Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Condon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling this amendment. I have put my name to it because I want to probe the Government on their exact intentions and the timescales for the changes and improvements to the IPCC that the Home Secretary has announced. I note with interest that this debate is now being observed by four former Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police. I cannot recall a previous instance when all four have been in the Chamber simultaneously and, as a consequence, I suspect that the Minister ought to be afraid, very afraid, about either this amendment or a subsequent one.

We need to consider this important amendment—and I look forward to the ministerial response—because it goes to the core of how we can have confidence and trust in the police service. The public want to be satisfied that, when things go wrong, their concern has been properly investigated in an independent, thorough, robust and timely manner. If it is a serious matter which may lead to criminal charges, or dismissal of officers or whatever else, that process must be above rebuke and there must be no question of bias or anything else.

I have a lot of confidence in the chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, Dame Anne Owers, who is working very hard to improve the capacity and capability of the IPCC. The Government, having initially not quite recognised the importance of this body, have now changed their position but we need some clarity on how quickly things are going to move. Having trust in the processes followed by the IPCC is a necessary component of having trust in the police themselves. Whether or not the police have the consent of the public is called into question unless the public can have confidence that their complaints are being investigated adequately and independently.

These amendments would, first, ensure that most investigations—particularly serious ones—are carried out by staff who are not, nor have ever been, police officers themselves. Secondly, they reduce the number of investigations delegated to another police force or to the police force itself under investigation. Thirdly, they ask the IPCC to report regularly on its progress. However, we have heard that the Home Secretary intends to increase the resources available to the IPCC. As I understand it, it is not intended to transfer officers from police forces into the IPCC but to give them new resources. What are the timescales for these changes? What do the Government expect to see happen? Do the Government accept the principle that the proportion of investigations carried out by people who have not previously been police officers should increase?

There is a general belief that, when it is a serious matter, things are swept under the carpet and I am afraid that some recent revelations and crises have not helped this. It is therefore important that clarity is given and that people have confidence that this is not just about the police investigating themselves. Noble Lords in this Committee may be very clear that this is not about a police officer who knows the individual under investigation and who is therefore investigating their mate’s performance. At the moment, the IPCC has all sorts of measures in place to avoid that being the case, but the public perception is that complaints are being investigated by current or former police officers and it is assumed that the police are investigating themselves. This amendment is important because we need clarity that there is genuine independence, and that those concerned are not former police officers who, it may be asserted—probably wrongly—know the individuals or are part of the same culture about which someone has complained.

The Minister will, no doubt, have a whole series of technical points on why this amendment is not quite right or does not work. He does not: that is even better. We can agree it tonight and that will be very good. It is important to understand the direction of travel, how quickly we are moving there and how we will see the sort of independence which will give confidence in the complaints process and, in turn, enable the police to move back to a position of public trust.

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, during my time as commissioner, I argued strongly for a fully independent and well resourced police investigation process. I have maintained that position since my retirement and I entirely support the motivation behind these amendments. However, I have concerns that Amendment 56QZF, in particular, is too prescriptive in the timescale available and that the notion of having 75% of investigators with a non-police background by January 2017 might, perversely, have the reverse effect of its intention. If it is a prescriptive requirement to get to that point, it may be tempting to employ people as investigators who are not adequately trained or have the right background to investigate these most serious and complex allegations. While admiring the intentions behind these amendments, I have concerns about the practicality of the timescales. I urge caution about such a prescriptive requirement.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Condon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I support Amendment 1A, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for the reasons that she has set out. I find myself agreeing with much of what the Minister said, apart from the mechanism that he advocates should be used in deciding this issue.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has said, this issue is so important to the national interest that the only mechanism that should be used to transfer responsibility for the lead on terrorism from the Metropolitan Police to the NCA or related agencies is primary legislation. Like the noble Baroness, I cannot imagine any urgent situation where primary legislation would impede the notion of national security and a super-affirmative order would be the better mechanism to use.

Lest I should be out of date in my feelings about this issue, I consulted the current Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police last Friday to see if my views and his were on the same wavelength. He is content for me to relay to your Lordships’ House that he shares my concerns that if there should be change—I am not against the notion of change—primary legislation is the vehicle that will best take care of the public interest on this issue.

I have said before in your Lordships’ House that I am not implacably opposed to any transfer. In saying that, I remind the House of my recorded interests in policing and that for seven years as commissioner this was a role that I discharged in leading the force that had this co-ordinating and leading responsibility. I believe that a super-affirmative order is the wrong way to take care of all the arguments and to preserve the public interest.

