My Lords, in addition to the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Authorised Officers) Order 2024, I shall speak to the following three draft statutory instruments: the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Recovery of Cryptoassets and Investigations: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2024; the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors: Code of Practice) Order 2024; and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Terrorism Act 2000 (Certain Information Orders: Code of Practice) Regulations 2024.
Before I address the contents of these SIs, I will give some background. The Government are firmly committed to tackling all forms of economic crime. We already undertook unprecedented action to prevent kleptocrats and organised criminals abusing our open economy when we expedited the passage of the economic crime Act through Parliament in 2022. The Home Office measures in that Act reformed the unexplained wealth orders regime to improve transparency of ownership structures and to allow more time for law enforcement to review material relating to unexplained wealth orders.
Building on that Act, the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 contains a wide range of reforms both to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and to terrorist financing legislation through the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Terrorism Act 2000. These reforms include: powers to allow the effective seizure of both criminal and terrorist crypto assets; reforms to enable targeted information sharing to tackle money laundering and remove reporting burdens on businesses; new intelligence gathering powers for law enforcement; and provisions to reform outdated criminal corporate liability laws.
The reforms to the unexplained wealth orders regime and corporate liability laws and reforms to enable targeted information sharing and reduce reporting burdens are already in force. The new offence of failure to prevent fraud will be brought into force once government guidance has been published and businesses have familiarised themselves with it. We intend to publish the guidance shortly. Most of the remaining Home Office measures will be commenced on 26 April 2024.
Today, we will debate the statutory instruments that underpin the codes of practice for those measures. Therefore, with respect, I do not intend to cover the powers themselves, as they were debated extensively in both Houses during the passage of the Act.
Four draft affirmative instruments, including one laid by the Attorney-General’s Office, are required to update six codes of practice. Four existing codes of practice are being revised and two new ones are being made. This includes a search, seizure and detention of property code, issued by the Home Secretary to guide the exercise of search and seizure powers in the context of criminal confiscation investigations for officers operating in England and Wales. It also includes two codes to guide the exercise of search and seizure powers. One is issued under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the other is issued under the Terrorism Act 2000, in relation to powers in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. These codes are to guide law enforcement in the use of these powers for civil forfeiture and counterterrorism investigations. These codes are also issued by the Home Secretary. It also includes two codes to guide the exercise of powers to investigate suspected criminal property. One code is issued by the Home Secretary and an equivalent code for prosecutors is issued by the Attorney-General for England and Wales and the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland. The final code being introduced by these draft instruments is a new code to guide National Crime Agency officers on the appropriate use of new information order powers. This code is issued by the Home Secretary under both the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act 2000.
The codes clarify the circumstances in which the powers may be exercised to ensure that they are applied consistently. This is of vital importance given the broad range of law enforcement agencies to which the powers apply. The use of the powers in these codes of practice may impact upon individuals’ rights and should therefore be proportionate to the outcome sought. Guidance on the exercise of the powers in these codes is required to safeguard against improper use.
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act 2000 mandate that the Secretary of State must publish a draft code, consider any representations made and modify the draft in the light of such representations, prior to laying revised codes. The draft codes we are debating were therefore subject to separate public consultations. Information on the consultations can be found in the Explanatory Memoranda that accompany these statutory instruments.
In conclusion, these four draft instruments are required to deliver on the Government’s objective to complete commencement of the 2022 and 2023 Acts. This will ensure that all necessary legislation is in place and that there is legal certainty for the judiciary, respondents and the legal profession as to how cases will be dealt with before the courts. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his helpful introduction to these detailed and important SIs. He is right to highlight the importance of tackling economic crime, which is something that we all believe we could and should be doing more about.
The four SIs that we are discussing this afternoon follow on from the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act and the previous Act, the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act. As the noble Lord pointed out, there are six new or revised codes of practice on how various authorities use their powers when tackling money laundering and terrorist financing. Consultation on these changes took place last summer. I have a number of questions, which I hope the noble Lord can answer for us.
Given that the consultation on these changes took place last summer, why is it only now that the changes are being implemented, some nine months later? Given that, for some of these instruments, the consultation took place before the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act was passed, will further changes be required?
The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act, which gained Royal Assent over two years ago, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act left a significant number of changes to be made through secondary legislation. The noble Lord may have mentioned this, but what is the timetable for implementing all these various changes? There were many provisions in the primary legislation that referred to secondary legislation that would be forthcoming in due course, but what does that actually mean? When can we expect all of that, given—and the noble Lord talked about the importance of tackling economic crime—we need the supporting secondary legislation to be passed as soon as possible?
