, such as paedophilia, are not. I maintain the view recorded in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This clause will be an unhelpful precedent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

An owner-occupier with a mortgage might well find his home taken from him as a result of a term of imprisonment. I say to the noble Lord that trying to compare bottles with cans is not a particularly helpful thing to do. Either he is in favour of retribution—

[Lord Faulks]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has been asked this question a number of times. Of course, there are differences. One significant difference, of which he will no doubt be aware, is that if you are a tenant of a public authority, you have additional protection by virtue of the Human Rights Act, whereas those who are not protected by a public authority—private tenants—do not have any such protection.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his intervention, which points to a difference. There is a difference in the treatment; there is not a difference in the way in which the victims are dealt with.