My Lords, I wish to reassert and reinforce some of the anxieties that we have been listening to. More than 20 years ago, a Conservative Government sought to privatise the electricity industry in favour of free enterprise and competition. The outcome has been an industry dominated by an oligopoly of six large suppliers owned primarily by foreign capital. There has been an absence of the necessary oversight of the industry that would provide an assurance that it will meet the future needs of the nation, and there has been a severe deficit in investment.
The present Conservative Government have sought to amend this situation through a programme of electricity market reform. The result was the Energy Bill, which we struggled with last summer. The Bill promised to engender a raft of secondary legislation that would come to haunt us later. Now, that legislation is represented by a massive pile of documents concerning the regulation of electricity market reform, the regulation of the so-called contracts for difference and the regulation of the capacity market. We are aware that not all the regulations are yet before us, and this shortfall promises to cause problems.
On encountering the mass of regulations, I am assailed by feelings of inadequacy. I have neither the time nor the energy for the task of scrutinising the regulations in detail. I fear that my own inadequacy may be a symptom of a more general problem with which government is faced in our era. One of the features of the problem is clear. It is that, by pursuing a philosophy of free enterprise and marketisation, the Government have created an almost impossible amount of centralised regulation.
The foreign ownership of our electricity industry is one of the reasons for the severe underinvestment. The owners of the big electricity companies are large multinational enterprises that are able to look worldwide for the best investment opportunities. They have no overriding incentive to invest in the UK. Therefore, the Government are constrained to look to small independent generators within the UK to provide much of the necessary investment. These companies require careful fostering if they are to fulfil this role and if they are not to be squeezed out by the big six oligopolists.
The Government have signally failed to protect independent generators. Their oversight in this respect is baffling and distressing. Last summer, it seemed that, eventually, the Government had been convinced that the independent generators required an assured route to market for their product. The means of providing the necessary assurance has been termed the offtaker of last resort. In the absence of a purchasing power agreement, the offtaker would be prepared to purchase the power at a heavy discount. This stringency threatens the viability of any investment projects that the independents might wish to pursue, and it has made it unlikely that they will be able to raise the necessary finance.
Now we are discovering that, notwithstanding the belated assurances of the Government, the problem persists. It seems that there will be an 18-month delay between the negotiation of the first contracts for difference and the realisation of the arrangements for the offtaker of last resort. My supposition is that this delay has been caused by the sheer volume of secondary legislation that is entailed in the electricity market reform and that this crucial element of the programme has been sidelined or at least severely delayed. The consequences for the independent generators and for their investment programmes will be dire.
My Lords, I, too, support my noble friend in his concerns. It is a pity that the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, retreated to his usual attack on free enterprise and a glorification of the appalling electricity industry which was there before privatisation. Those of us who worked with it knew that the Central Electricity Generating Board was one of the most inefficient, self-opinionated and dreadful bodies that has ever been created. It was so bad that it hid from the world the cost of nuclear power, and when it was taken to pieces, the Cabinet had to accept that it could not do much of what it wanted to because the facts had been hidden by Lord Marshall—Walter Marshall—whose personal fiefdom it had become. It really is a pity if we have to discuss this via the déjà vu which was extremely biased in the way that the noble Viscount put it forward.
It seems much better if we discuss how it is at the moment, which is that privatisation has done a great deal of good but has a number of problems. One of its problems is that it has ended up with an oligopoly, but that oligopoly has been made more possible by decisions made by other parties as well. Looking back on it, I think that the previous Government would not have made the changes that they did and which have underlined that. Let us not make this into a party-political argument but try hard to see what to do now.
The two things which we have to do now are, first, to stop being argumentative about the fact that it is going to cost money to enable us to have a generating system that will withstand the very many pressures upon it. There is the pressure of climate change; we have to decarbonise our electricity system and do so according to a budget, which I am happy to say has again been accepted by the Government. That budget means that it has to be done relatively fast because we cannot reach the 2050 target, which is a statutory one, unless we do it according to the sort of speed which the budgets lay down. That means we will need a portfolio of generating capacity, because only in that way can we ensure that we do not pick winners and find ourselves in a situation of not having the opportunities as technology changes.
Regarding my noble friend’s slightly offhand remark about the cost of supporting wind generation, there is a very big cost in supporting something that he is very fond of, which is nuclear power. The strike price which we agree now and the commitment to that over a very long period may well turn out to be the most expensive piece of decision-making that we have made. I happen to think that it is necessary but do not let us suggest that it is not expensive—because, frankly, it is extremely likely that offshore wind will have come down in price to be competitive with nuclear and goes on going down, whereas I am afraid that nuclear is a system which has never actually got cheaper. It has always become more expensive and been less reliable in delivery terms than almost anything else.
Let us realise how difficult is the issue that we are dealing with. We need to have a real mix. However, my noble friend is right to say that one of the ways in which you can ensure that that mix works is to be absolutely clear about the need for competition. Only competition will stop us returning to the easy, comfortable position of the electricity business in the days of its nationalised state. New and small companies that are based here find this extremely difficult. My noble friend has been their advocate over a long period.