The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act spans several departments. How is the Home Office working with other departments, such as the Department for Business and Trade, to bring about the effective implementation of these changes?
Can the noble Lord outline for us what assessment will be made of how the Government believe these two Acts are working in practice, and what further steps, if any, need to be taken to combat economic crime?
In reading the various codes of practice, I noticed that they refer to different law enforcement agencies. How is their activity to be co-ordinated? We have the National Crime Agency, the City of London Police as the lead for economic crime, and then we have the individual police forces. How will all that work be co-ordinated, so that it is as effective as we would all want it to be?
The Minister mentioned the impact that we hope to have on Russia-related economic crime, but what else needs to be done, given the impact that we hope economic sanctions have on Russia, particularly with respect to the conflict in Ukraine?
When I raised the issue of enforcement in respect of economic crime, I should have asked what the Government are doing to monitor the effectiveness of the Act. Have they ensured that the consultation outcomes are easily accessible from the consultation web page, as recommended by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee? I did not find it the easiest consultation response to access, and clearly the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee also had some trouble, so can the Minister say anything more about that?
Is there any oversight of the use of these powers? I understand that, with respect to the terrorism codes of practice, it is presumably the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Can the Minister confirm that and say whether there is any other oversight of these particular powers?
Can the Minister explain the differences in the proceeds of crime statutory instruments and their different application to the nations of the UK? The Minister will know that that is a favourite topic of mine, but I am not trying to be awkward. Clearly, for the territorial extent of the terrorism codes of practice before us, that is relatively easy because the application of those powers is UK-wide. But, on the other territorial application, some parts of the statutory instrument related to England and Wales, while other parts related to England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Can the Minister give a general explanation for all that, particularly, as always, with respect to Scotland? If it is devolved and a matter for the Scottish Government—I suspect that will be the Minister’s answer—how will we ensure that the work that Scottish law enforcement does with the other law enforcement bodies across the rest of the UK has the co-ordinated effectiveness that we want?
We of course support the moves that the Government are making. We all believe that economic crime needs to be more effectively tackled, which is why we supported the various provisions contained in the primary legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s responses to my questions because, as I say, we want this to be effective and we want economic crime to be tackled in a better way than perhaps it is presently.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support. Although it is literally a debate between him and me, he obviously made a good, thoughtful and insightful contribution, as expected. I do not wish to go back through the points I made in my opening, but I will seek to address a number of the noble Lord’s questions. I am afraid I do not have answers to some of them at this moment, but I will answer as many as I can, although I will not be able to do justice to a number of them. I assure the noble Lord that I will write to him on those. I will address his questions in no particular order.
On the timing from when the Act received Royal Assent through to this stage, the noble Lord will know that, in this case, the consultation had to be carried out on the codes, and consideration had to be given before the codes could be finalised and laid before the House.
That is very helpful. I am talking about the proceeds of crime oversight SI, as I assume that the terrorism SIs will have the normal oversight of the terrorism independent reviewer.
The point about Russia is also quite important, for obvious reasons; I would appreciate it if the noble Lord could look into that and see what impact the Government think this may have on the sanctions that we are trying to impose on Russia.
I thank the noble Lord and give him that undertaking.
I am very grateful for the noble Lord’s comments and thank the Committee for considering these instruments, which are necessary to deliver the Government’s objective to complete commencement of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. I beg to move.
My Lords, this order was laid before the House on 7 February. If approved by both Houses, it will transfer police and crime commissioner functions from the South Yorkshire PCC to the Mayor of South Yorkshire. It will also bring forward the next scheduled mayoral election in South Yorkshire from 2026 to May 2024, thereafter taking place every four years, so that the South Yorkshire mayoral election cycle is aligned to the existing PCC election cycle. We are grateful to the incumbent mayor, Oliver Coppard, for providing his consent to the transfer and to the amendment of his current mayoral electoral term to enable this alignment.
This first mayor to exercise PCC functions in South Yorkshire would do so following the next mayoral election, which is to be rescheduled for Thursday 2 May 2024. This maintains the direct democratic accountability for policing and crime in South Yorkshire, as the mayor will be elected by the people of South Yorkshire on the basis that they are to exercise the functions of the PCC in that area. The incumbent PCC for South Yorkshire will continue to exercise the PCC functions until the end of his elected term of office. The person elected as mayor, from the point of taking office on Tuesday 7 May following the mayoral election, will act as the single, directly elected individual responsible for holding the chief constable and police force to account. They will be accountable to the people of South Yorkshire for this.
