Water Bill

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, these amendments, tabled by my noble friends Lord Selborne and Lord Moynihan, seek to introduce a fundamental change which would narrow the approach to upstream competition in this Bill by removing the link between upstream arrangements and retail arrangements with customers. They would mean that licensees would be able to make arrangements with incumbent water companies to provide water and sewerage services without needing to have a specific customer to consume the water or use the sewerage services through the retail market. The implication is therefore that the market might be established through incumbents tendering for new resources under a so-called single buyer model. This would be a significant change from the regime that has been in place since the Water Act 2003 and which we propose to extend through this Bill.

The current approach provides common carriage rights to licensees who want to provide their customers with water resources or sewerage treatment services using incumbents’ networks. Common carriage is the term used when new entrants are given rights to use incumbents’ networks to provide services to their customers. A single buyer approach is a very different model with decisions on tendering for water supplies or sewerage services resting with the incumbent. It provides fewer rights and less flexibility for new entrants.

The Water Act 2003 brought in a specific common carriage regime for new entrants to access the public supply system by making water supply a licensable activity. Under this regime, the same licensee that puts the water into the system must supply the retail services to the customer. The Bill reforms the existing regime by allowing different licensees to input water and provide retail services to eligible customers, but still requires there to be a specific customer. There is nothing in existing legislation that prevents incumbent water companies from making arrangements with third-party water suppliers or sewerage service providers to input water into the system or deal with sewerage disposal. Indeed, we are pleased to see that Thames Water has gone to the market to see which third parties could provide it with water in order for it to meet future water resource needs. Potential suppliers to Thames Water do not need a water supply licence to be able to make an input under this tendering process. There is no need to amend the Bill to make it possible for third-party suppliers to sell water to incumbents, should we feel this is the right way to go in the future. Clause 12 is designed to enable this. The Bill also provides for licensees to withdraw waste water and sludge from the sewerage system through the disposal authorisation in the sewerage licence. This could be used by Ofwat to introduce a similar model to a single buyer arrangement in the sewerage market if it feels that this would be appropriate.

Through the Bill, we are seeking to bring in new resources and introduce more innovation into the sector. My noble friends’ amendments would allow incumbents to dictate the future direction of upstream markets. This would reduce pressure on those incumbents to introduce efficiencies that will benefit customers and the environment because only those licensees that are able to bid for and win contracts would be able to enter the market. Incumbents rather than customers would therefore determine future upstream markets.

My noble friends have indicated that the main objective of the amendments is to remove risks connected with the de-averaging of water charges. As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, said, that is something which we will come to in a little more detail in the next group of amendments, but I hope that your Lordships will allow me to say a few words on it now in response to the contributions that have been made. There is a crystal clear steer from the Government in our charging principles that Ofwat must not allow de-averaging that is harmful to customers. Ofwat has all the necessary regulatory tools to enable it to limit the effect of de-averaging on customer charges. Ofwat has clearly stated that it believes that these tools are sufficient. The Government’s charging principles make it plain that Ofwat must use these tools to ensure that any de-averaging or cost reflectivity is in the overall interests of customers. Two independent experts have reviewed the issue of de-averaging: Professor George Yarrow for Ofwat and Professor Martin Cave for the Consumer Council for Water. Both experts confirmed that Ofwat can facilitate upstream competition without any de-averaging. De-averaging has not happened in other regulated utility sectors, even though greater proportions of those markets are open to competition, and it is no more likely to happen in the water sector.

I stress again that the Bill puts in place a framework that enables household customers to be protected against any changes to their bills resulting from the expansion of the competitive market. Our charging guidance will explicitly say that de-averaging must occur only where it is in the best interests of customers.

My noble friend Lord Selborne raised the case of Shotton as a legal precedent to support the case that de-averaging is a real risk. It is a complex and long-running case, but I hope I can persuade him that it is a misunderstanding to describe it as a case of de-averaging. Shotton was a very unusual case and it is not appropriate to extrapolate from it more widely. For example, it concerned a discrete system that served only two customers, one of which was served by Albion Water. This is very rare. To give some context, the case only represented 0.01% of Welsh Water’s turnover. At the time of the dispute, this agreement was not subject to regulation by Ofwat. The Bill includes measures that will bring all such transfers within the scope of the regulatory regime. Ministerial guidance and Ofwat’s charging rules will therefore set out how charges between water companies and inset appointees such as Albion Water should be determined in future.

