All 2 Debates between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Baroness Smith of Newnham

Tue 9th Mar 2021
Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage & Lords Hansard & Committee stage

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Baroness Smith of Newnham
Baroness Smith of Newnham Portrait Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
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My Lords, in this suite of amendments we are focusing on a relatively narrow area. On this occasion, I should be slightly relived that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, does not entirely agree with the movers of the amendment, because at least it gives me some additional points to respond to.

I take the point that there might be a shorter period within civil law and domestically, but there is a very clear difference between overseas operations and the civilians and military who might have to bring claims, and what might happen in a civilian context in the United Kingdom. As Emma Norton pointed out in her evidence to the All- Party Groups on Drones and on the Rule of Law, if something happened

“within the UK more than 6 years ago, courts would remain able to extend time limits”,

but if something happened overseas the courts would not have that right. As my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford pointed out, what is being proposed is unique in the British justice system—a new category of claims arising from overseas operations in respect of which the courts would have no right to give an extension.

It is clearly right that claims should be brought expeditiously and dealt with expeditiously, but sometimes it will not be possible for cases to be brought within the time limits the Government are suggesting. It is surely right to look for ways to ensure that claimants who may have not been in a position to bring a claim within a year of date of knowledge can bring the claim, and further discretion can be brought.

As with amendments in the previous and subsequent groups, if the Minister does not feel able to accept the language of our amendments, perhaps he might suggest how claimants who have cases arising from overseas operations will not be disadvantaged by Part 2 of the Bill.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
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I will first pick up on a point made by my noble friend Lord Hendy in the last group, which in fact relates to a group debated on Tuesday. It concerns the validity or otherwise of the point advanced by the Government: that they cannot make special exceptions for military personnel only suing the Ministry of Defence—in other words, treat them as if they are governed by the normal limitation periods—because there would be discriminatory concerns under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

As I indicated on Tuesday, I disagree with that proposition, as does my noble friend Lord Hendy. It is significant for this group of amendments because real concern is being expressed by practically all of your Lordships—I say practically because the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is not—about members of the military not being able to bring claims in accordance with what I describe as the “normal law”. I do not ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, to respond to the legal point now, but I ask him to write to us indicating the legal basis for the proposition that you cannot have a provision stating that military personnel suing the Ministry of Defence will be governed by the ordinary rules of limitation.

The amendments in this group do two important things. First, the current proposal in the Bill is that the limitation period on civil claims should be

“the later of … the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place”,

or

“the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the date of knowledge”.

The position is that the claimant who discovers that they have a claim only at the end of six years has only 12 months to make that claim. The first amendment in this group from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, says that it should not be 12 months from the date of knowledge, but six years. I am sympathetic to that idea and I would like to know why a period of 12 months was chosen in relation to service personnel. I would be interested to know why, having regard to the circumstances that arise on overseas operations, the Government thought it appropriate to have what might be seen as a very short period.

The second significant amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, would add certain additional elements to what is meant by the “date of knowledge”. At the moment, the Bill treats you as knowing if you knew of the act complained of and that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, proposes amending Clause 11, so that you also have to know of the harm you suffered as a result of the act complained of. If, for example, the harm was mental illness, you might not know for some considerable time. In addition, the amendment says that you do not have to know only that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence, but that you might have a legal right to bring a claim too.

Taking the example given by my noble friend Lord Hendy, if you knew that your son was killed because of an act of the Ministry of Defence—friendly fire—but you did not know there was negligence and that you had a right to bring a claim, then knowing of the act complained of and that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence does not do you much good. These additional factors seem legitimate ones to take into account when considering what is meant by “date of knowledge”. These are important amendments and I am interested to hear the Minister’s answer.

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Baroness Smith of Newnham Portrait Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
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My Lords, I am glad to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, does not want to bias anyone; I am sure that is absolutely right and we are all on the same page on that. However, he talked of a public interest in having a period of limitation. Clearly, there is a public interest here, but there is also a private, individual one. The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, try to get that balance right. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, put the point very well by saying that we should not be talking about taking the role of the courts out of this entirely: there needs to be some discretion. Amendment 23 begins to rebalance this.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is right that, clearly, there is a period in which people can bring cases but, if our previous set of amendments, which would extend the point from one to six years after the date of knowledge, were not accepted, we would need some mechanism that allowed a bit of discretion because, at the moment, there would be none for the courts. As such, Amendment 23 is desirable in its own right, but it is even more important if other amendments are not accepted, either now or when they are put forward by the Government, or when they are moved on Report.