I have to ask the Government something terribly simple. If it is necessary to have an offtaker of last resort in the period following the first 18 months, why is it not necessary for the first 18 months? Indeed, I have to ask something much more fundamental than that. I am a businessman, and it seems to me that the process which has brought this to fruition has been one in which the Government have accepted that if you want independent generators, you need to have this protection. When do you need that protection most? You need it at the beginning of the process, when these people have just started, and when it is most difficult for them. If you need it at all, you need it when it begins. The idea that you need it not when it begins but 18 months later is almost incredible. I do not see how you can argue that case. The case must be that you either need it, in which case you need it at the beginning, or you do not need it, in which case you do not need it at all. It is not possible to argue a case which says that you need it, but only 18 months after you start. I find the economic and business arguments for that very difficult to take.
My Lords, we may have noticed that there is a good deal of support on both sides for what the Government are trying to do. I hope that my noble friend the Minister has noticed the tone in which these discussions have been carried through. We would like to be convinced, and we are unconvinced only because these measures are quite difficult to understand. The document that I have here is not for bedtime reading, unless you wish to give up on the Mogadon, because it is very complex.
One thing in the Climate Change Act that the climate change committee is supposed to do is to ensure that the public understands what it is doing. I do not think that that is a bad thing to have at the back of one’s mind. I just hope that I do not have to stand on a platform at this moment and explain in simple terms what is in here. I suspect that my noble friend the Minister would agree that that is not the most comfortable place in government just at this moment. It is not because there are things that are necessarily wrong with it, but there are extremely complicated things in it, and we want to make sure that it is as good as it can be. That is my first point.
On the amendments, I remind noble Lords that this is no small matter. Electricity from renewables increased last year by 19%, which is pretty remarkable; it is 11.3% of the total. We are not talking about some tiny little thing, which is what the climate change dismissers are always saying. This is no longer a gleam in the eye of Greenpeace; it is a central part of what we are seeking to do. Therefore, we have to recognise that enabling the elbow room for the renewables sector is very important. The Government have recognised that and, on all sides, people have said that the government amendments do extremely well.
I want to put three simple propositions to my noble friend. First, it is instinctively difficult for free marketeers such as me to be entirely keen on a system where the Government are fixing almost every element of the process. I recognise that it may be necessary—and, indeed, if it is necessary, I shall be the first to defend it. But I think that she understands why one starts by being a little concerned about that.
Secondly, we need a convincing explanation of why some kind of auction is not part of the set up. It has been shown around the world that the one way in which you get lower prices is through a descending auction. There is no doubt about that. The advantage of that is that it does have that effect. From what happened in Brazil it is clear—it is not that it has not been tried and found wanting; it has been tried and it works—that you can bring prices down if you operate in that way.
It gives huge confidence to the public because, instead of the Government having to explain in the context of a document such as this why they have delivered this, that or the other, they are able to say to the market, “Look, the price has been fixed at the lowest figure we can see working”. There is a real issue of communication here and a need to explain why—apart from the unconvincing pushing aside in the other place when Ministers said it would be very expensive and complicated. I was a Minister for 16 years and I knew that any civil servant who said we could not do something because it was expensive and complicated had not worked it out. That mechanism is always used; it is the technique. I look with care at those behind my noble friend. An issue may be complicated but you might be able to make it simple, but the idea that it is expensive I have never seen proved in any independent area. I would like to be 100% on the side of the Government on this but the whole concept of a competitive system based upon some kind of auction is so valuable that we should not lose it.
Thirdly, the worst kind of debates in the other place, and even more so in your Lordships’ House, are about what it means rather than about what should be done. My worry in this area is that if we get to the Floor of the House and spend our time trying to work out what it means, we will probably get it entirely wrong. It would be valuable if the Government could clear that bit out.
The noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, and I have not always agreed on matters over the years but at least on this we can be at one. We want to arrive in October with a clear view of what is being proposed and what its ramifications are so that if we do not agree with it at least we are talking about the same thing. I fear that if we argued about it now we would be arguing about something that was different in the mind of every Member of the Committee. After all, we have chosen to try to understand these things rather more than the generality. I hope my noble friend will treat the amendment with that kind of approach, rather than saying, “It does not quite work in this way or that way”.
My Lords I shall speak to Amendments 55AE, 55AFA and 55AFB, which are all in my name. Amendment 55AE, together with my subsidiary amendments in this group, covers the same ground as the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Roper, and others but it is not as specific in what it calls for. The amendment was conceived before the government amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, were tabled. I do not believe that the government amendments provide an adequate answer to the problems. My subsidiary Amendments 55AFA and 55AFB, which seek to amend one of the government amendments, are testimony to this.
Amendment 55AE calls on the secretary of State to make regulations that will ensure that the independent electricity generators that employ renewable technologies will find a route to market for their produce. We are aware that the Government are relying on those enterprises to provide a large proportion of the investment in renewable electricity generation: the figure is anything between 35% and 50% of the new investment. There is also a widely perceived danger that, in the absence of further provisions in the Bill, the independent generators will be squeezed out of the market. The reality is that the big six electricity firms, who supply more than 90% of the electricity that is sold to consumers and businesses, have been expanding their generating portfolios to include an increasing proportion of renewable energy. In the process, they have been dispensing with the services of the independent generators. The renewables obligation, which for a while was effective in obliging the big six to purchase the output of the independent generators, is becoming ever less effective in sustaining them. The suspension of the renewables obligation in 2017 would surely spell the doom of the independents unless some effective measures are enacted to prevent that.