Local Government Bill [HL]

Lord Elystan-Morgan Excerpts

Tuesday 8th June 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hanham]

My Lords, my understanding is that the Public Bill Office has not changed its view as a result of that advice, and I intend to proceed on that basis. Before I sit down, I should make it clear that if the noble Lord decides to put his Motion to a vote, I will have no option but to ask the House to oppose it as, were he to succeed, it would delay the passage of the Bill and clarity for the future of the local authorities concerned, which need a decision.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

I rise to support the Motion. Even in my greatest delusions of grandeur, I do not consider myself a constitutional lawyer. However, with very great respect to the House, I believe that this matter turns on a fairly narrow point to which I shall come in a moment.

The definition of hybridity stems from a ruling of the Speaker of the House of Commons in the Session 1962-63, and very much follows the words of the Companion which have already been quoted. The issue, therefore, is whether or not certain bodies or private interests, which stand on the same ground in respect of being private or being limited as bodies, are treated in exactly the same way. What is not spelt out in Erskine May, as I understand it, is whether or not there might be justification for treating bodies of that nature, which are of the same class, differently as different considerations relate to them. As I understand it, nothing in Erskine May casts light on that fundamental issue.

Since the enactment of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, 13 orders have been made creating unitary authorities in Cornwall, Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire, Wiltshire, east Cheshire, west Cheshire and the city of Chester, Bedford County, mid-Bedfordshire, south Bedfordshire, Norwich and Exeter. The first 11 of those authorities gained unitary status in 2008. By 2009, those procedures were well set and, indeed, the transitional stages had been completed. The other two bodies with which we are concerned were dealt with by this House—if I remember rightly—on 22 March and, clearly, the transitional provisions have not begun to operate. Therefore, their situations are very different. If that be the basis of distinction, there would be justification for dealing with them differently. However, as far as I know, there is no rule which says that special cases need special exemptions: either you deal with all bodies in exactly the same way or you fall foul of hybridity. As I say, 13 orders have been made since 2007 and there has been no challenge in 11 of them. The other two were challenged in this House. Is that challenge valid, or not? That is the narrow issue that this House should consider.