Libya

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for the way in which he introduced this very important debate. I know that the whole House will be with me in wishing our Armed Forces, which have been tasked by the Government to participate in the implementation of UN Resolution 1973, well. We should all admire the way in which each succeeding generation of service men and women contribute with great credit to the Government of the day’s determination to be seen to be punching above their weight in the world scene.

Understandably, the 6,000 mile round trips to attack targets in Libya by two-seater Tornado aircraft operating out of RAF Marham in Norfolk were highlighted. These were epic flights, but this should not overshadow admiration for the numerous and extremely rapid deployments to forward operating airfields of a variety of aircraft types and their ground supporting crews with all that they need by way of munitions, spares and supplies. Equally commendable were the movement and attacks from Royal Navy ships and submarines in the relevant areas of the Mediterranean.

Such short-notice movements of operational units and their essential support and their rapid involvement in very precise kinetic attacks rely on detailed fore-planning. Personnel must also have regular opportunities to train to ensure that all will go smoothly and seamlessly when the Government require. Too often, training exercises have been curtailed or even cancelled in the search for in-year economies. This is a risky choice for any Government aspiring to a robust foreign policy and intent on mounting or sustaining expeditionary operations, particularly at short notice, with the minimum of embarrassing mistakes or PR disasters.

The initial operations from RAF Marham underline the much valued, but poorly understood, characteristics of air operations and the responsiveness and flexibility of air power. However, it is not solely aircraft and weapon performances that contribute to the fighting attributes of air power; it is also the resourcefulness, ingenuity and imagination of the crews and commanders who turn the theories of air power into practicalities, such as we have seen in recent days.

How often our Armed Forces are committed to operations in wars of choice must ultimately be balanced against their numbers, their equipment and the other resources necessary to fulfil the objectives or mission that they have been given. Following our long involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan and the reductions that have been implemented, or are shortly to be implemented, in the wake of last year’s strategic defence and security review, our forces have reached levels of commitment that have to be reduced—witness the firm determination of Her Majesty’s Government to withdraw from combat operations in Afghanistan by 2015. A few tight years were forecast before a real-terms increase in defence budgets from 2015 would fund the defence aspirations of the 2020s, but then the unexpected happened, yet again. How rapidly the international security situation changed in the first few days and weeks of 2011. Fortuitously for the Government, current operations in Libya call mainly for effort from the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy as the United Kingdom’s contribution, forces less committed than in Afghanistan.

I turn now to the great unknown about this Libyan engagement. As the Government have admitted, the fulfilment of UN Resolution 1973 is not easily measured unless there is a major and beneficial change in the present shares of authority over the different regions of Libya. Rightly, the additional costs are to be funded from the reserve, but that too should not be seen as open-ended. While there were compelling reasons to get quickly into the rescue and evacuation of British nationals, particularly from Libya, at the start of the uprisings in the new year, of its nature that was going to be of only short duration, and they were operations of necessity.

The Prime Minister has said that it was not reasonable to argue that, because we could not help everywhere, we should not attempt to help to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Libya, but what we might characterise as humanitarian might be seen very differently through Arab and Islamic eyes. The switch from destroying Libyan air defences to the continuing night-after-night interdiction of Libyan armour and weapons storage, attempting to impose a no-drive zone and loose talk of arming the rebels, smacks of mission creep. We are on a high wire, without any safety net and in the hands of opinion-formers who could quickly turn these developments to our disadvantage. Are we not very close to being accused of involvement and taking sides in a Libyan civil war? Once again, we will face the accusation that oil-starved colonialists are up to their knavish tricks.

We have certainly ensured that in Gaddafi we now have an enemy for life. If he survives in power, our national interests will again be under renewed threat from him. Hopefully, however, sooner rather than later there has to be an exit and an end to our involvement. The experiences of recent history are not necessarily always relevant, but as a general rule no-fly zones or no-drive zones are rather like maritime mounted blockades: none, on its own, is likely to achieve any clear-cut political result. Consequently, once started they can become a long and protracted task.

Much more in the non-military field by politics and diplomacy has to be done and will surely be needed to bring about an internationally acceptable outcome in Libya. I therefore welcome the large international meeting of Foreign Ministers held in London earlier this week and the recent news of the defection of the Libyan Foreign Minister. This may well be a result of the efforts of the FCO and other government agencies that we cannot yet know about. We had rather a poor start when the Libyan crisis erupted, with delays in evacuating our citizens and the apparently crass attempt to infiltrate Special Forces into the country near Benghazi. Since then, there seems to have been a steadier hand on the tiller and I look forward to a satisfactory and hopefully early release from this new operation, which is adding to the overcommitment of our Armed Forces at this present time. Perhaps we should take a lesson from President Obama’s approach and realise that we cannot take on more and more military operations. Others must be persuaded to take the strain.