Ukraine: Defence Relationships

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I too join noble Lords in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, on obtaining this debate and on the robust way in which he introduced it.

In previous debates on Ukraine, I raised the issue of sanctions and in particular, what assessment the Government have made of their effect on Russia and on Putin. In answer to my question on this on Tuesday the Minister said that they

“have had an inhibiting effect in relation to Mr Putin’s ability to mobilise his forces.”—[Official Report, 7/6/22; col. 1078.]

I doubt that Ukrainians defending the Donbass would agree.

Historically, sanctions imposition has often been a political response to a “do something” cry falling short of war. A most significant distinction between all other sanctioned countries and those against Russia is that the former could be dealt with by Theodore Roosevelt’s diplomatic truism,

“Speak softly and carry a big stick”,


but Russia, unlike all others, also has a big stick.

Viewed from the Russian side, this is the second time that they have been sanctioned in the past decade. American sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were aimed to make Russia a pariah state. Should sanctions become an existential threat to Russia itself, the risks of their response, being a nuclear power, cannot be downplayed or ignored.

As the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, argued in his recent excellent essay on this topic:

“Economic sanctions against Russia are supposed to be an alternative to war, but they can reasonably be expected to change the Kremlin’s behaviour only by becoming tactical components of the conflict.”


Ukraine’s supporters do not intend to make or threaten war themselves directly against Russia, but without such, the true value of sanctions becomes unclear. As the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee report in May 2007 on The Impact of Economic Sanctions concluded:

“Economic sanctions used in isolation from other policy instruments are extremely unlikely to force a target to make major policy changes.”


Foremost among “other policy instruments” listed was the threat or actual use of force.

The assessments the Government have made do not show, even after 100 days of conflict, any great reduction in Russia’s war-fighting capability. Bearing in mind that some nations are still trading actively with Russia and many European countries are still paying Russia for oil and gas—no doubt with pricing increases—are the sanctions achieving the result required of a major change in Russia’s “special operation”? Not yet, and do not hold your breath.

Imposing sanctions is not a zero-sum game. Individuals and businesses that are no longer able to trade with Russia will not necessarily be able to make good in other markets what they were achieving in Russia. They will suffer losses, which will increase with time. The financial and banking sanctions sound severe, but workarounds are already evident. The rouble is trading near its pre-war rate. Rising oil and gas prices have increased the cost of living for all here in the UK.

More needs to be said publicly to explain what sanctions achieve. Russia’s combat forces remain active, even if their tactics are less than competent. So where does the balance of advantage lie? Should even more sanctions be imposed, with the attendant risks if Russia feels itself threatened, or has a limit been reached?

What plan, even thought, has been given to an exit strategy? No sanctions can be indefinite. As long ago as 1999, a government review of sanctions policy stressed the principle:

“Sanctions should … have clear objectives, including well-defined and realistic demands against which compliance can be judged, and a clear exit strategy”.


The present sanctions targeting falls far short of such a principle, which, as well as anti-corruption and Magnitsky ones, should have greater exposure in an integrated review.

Looking to the future, when some settlement has been achieved and peace restored—I have little confidence that this will be very soon—what support can be given to the inevitable restructuring needs in Ukraine? Can assets impounded from individuals or Russian banks and businesses be switched to benefit the restoration funds that will be required? Is that going to need legislation, and would that be internationally legal? What steps have the Government in mind or are they taking to study and to implement these post-conflict needs?