(8 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his point. I imagine that the monitoring committee was put there at the request of His Majesty’s Government because something needed to be done to keep an eye on what was going on in Rwanda. It is made up of people who are independently appointed, with no allegiance to either Government, so one can trust them as looking at the matter dispassionately, and therefore their advice can be trusted. That is why I have introduced the monitoring committee into my amendments as the best way of finding out whether the treaty is being properly implemented.
If I followed the noble Lord’s intervention correctly, I agree with what he is saying. However, on the other hand, I accept the point made by Sir Jeremy Wright that, in the end, Parliament has to have the final say based on the advice which it receives. There has to be some mechanism so Parliament can comment on it before the fact that Rwanda is safe is reversed. How that is to be done I simply do not know, which is why I am anxious that the Government should be able to have another look at it and decide how best to proceed. However, I thought it right that Parliament should have an opportunity to comment before the conclusion is reached that Rwanda is no longer safe. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.
The Minister in the other place said that my amendments should be resisted because they risk
“disturbing the independence and impartiality of the monitoring committee”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/24; col. 663.]
I simply do not understand that, because the members are all independent and nothing in my amendments would in any way undermine their independence. I am very glad that the Minister here, when he was introducing this debate, did not put that point forward as a reason for resisting my amendments.
As for the Commons reasons set out in the Marshalled List, which I think the Minister here endorsed, they say that
“it is not appropriate … to legislate for Rwanda adhering to its obligations under the Treaty”,
as those obligations
“will be subject to the monitoring provisions set out in the Treaty”.
However, that fails to address the problem that is created by the use of “is”, especially should something go wrong and it is apparent to the monitoring committee that Rwanda is no longer safe. I think the Minister was suggesting that in some way it was wrong that the Government should enter into discussions with the monitoring committee, and that in a way that would undermine its independence. However, I am not asking for that. I am simply asking for it to receive advice—that is all. The advice is given; I am not suggesting that it needs to be discussed or indeed that there should be any sort of conversation, simply that it would be given.
I have probably said enough to make my points clear, and for the reasons I have given, I beg to move.
My Lords, I will update the House on a further development in relation to the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. We had the privilege in the Constitution Committee this morning to have the Lord Chancellor give evidence to us. We spoke of the Rwanda Bill and raised specifically with him the question that the effect of the Bill is to say that Rwanda “is” a safe country, and that the Bill once passed means that for ever and ever it will be treated as a safe country. His response, unprompted, was that one of the great protections was the monitoring committee. He said that if the monitoring committee said that the provisions of the treaty were not being adhered to and that was made public—he envisaged that it would be made public —the consequence would be that it could lead to some sort of parliamentary debate or occasion. What he had in mind was not the automatic non-application of the Bill, as with the amendment of the noble and learned Lord. However, there is not much difference between what the noble and learned Lord proposes—namely, that if the monitoring committee says it is not being adhered to, it stops applying—and what the Lord Chancellor said: namely, that there would be the opportunity for a parliamentary occasion. Therefore, I strongly support what the noble and learned Lord said. An unanswerable part of his argument is that this must be sent back to the Commons so that it can express a view and we can hear more from the Lord Chancellor in relation to this.
On a completely separate point, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, before the Question was put. He said that the Rwandan Government— I am not sure quite how it works—were going to put a Bill somehow to the Rwandan Parliament to implement the terms of the treaty. That is separate from the point that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, made. Could the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, give an assurance to the House that the treaty will not be ratified and, therefore, that the Bill will not come into force until the Rwandan Bill has gone through its Parliament and been given effect to?
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall first address the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln. Speaking entirely for myself, nothing I say is intended to cast any aspersions on the state of Rwanda, the suffering that it has gone through or the plight in which it currently finds itself. I found his remarks incredibly moving. The Supreme Court made clear that it was not a lack of good faith that had led Rwanda to be in the position that it is in; it was just that Rwanda did not have a system that could properly deal with the analysis of asylum claims in a way that would be acceptable to the commitments that we as a country have made to asylum seekers.
I agree very strongly with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said: that Clause 1, in so far as it says that
“Rwanda is a safe country”
is not right, and it would be wrong for us as a Parliament, or as the House of Lords, to agree to that which we know is wrong.
May I address the four alternatives that are now before the House as a means of trying to deal with that? First, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has proposed that one can give effect to the provisions of the legislation only if the joint committee, set up under Article 16 of the recent Rwanda-UK treaty, says that the agreement is being complied with, and that committee would have to act on the advice of the monitoring committee. In principle, that sounds quite a good idea. As the noble and learned Lord acknowledged, one should recognise—I do not say this in a disparaging way—that the joint committee is just the two Governments.
If it is the joint committee alone, that gives no additional assurance. Because the UK Government want to do this come what may, it is hard to imagine that the Rwandan Government are going to say that they are not complying with a treaty which they say they are complying with and have committed themselves to complying with. If it was only the joint committee under Article 16, that would not provide much protection, I say with some respect.
The amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, says that the joint committee has got to act on the advice of the monitoring committee. Only if the monitoring committee positively advises that the agreement is not being complied with will the joint committee of the two Governments be prevented from giving the advice that it wants to give. I have no idea how this monitoring committee will work. It will presumably be 50:50 on each side. If it is paralysed, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord’s proposed requirements would then be satisfied. If the joint committee was not getting positive advice one way or the other, it would still be able to give the assurance that one gives. Could that be dealt with by a number of tweaks? It might well be possible.
Subject to those points, I can see attraction in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is saying. The only other point I have on his proposal is that the Minister appears to escape any duty at all. Should we not have it so that the Minister is subject to judicial review on the decision he takes about whether to implement the treaty?