My noble friend raised the concern that EU competition law might require that indiscriminate de-averaging takes place, affecting both business and household customers. First and foremost, there is no general prohibition under competition law against the use of average pricing. In fact, it is common practice in both regulated and unregulated sectors. The obvious examples are the gas, electricity and telecoms sectors. In each of these regulated, networked sectors, regionally averaged prices have remained the norm. There is no suggestion that this approach is inconsistent with competition law.

My noble friends Lord Moynihan and Lord Crickhowell referred to parallels with the Scottish system where there is no upstream competition. In England, we have a very different market structure and a different set of resource challenges. We are learning from the example of Scotland where it is appropriate to do so but they are different systems and their regulation will accordingly be different. Perhaps we might discuss the Scottish situation in more detail in subsequent groups of amendments.

My noble friends’ amendments remove the direct risk of de-averaging but may not lead to a better outcome for customers. They could still see an increase in charges if incumbents introduced overly burdensome standards in tendering contracts or made poor decisions over which bids to accept. Ultimately, incumbents would not be incentivised to make their upstream services more efficient and would continue to be incentivised to make decisions that benefit themselves rather than customers.

Given that these amendments considerably narrow the scope of competition in the sector, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, I was not expecting a resounding round of applause from the Minister for these proposals, which are fairly fundamental in tackling the whole concept. Nevertheless, the Committee should look seriously at precedents, such as Shotton, which, the Minister assures me can be ignored because it is almost irrelevant. When we have an example of a court case which has determined that the price of the local supply of water should prevail, there is, I suggest, quite a threat that this could be rolled out on a larger scale. I think we should take note of that.

We are effectively being assured that Ofwat will have the ability to regulate contracts made between the wholesaler and the retailer. We will come later in other amendments to test the extent to which Ofwat has sufficient powers and codes to ensure that these contracts do not ultimately work to the disadvantage of, for example, rural communities and others. I am not entirely clear why my noble friend is so certain that this puts the incumbent in a stronger position than he might otherwise be, because you are effectively getting back to the same position, which is that Ofwat, under the Bill, has to determine any contract.

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[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments and I have put my name to my noble friend Lord Moynihan’s amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is absolutely right to recognise that the more you put provisions in the Bill that help the Minister in his resolve to prevent de-averaging the better. It cannot do much harm. As you bring in competition, we see all sorts of snares and pitfalls in the way of Ofwat’s best intentions to prevent simple pricing determining the advantage. If Ofwat cannot do so—and we are still to test to what extent we find that Ofwat is capable of appropriate regulation of those individual contracts—provision such as that in Amendment 9 will clearly be helpful.

The real danger, after all, is that some retail providers could, for example, be providing excellent environmental and social services. They could be rolling out water butts, helping water harvesting and giving advice on water-saving gadgets. Those do not come free; they cost a bit. If they are competing against someone who is providing just a short, sharp service—the product in question at the cheapest price with none of those frills—we will eventually undermine those whom the Bill is intended to encourage, those with innovative practices that will lead to more sustainable use of water. Although I am all in favour of increasing the range of negotiation, we simply cannot allow the only differentiation to be on charges. That is why I think that the amendments are helpful.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, before I address this group of amendments, perhaps I may answer the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and my noble friend Lady Parminter, who asked about the truncated period between Committee and Report. I fear that these things are way above my pay grade and are decided through the usual channels. All I can do is apologise to noble Lords for any inconvenience that that may have caused and assure noble Lords that my door remains open. I will be there to answer questions between days in Committee and between Committee and Report; I hope that I can be helpful.

Turning to this group of amendments, I thank noble Lords for some articulate speeches about a complicated issue. It is one that we take very seriously. As noble Lords said in earlier debates, this is not an easy area to get one’s head around. Specifically on de-averaging, when we talk about averaging or de-averaging of costs, we are discussing how best to share the costs of sourcing and disposing of water between customers. Most providers of goods and services average their costs to some extent.

In my view, it makes sense to share the costs of maintaining the network on which all customers rely across all customers, regardless of their location. The network makes up about 90% of a water company’s assets, so when we discuss de-averaging in the context of the Bill, we are talking only about charges in the competitive part of the market, which accounts for about 10% of the companies’ activity. I think that many noble Lords agree that there could be real benefits from increasing the cost-reflectivity of charges for different sources of water to reflect the environmental costs of supply. That is especially important in water-stressed areas or for business users that use large volumes of water.

