Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Dholakia and Lord Goldsmith

Wednesday 1st February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dholakia]

My Lords, my Amendment 172C is grouped with Amendment 172A, among others. I agree very much with almost all of what noble Lords have said on these amendments. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for rightly seeking to put the victim very much at the centre of the process; victims must be informed about what has happened.

The purpose of my amendment is not to miss out a very important element in the sentencing process. It would retain the duty on courts passing custodial sentences to give reasons explaining why they consider it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment. It would not take away any powers from the courts to prescribe a custodial sentence. The intention is to provide an explanation which informs people about the purpose of passing a custodial sentence.

My amendment goes further than Amendment 176ZB, tabled by my noble friends Lady Linklater and Lord Thomas of Gresford. Their amendment, which I also support, is limited to sentences of less than six months, whereas mine would go further and apply to sentences of six months or more. Let me explain why.

In general, I welcome Clause 61. It replaces the current complicated requirements on courts to explain the implications of and reasons for their sentences with a simple requirement that they should explain the sentence in ordinary language—a point made by many noble Lords. This is a welcome simplification of the court’s duties at the sentencing stage.

However, I have one concern about this change—namely that it abolishes the requirement for courts passing prison sentences to explain why they consider that the offence requires a custodial sentence. Depriving offenders of their liberty by passing a custodial sentence is a uniquely serious decision that is in a different category from imposing even the most intensive community sentence. A prison sentence often means that an offender loses his or her accommodation. Many offenders sentenced to custody lose their jobs. Others have their education disrupted. All too often, custodial sentences contribute to the break-up of families. Community sentences, even intensive community sentences with significant restrictions on the offender's liberty, do not produce those results. I submit that a court should have to explain its reasons for concluding that, despite those negative consequences, it nevertheless believes that only a custodial sentence can be justified.

Although I support my noble friends’ Amendment 176ZB, I consider that this duty to give reasons should also apply to sentences of six months or longer. There are often occasions on which courts decide that it is more productive to impose a community sentence with, say, a drug rehabilitation requirement or a sex offender treatment programme than to pass a one-year or even a two-year custodial sentence. A one-year or two-year sentence means that the offender actually spends six months or a year in custody before release. He or she then returns to the community, usually without having been through a treatment programme that could help to reduce reoffending. In these cases, too, courts should have to exercise the discipline of giving reasons for their conclusion that only a custodial sentence can be justified. The discipline of having to give reasons for passing a custodial sentence helps to concentrate sentencers’ minds on the gravity of their decision. This is designed to help ensure that custodial sentences are imposed only when there is no reasonable alternative.

I therefore hope that the Government will think again and decide to retain this important requirement. My amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, bring transparency to the sentencing process, and I am sure that the Minister will, on reflection, consider this to be a sound case.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, this group of amendments touches on a number of important issues. I have great sympathy with what my noble friend Lady Quin and the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Wigley, said on those issues. I shall not touch on those matters as the noble Lords have greater experience. I was slightly alarmed to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said about the intention to take away prosecutors from conditional cautions. We will consider that issue later in the Bill and I look forward to hearing just what the proposal is and the justification for it.

I want to spend a moment or two on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, which does a great service to the Committee by focusing attention on the need for the victim to know in appropriate ways what the outcome of the case has been. The victim, although not like a plaintiff in a civil action, is after all still the person to whom the offence happened, and it is right that the victim should therefore be told what happened, and told appropriately. I also very much agree with the noble Lord that generally that duty should be on the prosecution.

It is important that the public and victims see that prosecutors are there to some extent as an interface between them and the court and justice system, and that prosecutors focus on the needs of victims—as well, obviously, as on the professional requirements of their job to bring and prosecute cases fairly.

My question about the amendment, while fully supporting the spirit and intent behind it, is whether it is necessary for that to be dealt with by way of imposition of a duty and a new form of order. I say that because I would have hoped that, by now, prosecutors would know that they have that responsibility. I will be interested to hear in due course from the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who has promoted the amendment, whether it is believed that prosecutors are not doing that.

There are one or two reasons why a duty may give rise to difficulties. The prosecution may not always be a professional prosecutor. Sometimes the prosecutor may be a private prosecutor. It may be inappropriate for a number of reasons to impose the same duty on a private prosecutor—a neighbour in a neighbour dispute, for example—as on a professional prosecutor. There may also be victims who need particular care in explaining to them the outcome of the case, and that may need professional skills.

I am also concerned that, by imposing a particular duty of information on prosecutors, we do not take away the need for them to provide other information. Reference has already been made in this short debate to the need for prosecutors to keep victims informed of the progress of cases. In my day, we attempted to deal with that and provide flexibility by creating a victims’ charter, which was intended for prosecutors to sign up to under the guidance—or, indeed, direction—of the Attorney-General, which would cover progress of the case and, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, its outcome. That may be a better system to achieve what he wants.

As I said, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. I entirely agree with the fundamental point that the victim should be informed of the outcome appropriately and that the prosecution should have a duty to do so.

Intelligence and Security Services: Treatment of Detainees

Debate between Lord Dholakia and Lord Goldsmith

Tuesday 6th July 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords—

[Lord Dholakia]

My Lords—