Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Flight

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I support the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. If the number of independent directors on the court is reduced to seven, and is not far off being equal to the number of resident directors, I am not sure what role the court has. I also raise the point as to what should independent directors of the court be. What sort of people should be there and how should they be appointed? I was surprised when exploring this to be told that there was now a ruling that a member of the court must not be any NED of any form of bank. It seems that, by and large, NEDs on the boards of banks are, in today’s world, almost an extension of regulators. One of their prime governance tasks is to make sure that the banks are run properly, in accordance with regulatory requirements. I would have thought that the independent members of the court ought to be a cross-section of NEDs from banks and other financial institutions, and that to say, “Oh no, you mustn’t have anybody who is an NED of a bank because there is a conflict of interest”, is a complete misunderstanding of the role of the court.

Obviously, if the bank of the individual NED were being discussed, they could leave the room and behave as in the normal arrangements when any conflict of interest arises. However, I repeat: if the court is to do a useful job, it should have on it independent representatives who have first-hand experience of the banking system in this country.

[Lord Davies of Oldham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, not just for his amendment but for the arguments that he put forward, with which we have a great deal of sympathy. I still find it difficult to understand the Government’s case for reducing the number of the non-executive directors in the Bill from nine to seven. I am sure that this issue will run like a—I almost said a golden thread, but certainly a constant thread throughout our discussions because we are concerned about the issues of accountability and openness, as well as the effectiveness of the Bank. I know that the Government want to achieve all those objectives. At the moment, I am afraid we have not, despite the assiduous work of the Minister. I pay due regard to that and to the meetings we have had identifying aspects of the Government’s case. However, we are still not persuaded of the merits of this argument, although the Minister obviously thought that we would be, and we probably anticipated that we would be.

I am unclear as to why the Government want to reduce the number to seven; they must recognise that that will change the balance of the court. What is the argument for reducing this crucial number of non-executive directors? I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Flight, said about a certain qualification for non-executive directors, but he would be the first to recognise that we need on this body people with a breadth of experience and understanding, not just of banking issues but of the most fundamental aspects of the operation of the economy.

What seems to underpin the Government’s position is the view that plenty of academic evidence exists which indicates that smaller boards are preferable to the more extensive boards that obtained in a great deal of City institutions in the past. I am not against that consideration as I hold academics in some regard. I probably ought to, given the well-informed contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who discussed the preceding Bill to which this one obviously relates, so of course I respect academic opinion on size. However, unless the Government make their case with greater clarity than they have done so far, I am not prepared to accept that the Bank of England is exactly like any other City institution. It is not. It has responsibilities and duties that go beyond those of any other institution and because of that we have to look carefully at the balance of forces on the Bank’s board. I almost use the word “cavalier” with regard to what the Government are doing, although I am not sure that they are being cavalier. However, they are seeking to reduce the size of the court and are claiming that this is good practice on the basis of some fairly thin arguments. We want to see good practice on the part of the Bank. We are well aware that the present position is the product of the legislation that was taken through after the crisis. We are all well aware of the criticisms and failures that occurred during the 2007-08 financial and economic crisis. However, we do not believe that the Government’s proposition for the Bank is based on secure arguments or that it will result in improvements.

We would like to know how the Government reached their decision to reduce the number of executives while increasing the official side of the Bank. We are not sure what consultation was undertaken on these matters, what advice was taken or who the prime mover behind such a striking and significant change was. The Minister is working hard on the Bill. We value that and the expertise he brings to it. This is only a limited aspect of the whole issue of the accountability and effectiveness of the Bank. However, on this point, the Government have thus far not established their case. Therefore, Her Majesty’s Opposition broadly support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Flight

Wednesday 17th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I want briefly to support the Government’s position here. I am one of the few people still around who participated in the lifeboat back in 1974 in the wake of the secondary banking crisis then. Although I felt that the Bank of England had been less than perfect in allowing that crisis to develop, the way in which it handled it was first class. It did not cost the taxpayer a penny and the lifeboat got to grips and sorted out the various banks that were, in essence, bust.

