(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Words matter; so too does the meaning that we give to them. That is especially so where targets are being set that will influence policy in a matter as far-reaching as the environment. That is why the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Randall of Uxbridge, were right to bring forward these amendments so that we can consider whether the choice of the word “biodiversity” to identify one of the priority areas in Clause 1(3) was well made, or whether it should be replaced by the word “nature”, as is being suggested.
I wish to concentrate on the use of words in this clause. I say nothing about the wording of Clauses 95 and 96 and others, except that it seems to make sense to follow whatever the choice is for Clause 1 when deciding what is right for those other clauses too. For me, the choice in Clause 1(3) should be guided by two things: the context, and the meaning of the word “biodiversity” itself.
The context for the choice of words in Clause 1(3) is created by the wording of Clause 1(1). We are told there that the long-term targets that the Secretary of State must have in mind relate to “the natural environment”. That suggests to me that when we come to Clause 1(3), we should expect to find, if I can put it this way, a list of subspecies within the natural environment rather than a repetition of the parent concept itself, embraced by the word “nature”. The word “nature”—the parent concept—embraces everything that comprises the phenomena of the natural world or, as Clause 1(1) puts it, of “the natural environment”. That suggests that we need something more specific and precise to serve the purpose of Clause 1(3), which is to identify the priority areas within that environment. The question then, therefore, is whether “biodiversity” achieves something for the identification of a priority area that “nature” would not achieve.
I was surprised to find, when I was consulting my dictionaries, how recent the word “biodiversity” is in the English language. Everyone talks about nature, said the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and he is absolutely right: it is so much in common use, and “biodiversity”, as the dictionaries indicated to me, is not in common use in that way. It is not even mentioned, let alone defined, in the editions of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary that I have, which were published in the 1990s. It is a mark of our increasing awareness of the importance of the variety and variability of life on earth and its preservation that we have created this portmanteau word to describe it. “Diversity” is what we are talking about when we use this word. The prefix “bio” makes it clear that we are using that word in the context of the natural environment in all its aspects which, of course, is the context in which we are using it here. In that context, it is no exaggeration to say that diversity is what keeps the environment alive. It is absolutely right to concentrate on diversity as a priority area.
I suggest, therefore, that the word “biodiversity”, although not so widely used as “nature”, is the one to use because it is more precisely targeted on that aspect of our environment. It achieves that much more than “nature”. It reaches out across the entirety of the ecosystem, on which the natural environment depends, and the diversity that gives it its life. With great respect to the two noble Lords, I believe that it is the right word to use here in this Bill.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and also the noble Lord, Lord Rooker; I well remember the late Sir David Renton, as he was in the other place, or Lord Renton, as he became in this one. He was an absolute terrier and was determined to try to ensure that all legislation was intelligible to those to whom it applied.
That really is the underlying reason why my noble friend Lord Blencathra has introduced this very interesting and probing amendment. We say again and again during this debate that this is a landmark Bill. It is indeed, and it has to bear the test of time: it has to be an Act of Parliament that becomes familiar to all those to whom it applies, which is virtually every citizen in our land. It must be an Act of Parliament that is understood. It is entirely right that my noble friend Lord Blencathra introduced this amendment so that we can debate, at an early stage of the Bill, what we are really talking about.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I echo the final words of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and implore my noble friend on the Front Bench to heed what she said.
I will begin on a personal note: 75 years ago, at the time of the VE celebrations, my parents took me, a six year-old boy, to see newsreels. Among them was Belsen. My mother’s instinctive reaction was to put her arm in front of my eyes; my father’s reaction was to sit me on his knee and say, “The boy must see what evil people can do.” It is one of my earliest and most vivid memories.
