Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Condon Excerpts

Monday 6th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, I support Amendment 211ZB proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I agree entirely with him that it is not just a theoretical possibility. If this legislation was enacted, over time there would probably come a set of circumstances in which it would be totally inappropriate for the acting commissioner appointed to be a member of the commissioner’s staff—if the commissioner had been charged with corruption or a related offence. I urge the Government to think of redrafting this in a way that does not exclude the possibility of a member of the commissioner’s staff being acting commissioner if he or she is the appropriate person in seniority and there is no role conflict, but not to insist on their being the only candidate who can be appointed in those circumstances.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I also speak to Amendment 211ZB on the basis that the principle that the Government should look to in this case is that the person who deputises under such functions must be an elected individual. If the principle of the Government’s legislation is that policing and crime commissioners are directly elected, the consequence must be that if they cannot carry out those functions, for whatever reason, the person who fulfils them in their absence must also be directly elected. I appreciate that in the current iteration of the Bill we are not talking about a directly elected policing and crime commissioner, but we are envisaging a situation in which the person who acts as policing and crime commissioner has a personal electoral mandate, not necessarily for the whole of the area but for part of the area. The principle of the person who deputises being directly elected is fundamental, whatever final models you have.

There are certain ways in which that aim could be achieved. If you had a direct election model for the commissioner, you could also require that a deputy was elected on the ticket at the same time, in the same way as a president and vice-president are elected at the same time in the United States. It would be a very simple change to make and would provide all sorts of additional sensible opportunities for delegation in the administration that was required. Alternatively, you could specify that it should be a member of the policing and crime panel who deputises, because they would have a personal electoral mandate and would be accountable in that way. However, the idea that individual officials, even if there is no cloud over them personally, could set the precept is an extraordinary one. I am sure that that is not what the Government have in mind and I am sure that we would all earnestly hope that there would never be circumstances in which a non-elected person set the precept. However, if the concept of the Bill is to vest these immense powers in a single individual, including the immense power of setting the precept, whether the veto is at 75 per cent, two-thirds or 50 per cent does not matter. You are vesting that power in one individual, and at the very least that person should have a personal electoral mandate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Doocey]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 170, 171, 181, 182, 227 and 228 and I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for supporting them. My concern is about the hiring and firing of chief constables and, in London, the hiring and firing of Met commissioners and deputy commissioners. I am concerned that the police and crime commissioner, or MOPC in London, has the power simply to decide to sack a chief constable or the Met commissioner. My concern is only magnified by the fact that there are absolutely no checks and balances, as noble Lords have already said. I do not believe that there will ever be a police and crime commissioner, or the equivalent in London, who will not be tempted to interfere in the day-to-day running of police and operational issues. There is no room for interference in operational issues, but, as night follows day, it is exactly what happens. As long as somebody has the ultimate power to fire the commissioner, it is quite easy to see that the commissioner might be persuaded to turn a blind eye to something because somebody feels particularly strongly about it and because, ultimately, they know that if they worry about it too much, they can be fired. That is a major problem and it risks the politicisation of the police.

I have a further concern relating to the hiring of chief constables. The Bill contains no selection criteria, which I find very worrying. There is no requirement for expertise or experience in policing; there is no requirement for political independence, as there ought to be. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Bill is its provisions for the hiring and firing of chief constables. The amendments would restore at least some clarity and probity.

[Lord Condon]

I support the amendments described by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, in relation to the appointment of chief officers below the level of chief constable. The problems inherent in the Bill as drafted have been described by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. For reasons of credibility, legitimacy, transparency and national requirements, it is important that the selection process for chief officers below the level of chief constable include people beyond the chief constable of the force involved. Otherwise, all the problems described by other noble Lords will emerge. It perhaps sounds paradoxical for me as a former chief constable and commissioner to support the amendments, but I really believe that it is in the public interest that appointments below chief constable level, at ACPO level, should involve some influence beyond that of the incumbent chief constable.