UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord De Mauley Excerpts

Thursday 9th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord De Mauley (Con)]

My Lords, I rise as the current chairman of the International Relations and Defence Committee. I very much thank my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and the committee’s members for their work on this important report. Although I did not join the committee until it had completed this report, I hope noble Lords will bear with me if I take this opportunity to focus on the pressing matter of the security of our critical national infrastructure in the face of emerging threats, particularly those being manifested in and coming from the Arctic.

The European Arctic has increasingly become an area of strategic importance. The rising tensions between NATO and Russia have created unprecedented security dynamics in the region. The Arctic and the Baltic regions are viewed as integral to Russia’s strategic interests. The Arctic’s difficult environment and related challenges for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance make that region particularly conducive to tactics which are difficult to detect. Russia has developed a range of capabilities to sabotage and disrupt critical infrastructure, including undersea data cables in the Arctic and further afield.

These specialist capabilities for deep-sea maritime sabotage are based on the Kola peninsula, which borders the European Arctic. Recent hybrid attacks, including deliberate disruption of undersea cables—one as recent as Christmas Day, as the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said—and heightened surveillance activities highlight the vulnerability. Our critical national infrastructure, particularly subsea telecommunications cables, energy infrastructure and maritime communication networks, is facing a growing number of risks.

We are witnessing a troubling shift towards more aggressive tactics. NATO and western intelligence services have warned that Russia is behind a growing number of hostile activities across the Euro-Atlantic area. The interconnectedness of our modern world means that a single incident away from our shores can have far-reaching consequences. In January 2022, one of two subsea data cables connecting Norway’s Svalbard archipelago and the Norwegian mainland was damaged. Although it did not result in prolonged disruption, it clearly demonstrated the capabilities of a hostile actor and should serve as a wake-up call to the United Kingdom and our allies.

Russian naval intelligence, under the guise of oceanographic research, operates vessels such as the “Admiral Vladimirsky”, which is designed, among other things, for maritime sabotage. Moreover, civilian ships, including fishing trawlers, are being used to survey and potentially attack infrastructure in shallower waters, such as those in the North Sea. In spring 2023, four Nordic broadcasting companies mapped suspicious trajectories of Russian fishing trawlers, research vessels and merchant ships travelling in the region and detected 50 ships that appeared to be collecting data along the seabed and monitoring military and other sensitive activities. In November 2022, the “Admiral Vladimirsky” was spotted loitering near the RAF’s maritime patrol base at Lossiemouth in the United Kingdom. It also passed suspiciously close to several UK offshore windfarms.

Returning to the experience of our Arctic partners, Norway, now Europe’s primary gas supplier, has been the subject of increased Russian surveillance of its energy infrastructure. Any disruption to its energy production would pose a significant risk for Europe’s overall energy security. Since Sweden’s NATO accession, several Swedish organisations have fallen victim to cyberattacks carried out by groups of hackers suspected of having ties to Russia. In this context, international collaboration is essential. Also important is collaboration between Governments and industry, as private companies often possess extensive monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The Norwegian oil and gas sector alone, for example, has 600 remotely operated underwater surveillance vehicles. The committee heard during its inquiry that military-civilian partnerships could considerably enhance deterrence. When infrastructure is designated for both civilian and military use, adversaries could perceive that the risk of sabotage leading to escalation would increase.

State collaboration with major tech companies will also be crucial for ensuring cyber resilience. As we confront the growing challenges to our critical national infrastructure, the role of our Reserve Forces becomes vital. Noble Lords may recall my interest in reservist service, as set out in the register. Our reservists, drawn from all parts of society, possess unique skill sets, linguistic capabilities, technical expertise and adaptable professional backgrounds that are invaluable. They can significantly enhance our capabilities and societal resilience in a way that is cost effective. However, in order fully to realise the potential of our Reserve Forces, we must ensure they are adequately funded, equipped and supported. This involves investing in their training and resources and recognising the invaluable contributions they make to our national security. The dismantling of mechanisms for mobilisation and civil defence after the Cold War has left us vulnerable. There is an urgent need for a whole-of-government effort to build resilience and improve protection of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. New Reserve Forces are needed to provide this protection.

The UK is far from immune to the hybrid threats experienced by Russia’s neighbours in the European Arctic. The protection of our critical national infrastructure is a pressing concern that requires our immediate attention. Reserve Forces, with their unique skills and expertise, are essential in addressing this challenge. I call on the Government, through the SDR, to prioritise the development and support of our Reserve Forces and recognise the vital role they play in defending our nation’s interests.