Northern Ireland: Legacy of the Troubles

Debate between Lord Dannatt and Viscount Younger of Leckie

Wednesday 5th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I first thank the usual channels for making time for this short but important debate; I also thank the Minister in advance for answering it.

The most depressing aspect of the subject under discussion is that we have to have this debate at all. After the shameful investigations and allegations of misconduct by the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, one might have thought that the appetite for further investigations into the conduct of members of the Armed Forces in other conflicts might have diminished. Sadly, this is not so. Despite the Iraq Historic Allegations Team looking at over 3,500 allegations, the only case that has come to court has been that of a bent investigator. Yet attention has returned, this time to Northern Ireland.

Many noble Lords will have seen the powerful intervention in the media by Field Marshal the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. The noble and gallant Lord focused on the 2010 Saville report into Bloody Sunday and opined quite correctly that Saville should have been the end of Bloody Sunday. On publication of that report, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, apologised for the actions of a very small number of soldiers and the residents of Londonderry seemed to accept that apology. But now the case of Sergeant “O”, one of those who gave evidence to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Saville, has become prominent eight years later—some 46 years after the incident itself. There is a horrible suspicion among veterans that the non-self-incriminatory basis on which they gave evidence to Saville has been broached, and that some soldiers now stand liable for further investigation and are in fear of a knock on the door. I would be grateful for a categorical assurance from the Minister that the confidential nature of the evidence given to the Saville Inquiry has not been used in subsequent investigations. There is considerable scepticism in the veteran community on this point.

The case of Sergeant “O” is not unique. The case of Corporal Major “H” is also worrying. He was questioned over the case of a young man with learning difficulties, who was shot dead on 15 June 1974. However, after a joint investigation by the civil and military police, within a year, the Ministry of Defence was informed that there would be no prosecution. I have seen a copy of that letter. Nevertheless, the Historical Enquiries Team, set up in September 2005 by the Blair Government, decided to look once more at the Corporal Major “H” case but concluded in 2013 that there was no basis to reopen it formally. After the Historical Enquiries Team was closed down in 2014, a new legacy investigation unit returned to the “H” case, leading the Police Service of Northern Ireland to arrest the corporal major on 21 April 2015 and deport him to Northern Ireland for interview. He was interviewed 26 times over the next four days—16 more times than Harold Shipman—and was charged with attempted murder on 24 April 2015. A complicated court case is still ongoing. The corporal major is now over 75 years old and a sick man.

That knock on the door is not confined to elderly retired paratroopers, riflemen and cavalrymen. On my last day as Chief of the General Staff on 28 August 2009, the final scheduled appointment in my diary, before I left the Ministry of Defence for the last time in uniform, was with two investigators from the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s Historical Enquiries Team. They had travelled from the Province to London to quiz me about the killing of a young man in Belfast some 36 years before. Having explained the circumstances of the day in question, I assumed that the matter was closed. This was not so, as one of my corporals—now 76 years old—was subsequently questioned, with the police finally accepting that events in our statements, nearly 40 years before, were an accurate account of a hostile attack which had been responded to professionally within the terms of the yellow card and within the law.

Time precludes description of other high-profile cases similar to those of Sergeant “O” and Corporal Major “H”, but there are troubling issues with them all. First, while the Army kept extremely good operational records, the terrorists did not. This makes a very uneven playing field on which to conduct these retrospective investigations.

Secondly, all allegations were investigated by service and civil police at the time and statements were taken. It therefore raises the question of why revisiting whatever evidence that may still exist 30 or 40 years later is likely to bring any greater clarity.

Thirdly, of the 2,547 cases referred to the PSNI Legacy Investigation Branch, 2,265 are deemed terrorist cases and only 282 to be British Army/Royal Ulster Constabulary cases—just 10%. But the reality is that 90% of cases that were killings by nationalist and loyalist terrorists were murder by any description of the word, while the 10% attributable to the security forces were deaths brought about by troops and policemen who, in the vast majority of cases, were doing their lawful duty. There is a very strong suspicion that, for the reasons I have just outlined, the low-hanging fruit of security forces cases are being plucked first and, on past evidence, are likely to be so by the proposed historical investigations unit.