Important issues that will have to be considered if there is to be a change include the fact that more than 80% of terrorist offences on the mainland are played out, sadly, in London, and that in fighting terrorism hearts and minds and prevention are as important as detection. Therefore, an integrated approach, which the Metropolitan Police has built up over decades with school visits, visits to mosques and neighbourhood policing, is as important in the fight against terrorism as the drama of executing warrants early in the morning and dramatic seizures of explosives. This is an integrated effort that has been built up over decades.

In the 12 months to September 2012, arrests for terrorism increased over the previous 12 months from 153 to 245, an increase of 60%. The current arrangements are working very well in preserving the national interest on this issue. I am not aware of any arguing or lobbying by the security services for this change to take place. Perhaps I am out of date on that issue, but to my knowledge the Metropolitan Police Service and the other agencies involved in the fight against terrorism are not advocating these changes.

My fear is that the creation of the NCA—this fledgling, embryonic new body, which is not even fully functioning, which is already struggling with border issues and which I fear will be underresourced—has led to the administrative tidiness of considering the transfer of terrorism from the Metropolitan Police to the NCA. That may be the right thing to do in time. It is unlikely to demand an emergency overnight or within-a-few-weeks change that would lead to the notion of a super-affirmative order. I believe the national interest demands that only primary legislation should be used in this case and I urge your Lordships’ House to support Amendment 1A.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, a few minutes ago the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, raised the question of the quality of scrutiny of legislation by your Lordships’ House. This amendment raises exactly the same set of questions about the quality of scrutiny that is possible for executive decisions. The Minister said that no decisions have been taken and that whether this is something the Government will want to do is an open question. He said that we need to see how the National Crime Agency develops and that only then will it be necessary to review and perhaps bring forward proposals. If that is the case, why do we need to legislate in this Bill for this process to happen in this particular way? If the Minister was saying that for the next 10 years the Home Office will not be presenting any Bills to Parliament and therefore this is the only legislative opportunity that exists, then maybe there would be a case for it. However, I do not recall a year when the Home Office has managed with no Bills. Sometimes it has had as many as four Bills before the Houses of Parliament. Therefore, it is likely that there will not be a suitable legislative opportunity at whatever time in the future it is considered appropriate to carry out this review.

Such a review having been carried out, the assumption that any transfer would be a simple matter which could be considered through even the elevated super-affirmative process is naïve. The integration, as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, stated, of counterterrorist work with mainstream policing is extremely important. I have probably said this in your Lordships’ House before but I live close to the Finsbury Park mosque. On the occasion that the Finsbury Park mosque was raided, as I arrived at the Underground station Metropolitan police officers were distributing leaflets explaining to the local community what had happened, why it had happened and what safeguards had been taken to protect the religious parts of that mosque. That was because counterterrorism is integrated into mainstream policing and there was a recognition that the Metropolitan Police would have to continue to police those streets after such a raid. That is why the integration of and arrangements with the counterterrorist units within the various forces around the country are so important. Shifting some or all of that to the National Crime Agency is complicated. These are not straightforward issues and they certainly ought to be debated properly in Parliament. That is what we are likely to miss.

I have another concern. We all now need the National Crime Agency to be a success and I believe it probably will be but it is going to take a while. Every reorganisation takes time. Every time you throw all the pieces up in the air and wait for them to settle, there is a period when the organisations have to come together. This is saying to an organisation which is not yet formally established, as this legislation is not yet through, that there may be some massive change to its remit just around the corner. I do not believe that is good for the current functions of the National Crime Agency; nor do I think it is necessarily good for counterterrorism if that change is to be made at some point in the future.