Strange as it may seem, at present, there are almost no economic incentives for businesses that use large volumes of water to seek out the least environmentally damaging source of water. Nor are there any economic incentives to encourage incumbent water companies or new entrants to the market to help businesses to identify the most environmentally efficient sources of water. The Bill is intended to change that. Our upstream reforms will encourage competition for business customers and incentivise more efficient use of resources. More efficient use of water resources must be good for customers and good for the environment.

I discussed earlier the measures in place to ensure that householders are protected. In regard to de-averaging, as I said in the debate on the previous group, we are clear in our charging principles that de-averaging must occur only where it is in the best interests of customers. In answer to my noble friend Lord Moynihan, when we issue the charging guidance we will make it clear that there must be robust boundaries on the scope of any de-averaging. In particular, Ofwat will be expected to exert control to prevent the de-averaging of network costs and any negative bill impacts that could arise from this. Any moves to enable greater cost reflectivity will be targeted squarely on water resource costs in the competitive parts of the market. This is where there may be social and environmental benefits from encouraging sharper price signals. The Government are completely committed to maintaining bill stability. Customers have made it clear repeatedly that stability is important to them. We will not permit anything that undermines that stability.

The charging rules that Ofwat makes, within the framework set by the Government’s charging guidance, will be flexible. As the situation changes over time, our guidance and the rules that Ofwat sets about charges will be able to respond to the way in which the market evolves. I mentioned earlier that it makes sense to provide a price signal that reflects important decisions about our precious water resources. Using the Bill to ban any kind of price signal would, I suggest, be disproportionate. At the same time, we want to ensure that customer bills remain stable and reasonable. The flexible framework of charging guidance and charging rules will achieve this.

The suggestion was made in the debate that customers could end up paying for stranded assets. This is a regulated sector and the important question of what costs should be borne by customers is one for the regulator. In fact, this point is less about de-averaging than about whether the investment made by incumbent water and sewerage companies is made efficiently and in the interests of customers. No one here, I suggest, would think it right that customers should have to foot the bill for inefficient investment. It must therefore be right that the regulator has the powers to protect customers from paying for inefficient investment.

My noble friend Lord Selborne asked how Ofwat can enforce rules on de-averaging. The charging rules produced by Ofwat will regulate the price relationship between the incumbent and the licensee. It will be able to set out how incumbents apportion the costs of the network and distribution. In making these decisions, it will need to take account of its duties, which include having regard to rural customers. It will also have to reflect the Government’s charging guidance. The Secretary of State can veto Ofwat’s charging rules if they do not reflect the guidance.

Noble Lords asked whether rural customers might lose out. Ofwat will continue to have a statutory duty to have particular regard to rural customers and the charging principles that the Government published recently reinforce the protections that will remain for rural customers. They require Ofwat to ensure that any greater cost reflectivity must provide benefits to customers. No customers should be unfairly disadvantaged by the way that reform impacts on water charges. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, referred to water being a universal right and I strongly agree. Water companies are under a statutory duty to supply and the Bill will not change that fundamental requirement.

I mentioned earlier that both Professor George Yarrow and Professor Martin Cave confirmed that Ofwat has the tools to regulate the upstream market without any de-averaging. The Bill will impose a legally binding framework for the industry and the regulator regarding their approach to the averaging of prices. This view is supported by competition experts. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will be reassured and be able to withdraw his amendment.

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[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Moynihan and welcome the tenor of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester.

I think that we are agreeing that common industry codes are critical. No one dissents from that. We come back to the question of the extent to which the existing codes, as written in the Bill, deliver these common codes and standards. New entrants simply cannot be allowed to be discriminated against by incumbents. Without a doubt, we have seen this in other utilities—in the rollout of broadband, for example. It is no coincidence that BT seems always to be on the inside track, so we should not be naive enough to think that the incumbent undertakers are not always going to try to ensure that they see off any competition. Later we will talk about discounts and special charges. These do happen. They need to be regulated and, in so far as these amendments help establish the principle that there should be common industry codes, I welcome them.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, as noble Lords have explained, the purpose of these amendments is to ensure that access to the retail market is regulated to minimise burdens and make access to the market simpler. I agree that requiring all licensees to negotiate with each of the 21 incumbent water companies to enter the market would represent a considerable burden on the market participants and undermine what we are trying to achieve with our reforms.