Fourthly, while over 500 prisoners convicted of terrorist offences were released on licence as part of the Belfast agreement, another 365 royal pardons were handed down over the last 35 years and over 300 on-the- run letters were issued. In the same period, just four servicemen were convicted for murder, while another 10 were prosecuted and acquitted. Does this not speak volumes about the integrity of the Army?

To move to the present, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Karen Bradley, has launched an open consultation entitled Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past. In the preamble to the consultation, she says that the legacy proposals should be,

“balanced, fair, equitable, and crucially proportionate”.

From what I have described so far, historical and current activity is demonstrably not,

“balanced, fair, equitable, and crucially proportionate”.

Furthermore, from a military veteran’s point of view, this consultation is already flawed in that it has precluded at the outset the introduction of a statute of limitations ending these historical investigations. However, I am aware that, in pursuit of the objective to be “equitable”, there is a concern that a statute of limitations to protect former members of the security forces would mean that terrorists would, in effect, be given an amnesty as well.

So the Army is caught in the crossfire between the Sinn Féin nationalist agenda to rewrite history and paint the IRA as having fought some form of just war against their self-styled oppressive state, and the Democratic Unionist Party and Ulster Unionist Party’s insistence on bringing predominantly nationalist terrorists to justice. It is also worth remembering that the proposed historical investigations unit will examine only fatalities, ignoring the 40,000 people—including 6,000 soldiers—injured during the Troubles, without investigating those responsible for over 15,000 explosions in the Province during that time. Is this “equitable”? What is to be done?

First, it should be recognised that the British Army is a national institution which should be regulated under the authority of the Westminster Parliament and not allowed to become victim to the intrigues of Stormont, whenever that Assembly might reconvene. The welfare and duty of care towards servicemen and military veterans should clearly be championed by the Secretary of State for Defence and not left to the outcome of a consultation by the Northern Ireland Secretary.

Secondly, it should be remembered that incidents in which members of the security forces fired their weapons were fully investigated by the military and, where appropriate, the civil police at the time. In the vast majority of cases, a decision was made that lethal force had been used within the prevailing rules of engagement and no further action was necessary or appropriate. I submit that those investigations should be confirmed now as legal, binding and final. Furthermore, I submit that any subsequent reinvestigation breaches the principle of double jeopardy.

Thirdly, if the principle of double jeopardy is accepted, it would be quite appropriate for a statute of limitations to apply to those cases and individuals that had already been investigated. This would protect policemen and soldiers who were doing their duty in pursuit of the sovereignty of the Crown’s right to rule over the whole of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland but, crucially, it would leave exposed to the full rigours of the law those terrorists who have never been exposed to investigation. That, I submit, is,

“balanced, fair, equitable, and crucially proportionate”.

In conclusion, I add that to many soldiers fighting in the Province during the 1970s and 1980s in particular, it felt like a war zone, although the IRA insurgency was never branded as such. Indeed, we should not forget that in 1972 alone, 102 British soldiers lost their lives fighting in the Province. Of course, the peace process since the Good Friday agreement has brought better times but the continuation of that peace cannot—and must not—be at the expense of more soldiers’ lives ruined.

Soldiers fully understand von Clausewitz’s classic dictum:

“War is but a continuation of politics by other means”.


But to paraphrase Clausewitz, perhaps Miss Bradley in the Northern Ireland Office might reflect on the reverse: a peace process should not be a continuation of war by other means. The nationalist agenda to divorce Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom is as alive today as it was throughout the 38 years of the Troubles. The British Government must not sleepwalk into that agenda.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, all speakers bar the Minister should heed the point on timings: as soon as two minutes appears on the clock, speeches should be concluded immediately. If not, the cumulative effect will undoubtedly squeeze the Minister’s remarks.