Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I completely agree with that. The Ministerial Code is to be enforced politically, in many respects, not by courts. However, if the position is that it is a breach of international law not to comply with Rule 39, how could a Minister be acting lawfully? I assume that this Government are committed to the rule of law and therefore if it is a breach of international law not to comply with Rule 39—which is what the European Court of Human Rights says, and we are a country that abides by the law—is it not reasonable for that to be struck down on judicial review? I could be wrong about that and would be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I have given notice, with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, of my intention to oppose the Question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. That is because, notwithstanding the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Howard, its provisions are in plain breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law and in breach of the rule of law.

Although complications have been cited and expanded on, the reasons for this are very simply stated. Article 32 of the convention states that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

“extends to all matters concerning the interpretation”

and

“the application of the convention”.

Critically, in the event of

“dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.

That is an approach that is not unknown to our own law in certain circumstances. Rule 39 of the rules of the European Court of Human Rights provides for the court to make interim orders. 

In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred, which was a case decided by the court in 2005, and Paladi v Moldova, decided by the same court in 2009, the European Court of Human Rights said that the failure of a member state to comply with interim measures is a breach of Article 34 of the convention. That article states that member states undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of the court to receive applications from any person.

Reference has been made to a lengthy and elaborate argument in a Policy Exchange document, published in 2023 during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill, by Professor Richard Ekins, in which he contended that the power to make interim measures was outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. That is the document with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, expresses his agreement. What is clear is that Article 32 confers on the court the right to determine the extent of its jurisdiction in the event that it is disputed. That article says so in the plainest terms, and, as a member state, we have signed up to that.

What is also indisputable, and is accepted by Professor Ekins, is that since the decision of Mamatkulov in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld the binding nature of Rule 39 interim measures, and the UK Government have never once challenged before the Strasbourg court that decision and the binding nature of interim measures. Indeed, the United Kingdom has not only complied with such measures but called on other states to comply with them. It has supported resolutions and declarations that assume that Rule 39 is legally binding.

International law has, therefore, reached a settled state of practice and agreement between member states and the Strasbourg court. Whatever other course might properly be taken in the future—that could include matters concerning the way in which these orders are dealt with, about which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained—it is clear that it would be a breach of international law and the rule of law for that settled agreement and practice to be peremptorily and unilaterally jettisoned by the United Kingdom acting alone. That is a basic principle of international law.

The wording of Clause 5 reflects similar, but not identical, provisions in the Illegal Migration Act. The challenge by Members of this House to those provisions in that Act were rejected by the Government and voted down in the other place. Should we then just placidly accept them now? I believe that it would be quite wrong to do so. This is yet another example of a blatant breach of the United Kingdom’s legal obligations. The other amendments in this group are worthy attempts to leave Clause 5 in the Bill but, in effect, to neuter its current intent and effect. My contention is that our constitutional role in this House impels us to reject Clause 5 in its entirety, and not provide it with any blanket of legitimacy, either in its current form or with amendments.