Schedule 4 of the Water Act 2003 inserted current new Sections 66A(2) and 66D(2) into the Water Industry Act. These placed the incumbent water company under a duty to make a water supply agreement on certain terms agreed with the licensee or determined by Ofwat. This duty has been interpreted to mean that each individual agreement between an incumbent water company and licensee must be negotiated, or imposed by Ofwat where the parties are unable to agree. Ofwat has produced guidance to facilitate negotiations, but the parties to these agreements could ignore the guidance and come to their own agreement. This is clearly a considerable barrier to entry into the retail market in particular and one that provides unco-operative incumbents with an opportunity to delay the making of agreements, about which the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, and my noble friend Lord Selborne have rightly expressed concerns.

New Sections 66A and 66D will be repealed by this Bill, and replaced with a requirement that agreements between incumbent water companies and licensees must be in accordance with new, enforceable charging rules and codes produced by Ofwat. This will reduce burdens and costs on all parties, and speed up customer switching when the market expands to include 1.2 million potential customers. Schedule 4 creates the same requirements for sewerage arrangements.

There has been some confusion as to the wording of some parts of Schedules 2 and 4 that might lead some to assume that a licensee will be able to enter the retail market only through a complex series of negotiations with every incumbent water company in England. For example, new Section 66DA states that codes may include provisions about procedures in connection with making a Section 66D agreement. This is not the case. We need some flexibility about allowing a certain level of negotiation in some cases, particularly for the upstream markets; negotiations might address water quality and environmental conditions specific to a locality in a water company’s area. We also want licensees to have some flexibility to negotiate innovative new ways of doing things. Market codes will be able to set out the circumstances when such negotiations would be appropriate or inappropriate. I draw noble Lords’ attention to new Section 66DA(2)(c) and (d) and new Section 117F(2)(c) and (d).

My noble friend Lord Moynihan referred to functional separation and we will discuss specific amendments on that matter in a little while, and perhaps I can address that at that point. He also referred to the regime in Scotland and the fact that it provides only for regulated access. Scottish legislation is silent on the need for WICS to produce codes to make the market work. WICS took the decision to regulate access to the retail market and Ofwat and the Open Water programme are taking the same approach. It is worth noting that there is no competition in Scotland for wholesale supplies of water. The two markets are therefore clearly not directly comparable.

I am happy to tell my noble friend that paragraph 5 of Schedule 2, which inserts new Section 66E into the Water Industry Act 1991, and new Section 117L, inserted by Schedule 4, already provide Ofwat with powers to regulate these charges between incumbents and licensees, and that Ofwat may make rules about their publication.

The Bill regulates licensees’ access to the supply and sewerage systems of the quasi-monopolistic incumbents only. We see no need to regulate arrangements between licensees themselves, as they all start on the same footing. That is competition and it will be left to market forces. I hope that my noble friend will therefore feel able to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, perhaps I may start by saying that our approach to retail competition is being developed jointly with the industry, along with the England and Scottish regulators, and others. This group is well placed to identify the conditions that will work best in England, capturing any lessons learnt and building on the Scottish experience.

I am not sure how a no-detriment duty would sit alongside the general duty for the Secretary of State and Ofwat to secure that licensees meet their statutory obligations and the conditions of their licences, given that these are set by the existing duties on Ofwat and Ministers. Ofwat is under a general duty to ensure that incumbents are able to finance their statutory functions. This duty enables Ofwat to create the right incentives to ensure that incumbents can benefit from investments that deliver improved water efficiency in their respective areas. It is suggested that incumbents may show preference to licensees that do not concentrate on water efficiency activities. This is addressed through Clause 23, which requires Ofwat to ensure that incumbent water companies do not discriminate in the provision of services. Ofwat is also able to address such issues through its Competition Act power, which incidentally is a power that WICS does not have in Scotland. In England and Wales, both incumbents and licensees are subject to a duty under the Water Industry Act 1991 to help their respective customers conserve water. I would not want to undermine the market for water efficiency services. I am sure that that was not an intended impact of the amendment.

