Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Eames and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eames]

I rise to briefly support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, but do so from an angle that has yet to be mentioned in the debate this afternoon. I base it on my own experience over the years. Exercising the duties given to me in Northern Ireland, I saw at first hand the burden that successive Secretaries of State had to carry on behalf of the Executive in situations of dire necessity demanding often urgent and serious decisions in a matter of hours. The former Secretaries of State who grace this House—I see the noble Lord, Lord King, in his place—will recognise the roles of the judiciary and the Executive.

The Bill has been thoughtfully carried to this stage, and I am aware from my own contacts of the thought and preparation that have gone into the terms before us. The Minister will obviously want to argue that the right way to do this in the case of urgent and very sensitive issues is through the work of the Executive and their decisions. In his position, many noble Lords would argue the same. However, where in the sensitive and urgent situation of widespread terrorism a whole community is faced with what should be protection by the Executive, there is a tendency not to value the importance of the community’s confidence in how those decisions are made.

In those years to which I referred in my own lifetime of experience, in the discussions to which I was privy and decisions that were taken where my own opinion was sought, there was no doubt of the urgency and necessity of moving as quickly from the level of executive or political decisions to what could be transparently seen as the decisions of the judiciary. The important point I am simply trying to underline is that, in our discussions this afternoon, let us bear in mind the question of the confidence of the community in decisions that are made at this level. I beg to suggest that, where those decisions are made by the judiciary, there is much more acceptance by a hard-pressed community under a situation of terrorism than in the other case. This is not to downgrade the integrity of any executive decision, and I am not doing that; I am simply saying that we must take a broader view. For that reason, I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with what my noble friend Lord Macdonald and many other noble Lords said, that we can trust the judges. As the Bill currently reads, they have the task of scrutinising the imposition of measures on judicial review principles. Experience and the dicta of judges suggest that they will be particularly rigorous in this. This area is not generally considered one where Ministers are permitted quite the same sense of discretion as, say, on an issue of economics, but it is one where judges really can get in among the detail and form a view of a matter. They are only too conscious of the potential limitations of closed hearings and special advocates, and the potential risk that these present to those who are potentially the target of these measures.

On the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, I acknowledge his distinguished pedigree and the pedigree of the amendment, which I think goes back some time to the original control orders, but I respectfully suggest that it is inappropriate. I suggest that the obligation rests on the Home Secretary to protect the security of citizens. It rests upon her shoulders and it is a heavy burden. If one needs to find any emphasis in this from the Human Rights Act, Article 2 provides an obligation on the part of the public authority, the Government, to take measures to protect the life of citizens. Those measures will include appropriate measures to prevent outrages of this sort—that is of course what this Bill is concerned with. In this Bill she has to reasonably believe that an individual is involved in terrorist activity and reasonably consider that a TPIM and its appropriate measures are necessary. That is an exercise that she, with that heavy burden placed upon her, should perform.

As I understand it, this amendment is born out of an outright opposition to TPIMs and their predecessors, control orders. The courts have minutely examined these control orders in a number of cases. They have had various degrees of enthusiasm about them and about the closed hearings and the special advocates, but they said that they could operate unlawfully or they could operate satisfactorily—it would depend on the individual cases. However, they have survived what was a wholesale attack on them as a measure. It was not decided by any court that they were by definition contrary to the rule of law. It was acknowledged by judges in a number of cases that the security of the nation was a potent argument in favour of such orders.

It was not suggested in any of those judgments that it was better for the courts to have the decision in the way that this amendment suggests. I doubt that the courts would really relish such a task. Their job, traditionally, is to scrutinise, to examine the legality of the decision, but not to take upon themselves an essentially executive decision. I suggest that the Secretary of State—knowing, as she will, that her reasonable belief will be subjected to close scrutiny by a process which, correctly, places a heavy emphasis on the freedom of the individual—will exercise that power extremely responsibly, and I suggest that the balance should remain as it is in the Bill.

Finally, I will say something about the question of the standard of proof. If there is a fundamental shift in the way that power is to be exercised, as is suggested by the amendment, and the matter comes to the courts to decide, then it may be that the standard of proof should be the balance of probabilities. That is the test that has evolved over the years to decide civil matters generally. There have been recent decisions that suggest there is no shifting standard, but it remains the standard. It has developed pragmatically because there have to be decisions in civil cases to be distinguished from the higher standard in criminal cases.

However, as I understand the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should the power remain with the Home Secretary, she should not have the decision based on reasonable belief but on balance of probabilities. I respectfully say that that balance of probability test may be appropriate where there is a judicial process to be undergone, but where we are talking about an executive decision, reasonable belief is much more appropriate than the process of coming to a conclusion on a 51:49 basis, which is far more suitable for a judicial determination other than the decision which at the moment would—and should—rest with the Secretary of State.