As a newly elected Member of the other place, 25 years later, at the invitation of the late Greville Janner, whose memory I honour, I became the first chairman of the all-party group—there were very few in those days—for the release of Soviet Jewry. I spoke on the telephone to those who had been to the gulags. I was refused a visa to Soviet Russia, but we smuggled out a volume of the Jewish scriptures for a young boy’s bar mitzvah gift. His father had been in the gulag. About 25 years after that, as chairman of the All-Party Group for Bosnia, I saw what happened in Srebrenica, which was almost the same time as those ghastly massacres in Rwanda.
Those who have brought this amendment before your Lordships’ House tonight have done us all a great service. The precision of the amendment is its most commending feature, because it concentrates on what the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, rightly referred to as the ultimate and most heinous of crimes: genocide.
A week ago, we debated that peculiarly named Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill. We had an amendment, on which a number of us spoke, which would forbid the authorising of young people under the age of 18 from committing crimes. I will certainly continue to support my amendment or others on that subject.
Why, my Lords? Because it is wrong. If anything is wrong on a gargantuan scale, it is of course genocide. We cannot and must not be fobbed off with an answer from the Front Bench that says that it is too difficult, that the wording of the amendment is wrong or that it does not fit in. Some of those excuses have already been rehearsed by those such as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has been pressing for the amendment, which I am also doing.
The Prime Minister talks very proudly of “global Britain”. Global Britain must have a moral compass. Global Britain must not sacrifice its national integrity. The country that was responsible for the abolition of the slave trade and the abolition of slavery throughout the British dominions, in 1807 and 1833 respectively, must draw upon that proud heritage. What is happening in China to the Uighurs, as we have just been reminded in a very moving speech, is despicable and appalling. I believe that we should ensure that those who can pronounce on these things are able to pronounce on this. Is it genocide? I do not believe that there is any doubt that it is right that it should be a legal judgment and pronouncement; if such a pronouncement is made, it is absolutely right that we should not seek to trade on preferential terms with the People’s Republic of China—a great country with a great and civilised people who are having things perpetrated in their name that are the very negation of civilisation.
I say to my noble friend Lady Noakes and others that business does matter, but lives matter more: black lives, white lives, Chinese lives, Muslim lives and Christian lives—all lives matter. We should not in any way be complicit, even tangentially, in turning a blind eye to some of the most evil deeds that have been perpetrated in the past 50 years. I support this amendment.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and his very moving speech. I wish to support this amendment. It presents your Lordships with an alternative way of dealing with the international crime of genocide from that which was considered under Amendment 8. I have noted the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about handing the matter over to the courts. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has just pointed out, there is a legal issue here that needs to be determined. There are complicated issues of fact as well that need to be carefully assessed, so any idea that this is not a matter for the courts really is misplaced. We need to consider this alternative.
As I said when noble Lords considered this amendment in Committee, the campaign to root out genocide and bring its perpetrators to justice is a hard struggle. The problem is that the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide means that the convention is simply not up to the job. Of course, we must be grateful for the declaration in Article 1 that genocide is a crime under international law and for the width of the definition of this crime in Article 2. We can also be sure that the United Kingdom, as one of the contracting parties, will play its full part in bringing to justice any individual who can be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts so that they can be punished for their part in this crime. But there are gaps which the UN convention leaves open. Its object remains largely unfulfilled and we have to face the fact that the international institutions are falling short too.
Of course, the vast majority of countries around the world do not practise genocide. They needed no persuasion when the convention was open for signature that they must refrain from it. The problem is with the minority, those states which have no conscience in this matter and which still engage in this horrific crime with impunity. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, who is such a steadfast advocate in this field, has reminded us once again that the struggle to fill those gaps cannot be allowed to fail.
The procedure that the noble Lord has chosen had my full support in Committee and it has my full support here, too. I remind your Lordships that it seems to have two very important advantages, which deserve to be emphasised once again. The first is that it meets the requirement that there must be a person, or a group of persons, with a relevant interest to bring the matter before the court. The persons described in the amendment will almost certainly satisfy that requirement. The second is that the procedure it seeks to introduce must allow for due process, with a hearing in open court, in full accordance with the rule of law.