Their functions would include issuing a police and crime plan; setting the police budget, including the PCC council tax precept requirements; appointing and, if necessary, suspending or dismissing the chief constable; addressing complaints about policing services; providing and commissioning services for victims and vulnerable people; and working in partnership to ensure that the local criminal justice system is effective and efficient.
Part 1 of the Government’s review into the role of PCCs cemented the Government’s view that bringing public safety functions together under the leadership of a combined authority mayor has the potential to offer wider levers and a more joined-up approach to preventing crime. The Government’s levelling up White Paper, published in February 2022, sets out the Government’s aspiration to have combined authority mayors take on the PCC role where feasible. By working in partnership across a range of agencies at local and national level, mayors can ensure that there is a more holistic, unified approach to public safety.
As is required by Section 113 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, the Home Secretary launched a public consultation on the proposed South Yorkshire police and crime commissioner functions transfer on 20 December 2023; it ran for six weeks to 31 January. Just over 3,000 responses were received to this public consultation and the Home Secretary considered the views gathered when deciding whether to lay this order enabling the transfer of PCC functions to the Mayor of South Yorkshire.
It is this Government’s view that incorporating PCC functions into the role of the Mayor of South Yorkshire, who is elected to deliver across a range of other functions, will bolster their mandate to bring greater join-up across the responsibilities that they are accountable for and help to facilitate a whole-system approach to crime reduction. It preserves the democratic accountability that underpins the PCC model while, at the same time, reducing the risk of competing democratic mandates within the South Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority area, providing greater clarity for the electorate on who is responsible for public service functions in their area.
The exercise of PCC functions by the Mayor of South Yorkshire is a significant step towards realising our ambition for more combined authority mayors to take on PCC functions, as is already the case in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire. It means that people in South Yorkshire will be served by a mayor with a range of functions and levers comparable to the Mayors of Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire and London, and will be able to hold their mayor to account for this enhanced range of responsibilities. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the careful way in which he outlined the case and reasons for the order before us, on the South Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority. He will know that, the other day, concerns were raised with respect to the West Midlands—that will follow its course, notwithstanding the judicial review of it—but this order refers to South Yorkshire, which is a totally different situation. We support the Government’s proposition here for the reasons that the Minister outlined.
I do not have much to add to what the Minister said. I just want to ask him this: what steps do the Government propose to take in order to inform the people of South Yorkshire of the proposed changes and the reasons for them? Also, can the Minister explain to us the Government’s view on the discussions they intend to have with the various local authorities in South Yorkshire, Members of Parliament and other local representatives? For these sorts of changes, we make the decision here—in this case, we support what the Government are doing—but it is of course important for us to consider how we both take it forward and explain, to local residents as much as anybody else, what we are doing.
With those brief comments, I have nothing further to add to the important points that the Minister made.
Yet again, as ever, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his comments and his support in this. He is absolutely right to mention the debate on the West Midlands the other day; I am personally glad that this debate has not been as excitable as that one.
I want to try briefly to run through a few things. One thing that I want to set out concerns the public consultation; it relates specifically to the noble Lord’s question on what engagement has been done and some of the local views that were expressed.
It is very helpful to hear that the mayor, the PCC and the local MPs were in favour of this. That is an important consideration for us all. My other point was that, while it is obviously important for the Government to work with MPs, the mayor and the PCC, they should also continue to inform the public about the different changes that are made. Obviously, this is quite a big change in their area, and it would be helpful for the Government to work with local representatives and support them in making sure that the public are fully informed about and aware of the changes and the reasons for them.
Yes. To clarify one point, MPs were engaged in and aware of the consultation, but that does not mean that all of them supported it, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware. However, they were certainly aware of it. The point I was making earlier is that the mayor and the PCC were both in support of it.
I accept that. The mayor and the PCC were in favour and all the local MPs were consulted; that is right. The point I am making is that the Government have taken the decision they have. We support that decision, but I ask them to consider how they will work with the mayor, the PCC and all those MPs, whatever view they took, in taking this proposal forward, if it is passed by Parliament. I also ask them to consider how they will work with all those representatives to make sure that the public are fully informed about the changes and why they are happening.