Curbing the licensees’ water efficiency activities could also put them at a competitive disadvantage if a similar duty was not placed on the retail side of the incumbent’s business. Why should licensees be kept under a duty which potentially curbs their water efficiency activities, while an incumbent’s retail business is allowed to operate without this barrier? Amendments 46 and 53, in particular, may be a barrier to licensees working with customers to become more water-efficient because they impose a condition that any new arrangements designed to reduce pressure on networks must not impose any more costs on incumbent water companies. This same requirement is not being placed on the incumbents’ retail businesses through these amendments. A no-detriment clause works in Scotland due to its circumstances, having just one incumbent retailer and wholesaler. It simply will not work in the same way in England and Wales. For that reason, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, I shall come to the no-detriment clause in a moment. The earlier four amendments deal with strengthening the codes for Ofwat, and I am fairly confident that the more robust the powers that Ofwat has to prevent discrimination the better.

I simply do not understand why, if the no-detriment clause works in Scotland, where there is one undertaker—one company—it would not work if there is more than one. I think that the case becomes stronger, not weaker. However, I will read with some care what the Minister said because I suspect that the whole area of a no-detriment clause is something that we will want to come back to at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, we now come to special charges, which I have to admit were a bit of a mystery to me. I did not even realise that they existed. Clause 33(2) on page 81 of the Bill amends Section 142 of the Water Industry Act 1999 so that there is a duty on incumbents to notify Ofwat if they make an individual charging agreement with a customer that is not covered by a charging scheme. In other words, they are special agreements. Ofwat already requires information provided by incumbents about those special charging agreements.

Special charging agreements have the potential to undermine just about everything we have been talking about. Once there is a special agreement, which by its nature is not a common agreement, it flies in the face of the excellent provisions in the Bill, not least to ensure that there is a level playing field and transparency. We need to establish just how many such special agreements are in place at the moment. Amendment 106 does that. It would amend Schedule 2 to require Ofwat to review existing special agreements and assess the charges payable under these agreements. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that such agreements that depart from the charging schemes are appropriately regulated in future. I would have thought that that was pretty uncontroversial, and I hope that the Minister agrees.

Amendment 103 requires any future special agreement to be allowed only if a customer has done, or has agreed to do, something that reduces or increases the costs incurred by an undertaker. Such agreement would have to receive the consent of Ofwat. In other words, there cannot be a deal that is specific to that particular customer. We would lose the averaging principle that we hold so dear. New Section 66E(3) is the basis on which Ofwat establishes these special charges. I am keen to ensure that Ofwat first makes it absolutely clear how many special charges exist at the moment and, above all, does not allow any future special charges, unless there is a reason that is transparent, obvious and does not undermine the averaging principle. I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, my noble friend would introduce changes to the way in which incumbent water companies’ special charging arrangements for customers operate in the reformed market. Special charging arrangements come about when incumbent water companies depart from published charges schemes to allow discounts on the wholesale element of a water charge where a customer, for example, agrees to do something to reduce pressure on a network or has made a contribution to a capital project carried out by an incumbent.

Amendment 103 would require Ofwat to approve special charging arrangements for licensees before they are put in place. Amendments 44 and 48 remove powers for Ofwat to introduce charging rules under Schedules 2 and 4 that would allow customers who receive discounts to switch to a licensee without losing those discounts. Amendments 106, 131, 166 and 169 will initially require incumbents, within one month of Royal Assent, to notify Ofwat of all existing special charging arrangements that are in place. However, Ofwat already collects and publishes information on special charging arrangements on an annual basis, which means that it is not necessary for the Bill to be changed for Ofwat to obtain details of historical agreements. The amendments would also require Ofwat to make and publish a determination about the appropriateness of these historical charges, publish details of its determination, and control the charges between the incumbent and the licensee as well as the price that the licensee can charge the customer from then on.

As part of the review of price limits for 2015 to 2020, Ofwat requires incumbent water companies to separate out the retail and wholesale components of the charges. Ofwat will be able to assess the appropriateness of such charges during this process and introduce charging rules under Schedules 2 and 4 to ensure that licensees will be able to access wholesale charges at a competitive rate and compete with incumbents on the retail element of the special charges. For example, rules can ensure that costs are properly allocated between the retail and wholesale elements of the special charge. Ministers will also be able to give their views on the content of charging rules.