Could the Minister give a further response on the date of knowledge? In opening his remarks on the previous set of amendments, clarifying a point he made on Tuesday, he said that the 94% of cases that were brought within—or what would be within—time were within six years not just of the incident but of the date of knowledge. If that is the case, does that not make it even more incumbent on the Government to look again at the date of knowledge as a relevant time point to have in the Bill—and not one but six years?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
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In effect, these amendments once again reintroduce the normal approach to limitation, which is that if you do not bring your claim within 12 months under the Human Rights Act or, if it is a personal injuries claim, within three years—based on tort or a breach of an implied contract—then the court can extend indefinitely, in effect, if it is just and equitable to do so. The courts have applied sensible approaches to those issues, and the longer you are away from the primary limitation period expiring, the better the reason you must have for extending the time.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made a very powerful point, asking why there should be special rules for the Ministry of Defence in relation to overseas operations. The answer that the Ministry of Defence gives is that military personnel involved in overseas operations should know—indirectly, because they will not normally be sued personally—that no litigation will arise from their conduct after a specified period, which is six years or one year from the date of knowledge, whichever is later.

That approach does not seem to me or veterans’ organisations to be legitimate in relation to claims being brought by soldiers or veterans in respect of negligence or breaches of human rights by the Ministry of Defence. Military veterans or existing soldiers should be subject to the same rules in relation to limitation as apply in any other claims. There is no evidence that the reassurance that individual members of the military are looking for—in relation to ongoing litigation out of overseas operations—is coming from fear of claims being brought by veterans against the Ministry of Defence for personal injuries caused normally by negligence on its part.

As such, in so far as the new rule about limitation in respect of overseas operations applies to prevent claims being brought by veterans or existing soldiers, I am against it. The proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, which, in effect, applies the normal rules, should be applied to veterans and existing soldiers who want to bring claims arising out of negligence or breaches of human rights in an overseas operation, just as much as if they bring a claim with the normal rules applying if the injury had occurred to them in the UK. The soldier injured by the provision of a negligent piece of equipment—body armour or a vehicle—can bring a claim with the normal rules applying if it happened on Salisbury Plain, but he or she cannot if the same act of negligence had occurred in an overseas operation. That is profoundly wrong.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Debate between Lord Falconer of Thoroton and Baroness Smith of Newnham
Baroness Smith of Newnham Portrait Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
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My Lords, unlike the first group of amendments, this group—particularly Amendment 14—has very broad support across your Lordships’ House. That is scarcely surprising because one of the very clear omissions from the Bill was precisely the group of crimes so eloquently outlined in the opening remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen.

It is clearly right that one of the exemptions from the presumption is sexual violence—that is fine—but it is a glaring omission to leave other war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and genocide off the face of the Bill. Indeed, it has been raised at every stage of the Bill. It was raised on Second Reading in the other place and many times on Second Reading in your Lordships’ House. I have only one question to ask the Minister: how can she and the Government justify this omission?

As Members across the Committee have said, it is so important for the reputation of our country that we abide by the rule of law and the conventions which we have signed up to and have so often led. As a country, we pride ourselves on supporting certain values, including opposing torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is inconceivable that we should say that this is anything that the Armed Forces or we as a country should condone.

My only sense from the Minister, in private meetings and her response to the debate at Second Reading regarding having sexual offences going against presumption but not other war crimes, was that there would never be a case on the battlefield when use of sexual violence was sanctioned. That seems to suggest that genocide, torture or other war crimes could be sanctioned. Surely that is not what the Minister meant or what the Government mean. Were there ever to be a case of torture or genocide—God forbid—surely we should be leading the way in ensuring that it is investigated and prosecuted. The reason it is so important to have this in the Bill is precisely to demonstrate our commitment to upholding human rights and not falling down any cracks.

I am absolutely sure that nobody would willingly commit any of these crimes, and I do not think that very many cases would ever even be investigated, but the amendments need to be in the Bill to ensure that we are not resiling from the conventions that we have signed up to. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, who I do not think has participated on this group of amendments, earlier prayed in aid Major Bob Campbell, who had said that he would not be taken to the ICC, and it might have been better to be in front of the ICC than subject to protracted and repeated investigations. The reason that service men and women and veterans from the United Kingdom have not been taken to the ICC is precisely because of our respect for international law.

Why are the Government creating a piece of legislation that leaves such a large hole and potentially damages our reputation? It would be much better to amend the Bill, to have it include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture, and ensure that if anyone were accused of such a crime, it would be investigated and prosecuted if necessary and there would not then be a stain. A great problem is the sense that there is a shadow hanging over somebody and the feeling of “If only it hadn’t been for that presumption” or “Because of that presumption, we are now being taken to the Hague”. Surely that is not a position the Government want to leave anybody in.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
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My Lords, this has been an incredibly instructive debate. Every single speaker has spoken in favour of Amendment 14 in a debate that has lasted an hour, and they could not have been more diverse in their experience: lawyers, military people, senior politicians. We have had the whole range, and they have all spoken in favour of Amendment 14.

