Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Baroness Finlay of Llandaff

Friday 7th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but I must intervene on him. I said nothing designed to impugn the good faith and sincerity of anyone in this House, let alone people who have gone to the trouble of producing these amendments. What I said was that, whether it is intended or not, many of these amendments would have consequences in terms of time and cost, and it would be wrong of us to underestimate those consequences—and certainly very wrong frivolously to dismiss that whole issue, as happened this morning.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

Would the noble Lord accept the premise that we are trying to provide the evidence based on what we know happens elsewhere? My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson outlined a reality—that we know reports come from those countries that have changed the law about patients whose symptoms are not being addressed in the days between the time that it has been agreed and when they have their lethal overdose. That is a reality that we abhor.

I would like to correct the perception about palliative sedation to which the noble Lord referred, as it is important that people out there do not have the misconception that patients are either not consulted about treatment decisions or that they are put into some kind of coma by those who are looking after them.

The evidence from Holland was presented at the international conference on clinical ethics in Paris in April this year. In Holland, about 2.7% of all deaths are from euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. Their regime of palliative sedation is used in between 12% and 16% of cases. That is completely different from what we do here. In this country we may use sedation, titrating the drugs up temporarily to get on top of symptoms but then lowering the dose again and adjusting it to meet the patient’s needs. That is quite different from deliberately using a dose of drugs to induce coma and using uncontrolled escalations of opioids and benzodiazepine cocktails to produce absolute loss of awareness as a therapeutic goal. There is concern among those of us who are operating in palliative care in this country about that way of managing patients at the end of life. That is not standard practice here.

If the noble Lord would like to look at the recommendations on the use of sedative drugs at the end of life, I would be happy to take him through them. They are on various therapeutic websites. However, I hope he will accept that what may be said casually by people and propaganda is not necessarily what should happen, and that nobody condones the withdrawal of fluids and dehydrating people until they die. That was exactly why the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, undertook an inquiry into the Liverpool care pathway. It was misused because that was not what the relevant document said should happen. That was abuse, not treatment.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Stamford and Baroness Finlay of Llandaff

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group which really builds on the amendment already spoken to comprehensively and efficiently by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—that is, to not impose a burden on providers in the process.

One of the difficulties in any type of regulation or inspection is that it is very easy for those who are doing the inspection to require more and more data from a provider to support whatever they view as their outcome and their inspection processes. There is a real danger in here that sometimes the regulatory processes can develop a life of their own, and, quite inadvertently, become a burden on providers. We have already seen that occur with some of the current inspection processes in place, which seem to have collected an inordinate amount of data sometimes, but have missed out on real deficits in care.

It is a paramount duty towards the safety of people who use healthcare services, and built into that of course will be good clinical outcomes, because bad clinical outcomes will be unsafe in the process. However, it is also a suggestion—and this is therefore a probing amendment—that the regulatory burden on the providers must not be excessive. They must be able to deliver patient care without diverting resources away from it in order to meet requirements from a regulator.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, I find it not entirely surprising that a number of us this afternoon have found it difficult to know at exactly what point we should be making the contribution that we wanted to make, because of course there is an immense overlap between the themes that all the clauses we have been reviewing today have brought forward.

All those clauses, and most of the amendments to them, necessarily derive from a single decision by the Government. This was the decision that they wanted to distance the Secretary of State from the operations of the health service and superimpose a set of bureaucracies and regulators that would in future take on the responsibility that the Secretary of State has had until now. That was a decision that has had, and will have, a lot of consequences.

Three consequences in particular are very unfortunate. The first is that there will inevitably be a lack of transparency. You may impose on Monitor the obligation to produce the annual report and occasional statements on the decisions it takes, and impose on clinical commissioning boards, foundation trusts and other bodies within the NHS an obligation to try to relate to the local public and have meetings and report to them and so on. However, you will never get the degree of close oversight that you can get in Parliament when the important decisions are taken by the Secretary of State in Parliament, where they are subject to a weekly or, when necessary, daily scrutiny. That does not apply to the functional decisions, which I will come to in a moment. That is the first inevitable cost of this proposal by the Government.

