(1 year, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for pointing out that the process here differs from that in the retained EU law Bill. Could the Minister in her response set out more clearly the differences between the process here and the process in the other Bill, and the reasons for the differences?
My Lords, I have just one brief point. I agree with the comments so far made that this may not be the appropriate place to deal with the whole problem of delegation, because this deals with revocation, although the amendment sensibly deals with what is inevitable, which is the replacement. It seems to me that parliamentary scrutiny is essential. We need to come back to this time and time again.
It is essential because, unlike the position of a Minister or that of a Government, we have, first, the issue of the accountability of regulators and, secondly, we do not want to politicise regulators. That is Parliament’s job. Therefore, we have to scrutinise this whole area, where we are moving financial services to regulators and away from being dealt with largely through a political process in the European Union. We are hoping to make great improvements, but the one thing we are losing is the input of the political process. One cannot pretend that the direction of financial services policy is not a political question as well as a regulatory question. Politics should be for this House and, although I hate to use this word, we should not taint the regulators with politics.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fully support my noble friend Lord Hunt and the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Patel. I will look at the wording of the clause; I might be slightly more inclined to consider giving the Government these powers if I understood better what the clause is getting at. I admire and sympathise with the parliamentary draftsperson; I understand that there is a massive amount of custom and practice, but what does the wording of this clause actually provide? We know what the Government are trying to do—take all the power—but we should at least try to provide something vaguely comprehensible.
Let us look at the wording. Subsection (1)(a) says that you cannot modify the legislation; under subsection (1)(b) you can
“make different provision for different purposes”;
and under subsection (1)(c) you can
“make supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision.”
That is just a word salad. I assume that there are good definitions of all these words, which make them distinct, but I struggle to understand what they are.
Subsection (2) says that, under Section 8, there is no power to modify legislation. Does that mean that you can still make different provisions for different purposes under Section 8, or does the word “modify” encompass everything in one? Subsection (3) gives us even more words: “amend, repeal or revoke”.
I really hope we can get an understanding of what the real powers that can be exercised under this clause mean and what the distinctions are between all these different ways of expressing what to me—a lay person—seem essentially to be the same objectives.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and his analysis of Clause 13. I do not wish to add to it, because each of the words used in that clause is deliberately used by parliamentary draftsmen for purposes that, at the moment, I do not fully understand. My objection to the clause—this is why I support the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Patel—is that this is yet another piece of framework legislation with extensive Henry VIII powers, unclear as they are, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out. There are occasions when one can see a justification for Henry VIII clauses or wide regulatory powers, but we have to ask about the context, and the context of this Bill is the professions, however broadly we define them. It is essential that professions be regulated under a structure approved in detail by Parliament, simply because we must be certain, first, of the quality of the professions, and secondly, of the scope of the restrictions. Thirdly, we must be certain that the professions are completely independent of government interference, given the reliance the Government place on them and the need for them to be steadfast in their independence and independent advice and statements to government.
The debate earlier this afternoon on Amendment 45 showed the fallacy of trying to do what the Government propose. It is only because this Bill—framework though it is and vague though it is—has been fully subjected to parliamentary scrutiny that some of the really difficult issues and the lack of preparation have come out. I dread to think what will happen when we move to looking at the way the Bill is to operate under regulations. It is clear, then, that the regulations will not subject to detailed parliamentary scrutiny. What can be worse than passing what I regret to say, with due deference to parliamentary counsel, for whom I have the highest respect and have had the pleasure of working with on many occasions, is a wholly unsatisfactory and poorly prepared Bill? But a draftsman is not to be blamed for that. The blame lies with those who give the draftsman instructions.
This is the kind of Bill on which Parliament must now take a stand. We should not be legislating without good primary legislation that sets out the detail, so that we are sure how the regulatory powers are to be used. We should curtail the use of these powers in relation to matters of great importance to the prosperity and health of the nation, and that is the independence of the profession.
I therefore warmly support the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Patel, in this regard. I have not added to what the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said about Henry VIII powers because I do not think I could have improved upon his eloquent explanation.