(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we are legislating in Clause 119 to double the maximum fine available to punish the persistent sale of alcohol to persons under 18 from £10,000 to £20,000. The amendment seeks to go further in doubling the maximum fines available for two other offences in the Licensing Act 2003, from their current level of £5,000 to £10,000. The offences relate to where a person buys or attempts to buy alcohol on behalf of a person under 18, or where a person buys or attempts to buy alcohol for consumption on licensed premises by a person under the age of 18.
At a first glance, we can see merit in the proposed new clause. My noble friend and I are absolutely with the noble Baroness in her strong feelings about the proxy purchase of alcohol for minors, and we take this very seriously. I hope that the noble Baroness will recall how we have responded to related amendments in earlier discussions in Committee. However, it is important to maintain consistency in the sentencing framework.
In addition to the two offences that I mentioned, a number of other offences currently exist for offences in the sale of alcohol to those under 18 or the consumption by those under 18 on licensed premises. They include knowingly allowing consumption of alcohol on licensed premises by an individual under 18. For all these other offences, the penalty is a maximum sentence of £5,000—level 5 on the standard scale in the sentencing framework.
In our view, however, the offence of persistently selling alcohol to children is distinct and distinguishable from the other offences in the Licensing Act and merits separate treatment in the Bill. It is far the more serious offence, not simply a one-off sale to or involving a person under the age of 18. This is reflected in the higher fine that the courts can impose for it. The offence of persistent sales to a person under 18 was created specifically to target irresponsible businesses rather than individual offenders. Indeed, there is an alternative to criminal prosecution for such premises—a punitive period of closure.
The fine for the offence of persistent sales, which stands at £10,000, was always intended to be set above the level 5 fine in the sentencing framework. The fine was high to reflect the seriousness of the offence and to reflect the intention of targeting irresponsible businesses.
In the Government’s view, increasing the maximum fine for the offence of the proxy purchase of alcohol for children, but not for others where individual adults have been responsible for providing or attempting to provide alcohol to children, could blur the existing distinctions in fines under the sentencing framework between offences targeting individuals rather than premises. In summary, we believe that the existing penalty for the proxy purchase of alcohol—a fine not exceeding £5,000—is sufficiently punitive for an offence by an individual. Yes, it is a serious offence, but not one that should be singled out for the provision of a greater fine than those for similar offences in the Licensing Act 2003 relating to the provision of alcohol to minors.
For these reasons, and having thought about it carefully, we believe that the offence of persistent sales of alcohol to children is sufficiently separate and easy to distinguish from the range of other alcohol-related offences in the Licensing Act. We want to send a clear message to irresponsible businesses that the persistent sale of alcohol to children is totally unacceptable. This is why we want to double the fine. All that I have said, however, should not be taken to mean that we will not look at the other alcohol-related criminal offences and consider whether further changes should be made in cases such as those that noble Lords have raised. Indeed, the Government are committed to a full examination of sentencing policy across the board. I can also say that we will look at the points raised by noble Lords in the context of the alcohol strategy that will be published later this year. For the reasons that I have outlined, we ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
My Lords, I am grateful for the support expressed by other noble Lords for the amendment. I cannot say that I accept the logic that proxy purchase is an offence of such a different order from persistent sales to children as the Government suggest. I stress that I am not seeking to make the maximum fine the same, but just to apply the same principle of doubling that fine as a signal that the harm and potential harm behind that offence is recognised.
I do not accept that my amendment would blur the distinction between the offences. However, I am encouraged by the Government's signal that the dangers of proxy purchase will be looked at again in the context of the revised strategy that we are expecting in the autumn and of a more widespread look at sentencing policy in general. Perhaps we can return to the issue, because it will continue to cause harm, and there is a higher incidence of proxy purchase than of persistent sales to children. The issue will not go away but, for the moment, I am content to withdraw my amendment.