(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI now call the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, who will be taking part remotely.
My Lords, I support the spirit of these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Mawson, in his working life at Bromley-by-Bow and more recently in north-west Surrey, and in his very full speech, has demonstrated the significance to healthcare of the principle of subsidiarity, the freedom to innovate and the mobilisation of community resources. If ICSs are to mobilise the full power of place this must indeed be a governing principle.
Although there might be definitional issues to clarify, I particularly applaud the ambition expressed in Amendment 159A that resources should be used at local discretion to promote collaboration by local groups, and that the procurement processes should take account of the benefits of stable partnerships. How could anyone dissent from that? Yet, the experience of so many non-clinical and VCSE organisations is of chronic financial instability and of promising work being aborted because of policy discontinuity.
I will give one instance of damaging discontinuity of funding. The Alchemy Project used dance as a form of early intervention in psychosis. The project was developed jointly by Dance United, South London and Maudsley, and King’s College London. Two cohorts of participants were drawn from young people in south London boroughs where the rate of psychosis is very high. With no previous experience of dance, after four weeks they performed a specially commissioned piece at the Shaw Theatre and Sadler’s Wells. Academic evaluation demonstrated clinically significant improvements in well-being, communication, concentration and focus, trust in others and team working. The project helped participants to develop relationships with their peers and restore relationships with their families. The Alchemy Project had to be abandoned, however, when a fragile consortium of funders did not renew its funding. ICBs and ICPs will need to be less fickle and less prodigal, bolder in supporting innovation, and more consistent and farsighted in their relationships with their providers and communities.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberForgive me, my Lords—I was too premature in eating my Polo Mints; I will save them for later.
As expected, this has been quite a technical debate, and I will do what I can to offer further details on some of the elements I have spoken of. The first thing I should stress to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, is that the letter was sent to his Whips for onward distribution; it would have gone there on Thursday of last week, and I believe that the same is true for those on the Labour Benches. The letter has been sent out and made available. I am very happy to resend it, so that he can have the details, and I will not belabour the House by reading it out again.
At issue in this debate is the question of the scope and depth of the powers, and we have heard much reference to Henry VIII. I emphasise that Clauses 21 and 22 are required to enable both the UK and the devolved Administrations to fully implement the Northern Ireland protocol. Secondary legislation will be needed to further implement certain elements of that protocol before December 2020, which is the end of the implementation period. As a number of noble Lords noted, failure to do so could affect the ultimate agreement between the EU and the UK, with negotiations being conducted in the light of the UK not fulfilling its obligations under the withdrawal Act. What we are saying is that, in the calendar year ahead, there is much to be done and much is still uncertain, because it will emerge from the negotiations that take place between the UK and the EU. It is important to stress also that, where the issue affects the Northern Ireland protocol, the Northern Ireland Executive will have a role and be involved.
The powers we seek are broad, but they are constrained. First, they are Northern Ireland protocol-specific and can be exercised only to implement the protocol, to supplement it within domestic law or to deal with matters arising out of, or related to, the protocol. Regulations beyond this scope are ultra vires. It is important to stress that, as it limits what these powers can be used to do. A number of noble Lords have suggested that they could be wide-ranging and could up-end or repeal the fundamental devolution settlements for Scotland and Wales. In fact, because they are so specific, that is not a possibility.
Further, any use of the power in Clause 21 that seeks to amend primary legislation, including the fundamental devolution statutes, will be subject to the affirmative procedure. There is no suggestion whatever that this will be done in secret, or in any attempt to blind-side this or the other place. The purpose is to ensure that there is full scrutiny by all the authorities within these Houses. The procedure attached to the use of this power means that there are no circumstances where the Government could change or amend the devolution statutes without the full involvement and scrutiny of both Houses. It affords the fundamental opportunity, according to custom and practice, for this and the other place to be engaged. On the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Scotland Act 1998, the Bill grants no vires for wholesale repeal of any of the devolution statutes—and I repeat “any”.
I turn to the specific points raised in the amendments. On Amendment 3, the powers are necessary to align Northern Ireland with certain elements of EU law. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the power in Clause 21 can be used to amend the withdrawal Act to ensure that the arrangements required in the protocol are operational and the statute book does not contain uncertainty. That is to happen in the time we have spoken of—by the end of this year.
The power will not be used to repeal any substantive provision in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, asked why the Government would wish to amend the withdrawal Act. I assure the noble Baroness that the Government have included the power with due consideration. If the statute book is not clear and in legal conformity with elements of the withdrawal Act, confusion and uncertainty could well result. Again, I reinforce that the Government cannot use this power to make changes to the 2018 Act for any purposes beyond those required for the full implementation of the protocol. It is the protocol itself that gains the ascendancy and restricts the onward actions in a wider sense.
