Lord Davies of Oldham
Main Page: Lord Davies of Oldham (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Davies of Oldham's debates with the Cabinet Office
(10 years ago)
Grand Committee“an NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
“(aza) a vehicle used for ambulance purposes or for the purpose of providing a response to an emergency at the request of an NHS ambulance service;”. |
“An NHS ambulance service | (a) an NHS trust or NHS foundation trust established under the National Health Service Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (b) an NHS trust established under the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 which has a function of providing ambulance services; (c) the Scottish Ambulance Service Board.” |
I have a question about this new schedule. As noble Lords, including Ministers, will recognise, it is a fairly lengthy addition to the Bill. I can see entirely the argument for the exemption of emergency vehicles carrying out an essential role, and why they need to be absolved from certain legal constraints in order to carry out their duties. However, I have the anxiety that the Government have provided for all bodies related to the National Health Service and vehicles driven on their behalf, in Wales and Scotland and so on—but what about other vehicles which are driven in emergency circumstances? If, for example, an accident occurs at a football ground and a St John Ambulance immediately springs into action, because one is always present, I have no doubt at all that it would seek the help of the nearest hospital. It could well have a vehicle and be able to expedite the matter more effectively. Would the driver be breaking the law if he or she exceeded the limits in seeking to get a trauma patient to hospital as rapidly as possible in a clear emergency, similar to those to which public vehicles respond?
My Lords, the amendments are designed to ensure that the definitions of “ambulance” and the way in which ambulances are used include the new vehicles that might well be used. I think that I will need to write to the noble Lord to make sure that all his points—I will look in Hansard at what he has said—are covered precisely.
I may have some assistance coming my way. These amendments relate, as at the top of Amendment 46, to emergency response by the NHS. They are to ensure that—because of case law, where there has been a particular problem with paramedic motorbikes—this is about an emergency response by the NHS. The noble Lord raises an interesting point, particularly about people going to emergencies. However, this legislation is to ensure that those who come out in response from the NHS are properly protected.
My Lords, I understand that in practice this relates to a call which would be from an NHS ambulance only. My officials have speedily passed me a note on this. One may ask why these amendments do not cover, for instance, all private organisations responding to emergencies. Our priority in this legislation is to allow NHS ambulance services to provide emergency responses. Those private organisations which have arrangements with NHS ambulance services to be dispatched by them to emergencies will be covered. Bringing other types of vehicle purposes within speed exemptions is part of a wider piece of work being carried out by the Department for Transport in relation to its commencement of Section 19 of the Road Safety Act 2006. I am most grateful to the noble Lord and my noble friend for their comments which have given me the opportunity to provide clarity—I hope—on the matter.
The noble Lord has certainly clarified the matter. I only hope that if vehicles are brought into use in this way they will act with due promptness, as did the Minister’s officials in providing an answer to a rather tricky question. I apologise for not giving notice of it. However, we wanted to clarify that regular support services which are not National Health services—St John’s Ambulance is the obvious one that springs to mind—would without doubt be covered by the legislation as the Minister described it.
My Lords, this is a long schedule. The Minister will be relieved to hear that we are in broad agreement with it. However, we have some difficulties because some real consequences need to be considered. Our Amendments 61A and 61B would improve the schedule by introducing further transparency into the process of issuing exemption orders. I am concerned about the extent of the Government’s powers to introduce accessibility standards for rail vehicles, established by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. We, in fact, introduced the first set of rail vehicle accessibility regulations in 1998. In 2005, I and one or two other noble Lords who are present in the Room, contributed to updating that Act by making it unlawful to discriminate against disabled people using public transport or transport facilities. We introduced minimum accessibility standards for all new carriages and light rail, and placed a requirement on rail operators to develop a disabled persons protection policy.
We are obviously proud of our record in government, and are concerned that it should be continued in the amendments to the legislation that this Bill represents. All new stock must be compliant with the regulations, and all vehicles that fall under their scope will have to be compliant by 2020. However, we recognise that some heritage systems use vehicles that can never be compliant in these terms, and they deserve exemption. The Government’s proposals would remove the requirement for exemption orders to be made by statutory instrument, thereby reducing the time it takes to issue an exemption.
We appreciate the principle of reducing the time it takes to issue such an exemption, but we are concerned that the Secretary of State’s power to limit exemptions could be undermined. Our amendments seek to ensure that the Secretary of State retains full freedom to impose conditions on exemption orders, such as on length, rather than just issue blanket exemptions. The Department for Work and Pensions figures show that more than one in five people with a disability has experienced difficulty using transport and, on several occasions at Question Time, disabled Peers have indicated that they still face some transport difficulties, not least when the trains are longer than the platforms at some halts, and the train does not stop where the ramp is provided. In any case, fewer than one-fifth of rail stations have full step-free access via lifts or ramps.