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Lord Falconer of Thoroton Portrait Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab) [V]
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We move on to a different part of the Bill, which seeks to impose more rigorous time limits for bringing civil actions, whether in accordance with the ordinary law of tort or contract, or under the Human Rights Act. Although I am slightly oversimplifying, the Bill essentially seeks to impose a six-year unextendable deadline for bringing civil claims in respect of the conduct of the military, except where knowledge occurs after the six years, in which case there is a further 12-month extension. This is in contradistinction to the normal position whereby a claim would be brought not arising out of overseas operations where the court would have an ability to extend the time for bringing a claim if it were equitable to do so.

In these amendments, we focus on two particular circumstances. First, where a claim is being brought by someone within the military against, in effect, the Government for a breach of human rights or a tortious claim, we take the view that we should not be providing additional limitation hurdles in respect of military personnel bringing claims against the MoD—for example, for the negligent provision of defective equipment. I should be interested to hear why the Government think that there should be such a limitation. As a subgroup, primarily dealing with military personnel but able to deal with others also, if, in relation to an identical claim that had occurred in the UK, somebody could bring a claim and have the limitation period extended if it were equitable to do so, we cannot see any reason why in identical circumstances such a claim could not also be brought, even though the circumstances or damage arose in the course of overseas operations.

For example, if the Ministry of Defence provided defective equipment to a soldier and, as a result, the soldier suffered serious injury in an exercise on Salisbury Plain, why should a soldier who suffers precisely the same injury while on an overseas operation because of the negligent provision of defective equipment by the Ministry of Defence have a shorter and harsher limitation period than the soldier who was injured in precisely the same circumstances for precisely the same reasons in an exercise on Salisbury Plain? For example, they were both injured not necessarily because of the activities of enemy insurgents against them but because all the forms of transport provided were defective in a way that was the fault of the Ministry of Defence. The injury would have occurred whether one was driving along a road in Wiltshire or a road in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is unfair that there should be different limitations for precisely the same sorts of injury.

Two questions arise on this group of amendments. First, why should there be different limitation periods for the military bringing claims against the Ministry of Defence? Secondly and separately, even if there is a reason for that, why should there be a different limitation period for precisely the same injury, the only difference being that it was caused in the course of overseas operations rather than at home, for example? We are aware of the problems that have arisen in relation to many claims being brought—and many failing—arising out of overseas operations. We are all aware of those circumstances, but we are very concerned that, in trying to deal with that multiplicity of claims, the Government are unfairly depriving military personnel of their legitimate right to protect their rights against the Ministry of Defence.

It is very important that the limitation period be fair for claims by military personnel because, for a whole variety of reasons that those engaged in the military will be aware of, there may be very good reasons why a member of the military takes a long time to discover either that they could bring a claim or that they are in an emotional or mental position to bring a claim because of their experiences. We think these provisions are very detrimental and unfair to military personnel and require amendment. I beg to move.

Baroness Smith of Newnham Portrait Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD) [V]
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My Lords, at this time of the evening it would be very easy simply to agree with everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has just said and be happy to move on, but that would do a disservice to our service men and women and veterans, because the points these amendments speak to and the words the noble and learned Lord has just uttered are extremely important. It is surely appropriate that we treat our service personnel and veterans with respect, and that they should not be disadvantaged because they have been service men and women.

Clearly, incidents and dangers can happen in the field of battle that will not be legislated for in a conventional civilian sense, but there might be other issues—hearing loss, for example—associated with having been in the Armed Forces which become clear only later. It seems very strange, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, that people should have different rights according to whether the problems arose while based in the UK or on overseas operations. Can the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, who appears to have taken over from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, say what work the Government have done in looking at the potential ramifications of this limitation?

This Bill has been put forward by the Government as something supposed to help our service men and women, but this limitation seems to limit their rights. I know the Minister will have been told that it is very important that cases are brought swiftly and issues are dealt with promptly, that it is in everybody’s interest to do so and that delaying things is in no one’s. But neither is curtailing people’s rights.

The Royal British Legion sent a briefing picking up in particular on the Armed Forces covenant, quoting the point:

“Those who serve in the Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserve, those who have served in the past and their families, should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services … In accessing services, former members of the Armed Forces should expect the same level of support as any other citizen in society.”


Assuming that Her Majesty’s Government still support the Armed Forces covenant, can the Minister explain how the proposals in Part 2 of the Bill live up to its commitments? Can he tell us what additional thoughts the Government might be willing to have on looking again at this limitation?