The limits in Amendment 4 risk preventing the United Kingdom fulfilling its international obligations under the Northern Ireland protocol. The proposed restrictions create problems. Several details of the protocol require further decisions in the UK-EU joint committee to become fully operational. The Government have committed that representatives from the Northern Ireland Executive will be invited to form part of the UK delegation in any joint committee meetings where Northern Ireland-specific matters are discussed, and where the Northern Ireland Government are present. This is evidence that the UK places significant importance on maintaining Northern Ireland’s unique place in the union. It is important that, after a very long absence, we now have an Assembly and an Executive in Northern Ireland.
The Government will not use these powers to repeal the devolution statutes wholesale. Indeed, they are wholly incapable of doing so because of the inherent limitations of the power, which I have already touched on. It is the Government’s firm intention to fully engage with the devolved Administrations, and it will be important to do so with regard the withdrawal agreement, and to ensure that the protocol itself is correct and delivered in the right manner.
On Amendment 7, the power is necessary to implement certain elements of the protocol that are within devolved competence. Any modification of the Government of Wales Act 2006 by way of the power in Clause 22 could in practice occur only with the agreement of the Welsh Government; it is only with their full participation that Clause 22 could be delivered. The amendment could impede the Welsh Government in exercising their own legitimate power when implementing the protocol in areas of devolved competence in a manner that they deem appropriate. So, again, the clause, if amended in that way, would cause the Welsh Government a problem in the natural fulfilment of their powers.
The Government fully seek and intend to proceed in the spirit of engagement and co-operation with the devolved Administrations, and that will include the Joint Ministerial Committee. We should bear in mind that that committee has two strata that we are concerned with. The first is one with which the officials themselves are fully engaged; a lot of the issues that we are talking about regarding the Northern Ireland protocol are technical issues that will be dealt with primarily at official level. The second is the ministerial level at which decisions can be taken. The powers themselves are deemed to be essential and are required to implement the protocol.
I will try now to address some of the specific points raised by noble Lords today. The first, which is the most important, is the question of why the Government do not seek to use a Section 109 Order in Council. A number of Peers raised this point, suggesting that it is the correct way. I too was curious and sought specific advice on this. A Section 109 order can be used where appropriate to make amendments to Schedules 7A or 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006. It would work in those areas. However, if amendments outside the scope of a Section 109 order were required, as updates to the protocol might require, it would not be possible to rely on a Section 109 order to make them. It is important to stress as we look at that that the Section 109 order would be adequate in only certain circumstances, not in all circumstances. Therefore, we cannot rely on that method to move forward.
There was also a question about other means that could be used. A question was raised by a number of noble Lords about whether powers to direct Welsh Ministers could be used to deliver this. Powers to direct are to compel acts in areas of devolved competence. Section 82 of the Government of Wales Act, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to, does not allow for amendment of the devolution statutes, which might be needed to implement the protocol. So, again, this route is not available to the Government to address the matters that might result from the ongoing negotiation between the EU and the UK.
I am being corrected, so I will put this on the record. On the joint committee, I should have said that for meetings discussing NI-specific matters and where the Irish—not the Northern Ireland—Government are present, representatives from the Northern Ireland Executive will be invited. Let me be clear on that.
The difficulty we face in this regard is that we now have before us several elements that we need to keep focused on. We will need powers to change the elements required for the Northern Ireland protocol itself. On the question of the concomitant impact on the Scotland Act or the Wales Act, the reason we have been so clear on this is that they will potentially be affected as elements of the negotiations unfold. That is why there needs to be an opportunity for them to be amended in the focused area, as required by the Northern Ireland protocol. They cannot be amended in a wholesale manner, whereby they could be repealed, revoked or amended beyond their constitutional necessity. That is why I was very clear in a letter that I wrote that the important point to take here is that these themselves can be addressed only via the need to institute the elements of the Northern Ireland protocol.
I am fully aware that this is an important issue and that people in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland are looking at this with some interest. The reality is that over the next few months we will have a serious negotiation on the future relationship between the UK and the EU, particularly on the Northern Ireland protocol. That will impact on the whole of the United Kingdom and all its manifest elements. However, I am also aware that I might not have fully satisfied your Lordships. If I have not, your Lordships might wish to take the mood of the House, because I will not be able to return to this matter at a later stage.
Before the Minister sits down, will he explain why the very extensive and potentially arbitrary powers the Government propose to take under Clause 41 are not subject to the affirmative procedure?