I believe that this object will be achieved. It means that notice of the proceedings will be served on the Secretary of State and on a representative of the other signatory of the bilateral agreement, both of whom must have the right of reply. That will ensure that they can present their cases to the court, thus enabling the court to scrutinise and test all the competing arguments. If the argument of the interested persons is upheld, the “preliminary determination” that the amendment refers to will amount to a direction to the Secretary of State that the United Kingdom must withdraw from the agreement; in the case of a bilateral agreement that will mean, in effect, that the agreement will be revoked.
Withdrawing from an international agreement in circumstances which the agreement itself does not provide for is a sensitive and difficult matter. That is especially so where it is not being suggested that any provisions of the agreement itself have been breached, but I believe that the noble Lord and his cosignatories are right not to have been deflected by these and other similar problems from persevering with this amendment. The strength of their position lies in the—if your Lordships will forgive me for using Latin—jus cogens erga omnes nature of the obligation under international law to prevent and punish acts of genocide.
That expression was used by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in the Appellate Committee of this House in A v Secretary of State (No 2) in 2005, when he was examining the obligation relating to torture under international law. What this means in our context is that the obligation to prevent and punish genocide is a peremptory obligation under international law. Not only that—as Lord Bingham said, it requires us to do more. It requires states to do all they can within lawful means to bring genocide to an end. As it binds all states, it is an obligation which lies at the heart of the relationships that states undertake with each other. It is the kind of obligation that goes without saying. The fact that an agreement does not refer to it does not mean that it does not exist or that it can be forgotten about.
The conclusion that has been drawn from the propositions that I have just summarised involves difficult and overlapping areas of law. The question of whether they provide an answer to an objection that the course which the amendment seeks to follow has no place in a trade agreement is an open question and it needs to be addressed. I believe that it is not capable of sound resolution simply by a debate in this House. It is best resolved by a court after hearing full and carefully reasoned argument from all sides. If that happens, the judgment—the determination—that is issued will carry with it great authority which will resonate throughout the world in a way that we need to be sure is done in order to further the cause of eliminating genocide. That is what this amendment provides for and it is why it has my full support.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, both noble and learned Lords have made powerful points. I do not wish to make anything other than a very brief intervention, but I have amendments, strongly supported both in Committee and on Report, concerning the word “normally”. I am extremely sorry that the Minister has not really met that point. It has been made with great eloquence by noble Lords learned in the law, and it was made by those of us throughout the United Kingdom who share the concern of the two noble and learned Lords who have just spoken. I am sorry that their amendments have not been deemed admissible. Of course they have done entirely properly in not seeking to move them, but this is an unsatisfactory Bill and we are in an unsatisfactory situation.
I put it on record that I remain extremely concerned about the use of this very loose word “normally”. I believe as a layman that it is clearly something that could be justiciable. I know not what will happen, but I fear that we are not putting on the statute book something that recognises what noble Lords in all parts of this House have recognised. In my opinion this is a flaw in the Bill, and it has been demonstrated as such by many people. I am sorry that the Minister has not felt able to move on this issue.
My Lords, when I spoke on this matter on Report, having tabled an amendment which dealt with the issue in slightly different terms from those proposed by Amendments 1 and 2 on the Marshalled List, I said that I would come back to the issue at Third Reading. But, on consideration of the various rules and practices, I decided not to renew my amendment in recognition of the fact that it would not be proper to bring it forward in those terms.
I am grateful to the Minister for the statement he has made, which goes a little way to addressing the problem. But I feel very strongly that this is an example of a missed opportunity, which could have been taken to clarify exactly what the Sewel convention is, to remove some of the problems to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred, and to deal with the complications raised by the use of the word “normally”.