(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, these are generally sensible regulations. There have been some very interesting points. The contribution from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, about being sensible—he flies in and out of these sorts of airfields—is useful to our consideration. There were also some interesting points from the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord German, particularly on Northern Ireland, which is always a complicating factor with respect to regulations, not least because people could land in Dublin and because of the interaction with the common travel area, et cetera. There are some interesting questions for the Minister.
It is worth placing on record for people who read our deliberations quite how serious an issue this is and how welcome it is that the Government are seeking to tighten it up. The noble Lord, Lord Young, alluded to that. Some 400 airfields currently operate 124,000 general aviation flights. That is a huge number of flights. I appreciate that many will be individuals, but it is still a significant number. Although we hear that the majority conform with the Government’s current regulations, 10% do not. It is welcome that the Government say quite categorically that none of these various airfields can be policed routinely—I think that is the word the Government used—by Border Force officials or police officers. Again, you do not have to be an intelligence expert to realise that there is potentially a real problem here, so the Government’s attempt to tighten this up through the requirement for people to submit information online is a welcome step forward.
The Minister very helpfully answered a couple of questions for me prior to this debate. I know it is not the subject of the SI, but I wonder whether the Government are considering this issue with respect to seaports. I take the point about Dover or Holyhead, but international shipping must come in and out of numerous other ports. If we are talking about the necessity of borders, I wonder whether the Government are giving any consideration to whether any changes are needed with respect to that. I appreciate that is outside the scope of these regulations, but I wanted to ask the Minister that. Perhaps he could answer by letter.
There is clearly a major issue here that the Government need to deal with. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Young, is especially pertinent: how will all this new information be monitored and enforced? How can we be sure that the Government will be able to do this effectively? If this information is coming into Border Force, it is really important that it can be collected and utilised. If I have read the regulations right, the information has to be provided not 48 hours before the flight but up to two hours before. How were those figures arrived at? I ask because if, two hours before, something arrives into Border Force and it is a problem, is that sufficient time to respond? I do not know. It clearly has not been plucked out of thin air, so I wondered whether the Minister could say something about how the figures of 48 and two were arrived at.
On the territorial extent, if this is obvious then I apologise, but I think it is worth putting on record that the regulations talk about the United Kingdom. Are the Channel Islands are added on, or not? Are Jersey and Guernsey, and the Isle of Man, subject to these regulations, or not?
Lastly, without repeating the questions from the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Young, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, military flights are clearly excluded under Regulation 3. Military personnel are exempted; I understand that and obviously agree with it. Can the Minister say something about what that means for intelligence services and for diplomats flying in and out? If there is an exemption for military personnel, I wonder whether the Minister can say anything —he may be constrained on this—around intelligence and/or diplomatic flights coming in and out.
As I say, the integrity and policing of our borders is obviously a really important matter. This instrument will help in a proportionate way and, subject to the answers to a couple of those questions, which will help inform discussions when it goes to the other place, these regulations are generally to be welcomed.
As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, some interesting questions have certainly been thrown up. This has been a useful and helpful conversation and it has been interesting to hear not just the concerns and issues raised but some of the direct experience that your Lordships have in using this method of travel. I will briefly set out the overall position, further to what I said in my opening remarks, but also try to answer some of the many questions that I received.
As I set out, these regulations intend to provide Border Force and other law enforcement partners with greater visibility of who intends to travel to and from the UK on international general aviation flights, and enable them to better use that information. While we have considered the impact on the general aviation sector, this must be viewed against the wider border security benefits that these regulations will provide.
As I said, more than 50% of those in the general aviation sector already submit their information using online methods. For these, there will be no change or impact as they are already complying. Yes, for those who submit via email and other means there will be a change, but we consider it to be a small change in behaviour and have provided a free-to-use web service through which to do this. The impact will be felt most by those who do not comply, and it is these persistent offenders who will be subject to the civil penalty regime.
I understand that there may be concerns about the operation of Border Force and the underpinning civil penalty regime where general aviation owners, agents or captains who breach a requirement of the regulations may be subject to a penalty of up to £10,000. We recognise this, of course, and I assure your Lordships that the civil penalty regime, while being robust, will also be fair. Our approach is one of collaborative working but, where a serious breach of the regulations occurs or Border Force has to deal with persistent non-compliance, it is only right and proper that we should penalise the general aviation owner, agent or captain. The Home Office has drafted guidance for Border Force and the general aviation sector, which will be published in advance of these regulations entering into force. This will give the sector adequate time to understand its obligations and the penalties should some fail to comply.