I had a note on that. I will have to write to the noble Lord, because I am not sure that I can put my hands on that particular matter at this second. If he will allow me, I will come back to him on that. The point is that the amendments we are talking about concern Clauses 21 and 22, not Clause 41, which would not be amended by these particular amendments.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberIs the Minister therefore saying that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is incorrect? Paragraph 9 of its report notes that Clause 41
“contains a Henry VIII power for a Minister of the Crown by regulations to repeal or amend any Act of Parliament … Such regulations are made pursuant to the negative procedure.”
To be clear, the information I have from my officials is that this will be done by the affirmative procedure. It is important to stress that point. Further, returning to the protocol, which has not been fully discussed in this particular debate, the question is: what do the two amendments seek to do? While we have no intention of in any way seeking to unravel the Wales Act or the Scotland Act, there will necessarily be elements in the Northern Ireland Act which will have to be explored and addressed, with full consultation—I express that clearly—with the restored Executive and Assembly. They will have this element for the first time: it was not there before. For example, the issue of democratic consent to the wider Northern Ireland protocol would represent a necessary adjustment to the Northern Ireland Act. This could only be taken forward by full dialogue and discussion with the restored Executive to ensure that the four and eight-year cycle that needs to go forward is inside the heart of this approach. There are also going to be elements, which we have anticipated, of disapplication of certain elements of retained EU law as they affect Northern Ireland. They too, in a domesticated form, would need to be adjusted using these powers.
We fear that there may be a hindrance of our ability to adopt the decisions of the Joint Committee, bearing in mind that that committee was established between the UK and EU. We will need to be able to move that forward in real time and this too will require a power similar to that which we have set out. Another thing we must be on top of is that we have, in this scenario, a potential restriction which might impact on the very issue which I thought might be more expansively explored—the unfettered access part—for reasons which will be touched on in the debate to follow. This debate has taken a turn that I had not anticipated—the notion that a power is now being granted to the Government to undo that which has been set before: if you like, the magisterium of the law which sets up the elements of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. That is not the purpose of this rule. Rather it is to allow the Government, where necessary and through full consultation with the powers of Northern Ireland, to deliver the elements that will emerge in the ongoing negotiations and in any other concomitant parts, to ensure that we are ready to deliver the required elements by one year from today. If we fail to do that, we run the risk of undermining our international obligations. That would then create the problem that this is designed to try and avoid.
It would be very easy for me to say: “You have just got to trust me”. That is not what I am trying to say, and it would be foolish as noble Lords should not try to trust me. The important thing is to test me, and to test the Government. That is why, as well as putting these points to the House now, and setting out the areas in which we do need these necessary powers, I am happy to put that in to a note which I will supply and make available to all noble Lords who are interested in this, so they can see where we believe this power will be required to deliver the very thing that Northern Ireland wants: safety and security within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is its purpose and that is, principally, why we are here tonight. I am tempted to quote from Clint Eastwood, but the only quotes I could come up with are:
“Do you feel lucky, punk?”
and “Make my day.” I am not sure either one is particularly relevant.
In conclusion, the purpose of this is to ensure that Northern Ireland is safe and secure as we move forward and is in such a place that the protocol will function in its entirety. Equally, and most importantly—it is a genuine pleasure to say this—there is now a restored Executive and an Assembly where these matters should be discussed and whose voices must be heard and heeded. In the year ahead, we commit to ensuring that Northern Ireland is a full component part of the debate and discussion on the issues of Brexit. That is something which I have not been able to say for a very long time.
On that basis, I cannot support the amendments as they have been tabled. I understand where they have come from, but I am afraid I cannot give comfort in that regard. However, I am committing to set out exactly why we believe these powers are necessary in the area of Northern Ireland and why they are there. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Baroness will recognise where I am coming from on these matters.
(5 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes an important point, which I will answer in two ways, if I may. First, in this country, we have very much a service-based economy. In making rules and laws that affect workers, we can tailor them carefully to the needs of the people of this country. My noble friend also made a point about the situation with regard to the laws and rights that exist in the EU at present. As I recall, for many decades the Benches opposite opposed almost every aspect of what was going on inside the EU, because they felt that it was servicing big business rather than individual workers. We must make sure that our laws are fit for our people.
My Lords, of course this country ought to maintain, and indeed pioneer, the best standards on workers’ rights—but, since the whole purpose of Brexit is to restore parliamentary government to the United Kingdom, how could it make sense for us to pre-commit to endorsing whatever legislation the EU might in future choose to bring in? Should we not have confidence in our own democracy?