The fears that I expressed in the other place at the time of the FiSMA about the tripartite agreement were exactly what transpired. The three parties failed to reach agreement, as I think is now widely recognised and known, and it is a miracle that the banking system did not actually collapse because it was dangerously close to doing so. In a banking crisis which is not about, if you like, conduct and how customers are treated, but for whatever reason is about the potential pack of cards implosion of the banking system, it is crucial that it is the banking regulator entity—in essence the Bank of England in consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day—that has clear authority to get on and take the necessary measures promptly.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, I am not sure that we are disputing that last point. We are arguing that there may be a crisis in which the contribution of the FCA would be of considerable importance. Perhaps the Minister will answer this point for the clarification of the Committee and all those interested in this matter. We are not quite clear why the other regulator, the PRA, operates in a different fashion from the FCA with regard to the consultation on the memorandum. I should like the noble Lord at least to identify that factor.

Financial Transaction Tax: European Union Report

Debate between Lord Davies of Oldham and Lord Flight

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

I accept that entirely from the noble Baroness. I am grateful for her intervention—but let me respond, if I may. I am merely indicating that this is not just a British reaction but is Europe-wide, which is why we have to put these proposals into some kind of context. People are responding to the crisis that was visited on us four years ago, for which all our fellow citizens, both here and elsewhere in Europe, are paying the price today.

[Lord Flight]

Does the noble Lord not agree that the problems of the eurozone are down to the faulty design of the euro, that the problems of public finances are largely about Governments having been spending too much and not taking a circular view of public spending, and that the problems of the banks are largely the result of money having been too easy for too long in the UK and elsewhere? History shows that banks always start doing foolish things if there is too much money.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

If the noble Lord is suggesting that the banks carry no responsibility for the economic and financial crisis that we have suffered since 2008, I am surprised at the proposition. Is he really saying that we do not understand that the massive increase in short-term transactions that rendered the banks so very vulnerable when some of the debts began to be called in—those developments in which bank balances far outweighed the whole resources of the British GDP—did not create a situation of colossal instability? When the financial crisis broke, it is clear that Governments were caught out too and some had somewhat overreached themselves, but as for the British position the problem was the massive drop in tax receipts after the crisis rather than extra spending before it.

[Lord Flight]

The noble Lord seems to be accepting my point that mistaken monetary policy led to bank balance sheets and lending being excessive. These things can happen only when monetary policy is wrong.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

Well, my Lords, then the noble Lord has to say that of each and every Government, because each and every society has suffered from this financial crisis and each and every Government were equally guilty of pursuing exactly the wrong framework of monetary policy. I have no doubt that it was the case that from deregulation onwards, Governments lost the capacity for some kind of control of the financial sector. I have no doubt at all that Governments rode the good years with light regulation, which was wished upon them by every area of political opinion in the countries involved. Certainly, that was the case in the United Kingdom. If it is suggested that Labour in government was too enthusiastic about light regulation, we have only to look at what the Opposition were saying to us at that time—that regulation was too tight.

Of course, I accept the strictures of the committee on the limitations of the proposals from the Commission. In particular, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for demolishing some of the myths around that mistaken proposition by the Commission. A passing reference to the fact that the resources would go to the European budget was certainly not the core of the proposal; it was much fairer than that towards the Governments who would collect the taxation.

It has not been mentioned in the debate that the tax would produce vastly greater resources to the taxpayers of each country and the Governments representing them than the existing structures of taxation. Taxpayers think that the financial sector owes them a great deal in terms of the direction of resources. Given that we have had to rob money from our taxpayers in order to sustain banks that are too big to fail, it is obvious that taxpayers expect the Government to take the kind of action which will help to restore those resources to the taxpayer.

The financial transaction tax is at this stage a distant objective. We all know that it cannot be introduced in one country and that it is not likely to succeed within a limited framework of countries—certainly if it were within only the eurozone countries and certainly if it was based upon the principles that the committee has so effectively criticised. The likelihood of it being effective—and looking anything other than being directed at the City of London—would be fairly remote. However, that does not alter the fact that the arguments may change. The United States may change its perspective on this issue. If it were to do so, and if Europe reflected on the concepts of which the committee is critical, the United Kingdom would look very odd indeed if we said that, because of the significance of the City of London and our financial institutions to our economy, we were staying outside any framework for the development of such a tax.

I congratulate the committee because it has identified a rather forlorn initiative which I cannot see making successful progress in Europe because of the faults that have been accurately identified. However, I would be dismayed if the work of the committee led to a position where the whole concept of a financial transaction tax was regarded as completely outwith any government interest or action. I hope the noble Lord replying on behalf of the Government will at least give some hope in that respect.