The House of Commons Transport Committee suggested last year that the department involved disability organisations and charities in prioritising stations for improvements in a future “access for all” programme. Ministers dismissed the views of disabled people by saying that that those organisations’ involvement would add little value.
In the context of our amendment, as we live longer, increasing numbers of us will be living with some kind of disability. It is therefore essential to adapt the public transport system and ensure that it fits the needs of disabled people. Amendment 61B requires the Secretary of State to,
“produce a report detailing the nature”,
of any exemptions issued,
“including the conditions or restrictions made as part of that order”,
and to publicise it.
Currently there are no requirements to publish any details when exemptions are issued; only the statutory instrument itself is published. How will this shift from a statutory instrument to an administrative regime make the documents more accessible and the process more open for a wider range of UK citizens? I do not say that they will not be—I am not accusing the Government of causing a deterioration in the position—but I seek some reassurance from the Minister that this has been fully considered in this fairly lengthy amendment to the schedule.
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord for his broad agreement on Part 7. I agree that we are dealing with some lengthy paperwork. We have made much progress in making rail vehicles more accessible to disabled people since accessibility standards were introduced in 1998—and rightly so. More than 8,100 rail vehicles now meet modern accessibility requirements, and the law requires all rail vehicles to be accessible by 2020. However, it is occasionally not appropriate, or proportionate, for those access standards to apply fully, so the Secretary of State retains the right to exempt specified vehicles from all, or parts, of them.
Originally, all such exemptions were made by statutory instrument. However, in 2008, the domestic rail vehicle accessibility regime covering mainline trains was replaced by an EU regime, whereby exemptions are issued administratively. As a result of implementation of the EU regime for mainline trains, the number of vehicles which remained within the scope of the domestic regime was reduced to just over one-quarter of those originally covered. These are the vehicles which are still subject to the use of statutory instruments for exemptions. Such vehicles include trams, underground, metro, airport people movers and even brand new vehicles for use on heritage railways. That brings the domestic regime more in line with the European regime, which the majority of vehicles are subject to, and is more proportionate than the current situation whereby, if sought, exemptions for the hundreds of trains serving Gatwick, Stansted and Birmingham airport stations would be subject to an administrative process, while any for the 17 small vehicles shuttling passengers between terminals would remain subject to a process involving statutory instruments.
I highlight to the Committee the fact that the vast majority of responses from stakeholders to the Government’s public consultation were in favour of these proposals. In particular, the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, the Government’s statutory adviser on the transport needs of disabled people, was involved as the proposals were developed and is strongly in favour of these changes. In this respect I am also pleased to note that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is now of the view that these proposals have merits and finds the arguments for consistency with the European regime compelling.
The practical effect of this measure will be to shorten the period between when an application is made and the outcome is given, so reducing uncertainty for the rail industry. It will also reduce the resources required within government to handle each application. I emphasise that it will not reduce in any way the strength of argument that any applicant will need to make to justify an exemption; no exemptions will be granted in future that would not have been granted under the existing arrangements. I also assure the Committee that we will continue to consult the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee, and others as necessary, on the merits of each application. The final decision on whether to grant an exemption will remain with Ministers, and the Government will continue to report annually to Parliament on the use of the exemption powers over the last year. This will allow Parliament to call Ministers to account if they feel that the powers have been used excessively or inappropriately.
Given the overwhelming support from stakeholders that this proposal received, we believe that this reform makes sense. Proceeding with this proposal will mean that applicants for exemption receive a decision sooner, so reducing uncertainty for them, and will reduce administrative burdens on government, but without lessening protection for disabled passengers, or reducing transparency on the use of exemption powers. That is why we have concerns about the noble Lord’s first amendment.
Turning to the noble Lord’s second amendment, the Government recognise that members of the public and Parliament will wish to know that the Secretary of State has used his powers to grant exemptions from the rail vehicle accessibility regulations. That is important. However, this amendment is unnecessary as transparency is already provided through two new routes, both of which will continue. First, the Equality Act 2010 already requires the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament on the use of exemption powers. The Secretary of State will continue to report annually to Parliament on those exemption powers. This will enable Parliament to call Ministers to account. Furthermore, the department already publishes on its website details of applications received for exemptions, the outcome of consultation on the merits of each application and the outcome, including the exemption order itself, if granted.