I will try to address some of the points raised, particularly by my noble friend Lord Goschen. There obviously may be occasions when, due to a technical issue during a flight, the aircraft cannot land at its intended destination or has to be redirected to an alternative aerodrome. In such circumstances, I understand that there is guidance available on GOV.UK setting out the process that should be followed on arrival. I assure your Lordships that there is no suggestion that safety should be put at risk to comply with the information that has been submitted.
Where changes in weather mean that a flight has to divert at short notice, that change should be notified to Border Force where possible. In the event that it is not possible for the information to be supplied online, in accordance with the proposed regulations, it should be supplied to the relevant Border Force region by telephone at the earliest opportunity. I understand that the detail of this is also set out on GOV.UK.
I thought it would also be worth setting out some of our engagement with other government departments that have an interest in this sector. The Home Office works in close partnership with colleagues from other government departments and law enforcement bodies, in particular HMRC, the Department for Transport, counterterrorism border policing and the National Crime Agency. Home Office officials hold regular meetings with their HMRC and DfT counterparts. All government departments and law enforcement partners, as well as the devolved Administrations, were invited to respond to the consultation last summer; I believe that the Home Office responded to each response received in order to address their specific concerns.
Can I just emphasise that point so that people who read our proceedings are clear? Any diplomat, of whatever rank, leaving or coming into this country who seeks to come in outside of a scheduled flight has to notify Border Force that they are coming in or leaving. Is that right?
Yes, I confirm that. I sought that clarity for myself. You are correct; it is only military personnel on military flights who will be exempt.
(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, we also welcome the general direction that the Government are taking in this SI. It goes without saying that we all agree that financial and economic crime and fraud are very serious issues and that we must do all we can to tackle them. Obviously, there is no disagreement between us at all.
I start where the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, finished. There is a bit of confusion. It is necessary for the Minister to clarify some of the territorial applications between the various powers outlined in the order. I highlight paragraph 6.3 of the EM, which says:
“Section 5(5) of the 2013 Act makes provision for the Director General of the NCA to direct chief officers of an England and Wales police force or the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police”.
Clearly, that does not apply to direct tasking in Scotland and Northern Ireland, yet this order applies to the whole of the UK. How do the NCA’s powers, as directed under this SI, and the Serious Fraud Office’s powers relate to each other? It is about understanding that and having some clarity around the legislation with respect to that issue; this would also give clarity to the NCA, the Serious Fraud Office and the chief officers of the police of all four parts of the United Kingdom. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is quite right to raise this; indeed, it is one of the issues that I was going to raise.
I want to ask the Minister about a couple of other things. Can he say why the change is needed? Presumably, the co-operation is good. If it is, why does it need to be legislated for? Have there been occasions when there has been a refusal by the SFO director to do something that the NCA’s director-general has asked them to do, leading the Government to think that we need some clarity there? What problems have emerged in the current arrangements to necessitate the Government deciding that they need to take this action?
Also, can the Minister explain what direct tasking actually is? Is it a compulsory demand that the SFO does this or that? Is there a level of seriousness that must be met, or is it a subjective judgment on the part of the NCA’s director-general—that is, this is what they would like the SFO to do and can require them to do? The other thing that emerges from this is the fact that, presumably, there is no way in which the SFO’s director can refuse? Otherwise, there would be no point to this legislation. Some clarity around direct tasking and the problems or difficulties that have come up, including what this SI seeks to overcome and in what circumstances it may be used, is needed.
Clearly, we all support this attempt to do more about economic and financial crime and fraud. The Government think that this order will help. I think that a little more explanation of how it will help, rather than an assertion that it will, would be helpful in our deliberations.
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their comments and their support for this order. I will begin with some brief remarks that should answer a number of the points raised and then try to tackle any specific outstanding ones.
As we have discussed, this order would amend the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to grant the National Crime Agency direct tasking power over the Serious Fraud Office in relation to combating fraud, bribery and corruption. The use of this power would be at the discretion of the director-general of the National Crime Agency. It will be used when it is deemed that such tasking would assist the agency in its role of investigating and reducing crime and, in particular, tackling serious and complex fraud, including bribery and corruption, as well as when satisfactory voluntary arrangements cannot be made, or cannot be made in time.