The second consequence is the cost to democracy. People will no longer feel that the health service is being delivered by their democracy, or is part of their democracy. It will increasingly be delivered by relatively remote and autonomous bureaucracies which will no doubt be staffed by the most high-minded people—a sort of platonic mandarinate who will certainly deliver the best they can for the human beings in their care. However, that is a very different concept from the democratically driven concept of the National Health Service on which a lot of us were brought up and which was, of course, the vision of Beveridge and Bevan.

The third consequence, to which I turn in specific detail, relates directly to the clause and amendments before us. Many contradictions and conflicts of interest will be created in the organisations and bureaucracy that take over the Secretary of State’s role. Until now the Secretary of State has been responsible for taking those decisions that are properly political decisions in the true sense of the word. They involve priorities, value judgments, trade-offs and strategic decisions for the future, which have properly been decisions of the Secretary of State up to now. Many of them will now be taken by someone else, particularly Monitor, which will take over from the Secretary of State the job of making sure that the whole system works. I have no doubt that the Government hope that that will work out well, but I repeat that I think that the effort, the initiative, is misconceived.

Two types of conflict will inevitably be structurally hardwired into Monitor. There will be the functional conflicts to which I have already referred. Monitor has specific, specialised responsibility for licensing and overseeing foundation trusts and making sure that problems are ironed out. That is one particular sector on the provider side of the equation. It now has a whole lot of responsibility for everyone else on the provider side and for the supplier side. There are some inherent conflicts.

There are also philosophical conflicts. Monitor is being given very many criteria. Clause 59 sets out what probably most of us would write if we were asked to write the most important targets of the health service on the back of an envelope. However, there is no attempt to establish a hierarchy and there will be conflicts between them the whole time. In the short term at least there could be serious conflicts between increases in efficiency, for example in access and improvement in care, and in all the other virtuous objectives set out in that clause.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, have brought forward their own solution. They say, “Well, let us take one criteria, make that the overriding criteria and then Monitor won’t have a conflict any more”. That is how I understand the logic of what they propose. Perhaps I may disagree for a moment with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. It is not right to say that she builds on the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because her proposal comes under different criteria. The noble Lord thinks that the safety of the patient is the most important thing, and the noble Baroness thinks that it is not to place too great a burden on providers. Both are admirable considerations, but by definition they cannot both be the overriding determining consideration where there is otherwise a conflict between desirable objectives. That will occur the whole time. These two amendments highlight the problem created by the way that the Government have decided to approach the future of healthcare in this country.

I turn now to the Government’s answer to the problem that I have set out. It is quite extraordinary. Clause 63(2) states:

“Monitor must act so as to secure that there is not, and could not reasonably be regarded as being, a conflict between”,

its responsibilities, which in this case are foundation trusts, and the rest. How can Monitor possibly act as if there is not conflict if there is a conflict? You cannot just pretend that there is not conflict and think that that means that the conflict has disappeared. That does not work at all. The same thing applies to subsection (3), which states:

“Monitor must ignore the functions it has under sections 109 and 111 when exercising … its functions under Chapter 2 … and Chapter 4”.

What exactly does that mean? It cannot be ignored. Of course, Clause 109 is about when a foundation trust runs into difficulty. When that happens the Government cannot wish away the fact that the foundation trust has a difficulty; they have a responsibility to resolve it. Perhaps they mean that there will be a department looking after the foundation trust’s problems but that it will not be allowed to speak to the departments with the general responsibility that Monitor exercises across the rest of the health service.

If that is what the Government are saying, perhaps they should say it explicitly. But if they are going to set up two separate departments which will not be allowed to talk to each other—there is a kind of negative synergy in an organisation having two functions of that sort—why not have two separate organisations? What is the logic for having Monitor at all if it will have to operate in this extraordinary way? I have intervened because the Government need to tell us clearly, before we agree Clause 63 and accept this Bill into the legislation of this country, exactly how they propose to grapple with the serious problems that their decision has created. I do not think that we will accept in this House that their decisions can simply be wished or thought away.