I assure the Committee that the Government’s intention is that openness must continue. Although I understand the position that the noble Lord has taken, it is for those reasons that we feel his amendments are not necessary.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend. His experience is invaluable and I will certainly discuss this with officials so that we can come to a mutually satisfactory conclusion.
As ever, the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, is to be congratulated on his eagle eye. We shall see that the Minister gives a satisfactory reply. I listened carefully to the Minister and was grateful for his remarks, which were reassuring. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s acceptance of the position was enough for me, so I assure the Committee that when the time comes I will not move my amendment.
My Lords, those two powerful speeches have made the case that we wish to make from the Front Bench. We also hope to persuade my noble friend Lord Rooker than objecting to the clause itself is in fact a stronger position than his amendment. I hope the speeches have convinced a very significant number of Members of the Committee, perhaps even the Government, to think again, but they have also reduced the length of my speech because all the issues have been more than adequately covered.
I emphasise that the effect of the Government’s legislation would be to downgrade rights that are derived from a duty on the part of the Minister to a mere choice by him, which is the emphatic point that my noble friend Lord Prescott was making. There is an obvious flaw in the Government’s proposals. My noble friend has made his case already but I will show how much we on the Front Bench are concerned about this. It is not clear how the Secretary of State can be expected adequately to assess the existing evidence in order to suspect a miscarriage of justice without investigative help by the very accident investigation branch itself. As my noble friend Lord Prescott has indicated, there are very good reasons why the branch should be reluctant to participate in this. The work will now be undertaken by the branch only if the Secretary of State requests it because he already suspects a miscarriage of justice. That is a long shot in circumstances where he has no or very little evidence before him at that stage. In addition, reinvestigating might unearth difficult truths about the adequacy and focus of previous assessments by officials and the department when making the initial judgment. Any Minister should, of course, be able to process issues without fear or favour, but there is bound to be an inhibition when he is dependent on the department for certain facts.
The justification that Ministers have given for the change is entirely spurious. They have claimed that it is to safeguard the human rights of officers involved in accidents, whose careers could be undermined by an automatic investigation organised by the Minister. It might have that advantage, but it would block off new evidence to support future safety measures and which could tell families what really happened. We know, from the illustrations given today, two things from the “Derbyshire” inquiry. First, the families of those who were lost got to hear what had actually happened 20 years later, as opposed to the original depiction. Secondly, future safety measures were inaugurated by my noble friend in the department as a result of the evidence of why the ship had sunk.
I believe that the clause should be opposed and not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the Secretary of State is obliged to reopen a formal investigation either if new and important evidence that was not available at the time of the original investigation becomes known, or if there appear to be grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice. For any other circumstances, the Secretary of State has a discretionary power to reopen an investigation. There is no time limitation on the current obligations to reopen a formal investigation. This is surely right and proper where there are grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice, and the Bill most certainly does not seek to change this duty in any way. However, in other cases, the potential value of reopening a formal investigation in terms of enhancing safety for today’s mariners may—and I emphasise may—diminish with the passage of time after the loss of a ship.
The design of ships and their equipment, industry crewing and operating practices, continually change and develop. By the time that new and important evidence is found, these matters may be very different from those that applied at the time of an accident. That is not to say that one can draw a specific time limit on the usefulness of an inquiry. Each case is likely to be unique and should be considered on its own merits. This would be preferable to the current blanket imposition of a duty that may not always be beneficial for maritime safety, which is rightly our priority. Therefore, Clause 40 is drafted to enable the Secretary of State to take a considered view on the likely benefits of reopening a formal investigation in circumstances where new evidence comes to light. To be clear, a formal investigation, the subject of this clause, is very different from the safety investigations undertaken by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. The noble Lords, Lord Rooker and Lord Prescott, mentioned that. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch’s sole objective is to determine the causes and circumstances of an accident to prevent a recurrence; it does not seek to apportion blame or liability. I re-emphasise that the clause does not affect these safety investigations, nor situations in which new and important evidence is found from accidents that have been subject only to a safety investigation. Of course, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch acts of its own decision.
In contrast, formal and reopened formal investigations are proceedings which, as well as probing the causes of an accident, can apportion liability and blame, censure ships’ officers, or cancel their certificates of competency. There have been four since 1997: a formal investigation into the loss of the “Marchioness”—the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, spoke very powerfully and with great experience of that tragedy—and reopened formal investigations into the “Derbyshire”, “Gaul” and “Trident”. The three reopened formal investigations all related to accidents that occurred prior to the establishment in 1989 of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch. With most accidents since then being subject to safety rather than formal investigations, increasingly any reopened formal investigation would relate to more historic accidents.