Through the extension of these tasking powers to the Serious Fraud Office, we align the arrangement between this office and the National Crime Agency, as I have said, with those for police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police. In doing so, we are strengthening the mechanisms for co-operation and a system-wide response. The agency has previously used its power to task to great effect: taking weapons off our streets; identifying and bringing to justice the highest-harm drug gangs we face; searching for and tackling prolific child sexual abusers; and combating fraudsters and seizing the proceeds of crime.
Further to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, ideally this mechanism would not need to be used because of the already very good co-operation and relationship between the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office. However, it is important to have it in place to ensure a joined-up response to serious or complex fraud, including bribery and corruption, when and if needed. This step is part of the response set out in the Government’s serious and organised crime strategy. As we have discussed, this new strategy, which the Home Secretary published last year, makes clear the challenges we face from serious and organised crime. Its mission is to reduce serious and organised crime in the UK by disrupting and dismantling the organised crime groups operating in and against the UK. The strategy has five lines of action for reducing serious and organised crime: in-country, at the border, international, technology and capabilities, and a multiagency response. The package of measures announced as part of the strategy also included new powers in the Criminal Justice Bill that will clamp down on organised criminal gangs. As I have said, there is also a further £5 million for the police to disrupt organised immigration crime and £24 million allocated to the modern slavery fund to address the serious root causes of modern slavery and human trafficking.
To be clear, this power is intended to strengthen the ability of the NCA to lead the system in tackling serious and organised crime. The Serious Fraud Office will remain a strong and independent body. The wider reform agenda being delivered by Director Ephgrave is strengthening its capacity to deliver more effective investigations into the most complex cases. It has had several notable successes over the past few years, including deferred prosecution agreements, which have contributed almost £1.3 billion to the public purse since 2017. This attests to its capacity and capability to investigate the most serious, complex and harmful fraud cases and prosecute those responsible.
I will now try to address the points raised—with the emphasis on “try”. The devolved Administrations have been consulted on this and, before any application, we will have further discussions with them. They have been consulted in advance, but we will continue to do so. The SFO may need to use its powers to investigate crime within its jurisdictions in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked when there would be a review of the MoU. This is a consultative process, and we will check on requirements to update the MoU—but I reiterate that this is consultative and collaborative, and that is the crucial part.
I was also asked about examples. I think the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked whether there have been refusals. As it stands, there have not been any. A lot of it is just streamlining the process to ensure that it is there. I am informed that when different agencies talk it may not be possible for the NCA to raise a specific issue, so in effect it is a power that it has in its back pocket.
On how it might be used, decisions on voluntary and directed tasking are taken following discussions with the national strategic tasking and co-ordination group where it is assessed that improving the intelligence picture or operational delivery to tackle a threat is required as a priority. Obviously, there are discussions between a number of parties at official and senior level in advance of those discussions. Directing tasking will occur only where a voluntary arrangement cannot be made or made in time.
The territorial complexities of that may need to be teased out a little more between now and discussion in the other place. To be fair, there is still a little confusion in my mind about the inter- relationship between all that. I leave that on the table for the Minister to consider. That would be helpful; I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, agrees.
Before we move on, the main point I want to make on this direct tasking is that there clearly is an issue where the National Crime Agency wants to be able to direct the Serious Fraud Office to do certain things that the NCA is worried the SFO is not going to do. Is that a fair interpretation? In other words, the Home Office wants to strengthen the response to financial and economic crime, it is worried about whether the Serious Fraud Office will take the same priorities as the National Crime Agency, and this is a way of saying, “If you don’t, we’ll direct task you to do it”.
I thank the noble Lord for those two points. I will certainly write to both noble Lords on the devolved nations and any other outstanding issues. I completely appreciate the points made.
Forgive me if I have not been clear. Given that this has not been used in other circumstances, my understanding is that this has always been the intent for some time. It is not in response to anything in particular but an important part of a broader strategy to tackle crime. I am assured, having spoken to officials in those bodies, that there is a very good working relationship at senior level. My understanding is that this is just a backstop, just in case, should that relationship not work. If I am not correct on that I will write to both noble Lords, but I will also reiterate the point if it is correct.
To conclude, this measure represents a positive step forward, in our view. It is part of a larger effort and a wider package of measures to strengthen our collective ability to identify and investigate the most harmful and complex criminal cases, and prosecute those responsible.