The Government have never answered the question of what is the problem that they are trying to fix. They say, “There might be a problem. We might have a review at some point in the future and if we do have a review, we want to be able to push this through by super-affirmative resolution”. That is simply not good enough. These are important questions. There must be proper parliamentary scrutiny in the future when these matters are considered.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Condon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Monday 18th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I would not seek to challenge the architecture in the Bill for control and accountability, but it is not a question of all or nothing—there can remain clear direction and control by the director-general and clear accountability to the Home Secretary and onwards to Parliament. Nevertheless, I hope that the Minister will find ways to reassure your Lordships’ House and the wider public that in this day and age notions of good governance demand that there should be something more than just that naked architecture of the DG in control and the Home Secretary being accountable. It would be good to have reassurance around the notion of a management board, a supervisory board, an advisory board or some board mechanism that allows both stakeholder interest and independent voices to contribute to the health and well-being in the future of the NCA so that issues such as value for money, good governance, priorities and so on could somehow be part of a wider debate within that family than just between the DG and the Home Secretary. I understand that the Bill and this agency will deal with some of the most challenging criminal matters facing the country. Should terrorism subsequently also be transferred as a responsibility to the NCA, I understand that there must be very clear direction, control and accountability, but a committee-type model does not fit well with those demands. Nevertheless, there is ample scope for reassurance around the notion of a management board that involves stakeholders from the police service, the emerging police and crime commissioners, the wider local authority family and the business community. I hope that the Minister, today or subsequently, will be able to give us some reassurance that the Bill will be able to move us in that direction.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I certainly do not want to fall into the trap of automatically accepting the Government’s architecture for these proposals. However, the amendment put forward by my noble friend does not necessarily undermine that architecture. The key point of this part of the proposed legislation is the creation of a new National Crime Agency. That is the key concept, and in this group of amendments we are dealing with some of the accountability mechanisms and the arrangements that will be put around the agency to ensure that its governance is of an appropriate and effective standard.

Let us be clear why this is important. The National Crime Agency, as proposed, will be a tremendously significant organisation. It will be responsible for ensuring that as a country we deal effectively with the most serious types of crime. In due course, it may be responsible for dealing with terrorism. This is not some minor government body; it is an extremely important part of the arrangements that we put in place to ensure that our citizens are properly protected against serious crime.

The other fundamental part of the architecture of the Bill, if you are wedded to that architecture, as no doubt the Minister is—no doubt we will come onto this in due course—are the provisions within the legislation that enable the director-general to require from police services around the country various things to happen. There is a potential power of direction—and certainly the expectation in terms of individual operations—that local police forces will work with the National Crime Agency to ensure that certain operations proceed. The relationship between the director-general and individual chief officers of police will be a fundamental one. That is precisely why, when we look at the governance structures and the arrangements that will be put around the director-general, we need to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for chief officers of police and those responsible for their governance, in terms of police and crime commissions, to be adequately represented within them.

The Government have to put forward a clear justification as to why this very lean approach to governance has been included in the Bill. As a number of your Lordships have already indicated in Committee, there is a virtue in having a proper governance structure, a group of non-executives and a group of individuals to whom the director-general must report or explain or expand on his or her proposals on how the agency goes forward. That is not to decry the direct accountability to the Home Secretary because it will be the Home Secretary who will, whatever is written into the Bill, have to answer to Parliament as to whether this new structure works. It supports that function and gives the Home Secretary reassurance that all the processes and procedures that any sensible Home Secretary would expect to be around the director-general are in place.

I am not suggesting that the Home Secretary is incapable of providing adequate supervision of the agency. I am simply saying that it is not necessarily the most effective or efficient way of doing it and that some board structure supporting that process is better and more likely to be successful. I have looked for precedents for this sort of one-to-one relationship between the Home Secretary and significant agencies. For 175 years the Home Secretary was the police authority for London and at the end of those 175 years the Metropolitan Police was so well governed, despite the excellent leadership at that stage provided by the noble Lord, Lord Condon, that it did not have a system in place—it was a £2 billion business at the time—for telling whether it had paid a bill more than once. I rather suspect that had the Home Office—I absolve previous Home Secretaries from day-to-day responsibility for this—been doing its job properly proper accountancy systems would have been installed within the organisation. However, the supervision of the Home Office and the Home Secretary was quite properly on the main policing issues, which would have been advised by the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and his predecessors as Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. This was not about the way in which the organisation was run, administered or governed. That is the natural tendency. Home Secretaries are busy people. They have broad responsibilities. They are not going to be involved in day-to-day issues about the robustness or otherwise of governance structures. The history of the Metropolitan Police is not a sound precedent.

More recently we have the precedent of the border agency. Here, the opposite problem seems to have occurred. You seem to have a Home Secretary—perhaps successive Home Office Ministers would be a fairer way of putting it—who wanted certain things to happen and applied pressure on the border agency to do so. You then end up in arguments about what was said to whom by whom because of that one-to-one relationship. In all the fuss that there was a few months ago about whether certain expectations were being bypassed to let people into the country and remove queues, would it not have been better for there to have been a supervisory board between the Home Secretary and the chief executive of the border agency where there would have been a record, minutes, and perhaps an opportunity for dissent to be expressed? All that would be missing in the arrangements for the National Crime Agency, which raises the question of whether we are not in danger of creating a structure where the Home Secretary has too much of a role in respect of a policing body.