Importantly, the change introduced by Clause 33 will place incumbents under an enforceable duty to report new special charging arrangements to Ofwat as soon as they are made. Clause 33 comes into force two months after Royal Assent. This provision also requires Ofwat to publish details of these arrangements in its register, which is available on its website. Taken together, Clause 33 and Schedules 2 and 4 deliver most of what my noble friend wants to achieve through his amendments. Like my noble friend, we want to increase transparency around the setting of new special charges to enable the beneficiaries to be able to switch to a licensee and still retain their discounts on wholesale charges, if appropriate. As part of the price review process for April 2015, when new price limits are introduced, Ofwat will be able to assess the appropriateness of existing special charges ahead of the retail market opening. With these assurances, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, I draw some comfort from my noble friend’s response. I think we all agree that special charges represent a potential Trojan horse and are not to be encouraged. In so far as they can be transparent, reduced or even eliminated, that would surely be helpful. I should like to think that Ofwat would trenchantly make it clear that it is not in favour of special agreements, and that any special agreements would be published in a transparent and open way annually, as I understand the Minister says Ofwat does and will do. Above all, Ofwat should make it clear to the industry that it does not expect special agreements to be common practice, and should be countenanced only under exceptional circumstances. With that assurance from the Minister, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Water Bill

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Tuesday 4th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, Amendment 108 refers to the rights to discharge and its purpose is to support the installation of sustainable urban drainage systems, or SUDS. It is generally recognised that SUDS are part of the long-term solution towards the sustainable use and drainage of water. They improve surface water management and reduced the risk of flooding, and they may include rain gardens, permeable paving, swales and the like. They are designed to collect water and release it slowly back into the environment.

Clause 21, which we have just agreed, clarifies the function of a sewerage undertaker under the Water Industry Act 1991 to include the building and maintenance of SUDS features, so we are here to promote SUDS and the Bill does that. However, there is a problem. To install a SUDS scheme an undertaker, a water company or a drainage company has at present to negotiate the right of discharge. Without such a right or with the prospect of costly negotiations and litigation—there has been plenty of that—there is little incentive to deliver SUDS schemes as opposed to surface water sewers.

The amendment would remove this uncertainty, which has led to litigation and to a lack of incentive for the installation of SUDS. It helps sewerage undertakers to deliver SUDS schemes. We are of course awaiting secondary legislation, which is a separate issue, on the maintenance and the issues with local government on SUDS. That apart, this deals with a much more fundamental issue. It would resolve the legal uncertainty that has arisen since 1989, when a previous water Bill removed the right of sewerage undertakers to discharge. The amendment would therefore restore the legal position to where it was before 1989, when sewerage undertakers had a statutory right, as highway authorities still have, to discharge pure water into any watercourse. I emphasise that it has to be pure; no one is suggesting that there should be a licence to pollute in any shape or form.

At the moment traditional pipe discharges, which are inferior in many respects to SUDS, as I have explained, can be acquired by compulsory purchase powers. However, again, under the Bill we are not extending compulsory purchase powers to SUDS. I am not suggesting that they should be but that once you have the right to discharge, these powers will give an incentive for SUDS to be installed. That incentive is greatly needed, and I beg to move.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the importance of sustainable drainage systems and I agree with him on this. I can confirm—my noble friend referred briefly to this—that we plan to bring forward the secondary legislation needed to implement Schedule 3 of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 by April this year, and to commence it at the earliest possible opportunity.

I appreciate, also, that the issue of the right to discharge water is important for sewerage undertakers. However, this is not, by any means, a straightforward issue and there are more interests which would need to be taken into consideration, including the impact on landowners and bill payers. The amendment would allow the discharge of water without express consent. It suggests that compensation should be paid if there is any damage but that no permission needs to be sought. Interference with third parties’ land rights would need careful and detailed consideration.

Current case law suggests that there is no general right to discharge without compensation under the Water Industry Act 1991, for sewerage undertakers or others. Private parties who wish to discharge water on to other parties’ land or into other parties’ assets such as lakes, canals or rivers have to negotiate an agreement to discharge water with the owners.