As I stressed on Report, my concern was to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament, which the Minister mentioned in his brief address. The problem with the method he has chosen is that it opens up the possibility of a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament, which is the greatest danger of all, because it puts at risk the enforceability of legislation where the spectre, if I should put it this way, of the Sewel convention may be hanging over it. I understand that the Minister has gone as far as he believes he can—but, like others, I regret that he was not able to go further.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am as disappointed as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that some of the points that were raised—indeed, all the points that were raised—in Committee on Clause 1 have met with no response from the Government by way of amendment. My amendment in this group is Amendment 2, which is directed to the wording of the new Section 63A(3). I am repeating points that I made in Committee which were designed to achieve greater clarity. In some respects, the need for greater clarity is revealed by the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has tabled and, indeed, by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, just a moment ago.
There were two particular points in new subsection (3) to which I drew attention last time and to which I draw attention yet again. The first is the phrase,
“a decision of the people of Scotland”.
The first question is: what kind of decision? What majority, if any? Is it to be by simple majority or something else? Merely to use the phrase “a decision” does not tell us what the mechanism is to be to record that decision in a way that would have effect. The second is the phrase, “the people of Scotland”. Is the referendum to be confined to people who are in Scotland, or are any people who can claim they are of Scotland to be allowed to participate in the referendum?
My amendment seeks to clarify those matters by saying that the,
“referendum has been held in Scotland”;
and, secondly, that the decision is to be that of,
“a majority of those voting”—
in other words, a simple majority only.
Unless those points are tidied up and greater clarity is achieved, the uncertainty which I suggested lurked within the current wording of the subsection will remain. I hope very much that the Minister will feel able to reflect yet again on the need for clarity. It is a feature in various parts of the Bill that a great deal of clarity has been achieved. It is disappointing that, in the constitutional part of the Bill—Part 1, which has very great significance—the clarity which is present in other parts of the Bill is not being achieved. It is for that reason that I have come back yet again on Report with the points that I made earlier, in the hope that they will still receive attention.
My Lords, Amendment 3 is in my name. I moved a similar amendment in Committee and expressed the hope, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, that there would be some response from the Government. I do not think any one of us is suggesting that our individual solutions are perfect, but clarity is certainly needed. We need to reflect, particularly this afternoon, having heard a Statement, to which we will doubtless return on Monday, that is fraught with danger for the future of the United Kingdom. It is tremendously important in that context that the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament should be specifically acknowledged in one way or another.
Where I differ from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is that I do not want the ultimate decision to be made in a referendum, if it comes—I hope it will not, but it might—to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament was the creation of the United Kingdom Parliament. If it is to be abolished at any time—I reiterate my hope and belief that it will not be—it is crucial that the final word should be with the United Kingdom Parliament.
It may well be that part of such a process would be a referendum. I do not particularly like referenda, but they are now part of our constitutional system and, like them or not, we all have to accept that. But I believe fundamentally in parliamentary democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that the ultimate decision should be made in Parliament and should be made in the elected House. Of course your Lordships’ House should have a constructive part to play. Of course it should scrutinise any legislation that is placed before Parliament. But ultimately, this should be the decision of the elected House.
I am conscious that small majorities can sometimes provoke great wrath and dissension, so I have made a suggestion in my amendment and it is here for noble Lords to see. There would have to be,
“a two-thirds majority in a vote of the House of Commons in which 75 per cent of the members elected by Scottish constituencies voted for abolition”.
I do not put that before noble Lords as the ultimate panacea, but something along those lines would go a long way to reassure those of us who are concerned for the long-term future of the United Kingdom. I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House at least shares that concern. I made similar points in Committee and expressed the hope that the Minister would reflect and that we would see the results of his reflection when we came to Report, but there is no sign of that. It is a great pity, because if we truly believe in the United Kingdom, it follows, as night follows day, that we believe in the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament. There has to be something in this Bill, either along the lines of the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Forsyth or of mine, as well as taking up some of the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. It is just not good enough to leave the Bill as it is.
In all that has been going on over the past few months, there is an element of the paying of Danegeld. Those who pay Danegeld rarely get value for money, and I think we should bear that carefully in mind.