In this country, we have always expressed real concern about politicians having direct operational control of policing. That is part of the reason why there was a little bit of debate about the creation of police and crime commissioners, but that debate has moved on and we are now well into the process with the Labour Party having today announced a selection of candidates for those positions that includes my noble friend Lord Prescott. The Labour Party will clearly have an excellent set of candidates and we wait to see whether the Conservative list will be quite as exciting or interesting. The reason that there was some concern about that and there is even more concern about a national agency directly under the control of a single politician is the danger that that power is abused. I am certainly not accusing the present Home Secretary of having any desire to abuse that power. I am simply saying that we are creating a structure where such an abuse is possible and that it might happen in future.

Imagine occasions when there is a considerable threat from some organised crime group or a terrorist organisation, if that is the direction that the new agency goes in, and it is the responsibility of the Home Secretary to direct what the agency should do. The guarantees in the Bill for operational independence do not amount to very much in those circumstances. There is no place for control freakery here. This has to be about a proper system of governance. In a few years’ time, I would not want people to be making all sorts of sinister connections between policing operations that happen under the auspices of the National Crime Agency and saying that there are sinister implications that they have been personally directed or required by the Home Secretary, but that is the danger of the governance model that the Government have created.

My final point returns to what I mentioned in passing earlier. A critical part of this new agency will be the ability of the National Crime Agency to say that it wants local police forces to carry out or collaborate on particular operations. The danger of having a National Crime Agency that is divorced from the rest of the police structure is very real. I recall the discussions that took place over several years to try to get a system that worked on counterterrorism with primacy for one force and the ability to make operations happen across the country. It was not an easy process. The Government are making it more difficult for the director-general of the National Crime Agency if there are not police and crime commissioners or chief officers of police playing an active part in the governance of this new organisation. If they are there, if they are around the table and able to say, “This is a better way of doing that”, or to encourage the director-general to do things in a way that ensures their collaboration, that is surely going to mean that it is more likely that this new agency will succeed.

My noble friend’s amendments, which address precisely those points, are very welcome. There is a slight drafting error in that they make no reference to London, but I am sure that could be adjusted when we return to this at a later stage. The key issue that the Minister has to explain today is why this particular governance model has been put forward and why it is genuinely an improvement on a supervisory board which involves, for example, chief officers of police and police and crime commissioners.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Lord Condon and Lord Harris of Haringey

Monday 6th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I support Amendment 211ZB proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I agree entirely with him that it is not just a theoretical possibility. If this legislation was enacted, over time there would probably come a set of circumstances in which it would be totally inappropriate for the acting commissioner appointed to be a member of the commissioner’s staff—if the commissioner had been charged with corruption or a related offence. I urge the Government to think of redrafting this in a way that does not exclude the possibility of a member of the commissioner’s staff being acting commissioner if he or she is the appropriate person in seniority and there is no role conflict, but not to insist on their being the only candidate who can be appointed in those circumstances.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I also speak to Amendment 211ZB on the basis that the principle that the Government should look to in this case is that the person who deputises under such functions must be an elected individual. If the principle of the Government’s legislation is that policing and crime commissioners are directly elected, the consequence must be that if they cannot carry out those functions, for whatever reason, the person who fulfils them in their absence must also be directly elected. I appreciate that in the current iteration of the Bill we are not talking about a directly elected policing and crime commissioner, but we are envisaging a situation in which the person who acts as policing and crime commissioner has a personal electoral mandate, not necessarily for the whole of the area but for part of the area. The principle of the person who deputises being directly elected is fundamental, whatever final models you have.

There are certain ways in which that aim could be achieved. If you had a direct election model for the commissioner, you could also require that a deputy was elected on the ticket at the same time, in the same way as a president and vice-president are elected at the same time in the United States. It would be a very simple change to make and would provide all sorts of additional sensible opportunities for delegation in the administration that was required. Alternatively, you could specify that it should be a member of the policing and crime panel who deputises, because they would have a personal electoral mandate and would be accountable in that way. However, the idea that individual officials, even if there is no cloud over them personally, could set the precept is an extraordinary one. I am sure that that is not what the Government have in mind and I am sure that we would all earnestly hope that there would never be circumstances in which a non-elected person set the precept. However, if the concept of the Bill is to vest these immense powers in a single individual, including the immense power of setting the precept, whether the veto is at 75 per cent, two-thirds or 50 per cent does not matter. You are vesting that power in one individual, and at the very least that person should have a personal electoral mandate.