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for his comments on the significance of the joint committee. I would introduce it only at the beginning. For the future, it is entirely a matter for the monitoring committee to advise on whether the system is being fully implemented, once it has started up. One could remove the joint committee altogether and just have it rest entirely on the monitoring committee; that would be very close to the position of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and indeed that of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. We are working towards a solution of some kind, but I welcome very much the helpful comments of the noble and learned Lord.
I am grateful. The other proposal, which my noble friend Lord Coaker has put his name to, as well as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is to get the monitoring committee to decide. Then one of the only wrinkles would be: how does this monitoring committee work? It would require a positive assertion by the monitoring committee that the terms of the agreement are being broken. If the committee cannot get that, for example because it is deadlocked, then this potential Act would be given effect to. That is the second alternative.
The third alternative is the proposal by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that there be an independent reviewer. If that reviewer says it is not safe, this potential Act would be given effect to, as I understand it, only if there is a resolution by the House of Commons saying that it is safe. That has some attractions, but I am not attracted to it at the moment. First, the House of Commons has already shown its willingness—not because its Members are dishonourable people but because they are whipped by the Government, who have a significant majority—to pass a Bill that uses the word “is”. Secondly, surely such a resolution has the same vice as the Bill: one is asking Parliament to sit in judgment on the question of whether Rwanda is a safe country, and that is an inappropriate activity for Parliament.
I am in favour of one or other of the proposals of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in Amendments 15 and 16, or the monitoring committee—subject to my anxiety about how it would work. I strongly submit that we should not let the Minister off the hook; he or she should be subject to judicial review.
Of course, one has great sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said. However, our attitude—although it sticks in the gullet—nevertheless has to be to try to make this Bill work. My own view is that, if you are going to do offshore processing or deportations to safe countries, the one thing you have to be sure of is that you are acting in accordance with the law.
What makes this Bill so discreditable is not necessarily the policy, which people can disagree with, of offshore processing in third countries, but trying to do something like that in breach of the law. We should be working to get to a point where we are acting in accordance with the law.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble and learned Lord was kind enough to refer to the case that I was referring to. However, I was suggesting that the court should have power, in effect, to direct that the order made under the United Nations provisions be treated as valid until Parliament could introduce a measure giving authority to the making of the order. That is indeed what happened afterwards; Parliament had to remedy the problem and some time was needed to allow it to do that.
The banks were holding on to the money; of course, they were not going to release it unless it was demanded by these suspected terrorists, but had they demanded it, it might have been quite difficult for the banks to refuse to release some money. My point was that something should be done to prevent that happening. The last thing one wanted was to give these terrorists the opportunity to make off and dissipate all the assets that had been protected by the order made under the international obligation.
The problem that the noble and learned Lord is grappling with is that there is a huge range of circumstances in which these provisions may come into effect, some of which, I quite agree, would be offensive. I would hope that the courts would be sensible enough not to exercise the power. There are various provisions later in the Bill, which we will discuss and which might be better removed to preserve the court’s flexibility. The question is whether the power should be there at all. My point was that, yes, it should be there because there can be cases where the interests of good administration, and possibly national security, require the possibility of doing that to prevent the event—or whatever it was that the defective order was designed to prevent—taking effect.
New subsection (1)(a) deals with that point. The effect of the order stood until the Supreme Court set it aside, and everybody would accept that that is the position. If the Supreme Court had had new subsection (1)(a)—which it could have—it could have said that the order freezing the money continues for six more months and in six months’ more time it is then quashed. That is my understanding of a (1)(a) order: the quashing order means getting rid of the restraint on dealing with the money and does not take effect until the date specified in the order.
If the Supreme Court had said, “This order stands until six months’ time”, and a bank had then been approached and told, “Excuse me, the terrorists want their money now”, the answer would have been no because there would still, in effect, be a restraining order. It would have dealt with the problem that the noble and learned Lord posits; I think Clause 1(1)(a) would have dealt with it.
I recommend that the noble and learned Lord refers to Treasury 2 because I made exactly the point that he was trying to make and I was overruled by the others. They said, “You can’t do that”, and they would not make the suspended order. We are in Committee and we cannot prolong the discussion, but that is the problem that I was faced with. I tried to do exactly what the noble and learned Lord suggested but I was overruled. That is the problem that I think the Government are trying to address; the Minister will correct me if I am wrong.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI intervene only to say this: I did not suggest that the motive of the Government was to do this. My experience as a Minister is that you put through legislation and many years later, after emollient assurances given in the House of Lords, those pesky lawyers look at what is possible under the Act. What I have described is possible. Let us imagine if those very same pesky lawyers said, “Well, you might have difficulty getting that through with primary legislation because of the extraordinary width of the powers, but actually we’ve found these rather clever powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill which allow you to do it without primary legislation”. That is the danger.
My Lords, I do not want to take anything away from the force of the points just made by the various speakers who object to the clause more fundamentally, but I want to pick up the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described as minor: the wording of the clause. If the Government are minded to keep it, I suggest they might like to look at it again. Subsection (1) is very general, and the opening words of subsection (2) state that what follows is:
“Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)”.
The bit at the end in brackets, one assumes, does not qualify subsection (1). Is it in the right place? Is the proclamation that what follows is:
“Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)”,
really apposite if you are trying to restrict the scope of the powers as you seek to do in subsection (2)? It is a very interesting interaction of subsections but I suggest that it needs a little more care if the clause is to remain—I say nothing more in support of the point that the clause should not stand part of the Bill.