As my noble friend knows, a challenge to the existing case law on whether there is a right to discharge has been made and will go before the Supreme Court in May. I am sure noble Lords understand that it would not be appropriate to comment on that case. In the circumstances, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[The Earl of Selborne]

I am grateful to my noble friend. The fact that this has led to such protracted, expensive and time-consuming litigation demonstrates that the law was left in an ambiguous situation—to put it at its kindest—after 1989. The issue clearly has to be resolved but whether the Supreme Court is the right organisation to do so is another matter. I think it would be more appropriate for it to be done by an appropriate Act of Parliament. This is not asking for something particularly unusual. As I said, highways authorities have the right to discharge at the moment. Before 1989, sewerage undertakers had the right to discharge. If landowners found themselves inconvenienced, it would only be in the sense that they were reverting to a situation to which they had been quite accustomed.

I have heard what the Minister says and accept that, with a case in the Supreme Court, he is constrained from discussing the detail. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Golden Rice

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Thursday 17th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, of course the noble Countess makes a really important point. However, we have to say that developing countries are capable, and are proceeding and doing a lot of work themselves to feed their populations. We are talking specifically about how we can help them in the area of genetically modified food, which will increase the vitamin A that is so necessary, in particular to reduce blindness.

[The Earl of Selborne (Con)]

Does my noble friend accept that the exciting new technologies owe much to research in this country, and does he therefore accept that funding research here is a very effective way for us to tackle the urgent issue of food security around the globe?

[Lord De Mauley]

Yes, my Lords.

Bees

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Tuesday 30th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

I am grateful. These are not covered by the restrictions as they are of relatively low acute toxicity to bees. The restrictions apply to the remaining three neonicotinoids—which I hope noble Lords will permit me not to pronounce—and are intended to remove those uses that might cause bees to be exposed to the compounds. Therefore, uses permitted include spray applications made to crops after they have flowered.

[The Earl of Selborne]

I declare an interest as food grower; my living therefore depends on pollination. Does the Minister accept that, while it is very important to protect bees, it is equally important to protect all insect pollinators? Therefore we have to make sure that their habitat is conserved, which is a much wider issue than just protecting honey bees.

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, yes. We have had this discussion in your Lordships’ House before. I was pleased to announce recently that we are developing a national pollinator strategy precisely because of the concerns my noble friend raised.

Thames Tideway Tunnel

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Wednesday 24th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, surely an infrastructure project of this lifespan, expense and complexity should deliver more than just a cleaner river. Is my noble friend confident that the project will deliver flood-risk management, drought management, nature conservation and reuse of water, all of which future generations would certainly expect from a project of this size?

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, my noble friend makes an important point. Of course, the primary purpose of the tunnel is to reduce the impact of sewage pollution on the river, thus, I think, indirectly contributing to recreation by giving us a cleaner river. However, my noble friend’s question leads me to the broader point, which is that the tunnel on its own is not enough. We also need sustainable drainage systems. I was visiting some very innovative solutions today in Herne Hill. Those solutions are not able to deal with the whole problem on their own either, but they can directly contribute to flood—particularly surface water—and drought management, conservation, recreation and better public places.

Flooding: Insurance

Debate between Lord De Mauley and Earl of Selborne

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, I had hoped we might have a constructive debate about this. However, since the noble Lord has raised the common agricultural policy, perhaps I should say that it was Labour’s leadership in the last round of CAP reform that cost us €550 million in disallowance and led us to the disastrous administration of the single farm payment. We, by contrast, are tackling another immensely complex negotiation on flood insurance in a measured and sensible way. We have to balance the interests of those at high risk of flood, wider policyholders and taxpayers, while the ABI is a membership organisation with a lot of interests to represent. The noble Lord asks about an opportunity to debate the eventual outcome. I would be pleased about that; it is not my role to guarantee it, but I am sure that we will have a chance to do that.

[The Earl of Selborne]

My Lords, to bring the question back to flood insurance, has my noble friend looked at the precedent in America, and are there lessons to be learnt as to how to deal with flood insurance from the treatment of vulnerable homeowners in America?

[Lord De Mauley]

My Lords, that is something to which we have given considerable thought. However, international comparisons provide no clear model. The state-backed national disaster insurance system in the US was in debt to the taxpayer by $17 billion even before Hurricane Sandy struck. Emergency legislation was required in January 2013 to increase the fund’s borrowing by $9.7 billion when the scheme was days from running out of money, to enable claims to be paid. So we have considered it, but it has its limitations.